

**Technicians of the Spirit: Post-Fascist Technocratic Authoritarianism in Spain, Argentina,
and Chile, 1945-1988**

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ABSTRACT

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The focus of this dissertation is a distinctive post-fascist ideology that emerged during the Cold War era. Developed and first put to practice in Francisco Franco's Spain during the 1950s and 1960s, this model for a market-oriented dictatorship, which I label *Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism*, became a key ideological reference for the dictatorships of Juan Carlos Onganía in Argentina (1966-1970) and Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973-1988). For its chief designers, this theory of state represented a noble dream of a "post-ideological" society marked by neoliberal economic development, firm social hierarchies, and most importantly, a project of spiritual "perfection." Rather than a simple mimesis, this study points to a dynamic of constant transatlantic intellectual dialogue between what were, in essence, three attempts to foster an alternative "Hispanic" modernity, within three dissimilar historical settings.

The venture to constitute a reactionary modernity, as a spiritual "third position" that would transcend the antagonistic "materialist" ideologies born at the time of the French Revolution, is as old as modernity itself. The present study explores a prominent case study of these ideological projects, in the Spanish speaking world. My point of departure is that there is a certain lacuna in the historical analysis on Latin America's far-right ideology during the Cold War. Whereas

historiography has fully scrutinized extreme neo-fascist revolutionary movements, military counterrevolutionary states, and populist authoritarianism in the region, there is a dearth of analytic work on the post-fascist technocratic ideologies of the 1960s. My analysis therefore underscores the role of the international Catholic Society Opus Dei as one conspicuous arena for the formulation of the technocratic-authoritarian ideology. Thus, my work accounts for the rise of the “technocrats” as a contingent historical phenomenon that mirrored the economic and cultural contexts of the Cold War era. Consciously setting out to replace what they thought was the failed fascist revolution of the 1930s, the ideologues I analyze formulated what they believed was a more sophisticated method of Catholic modernization - one comprising of a consumerist society protected from the harms of either parliamentarism or rationalism.

Chapter 1 of the dissertation explores how, during the 1950s, Franco’s regime propagated a distinct post-fascist ideology of “Hispanism” via a transnational organization by the name of Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, and how this traditionalist ideology founds its most zealous interlocutors in Argentina and Chile. Chapter 2 hones in on Spain’s novel technocratic-authoritarian ideologies of the 1960s. Designed and implemented by members of the Secular Catholic Organization Opus Dei, this ideology soon became identified with Spain’s 1960s “economic miracle.” Chapter 3 explains how the Francoist ideologies made their way into the Argentine public sphere through two Argentine intellectual affiliations: the Ateneo de la República and the *Cuadernos del Sur* journal. These groups, I explain, began designing Argentina’s “post-ideological” society during the early 1960s. Chapter 4 explores how the regime of Juan Carlos Onganía (1966-1970) utilized the ideologies of the aforementioned affiliations, as well as several Francoist “development” tactics such as “poles of growth.” Chapter 5 depicts the impact of the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica and the Opus Dei on the Chilean far-right during the late-1960s

leading to the regime of Augusto Pinochet. Like Onganía, Pinochet and his ideologues borrowed Francoist political myths for their purposes. Last, Chapter 6 analyzes the decline of the technocratic-authoritarian model. The circumstances of the late 1970s, I suggest, propelled the authoritarian ideologues to abandon the technocratic-authoritarian schemes and seek new forms of civic participation, thereby leading them to initiate unique “protected” democratic transitions.

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List of Abbreviations

ACE	Acción Católica Ecuménica
ACNdP	Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas
AGA	Archivo General de la Administración
AGMAE	Archivo General Histórico del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores
AGN	Archivo General de la Nación
AGUN	Archivo General de la Universidad de Navarra
AMREC	Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Culto
AP	Alianza Popular
BOE	Boletín Oficial del Estado
CEDADE	Círculo Español de Amigos de Europa
CEDINCI	Centro de Investigaciones de Izquierdas
CGT	Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina
CONADE.	Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo
CONASE	Consejo Nacional de Seguridad
CONICET	Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
CONSUDEC	Consejo Superior de Educación Católica
CSIC	Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
ERP	Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Patria Vasca y Libertad)
FET	Falange Española Tradicionalista
FNFF	Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco
FRAP	Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota

FREJULI	Frente Justicialista de Liberación
ICH	Instituto de Cultura Hispánica
ICI	Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana
IEP	Instituto de Estudios Políticos
IHLADI	Instituto Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho Internacional
IWO	Instituto Científico Judío
MIR	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista de Restauración
MNT	Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara
ODEPLAN	Oficina de Planificación Nacional
OEI	Oficina de Educación Iberoamericana
PCE	Partido Comunista de España
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero de España
TFP	Tradición, Familia, y Propiedad
UNAV	Universidad de Navarra
UC	Universidad Católica
UCD	Unión de Centro Democrático
UCRI	Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente
UCRP	Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo
UDI	Unión Democrática Independiente

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Introduction

The subject matter of this dissertation is a distinctive post-fascist ideology that emerged during the Cold War era. Developed and first put to practice in Francisco Franco's Spain during the 1950s and 1960s, this model for a market-oriented development regime, which I label *Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism*, became a key ideological reference of the dictatorship of Juan Carlos Onganía in Argentina (1966-1970), and the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973-1988). For its chief designers, this new theory of state represented a noble dream of a "post-ideological" society marked by neoliberal economic openings, firm social hierarchies, civic participation, and a project of spiritual "perfection." And yet, this dissertation does not present a dynamic of simple mimesis but rather of transatlantic intellectual networking and dialogue between what were, in essence, three historical attempts to foster a *sui generis* "Hispanic" democracy, within three separate and fairly dissimilar historic settings.

The venture to constitute a reactionary modernity, as a spiritual "third position" that would transcend the antagonistic "materialist" ideologies born at the time of the French Revolution, is as old as modernity itself. The present dissertation is a key inquiry into one of these ideological projects. Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism, I will indicate, emerged as an international ideology thanks to the operation of a post-fascist intellectual network, which was buttressed by transnational agencies such as The Institute for Hispanic Culture (Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, or ICH), the Opus Dei ("the work of God") and Cursillos de la Cristiandad ("Short courses in Christianity"). Originating in Franco's Spain in the 1940s, each of them aimed, in their own unique way, to present Latin America with a pragmatic alternative to the nationalist revolutions of the 1930s. In doing so, they served as the platform where Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean

ideologues collaborated in designing a common authoritarian state-model for what were, in fact, entirely dissimilar political and social historical contexts.

During the late-1940s, in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Second World War, Latin America saw a salient wave of democratic transitions. Alas, this period was short-lived and quickly gave way to an authoritarian turn. Lasting for four decades, it came in the shape of military dictatorships, populist-authoritarian governments, and a handful of authoritarian socialistic-revolutionary regimes. This study contributes to a field of historical analysis that explores this unique historical context.¹ Strikingly, scholars have labeled military dictatorships I explore as “soft” dictatorships (“dictablanda”) - “authoritarian,” rather than “totalitarian.”² This classification, I contend, stems not necessarily from their actual character but from their own cunning propaganda. Conscious of the Nuremberg Trials and the emerging semantics of “genocide” and “human rights,” the ideologues I examine were particularly adept at adjusting to the Cold War “anti-totalitarian” critique. While still making ample use of violence and oppression, the technocratic-authoritarian dictatorships promoted themselves internationally as societies that had merely substituted parliamentarism with new systems of representation, and thus, as guarantors of personal “freedom” against the Left’s “totalitarianism.”

In other words, this study accounts for the rise of technocratic-authoritarianism as a contingent historical phenomenon that mirrored the political, economic, and cultural stipulations of the Cold War era. In recent decades, historians of Latin America have been reaching different conclusions regarding the character of the Cold War in the continent. In broad strokes, for those

¹ Over the years, historians have tried to establish various general conceptions of authoritarianism in Latin America, see for example - Paul H. Lewis, *Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Dictators, Despots, and Tyrants* (Lanham MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *On the Characterisation of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America* (Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, 1978); Jorge I. Domínguez (ed.), *Authoritarian and Democratic Regimes in Latin America* (New York: Garland Pub, 1994).

² Sociologists such as Juan Linz have famously promoted the conceptual separation between “totalitarian” and “authoritarian,” see - Juan José Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

researching the Caribbean and Central American hemispheres, Cold War Latin America was the scene of the USA's direct economic, ideological, and military interventions, within the context of a relentless effort to belie the rise of socialistic-oriented political movements in this region.³ In the work of those researching Brazil, Mexico, the Southern Cone, and the Andean region, a more nuanced narrative has become apparent in recent years regarding the nature of Latin America's Cold War. As historian Tanya Harmer has defined it, "rather than a bipolar superpower struggle projected onto a Latin American theater from outside" Latin America's "inter-American Cold War" was a "multisided contest between regional proponents of communism and capitalism."⁴ This dissertation, too, holds that the meta-narratives regarding the USA's influence in the Latin American and Iberian spheres are worth reappraisal and complication. Unlike Guatemala or Cuba, the Iberian Peninsula and the Southern Cone were far from being the USA's direct spheres of control; nonetheless, as developing industrial societies they were immensely influenced by the expanding western economic order, set about at the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944. In fact, I suggest that if Franco demonstrated anything to Latin America spectators it was how to build a successful symbiotic relationship with the USA's financial and political elites, while at the same time fostering an autonomous ideological and social order.

While historian Odd Arne Westad has notably stressed that the Cold War was a struggle over the future of the Third World, by empires representing two versions of European modernity and striving to show the universal applicability of their ideologies, this study touches on

³ This has been the position of historians such as Greg Grandin, Piero Gleijeses, and John Coatsworth, see - Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1992); John H. Coatsworth, *Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994).

⁴ Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 1; this is also the overall argument of Hal Brands and Daniela Spenser, see - Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010); Daniela Spenser, "Standing Conventional Cold War History on its Head", in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, *In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 381-96.

Westad's overlooked ideas regarding the Third World's so-called "third way" to modernity.⁵ Not dissimilar to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Luso-Hispanic sphere exhibited salient efforts to produce not only an alternative modernity but also autonomous Cold War "blocs." Indisputably, the three regimes I scrutinize identified themselves as the Cold War's anti-communist vanguard and even exhibited unapologetic rancor towards the Détente during the late-1960s. On the one hand, Franco, Onganía, and Pinochet, collaborated with the communist bloc during in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand - and aligning with historian Luis Herrán Ávila's recent notion of the Latin American "politics of enmity"⁶ - the authoritarian technocrats sought to purge Latin America from Marxism as well as from Catholic movements they identified as progressive. But overall, to read technocratic-authoritarianism entirely through an anti-communistic lens runs the risk of analytic reduction. Building on the definitions of historian Zeev Sternhell, I would argue that if fascism was a *revision of* Marxism rather than its consequence,⁷ by alleging to create a scientifically "planned" industrial society, the authoritarian technocrats believed their project was the pragmatic alternative to the socialists' pipedreams, in what some commentators even labeled "positive anti-communism."⁸

True enough, this analysis could have chosen an earlier date as its starting point. As the frequent scholarly debates over "long Cold War" have shown, one could certainly begin narrating Cold War history with the birth of the Communistic International and the first anti-

⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.

⁶ Luis Alberto Herrán Ávila, "Anticommunism, the Extreme Right, and the Politics of Enmity in Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico, 1946-1972," Ph.D., The New School for Social Research, 2017; See also – Luis Herrán Ávila, "Las Guerrillas Blancas: Anticomunismo Transnacional e Imaginarios de Derechas En Argentina y México, 1954-1972," *Quinto Sol*, vol. 19, no. 1 (June 2015): 1–26.

⁷ Zeev Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1995), 3.

⁸ "Anticomunismo positive," is how the Argentines media presented the Spanish system to its readers at least, see - "Minorías activas," *Primera Plana*, no. 38 (July 30, 1963): 14.

communistic movements in Europe and America in the 1920s.⁹ This is particularly true in the case of Spain, where the ideological polarization between Left and Right undermined the Second Spanish Republic during the 1930s, leading to the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Accordingly, Latin America's Cold War - as an insoluble polarity between revolution and counterrevolution - cannot be grasped disconnected from this immensely symbolic war fought on the soil of Latin America's Madre Patria.¹⁰ Still, the striking sense of a break with the past after May 1945, and division of the world into a defined bipolar system, makes the Cold War a distinctively separated epoch and thus a more apt periodization for the present study, in both Spain and Latin America.

While positioned within Cold War historiography, this dissertation does touch on the legacies of international fascism and Latin America's vital place within it.¹¹ The ideologies, apparatuses, and regimes examined in what follows were, I pose, a post-fascist phenomenon. As several historians have discussed recently, the stipulation to align with the Western Bloc after 1945, meant that a generation of right-wing thinkers, who had believed themselves to belong to an international revolutionary movement of the Right in the 1930s, had little choice but to frame authoritarian ideologies that were to be consciously different from the fascist theories of the

⁹ Greg Grandin, "Coming to terms with the Violence of Latin America's Long Cold War," in Greg Grandin, and G. M. Joseph (eds.), *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America's Long Cold War* (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 2010); See also - Enzo Traverso, *The European Civil War, 1919-1945* (New York: Verso, 2016).

¹⁰ Historians have recently showed renewed interest in the impact of the Spanish Civil War in Latin America, see for example - Pablo Sapag M., *Chile, frente de combate de la guerra civil española: propaganda republicana y franquista al otro lado del mundo* (Valencia: Centro Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 2003); Ricardo Pérez Montfort, *Hispanismo y Falange: los sueños imperiales de la derecha española y México* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992); Niall Binns, *Argentina y la guerra civil española: la voz de los intelectuales* (Madrid: Editorial Cumio, 2012); Matías Barchino (ed.), *Chile y la guerra civil española: la voz de los intelectuales* (Madrid: Calambur, 2014); Ariel Mae Lambe, "Cuban Antifascism and the Spanish Civil War: Transnational Activism, Networks, and Solidarity in the 1930s." Ph.D., Columbia University, 2014.

¹¹ Matteo Albanese and Pablo del Hierro, *Transnational Fascism in the Twentieth Century: Spain, Italy and the Global Neo-Fascist Network* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010); Andrea Mammone, *Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Roger Griffin, ed., *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus*, Arnold Readers in History (London; New York: Arnold: Oxford University Press, 1998).

state.¹² That is to say, this study engages with ideologues that rather than promoting a return to a corporatist “third position,” chose to break from the fascist legacy, thereby promoting an alternative political imaginary. While historians focus on the global lure of corporatism (or alternatively, “corporativism”) in the 1930s, understood then as a legitimate alternative to parliamentary democracy, my research explores how components of the corporatist jargon were used in the 1960s to justify and sustain a novel neoliberal project; in this respect, this as much a study on post-fascism as it is about the birth of neoliberalism in Latin America.¹³ As importantly, I will elucidate how technocratic-authoritarianism emerged always within a dialectic feud with other post-fascist ideologies, struggling for hegemony between themselves as well as against a formidable neo-fascist mobilization, in Spain, Argentina, and Chile.

Put differently, I suggest that technocratic-authoritarianism fails any “fascist minimum” test, as proposed in the 1960s by historian Ernst Nolte and developed by the historian Stanley Payne.¹⁴ Yet this dissertation also differs markedly from the 1990s generation of experts of fascism who have alleged that fascist ideology had come to its abrupt end in 1945.¹⁵ Sure

¹² For more recent conceptualizations of “post-fascism, see - Roger Griffin, “Interregnum or Endgame? The Radical Right in the ‘Post-Fascist’ Era,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 5, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 63-78; Roger Griffin and Matthew Feldman, *Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science: Post-War Fascisms* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella, *Re-Inventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and “Post-Fascism”* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Enzo Traverso, *The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right* (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2019); Federico Finchelstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2017);

¹³ Here my work builds on the burgeoning discussion in the literature on corporatism and its global dimensions, see - Antonio Costa Pinto, *Corporatism and Fascism: The Corporatist Wave in Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2017); António Costa Pinto and Federico Finchelstein, eds., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Europe and Latin America: Crossing Borders* (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019); Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great “Ism”* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); Sebastián Royo, “A New Century of Corporatism?” : *Corporatism in Southern Europe, Spain and Portugal in Comparative Perspective* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002).

¹⁴ Ernst Nolte, *Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen Bewegungen* (Munich: Piper, 1968), 385; Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition* (Madison, Wi.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 5-7.

¹⁵ In these accounts, fascism had been reduced to nostalgic movement of “skinheads,” or post-fascist clerical “fundamentalism,” as in the case of the Iranian Revolution, see - Walter Laqueur, *Fascism: Past, Present, Future*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 125; Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991); Roger Griffin, *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus* (London: Bloomsbury, 1998).

enough, in the decades following the Second World War international fascism ostensibly reached its political dead-end. However, as a profound belief system and transnational network fascism did not disappear. While European fascism was born out of the rejection of the 19th century and the legacies of the Enlightenment, the Cold War post-fascist intellectuals were no less avid to promote a state that would transgress the Enlightenment's political theories.¹⁶ Interestingly, at the very same time the Frankfurt School theorists - Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer for instance -¹⁷ warned against the return of mythological thinking and irrational thought to the center of modern politics, the post-fascist theorists believed the crisis of totalitarianism *could only be answered by* salvaging components of pre-modern mysticism and alleged guild-based societal order. In an anti-nationalist plea, they further proposed terminating the nation-state-oriented Westphalian Order - ironically, a demand that is not dissimilar from the call to transcend the "Westphalian political imaginary" voiced lately by political scientist such as Nancy Fraser.¹⁸

Nationalist Spain (1936-1975), a regime better known as "Francoism," had a distinctive role in the perpetuation of these spiritualist post-fascist ideologies in Latin America during the Cold War. Under the auspice of General Francisco Franco, this dictatorship actively linked with its ideological counterparts in the Latin American Right in an effort to support regimes adherent to its ideological and mythological foundations. That this dictatorship was an anomaly in the Cold War ideological panorama is not only a common historiographic assessment but the regime's very public teleology; Franco and his men believed their regime to be "different" - as a proud alternative to the Cold War blocs. A bearer of its triumphant Civil War legacy, and a

¹⁶ Zeev Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

¹⁷ "In the enlightened world, mythology has permeated the sphere of the profane," they wrote in 1944, see - Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Gunzelin Noeri, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Stanford, Ca.; Stanford University Press, 2002), 21.

¹⁸ Nancy Fraser, *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009), 4.

conscious promoter of a Catholic “crusade” against the Enlightenment, Francoism was, therefore, a radicalizing entity in Latin American far-right politics. Indeed, historiography has shown a keen interest in Franco’s foreign policy and his neo-imperial aspirations in Latin America during the 1940s. The seminal work of historians Lorenzo Delgado and Raanan Rein has clarified, for example, that in the late-1940s this cooperation, especially between Argentina and Spain, was crucial for the Francoist regime’s survival.¹⁹ At the same time, historiography tends to present the 1960s and 1970s as a period when the regime became ideologically moderate, gradually abstained from meddling in Latin American affairs, and therefore of lesser analytic interest.²⁰ The present study offers a corrective to these premises. I argue that the Spanish dictatorship actually became extremely significant - to an extent, even exemplary - for Latin America’s right-wing spectators during the 1960s, precisely because it indicated how to successfully refurbish its own fascist legacies.

That the Argentine and Chilean right-wing ideologues were the Spanish dictatorship’s most intimate interlocutors originated from their mutual recognition that Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay were the closest “racially” to the Mother Nation, and thus “Europe in America.” As several historians have shown, and as the first chapter of this dissertation will further explore, the very ideological tropes of the Francoist dictatorship had been conceived via Spanish-Argentine

¹⁹ An essential list of publications on this topic would include: Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel: acción cultural y política durante el primer Franquismo* (Madrid: CSIC, 1992); Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Diplomacia Franquista y política cultural hacia Iberoamérica, 1939-1953* (Madrid: CSIC, 1988); Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, *The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy: Spain’s International Relations from Franco to Democracy* (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1987); Rosa María Pardo Sanz, *Con Franco hacia el imperio!: la política exterior española en América Latina, 1939-1945* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1995); Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España hacia Iberoamérica* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1994); Raanan Rein, *The Franco-Perón Alliance: Relations between Spain and Argentina, 1946-1955* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); Charles Powell, *Del autoritarismo a la democracia: estudios de política exterior española* (Madrid: Silex Ediciones, 2007).

²⁰ On this alleged “change of direction” see for example - Manuel Espadas Burgos, *Franquismo y política exterior*. (Madrid: Rialp, 1988), 207-25; Javier Tusell, *La España de Franco: el poder, la oposición y la política exterior durante el franquismo* (Madrid: Historia 16, 1989), 185-244.

cooperation.²¹ From an Argentine standpoint, my work principally adds to a complex genealogy of Argentina's singular fascist movement self-named the "nacionalistas."²² The ensuing pages account for a period when the Argentine fascists were in search of new ideological openings, subsequently finding ever greater interest in the Francoist post-fascist theories of the state as a possible model for surpassing their own theoretical *cul-de-sac*. From a Chilean perspective, this analysis delves into the history of the Chilean authoritarian ideological sphere. A more elitist and traditionalist group, ever since the 1930 the Chilean Right has been producing its unique counterrevolutionary ideologies.²³ In the 1960s, it was from these two milieus that the Argentine and Chilean post-fascist technocratic-authoritarian ideologies were to emerge. That these intellectuals frequently betrayed allusions of their Francoist inspirations over the course of the 1960s and 1970s is a feature my work will explore fully. Yet rather than arguing that Franco manipulated the Latin American political landscape, or that his interlocutors were mimetic of his state ideology, this study indicates that Argentine and Chilean intellectuals appropriated Spanish formulas in what was, in essence, a lively exchange of ideas. That is to say, this dissertation is couched in terms of collaboration and reformulation rather than imitation, and even stresses the

²¹ Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, *Maetzú: biografía de un nacionalista español* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2003); Marisa González de Oleaga, *El doble juego de la Hispanidad: España y la Argentina durante la segunda guerra mundial* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2001).

²² This ideological movement has been analyzed by multiple scholars throughout the years see - Fernando Devoto, *Nacionalismo, Fascismo y Tradicionalismo en la Argentina moderna: una historia* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno de Argentina, 2002); Sandra McGee Deutsch and Ronald H. Dolkart, *The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present* (Wilmington, Del.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993); Federico Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Alberto Spektorowski, *The Origins of Argentina's Revolution of the Right* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003); David Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History, and Its Impact* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Daniel Lvovich, *El nacionalismo de derecha: desde sus orígenes a Tacuara* (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2006); Cristián Buchrucker, *Nacionalismo y Peronismo: la Argentina en la crisis ideológica mundial (1927-1955)* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1987).

²³ The historiography of the Chilean far-right includes titles such as the following: Sandra McGee Deutsch, *Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1999); Sofía Correa, *Con las riendas del poder: la derecha chilena en el siglo XX* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana, 2005); Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárte, *Nacionales y Gremialistas: el "parto" de la nueva derecha política chilena, 1964-1973* (Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones, 2008); José Fernando García (ed), *El discurso de la derecha chilena* (Santiago de Chile: CERC, 1992).

leadership of Southern Cone intellectuals within the aforementioned networks, for instance in periods when the Spanish dictatorship strove for a certain *modus vivendi* with Latin America's socialistic regimes.

The dictatorships of Onganía and Pinochet emerged in historical contexts dissimilar to that of technocratic-authoritarian Spain.²⁴ Despite periods of authoritarian intervals, Argentina and Chile had cultivated fairly robust democratic cultures and parliamentary institutions throughout the 20th century. In turn, during the Cold War the two countries witnessed the ongoing mobilization of their working classes within *sui generis* political movements that strove for a fundamental redistribution of their nations' wealth. Lieutenant General Juan Carlos Onganía rose to power against the backdrop of an acute political instability stemming from the prohibition of Juan Perón's mass-based movement in 1955. As a non-elected "president," Onganía sought to therefore replace Argentina's parliamentary democracy with what he believed was a non-violent, and even consensual, authoritarian regime of civic participation and rapid economic growth. Augusto Pinochet, on the other hand, took power in a far more murderous *coup d'état*, amid a period of profound political and economic crisis following the tenure of Salvador Allende's socialist government. In his first four years in power, Pinochet too alleged to transcend parliamentarism towards an entirely new regime of "participation." Seemingly detached authoritarian projects, the two dictatorships nonetheless exhibited a noticeable semblance: both generals consciously turned to the assistance of post-fascist technocratic intellectuals when designing their state ideologies; and the two leaders immediately sought to link politically, economically, and ideologically with the Francoist dictatorship. There is little evidence to support the claim that Onganía and Pinochet simply sought to reproduce Francoism in Latin

²⁴ Given the sheer abundance of scholarly writing on each of these regimes, a detailed bibliography on Franco, Pinochet, and Onganía will appear in the following chapters.

America. Rather, by borrowing from Franco's toolkit of political myths they sought to legitimize their regimes, but also to adjust and refurbish the Francoist state model further, within their own national contexts. By doing so, Onganía and Pinochet generated regimes that were consciously different from the Spanish original source of inspiration, as well as from each other.

Sure enough, Franco, Onganía, and Pinochet justified their initial power grab reverberating Carl Schmitt's concept of "state of exception" (*Ausnahmezustand*) - understood as a transcendence of the rule of law in the name of national salvation.²⁵ Yet these regimes and their intellectuals also clearly surpassed Schmitt's theoretical formulas by fostering novel concepts of collective action. The contempt for the "masses" - epitomized in philosopher José Ortega y Gasset's *The Revolt of the Masses*, a text frequently echoed in the words of the authoritarian technocrats - meant these dictatorships sought to demobilize society and purge the center of decision-making from any popular influence.²⁶ To legitimate this process they tailored a powerful meta-narrative regarding the global transition from "sub-developed" to "developed" societies. The Iberoamerican sphere, the argument went, necessitated a profound modernizing phase in order not to become "subjugated" by the other Cold War blocs, an endeavor that could be only orchestrated by an authoritarian Léviathan. Accordingly, the masses were expected to voluntarily relinquish political agency for the sake of the common good. As will become apparent in the following pages, all three regimes made conspicuous efforts to demonstrate that the public was indeed willingly "partaking" in the regime in alternative paths, through various other "intermediary societies," "councils," and even perennial referendums.

²⁵ Carl Schmitt, *Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 118-19; for further analyses of this term and analysis and on Schmitt's influence on post-WWII ideologies, see - Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Jan-Werner Müller, *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Brian Loveman, *The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).

²⁶ José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: Norton, 1957 [1932]).

In the 1980s, German sociologist Jürgen Habermas published his *Theory of Communicative Action*, stressing, broadly speaking, a dynamic whereby a multisided debate in the public sphere produces “rational” thought.²⁷ The technocratic-authoritarian theory of knowledge production and rationality was, in a sense, the precise contrast to Habermas’s intuitions. For the Opus Dei intellectuals, for instance, the lesson to be learned from the age of totalitarianism was the need to discover a narrow “ruling elite” and grant it with the entire responsibility for defining the common good. While promoting the image of a society with “free press,” the authoritarian technocrats were nonetheless mistrustful of a pluralist political debate over the future of society, believing it could only lead to demagoguery, falsehood, and in the worst case, civil war.

Scholars and publicists have repeatedly used the term “technocrats” (“tecnócratas” or “tecnicos”) to portray the theorists and statesmen that are the focus of this study. A somewhat hackneyed term, it has been also used habitually to portray many other governments in Latin America during the Cold War.²⁸ The first task this dissertation will assume will be to delineate a clear distinction between the emergence of “technocrats” in the Western Bloc’s liberal-democratic context, and the authoritarian “technocrats” operating in Franco’s Spain, Onganía’s Argentina, and Pinochet’s Chile. Despite having coinciding traits, these were not the same phenomenon. The western “technocrat” was symptomatic of the 1950s capitalist order and the development of global markets. While seeking to “depoliticize” large segments of the state’s apparatus, he did not aspire to eliminate parliamentarism, as his source of political legitimation

²⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).

²⁸ Especially in reference to Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico, see for instance - Francisco Panizza and George Philip, “Second Generation Reform in Latin America: Reforming the Public Sector in Uruguay and Mexico,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37, no. 4 (2005), 667–91; Roderic A. Camp, “The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System,” *Latin American Research Review* 20, no. 1 (1985): 97–118; Eduardo Dargent, *Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America: The Experts Running Government* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Centeno, Miguel Angel, Patricio Silva (eds.), *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).

stemmed directly from the democratic ritual itself. The “Hispanic technocrat”²⁹ was, on the other hand, a post-fascist ideologue who carried deeply entrenched anti-Enlightenment sentiments and distinctively “spiritual” (or “mystical”) conception of man and society. As such, he believed himself to have transcended both parliamentary politics and the modern separation of powers, towards a superior modernization.

The notion of a regime based purely on the design of technicians and specialists goes back to the 19th century, for instance to Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism or Henri de Saint-Simon’s Industrialism. Coined in 1919 in the USA, and identified with theorist such as Howard Scott in the early 1930s, in its most elementary sense “technocracy” stands for a society operating according to the rules of “science” rather than abstract ideologies.³⁰ More specifically, in the wake of the Great Depression, these theorists advocated replacing the American political elite with “engineers” who would calculate economic productivity and harmonize the social and technological aspects of industrial society. Amid a period of increasing awe of technological acceleration (or “Fordism”), the 1930 technocrats believed they could spur “radical social engineering,” and even, according to some critical voices, an “approximation of a modern utopia.”³¹ But while proposing a world of material abundance, the technocratic theorists offered scarce little when it came to essential ethical questions concerning the nature of collective action, the division of labor, and the redistribution of wealth. Consequently, within the context of the

²⁹ Antonio Cañellas Mas (ed.), *La tecnocracia hispánica: ideas y proyecto político en Europa y América* (Gijón: Trea, 2016).

³⁰ As has been revealed in Scott’s interview to the *New York Times* on August 21, 1932, in which he argued the impossibility of further technological change, and thus for an organization of society by technicians according to the current system of manufacture, see also - Allen Ramond, *What is Technocracy?* (New York: Whittelessey, 1933), 16-17.

³¹ Charles S. Maier, “Between Taylorism and technocracy: European ideologies and the vision of industrial productivity in the 1920s,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1970): 27-61; William E. Akin, *Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement, 1900-1941* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 27-28, 131.

rise of the interventionist Keynesian model, in the 1930s technocracy disappeared entirely from the western ideological panorama.

Next, in the 1950s the “technocratic” labeling returned to the scholarly debate as a pejorative term used to disparage market-oriented reformers. In his seminal work, Jean Meynaud explained that “the complex demands and workings of technological civilization” coupled with the fact that methods of government seemingly have not “undergone any fundamental changes since antiquity” meant that in the 1950s a new demand surfaced to “dethrone the politician” and replace him with the “specialist,” either quietly or avowedly.³² The image of the technocrat who believes himself to fathom the conundrums of technological society and thus grasps the common good better than the politician was to become identified in particular with Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth French Republic. The sole mission of the French technocrats, argued some, was to “rationalize” the state administration and promote economic “efficiency.”³³ Yet here too it is important to note that while de Gaulle’s ministers perhaps held such views, only in the Francoist state did this theory of “rationalization” first become the key political myth of the regime.

Which brings us to another leitmotif in this dissertation: the “post-ideological society.” At first blush, this concept could be well considered another one of the 1930s technocratic or corporatist tropes.³⁴ However, the present study will show that the public debate on the “end of ideology” was more crucial during the Cold War. When in 1957 the French philosopher Raymond Aron heralded the “end of the ideological age” he referred to the alleged decline of the “proletarian” ideologies in a world ruled by nationalism and technology.³⁵ Similarly, in 1960,

³² Jean Meynaud, *Technocracy* (London: Faber, 1968), 13.

³³ W. H. G. Armytage, *The Rise of the Technocrats: A Social History* (New York: Routledge, 2013 [1965]); Robert Elgie and Steven Griggs, *French Politics: Debates and Controversies* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 227-28.

³⁴ William E. Akin, *Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement, 1900-1941* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 97-98.

³⁵ Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (New York: Norton, 1962), 310-11.

when sociologist Daniel Bell spoke of the “end of ideology” he did not mean the end of “any belief system,” but of a specific 19th century “complex of ideas and passions.”³⁶ The authoritarian technocrats I scrutinize, however, used these very tropes to justify their neoliberal turn. For them, the “end of ideologies” meant nothing less than the closing of a vicious “cycle” opened in the French Revolution, and the return to the lost harmony of the pre-modern era. At the same time, for them “ideology” - always synonymous with “materialism” - was symptomatic of the Third World’s “underdevelopment,” and therefore remediable through consumption and spiritual development.

That an agent advocates a “non-ideological” system of government based on his belief in holding the one and only “truth,” is an ideological moment *par excellence*. However, to avoid confusing *emic* and *etic* - between how the technocrats perceived the enlightenment’s “ideologies” and how we, critical historians, should use the word *ideology* as a heuristic tool - it is worthwhile configuring a simple, albeit hopefully not simplistic, working definition for the latter. Assuredly, many have done so in the past with varying degrees of success. Traditionally identified with communism and liberalism, for Hannah Arendt ideologies were rather a position “that pretends to have found the key explanation for all the mysteries of life and the world.”³⁷ Similarly, Louis Althusser thought they were systems of representation “endowed with both existence and a historical role in some particular society.”³⁸ Adding to these two forefathers of ideology conceptualization, let us grant the following: any modern ideology makes assumptions on the human essence, and consequently, on the ethical Archimedean point for society’s

³⁶ Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1960), 17.

³⁷ Hannah Arendt, “On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding,” in Hannah Arendt, *Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1994), 349.

³⁸ This famous maxim is taken from his text “Marxism and humanism”, in *Cahiers de l’I.S.E.A.*, June 1964; see also - Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (New York: Verso, 1969), 231; see also - <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1964/marxism-humanism.htm>

organization and future perfection. Unlike religions, although the two clearly overlap, ideologies do not allege to directly serve a transcendental authority but rather an abstract community. Thus, if the Jewish and Catholic religions serve the will of God, the Zionist ideology operates on the behalf of the “Jewish People” while Catholic traditionalism defends the spiritual harmony achieved by the “Catholic civilization.”

The success of any “ideological interpellation” - as a process of making knowledge commonsensical in everyday life - relies, however, on other operations. To begin with, without exception ideology relies on mythological underpinnings to totalize its ethical ground through a seemingly inductive method of historical reasoning. The theoretical toolbox from which to begin exploring this phenomenon abound. Roland Barthes’s concept of “mythologies,” and Paul Ricœur’s ideas of “emplotment,” are two examples of attempts to explain the mechanisms of the establishment of a symbol through narrative.³⁹ More recently, philosophers Hans Blumenberg and Chiara Bottici have further discussed how “political myths” - be they archaic or modern - “ground significance” and thus are the foundation of any ideological movement. The preoccupation with the linguistic grounding of “floating” symbols appears in the work of theorists ranging from Ludwig Wittgenstein to post-structural theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek. Without going deeper into their specific theories of the self, suffice it to say that these philosophers are preoccupied by how narration acts generate “emptied” signifiers upon which society constitutes entire ideological structures.⁴⁰ My own analysis of the post-fascist theory of the spirit will further elaborate on the deep-seated connection between mythology and

³⁹ Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (New York: Noonday Press, 1972); Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

⁴⁰ Building on Jacques Lacan’s concept of the linguistic *point de capiton*, Žižek has presented his own concept of ideological “quilting point” by which a narrative inversion “performs the totalization by means of which this free floating of ideological elements is halted, fixed,” see - Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (New York: Verso, 1989), 95; see also - “Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?” in Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(S)* (New York: Verso, 1996), 36-47.

ideology. As we shall see, the interconnected ideological networks our three dictatorships shared relentlessly evoked pre-modern mythological components to justify the “sacred” ethical core at the heart of their alternative modernity.

Furthermore, for many theoreticians what actually makes ideology “work” as an instrument for political mobilization are not merely abstract ideas of justice but fantasies that, consciously or implicitly, spur profound emotional drives. Ideologies are nowadays debated as systems that are vested with psychoanalytic enjoyment, arousing operations such as *fetishism*, *victimhood*, and *melancholia*.⁴¹ In fact, as has been vastly debated in historiography already, fascist ideology differed substantially and ostentatiously from liberalism and communism in that it posed an alternative system of enjoyment as the very center of its ethical order, based on “irrational” spontaneity “springing from the depths of the unconscious.”⁴² As historian Dominick LaCapra has suggested, Nazi ideology relied on a profound sense of victimhood to produce a sensation of “negative sublime” - a powerful driving emotion that cannot be explained in simple materialist terminologies.⁴³ Building on these illuminations, my analysis will explicate that the technocratic-authoritarian ideology, too, nourished a fantasy of a society of spiritual sublime that was to be pointedly different from the secular liberal society. In short, this dissertation proposes reading the Hispanic technocratic-authoritarian ideology as a purposeful ethical configuration that, based on several dominant founding myths, advocated concrete collective action towards both societal perfection and spiritual sublime.

⁴¹ In her 1997 *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection*, Judith Butler set the coordinates for the novel research of the melancholic operation in politics and society, see - Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997); the same goes for the early work of Žižek that focused on Lacanian enjoyment and fetishism, see - Slavoj Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor* (New York: Verso, 1991).

⁴² Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*, 10.

⁴³ Dominick LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 27-30; Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 94.

Besides ideologies per se, this study is preoccupied with intellectual apparatuses. Rather than the fascist revolutionary “movement” or party, novel transnational societies dominated the Cold War far-right polity. In the ensuing chapters, I will clarify how the Opus Dei epitomized this novel framework, as a transnational apparatus that promoted a holistic vision of man, society, and state, in the midst of the secular world. What is an “apparatus”? Literary critic Giorgio Agamben has suggested a basic definition for this term that goes as follows: the apparatus is the moment when a “heterogeneous set of discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, and police measures” are knotted into a network with a “concrete strategic function.”⁴⁴ The intellectual apparatus, I will add, aims to make ubiquitous and commonsensical a certain ideology through means of persuasion, without acknowledging ever having done so. In our case, the post-fascist ideological apparatus aimed to convince Catholics worldwide to replace the fascist revolutionary movement of the spirit with a more sophisticated immanent “crusade.” Put slightly differently, the technocratic-authoritarian state relied not on a revolutionary vanguard, but on elite societies operating independently from the state through means of *soft power*. Originally coined by political scientist Joseph Nye, this term conveys “the ability to shape preferences of others” - a notion that is perhaps not too distant from Michael Foucault’s idea of *disciplinary power*, but that is still important if we are to recognize how ideological groups appeal to audiences without either coercion or inducements.⁴⁵ For Nye, the making of an opinion hegemonic depends on the ability of public agents to “entice and attract.”⁴⁶ Indeed, what the Opus Dei did best in the 1960s was establishing novel modes of appealing to conservative

⁴⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *What Is an Apparatus?: And Other Essays* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 2009).

⁴⁵ Michel Foucault, in his influential work *Discipline and Punish*, gave special emphasis to modern disciplinary institutions (Schools, Prisons), but somewhat overlooked the public sphere as a scene of disciplining through attraction, see - Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995 [1977]).

⁴⁶ Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 95; also - Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.

audiences through a combination of middle-class respectability and mystical allure, in a world that was gradually ridding itself from the 1930s fascist pathos.

Lastly, this dissertation explores the moment when an abstract ideology developed into a concrete *state-ideology*.⁴⁷ There are two ways in which we should understand this term. For one thing, state-ideology presents the legal framework that defines and sustains tangible social hierarchies, the division of labor, and distribution of wealth. Breaking away from the political myth of the fascist corporatist statist model (or *national-syndicalism*) technocratic-authoritarianism represented a fundamental shift in its conception of the state. Through deregulation, privatization, and elimination of taxation and tariffs, the three regime I discuss presented some of the more outlandish case-studies of neoliberal experimentation in the western hemisphere. In the early 1980s, political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell coined the term Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (BA) in an attempt to characterize these so-called “soft” Latin American dictatorships, a term that has been discussed at length ever since.⁴⁸ As I will illustrate in depth throughout my analysis, this labeling is flawed inasmuch as the technocratic-authoritarian dictatorships aggressively promoted anti-bureaucratic and anti-statist imagery. By not adhering to the principle of separation of powers, the technocratic-authoritarian state also relied on clientelism and political violence for its survival. That is to say, while the technocrats took pride for pulling the state out of the economic domain, they nonetheless presented a ruthless control of many other spheres of social life, in particular, higher education and labor, hence

⁴⁷ Here I also build on what Althusser had defined as the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) of concrete institutions and performativity, see – Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays* (London: New Left Books, 1971), 121-76.

⁴⁸ Guillermo O'Donnell, *1966-1973 El Estado Burocrático Autoritario: Triunfos, Derrotas y Crisis* (Buenos Aires: Belgrano, 1982); see also - Karen L. Remmer, and Gilbert W. Merkx, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” *Latin American Research Review*, vol.17, no. 2 (1982): 3-40; Hector E. Schamis, “Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism,” *Comparative Politics* vol. 23, no. 2 (1991): 201–20; Model David Collier “Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model,” in David Collier and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (eds.), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1979), 19-32.

presenting their countries as havens for Direct Foreign Investment. In turn, all three dictatorships enjoyed periods of economic growth, which they straightaway narrated as economic “miracles.”

More important, the concept of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism overlooks the spiritual projects at the heart of the technocratic-authoritarian state-ideology. The gist of this study’s argument is as follows: the “technocrats” operating within the Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean authoritarian states sought to spur not only economic “modernization” but a “change of mentalities.” Reverberating the fascist imaginary of a “new man,” they constantly expressed their desire to alter the selfhood of the masses, a metamorphosis by the end of which the latter were expected to become unified, spiritual, and obedient “middle-classes.” In short, the second and more fundamental meaning of state-ideology is the tangible ways in which a regime consciously aims to mold new subjects to accept a given method of collective action willingly, believing it to be the only plausible path for their material wellbeing.

This study ultimately presents a commentary on Latin America’s conservative subjectivity, synonymous with the Latin American Right. A predominantly *elitist* subject - a category I define less by socio-economic criteria as by relative position to impact the political sphere and identity within a national and transnational imagined community - in the 1960s the Latin American Right believed itself to be at the forefront of a new global cultural war.⁴⁹ Exhausted from the failed attempts to tame parliamentary democracy to their benefit, these members of society welcomed

⁴⁹ The classic literature on the Latin American elite politics include - Seymour Martin Lipset, *Elites in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); E. Bradford Burns, *Elites, Masses, and Modernization in Latin America, 1850-1930* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979); John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds.), *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); In recent years a blessed wave of academic anthologies has been aiming to conceptualize Latin America’s Right ideological and socially, see - Douglas A. Chalmers, Maria do Carmo C. Campello de Souza, Atilio Borón (eds.), *The Right and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1992); Kevin J. Middlebrook (ed.), *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Francisco Domínguez, Geraldine Lievesley, and Steve Ludlam (eds.), *Right-Wing Politics in the New Latin America: Reaction and Revolt* (New York: Zed Books, 2011); Juan Pablo Luna, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.), *The Resilience of the Latin American Right* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Barry Cannon, *The Right in Latin America: Elite Power, Hegemony, and the Struggle for the State* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016).

authoritarianism as the only strategy for maintaining their privileges, and for winning the global modernizing race. In addition, their enthusiastic embracing of urbane Catholic authoritarianism should be read as a profound reaction to the far-reaching cultural changes of the 1960s. Whereas historiography tends to focus on the “long 1960s” revolutionary zeitgeist, my dissertation contributes to a nascent scholarly field that explores the fierce reaction to the 1960s secular rebellion.⁵⁰ For my part, I focus on a generation of men and women who came of age between 1940 and 1960. For them, Rock-&-Roll, Hippies, the sexual revolution, and the feminist movement, were the antithesis of how modern civility *should be*: heroic, disciplined, reverent, and intensely spiritual. Though sharing much of the fascist penchants for a redemptive “crusade” against the “enemies” of civilization, the technocrats were, I argue, also unique in the subtle techniques they promoted for “bridging” between the Western Bloc and their “Hispanic” spiritual domain.

Whether it be historian Jeffrey Herf’s influential theory of “reactionary modernism,”⁵¹ or political scientist Corey Robin’s recent analysis of the *Reactionary Mind*,⁵² various studies have aimed to explain the paradoxical modern/reactionary subjectivity. These analyses have shown us that unlike anti-modern fundamentalisms, in the Islamic world, for instance, reactionary modernists do not repudiate modernity but interpret it differently, hence proposing a hybrid of rational and irrational elements. “Have we ever been modern?” pondered likewise French

⁵⁰ See for instance - Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003); Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, 1958-1974* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Hugh McLeod, *The Religious Crisis of the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁵¹ “There is no such thing as modernity as such. There are only national societies, each of which becomes modern in its own fashion,” Herf stated, see - Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); see also - David E. Cooper, “Reactionary Modernism,” *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements* no. 44 (March 1999): 291–304.

⁵² Corey Robin, *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

philosopher Bruno Latour in 1993. What he meant to say was that what had always appeared in western culture as purified categories - “modern” versus “archaic” - seemed by the end of the Cold War as a panorama of hybrids of rational and irrational thought.⁵³ The intervention this dissertation will propose to Latour’s now-classic theorization is that Spain and Latin America’s ultra-conservative elites have never once been equivocal about their determination to amalgamate these seemingly unbridgeable domains. Since the scientific project had not convincingly answered the very mysteries of existence, they opined, a reintroduction of mystical thought to the center of the modern project - whether in higher education, the cultural dominion, or even the state’s control of its citizens’ public morality - was not only tolerable but mandatory.

This study explores three national histories, and as such, lacks the capacity of offering a meticulous historical narrative for every single country. Besides relying on secondary literature for bridging this gap, my justification for doing so is to bring to the fore a different ideological setting altogether. Like the international movement of the Left, the far-right intellectual world depended on an energetic sphere of publications and travelers who identified themselves as something larger than their national settings. Additionally, my analysis excludes other sites of intellectual activity. For instance, when discussing the Opus Dei, I will refrain from fully exploring its operation in Europe or discuss its polemical political intrigues in the Vatican. Likewise, this dissertation is an intellectual history of the Latin American far-right and as such touches on issues of economic and social history somewhat superficially, mostly to contextualize ideological change. Last, other Latin American cases of technocratic ideologies - in Brazil, Uruguay and Mexico to name a few - are absent from this analysis. Still, the unique linkage between the Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean intellectual networks and regime models, justifies

⁵³ Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993).

the selections of these particular case studies as an interlinked history that merits a comparative analysis.

The dissertation opens in 1945 and explores the Post-WWII transatlantic cooperation between Franco's Spain and the Latin American far-right.⁵⁴ Chapter 1 offers an overview of the role the Francoist regime sought to play in Latin American politics after 1945. The focus of my analysis is the Francoist-led Institute for Hispanic Culture (Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, or ICH). A transnational ideological apparatus, this was the first organ wherein Francoism cooperated with the Latin American far-right ideologues during the Cold War. It was here that Francoism, the Argentine nacionalistas, and Chilean authoritarian thinkers first promoted a "Hispanic bloc" based on the anti-modern ideology of "Hispanidad" (Hispanism). My analysis departs from previous views of these projects as merely a reiteration of the 1930s tropes of far-right thinkers such as Ramiro de Maeztu. Rather, this was one of the first example of a post-fascist network setting out to present an alternative to the 1930s national revolutions by suggesting a return to a pre-Westphalian spiritual order, while at the same time pledging to modernize Latin America technologically and socially. The collaboration between these ideological groups, I argue, established the ideological basis for the authoritarian experiments of the 1960s in the Southern Cone.

Chapter 2 gives insight into the rise of Spain's unique technocratic-authoritarian ideology and social experiment. During the 1950s, Franco's Spain underwent a profound ideological transition from a fascist terror-based dictatorship to a post-fascist technocratic-authoritarian regime. This change entailed diminishing the power of Franco's fascist movement, the Falange (FET), and elevating the Opus Dei's technocrats to a position of hegemony, thereby replacing

⁵⁴ For a detailed description of the archival sources, primary sources and methodology used in this dissertation see Methodological Appendix, page 346.

Spain's nationalist-syndicalist project with the Opus Dei's state-ideology. Beyond analyzing the novelties of the "technocratic" language, the chapter underscores two essential points: For one, I maintain that like the ICH the work of Opus Dei's apparatus became salient in Latin America in the 1960s, and thus that the Spanish technocratic ideology and social experiments soon reached audiences far beyond the Iberic peninsula. For another, I make the case that Spain's technocrats arrived in Latin America propagating not only their "development plans" and the political myth of Spain's "economic miracle" but also a roadmap for what they claimed was a "post-ideological" consumerist society.

In Chapter 3, I move on to Argentina and analyze the post-Peronist era of regime changes, also known as the "Liberating Revolution" (1955-1966). This chapter broaches the subject of the profound splintering within the nacionalista ideological circles of the late-1950s, between neo-fascist and post-fascist inclinations. My study will demonstrate that in the wake of Juan Perón's relentless influence over its political sphere, Argentina witnessed the birth of its own technocratic-authoritarian intellectual projects. I hone in on an association by the name of Ateneo de la República ("Athenaeum of the Republic") and the Opus Dei's Argentine-Chilean journal *Cuadernos del Sur*. I argue that during the 1960s it was within these circles that the main groundwork for the Argentine - and to a certain point, Chilean - future technocratic-authoritarian experiment was conceived. Much in tandem with the discordance between the Falange and the Opus Dei, I further stress that the fissure between the Argentine technocratic-authoritarian theorists and neo-fascist nacionalistas was substantial, a condition that escalated even further with the salient activity of Argentina's neo-fascist gangs in the early 1960s. Last, I will indicate how the technocratic-authoritarian ideology eventually became prevalent in Argentina's

mainstream media during the mid-1960s against the backdrop of a profound political crisis during the tenure of elected president Arturo Illia (1963-1966).

In Chapter 4 the study analyses the rise of Juan Carlos Onganía's dictatorship in 1966, also known as the "Argentine Revolution." With its conspicuous post-ideological and Hispanic rhetoric, this regime displayed one of the more enthusiastic implementations of Hispanic technocratic-authoritarian in Latin America. Here my study illuminates the unique dialogue between Onganía and the Francoist regime, and Onganía's intimate collaboration with the Spanish technocrats. What is more, this chapter highlights the fundamental function of the Ateneo de la República and *Cuadernos del Sur* intellectuals as the designers of the regime's state-ideology of "administrative rationalization," "mentalities change," and "organic representation." In turn, I will show that by 1969 Spain and Argentina exhibited not only fairly analogous regimes but also matching authoritarian "political" visions for their future. Lastly, the chapter will explain the circumstances for the Argentine Revolution's dramatic breakdown between 1969 and 1973.

Chapter 5 continues to Chile and accounts for the unique ways in which the Chilean conservatives espoused Francoist political myths to establish their own post-fascist technocratic ideology between 1964 and 1977. Amid a period of working-class mobilization and reforms, by the late-1960s members of the Chilean conservative elite produced a unique technocratic-authoritarian intellectual movement: the gremialistas. Joined by the Chilean ICH and Opus Dei intellectual apparatuses, these ideologues were at the forefront of the opposition to Salvador Allende's government (1970-1973). Subsequently, these men and women became the chief designers of Augusto Pinochet's ideological apparatus in its early years. Like Onganía, Pinochet made conspicuous efforts to link with the Spanish dictatorship, I argue. No less important, in its

first four years of existence, his regime conspired its own original “post-ideological” state-ideology, comprising of “Hispanic” spirituality and voluntary “intermediate” societies. As such, Pinochet’s dictatorship became the third Hispanic technocratic-authoritarian regime in Cold War history.

Lastly, chapter 6 offers a comprehensive account of the decline of technocratic-authoritarianism, as an ideology, intellectual apparatus, and state-ideology, during the 1970s. The chapter opens with exploring the unforeseen resurgence of neo-fascist thought and Falangist nostalgia during the early 1970s. This, I argue, was mostly an interconnected Spanish-Argentine phenomenon that originated from a shared discontent of the technocratic era. Thereafter, the study scrutinizes the ways by which the technocrats altered their ideological project in the face of new national and international circumstances. This chapter discusses the crisis of the Francoism in 1973, and the regime’s motion towards a return to parliamentarism. Moreover, I explore the continuations of several ideological concepts from Onganía’s regime to Argentina’s Military Dictatorship of 1976-1983. This regime, I stress, could be read as a response to the failed projects of the 1960s, but also, in several cases, as their ideological continuation. Next, as a way of conclusion, my study will inquire into the activity of the technocrats throughout the democratic transitions of in the late-1970s and 1980s. First, I make the case that the narratives of Franco’s “post-ideological” society were vividly present during the Spanish transition (1975-1982), as the technocrats struggled to defend their legacies within the so-called Spanish democratic “consensus.” Second, my work elucidates Pinochet’s replacement of his technocratic-authoritarian ideology with a new scheme of “protected democracy,” during the late 1970s, a process that saliently alleged to differ from the Spanish transitional model. Within this context, my analysis will conclude with the anecdotal return of Franco’s technocrats to Chile in the mid-

1980s, one of the last instances of technocratic-authoritarian propaganda in the 1980s. In brief, this dissertation presents a rounded genealogy of the rise, zenith, and ultimate decline of the post-fascist authoritarian technocrats; men and women whose ideology and legacies were to have troubling bearings on the societies in which they operated.

Chapter 1: The Era of Hispanidad and the Search for a Workable “Third Path” for Modernity during the Early Cold War Years, 1945-1957

On April 8, 1945, European Fascism came to its abrupt political end. Nevertheless, as historians have indicated time and again, fascist ideology disappeared neither in Latin America, nor in Salazar’s Portugal, or even in Italy and France.¹ In particular, it was Francoist Spain, the most conspicuous fascist remainder in Europe, that was to have a unique role in the reformation of fascist thought after 1945. Firmly in the hands of Francisco Franco, the victorious General of the Spanish Civil War and intimate ally of both Hitler and Mussolini, during the 1950s this regime linked with its Latin American far-right counterparts in an effort to establish a new “international” that would transcend the ideologies of the Enlightenment - now seemingly represented by the new Cold War “blocs.” Learning from the errors of fascism, a group of Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean intellectuals were now to jointly articulate what was meant to be yet another “third path” to modernity.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the transatlantic ideological projects of the 1950s constituted the foundations of the technocratic-authoritarian regimes of the 1960s. In the main, rather than presenting a concrete theory of the state, these projects were preoccupied primarily with defining the mythologic and “spiritual” core of mankind and society. Still, this ongoing configuration of an alternative Catholic modernity, and the “anti-ideological” imaginary that appeared throughout this endeavor, informed the technocratic-authoritarianism of the 1960s.

¹ Klaus von Beyme, “Right-wing Extremism in Post-war Europe,” *West European Politics*, vol. 11, no. 2 (April 1, 1988): 1-18; Mario Caciagli, “The Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale and Neo-fascism in Italy,” *West European Politics* 11, no. 2 (April 1, 1988): 19-33; Tamir Bar-On, *Where Have All the Fascists Gone?* (London: Routledge, 2016); Matteo Albanese, *Transnational Fascism in the Twentieth Century: Spain, Italy and the Global Neo-Fascist Network* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016);

As importantly, the intellectual networks established during the 1950s would reappear throughout this study as the ideological backbone of the Southern Cone's authoritarian regimes.

“America starts at the Pyreneans”: Franco's regime and the turn to Latin America

“The purposes of the trip are multiple,” stated the report: “to establish direct contact with the most prominent Hispanistas in each country; obtain accurate information on the current situation of each of them in the social, economic, and cultural realm; search for possible guests to bring back to Spain [...]”² In this manner, Alfredo Sánchez Bella and Fernando María Castiella described their 1947 visit in Latin America to their superior, Spain's Foreign Minister Alberto Martín-Artajo. As their text indicates, the diplomats' task was to attract Latin America's “Hispanistas.” And attract them, they did. In less than two years Spain saw the arrival of the continent's most famous far-right figures, who all believed they were partaking in a renewed international post-fascist movement. Argentina, and to slightly a lesser degree Chile, led this new pilgrimage on the side of the Americas.

By reading Francoism “through Latin American eyes,” our task is primarily to clarify why an oppressive and impoverished regime, which by no means can be compared with the European powers of the 1950s economically or politically, captivated the imagination of a generation of conservative Latin Americans.³ The premise of this chapter is that even before Spain's alleged “economic miracle” of the 1960s ever occurred, Francoism had already become exemplary for many among Latin America's conservatives. To clarify this, in the next section I will briefly

² “El director del ICH al Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores,” March 24, 1947, Archivo General de la Administración de España (hereafter cited as AGA), caja 82/13946.

³ There is a consensus among historians that during the late-1940s and 1950s (“el primer Franquismo”) Spain saw a period of unprecedented suffering and hunger following its isolation and Franco's autarchic economic policies, see-Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, *Fear and Progress: Ordinary Lives in Franco's Spain, 1939-1975* (Malden, MA: John Wiley, 2009), 58-65; Glicerio Sánchez Recio (ed.), *El primer franquismo, 1936-1959* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1999); José Sanchis Sinisterra, *Terror y miseria en el primer Franquismo* (Madrid: Cátedra, 2003).

establish a workable definition for this regime's ideological guidelines and explain what it was that Franco and his followers proposed to their Latin American audiences.

Francoist Spain was a dictatorship that famously evaded simple ideological taxonomies. Even the term "Francoism" is not without its problems. Francisco Franco was a military General who, despite his affection for pompous speeches, left the task of ideological production to his intellectuals and speech-writers. Consequently, unlike Nazism or Italian Fascism, Francoism was a term coined and used mainly by the regime's opponents. For Franco and his followers, their regime was simply "the New Spanish State," which was not even officially "nationalist" but merely "Unified, Great, and Free" (*una grande y libre*).⁴

Francoism was born in the context of the Spanish Civil War but was essentially an outcome of decades of anti-modern and anti-liberal ideological production, which is worth mentioning succinctly as references to it will appear in many instances throughout this study. The dialectic motion between modern and anti-modern sentiments had defined the political landscape in Spain throughout the 19th century. From it emerged the founding fathers of Spain's anti-modern "traditionalism," Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo and Juan Vázquez de Mella, who quickly became household names among Latin American reactionaries. Then, the Generation of 98 - a category referring to a group of thinkers, novelists, and poets, who following Spain's loss of empire, configured the "regeneration" of Spain's national essence - was the first to articulate a calling for a spiritual bridge between Spain and its independent progenies. Miguel de Unamuno's *En torno al casticismo*, for instance, outlined the ethnic essence uniting the Hispanic race (or "castizo") vis-à-

⁴ The amount of texts dedicated to defining Francoism is indeed vast and fills entire bibliographic essays. Here is a list of classical analyses, from which my own work takes its inspiration: Stanley G. Payne, *Franco's Spain* (New York: Crowell, 1967); Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London: Harper Collins, 1993); Xosé Manoel Núñez-Seixas, *La España de Franco* (Madrid: Información e Historia, 1996); Carme Molinero, *La anatomía del Franquismo: de la supervivencia a la agonía, 1945-1977* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2008); Javier Tusell, *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy, 1939 to the Present* (Malden, MA: John Wiley, 2011); Julio Gil Pecharrromán, *Con permiso de la autoridad: la España de Franco (1939-1975)* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2008).

vis Europe's "sameness," and thus inspired Latin American audiences in years to come. And last, a selective reading of José Ortega y Gasset made Spain's most famous liberal philosopher a prominent source of reference for Francoist and Latin American intellectuals alike.⁵

By and large, however, Franco based his state-ideology on two key corporatist ideological schools, both emerging during Miguel Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (1923-1930) and Spain's Second Republic (1931-1936). On the one hand, Francoism relied on Spain's authoritarian traditionalism, represented in its extreme version by Ramiro de Maeztu's affiliation *Acción Española*, and its somewhat more moderated version by Ángel Herrera Oria's Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNdP). On the other hand, Franco utilized the symbols and revolutionary language of José Antonio Primo de Rivera's Falange Española Tradicionalista (FET y de las JONS).⁶ While the former school was profoundly indebted to the French and German ultra-conservative ideologues such as Charles Maurras, Oswald Spengler, and Carl Schmitt, the latter took its inspiration from Mussolini's fascist state. Whereas Maeztu proposed a reactionary restoration of a pre-modern monarchy, José Antonio and his followers advocated a non-clerical, "poetic," and "irrational" national-syndicalist revolution.⁷ These movements shared, however, similar fantasies. Both of them sought to induce an alternative modernity, based on a spiritual sublime and a corporatist - be it social or statist - organization of society. More important for our

⁵ Especially in the case of Argentina, see for instance - Máximo Etchecopar, *Ortega en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Institución Ortega y Gasset, 1983); Enrique Aguilar, *Ortega y la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997); Marta M. Campomar Fornieles, *Ortega y Gasset en "La Nación"* (Buenos Aires: El Elefante Blanco, 2003).

⁶ Many historians have already outlined the genealogy of the Falange and its function within the Francoist dictatorship, the most prominent analyses being the following: Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923-1977* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999); Ricardo Chueca, *El fascismo en los comienzos del régimen de Franco: un estudio sobre FET-JONS* (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1983); Ismael Saz Campos, *Fascismo y Franquismo* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2004); Joan María Thomàs, *La Falange de Franco: fascismo y fascistización en el régimen Franquista, 1937-1945* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2001).

⁷ In the case of Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, this irrational condition was equated to the spirit of Don Quijote's madness, see - Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, *El Quijote y nuestro tiempo* (Madrid: Vassallo de Mumbert, 1971); for more on this trend see - Christopher Britt, *Quixotism: The Imaginative Denial of Spain's Loss of Empire* (New York: SUNY Press, 2005).

purposes, they both presented Latin American audiences with a heroic neo-imperial vision. Subsequently, Maeztu and José Antonio, both executed during the Civil War by the Republic, became an inseparable component of the Latin American far-right canon during the Cold War, as we shall see in the following chapters.⁸

Strikingly, Francoism did not only inspire but was *influenced by* Latin American thought. Nothing illustrates this better than the invention of the word Hispanidad - the elusive neologism that, during the 1950s served as the ideological ground for Franco's linkage with Latin America. Coined in Argentina's by the Spanish-born priest Zacarias de Vizcarra in 1926, Ramiro de Maeztu, then Miguel Primo de Rivera's ambassador in Buenos Aires, adopted the term, and, in turn, brought it to optimal levels of publicity during the turbulent years of the Second Republic. Rather than deeming Hispanidad an "Argentine" or "Spanish" ideology, it is worthwhile to think of this term as the consciously reciprocal effort to produce a transatlantic anti-modern ideology that could successfully unite the Hispanic world against the alleged threat of the 20th century's "internationals."

What *is* Hispanidad? In its most basic form, the term represented a nostalgia for a pre-modern era, and more specifically, to the alleged spiritual harmony that existed during the 16th century Habsburg Iberian Empire.⁹ Supposedly vanquished by the Enlightenment in the 18th century, For Maeztu, this "spiritual equilibrium" had resolved the "anxiety" that is the essence of man;¹⁰ thus it was Hispanidad that created "universal history" he said,¹¹ rather than the "false dogmas" of the

⁸ Several historians have touched on Franco's use of Maeztu's ideology, see - Elías Díaz, *Pensamiento español en la era de Franco: 1939-1975* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1983); Raúl Morodo, *Los orígenes ideológicos del franquismo: Acción Española* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985); Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, *Historia de las derechas españolas: de la ilustración a nuestros días* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2000).

⁹ For an updated debate on the denotation of this term, see Ilan Stavans and Iván Jaksic, *What Is La Hispanidad?: A Conversation* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011).

¹⁰ "La defensa de la Hispnidad," *Acción Española*, no. 5 (February 16, 1932).

¹¹ Ramiro de Maeztu, *Defensa de La Hispanidad* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Poblet, 1941), 44.

French Revolution.¹² Without ever elucidating what the “spirit” actually was, the spokesmen of Hispanidad further portrayed it as a condition of nirvana-like sublime.¹³ Others, portrayed Hispanidad as a certain “style,” “way of being,” or “hierarchy of values”¹⁴ (or tautologically, “Hispanic values”).¹⁵ Yet if there was ever a consensus on the meaning of Hispanidad, it was that it signified a universal civilizing mission, deriving from the Spaniards’ unique character revealed in Spain’s anti-Muslimism reconquest and the Christianization of the Americas. Living in Tucumán, Argentina, in 1938 the Spanish theologian Manuel García Morente advocated Hispanidad as a mentality of a “Christian gentleman” (or “Paladín”), whose characteristics include “accepting stoically” his universal “mission” as a modern crusader.¹⁶

Another way to address the appeal of Hispanidad is by understanding it an ideological “empty signifier”¹⁷ whose spokespersons often advised forsaking the question of its precise signification. In the words of Uruguayan poet Carlos Lacalle, “one lives Hispanidad, not thinks it.”¹⁸ Or as García Morente put it:

What is the typical style of Hispanidad? Difficult to answer, [...] impossible to solve. Because the concepts that we use to define something apply well to “things,” to “beings,” but they cannot serve to apprehend a style which is neither a thing nor being, but a “mode” of things, a way of being. For that reason, we will not even try to “define” the Hispanic style and we will have to limit ourselves to the effort of “showing it,” of making it intuitive.¹⁹

¹² “Falsos dogmas,” *Acción Española*, no. 8 (April 1, 1932).

¹³ At times it was defined as an “Atlantis” or “ínsula” see - “A quien le yere,” *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 1 (March-April 1948), 7-8; Like Maurras, Maeztu often conflated “spirit” as a metaphysical essence (or “soul”) and “spirit” as in consciousness (“revolutionary spirit”). When Maeztu advocates “the absolute primacy of The Spiritual” he might actually meant both, see - Maeztu, *Defensa de La Hispanidad*, 148.

¹⁴ For Laín Entralgo, Hispanidad meant a “mentality of radical melancholy,” see - Pedro Laín Entralgo, “Lengua y ser de la Hispanidad,” *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 70 (1955): 14.

¹⁵ *XXV aniversario del Instituto de cultura hispánica Santiago de Chile* (1973), 7.

¹⁶ Manuel García Morente, *Idea de la Hispanidad* (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, 1939), 19.

¹⁷ Here I build on Ernesto Laclau’s definition of the term, which associates any establishment of a symbolic system with the effective creation of an empty ontological ground, usually through tautologies or a demand not to inquire further into its meaning (“the constitutively unreachable”), see - Ernesto Laclau, “Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?” in *Emancipation(s)* (London: Verso. 1996), 36-46.

¹⁸ Carlos Lacalle, “Diez años en la política de la hispanidad,” *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 103 (1956), 3.

¹⁹ Morente, *Idea de la Hispanidad*, 54.

Evidently, as a mysterious place-holder, upon which a tangible political system could be built, Hispanidad could not be defined in simple linguistic, ethnic, or religious terminologies. Could Jews be included in Hispanidad? Or the once-Spanish Philippines? Nobody, it seemed, had an absolute answer for such questions.²⁰ Hispanidad was a “living thing,” some Francoists stated proudly.²¹ Yet it was outlining its borderlines that made it a useful ideological tool for Franco when defining his regime as the most loyal guardian against the “enemies” of Hispanidad.

Not all Francoists were comfortable with the Hispanidad rhetoric. Being the hegemonic ideological group within the regime in the 1940s, the filo-fascist Falange defied this traditionalist trope at first, proposing Latin America its own secular “unification of culture, economic interests, and power.”²² As historian Ismael Saz Campos has noted, in these years Francoism was “a fascistized dictatorship” rather than a traditionalist one.²³ This, I argue, is an apt depiction that nonetheless calls for further elucidation. When dealing with the question of whether Francoism was “fascist,” let us first grant the following: no other European regime had mimicked Mussolini’s state-ideology, in its symbolism and initial “nationalist-syndicalist” apparatus, as Francoism.²⁴ Likewise, the regime’s brutalities during its early years - including execution, mass incarceration, and torture of horrendous scale - should allow us to consider Francoism as the first fascist regime

²⁰ The discussions over the exact Hispanic component of Sephardi Jews and the Philippines (a Spanish colony in the past) clearly fascinated the Francoist publishing apparatus, see for instance - Francisco Javier Conde, “La hazaña estupenda de la cristianización de Filipinas,” *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 119 (February 1958): 19-21; José María Lacalle, “La hispanidad mediterránea,” *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 151 (October 1969): 32-33; Blas Pinar, “Legazpi, fundador de filipinas,” *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 199 (October 1964): 32-34.

²¹ See for instance - Alfredo Sánchez Bella, “Proyecto de decreto del ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores por el se crea el instituto Español de Cooperación Intelectual,” AGA, caja 82/11114.

²² The Falange intellectuals, most conspicuously Ernesto Giménez Caballero, aimed to establish their own parallel secular theorization of the Hispanic essence see - Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España* (Madrid: Ediciones Gaceta Literaria, 1932).

²³ Saz Campos, *Fascismo y Franquismo*, 79-87.

²⁴ Taken directly from the Falange’s constitution, Franco’s “twenty-six points of the Movimiento” from 1939 are a fascist text *par excellence*. My reading here aligns with Zeev Sternhell’s complete separation between Nazi Germany’s ideology and regime and Mussolini’s ideology, see - Zeev Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*, 4.

to put its annihilationist fantasies into practice, against its own citizens.²⁵ On a theoretical level, like Mussolini, Franco saw his regime as an ideology in the making.²⁶ “We have overcome the old concepts of right and left”²⁷ he often stated, confirming time and again that his “third path” had transcended the enlightenment’s philosophies of the state altogether. Assuredly, in April 1937 Franco’s decree coerced Spain’s right-wing ideological groups to merge within one coordinated organization: the Movimiento. But he also insisted that this body was neither “a program” nor “a party” but a moral “principle.” Franco also spoke of an “open constitution,” thus never committing to a definite socio-political theory of the state.²⁸ Instead, Francoism identified as a “pluralistic” assembly of ideological schools (or “families”) fighting for the same moral absolutes.

Francoism did purport to have a “doctrine,” however, which was intrinsically tied to the Catholic sacred. Franco’s own leadership (Caudillaje nacional) appeared as an indisputable incarnation “the Grace of God.”²⁹ And anyone who partook in the regime agreed that the Civil War had been a “Crusade” of eschatological importance. A showdown between ultimate “good” and “evil,” for them their victory meant the closure of a universal disharmony that had begun with the French Revolution. Put differently, Francoism represented itself as a final condition of spiritual restoration. Its spokesmen and spokeswomen believed that their hunger-plagued country was the

²⁵ The “Spanish holocaust” is the provocative labeling that has been used in contemporary historiography to discuss the campaign of annihilation conducted by Franco’s Armies, see - Montse Armengou, *Las fosas del silencio: hay un holocausto español?* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2004); Char Prieto (ed.), *El holocausto olvidado: guerra, masacre, pacto, olvido y recuperación de la memoria histórica española* (Madrid: Editorial Pliegos, 2011); Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain* (London: Harper Press, 2012).

²⁶ Here I build on the theoretical discussion initiated by historian Federico Finchelstein regarding Mussolini’s ideological fluctuation, see - Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 26.

²⁷ “Our political system is open to any improvements and perfections” he said in May 1946, see - Francisco Franco, “Con España están la verdad y la razón,” in *Textos de doctrina política* (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1951), 44.

²⁸ Francisco Franco, *Pensamiento político de Franco: antología* (Madrid: Servicio Informativo Español, 1964), 225.

²⁹ For a lucid analysis of this term, see - William Viestenz, *By the Grace of God: Francoist Spain and the Sacred Roots of Political Imagination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).

“only oasis of peace in the world,”³⁰ as the only place where the truthful Catholic dogma materialized as a “confessional” state. In other words, in its own historiosophic vision not only had Francoism retrieved humanity to its correct path but showed the western civilization the roadmap for its future perfection. Tellingly, while being profoundly liturgical, Francoism was in perpetual conflict with the Vatican for most of its years of existence; thus, this was a rogue format of Catholicism, one that buttressed Franco’s “political theology” rather than the Roman Church’s hierarchy.³¹

In 1945, against the background of a brief period of international isolation, Franco and his new emerging deputy, Luis Carrero Blanco, began ridding the regime from fascist connotations. This meant not only the gradual closing of punishment facilities,³² but also the removal of key Falange figures from positions of leadership, appointing instead the more “moderate” ACNdP members Alberto Martín-Artajo as Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and José Ibáñez Martín as Minister of Education.³³ Next, Franco initiated a peculiar constitutional phase, by establishing his own “Parliament” (Cortes),³⁴ and granting his citizens a “Charter” (Fuero de los Españoles) - “the regime’s great charter of civil and social rights and political liberties” in Manuel Fraga Iribarne’s words.³⁵ This young Falange intellectual was arguably less enthusiastic of the 1947 Law of

³⁰ In the words of one of Franco’s more salient spokeswomen, Blanca de los Rios, see - Blanca de los Rios, “Hispanidad,” *ABC Sevilla* (October 23, 1953).

³¹ After WWII, and with the beginning of the papacy of Pius XII, the Catholic Church became critical of, and at times openly hostile to, Franco’s dictatorship. This further made Francoism a symbol of a stronghold against the emerging reformist Catholic movement later culminating in the II Vatican Council. Several monographs have debated the role of the Catholic Church in the regime, see for instance - Javier Tusell, *Franco y los católicos: la política interior española entre 1945 y 1957* (Madrid: Alianza, 1984); Julián Casanova, *La Iglesia de Franco* (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 2001); Luis Suárez Fernández, *Franco y la iglesia: las relaciones con el Vaticano* (Matriti: Homo Legens, 2011).

³² Alberto Reig Tapia, *Ideología e historia: sobre la represión Franquista y la Guerra Civil* (Madrid: Akal, 1984).

³³ This meant, as historian Paul Preston put it, “casting off the burdens of Falangism while retaining the regime’s essential authoritarianism,” see - Paul Preston, *The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 115.

³⁴ Titled “Ley Constitución de las Cortes Españolas,” of July 17, 1942.

³⁵ Manuel Fraga, *How Spain is Governed* (Madrid: Diplomatic Information office, 1950), 45.

Succession, an arrangement that made Spain a monarchy again and appointed Franco as its regent for life. Approved via “referendum” in 1947, it was the regime’s most prominent seal of legitimacy. This notwithstanding, merely stating that the regime disposed of its fascist legacy would be to overlook a spectrum of ideological phenomena. For one thing, the Falange ideology did not disappear from the Spanish landscape. Under its tamed leadership, during the Cold War years, Francoism was still a laboratory for further “national-syndicalist” projects wherein the state alleged to harmonize labor and private production through so-called “vertical syndicates.”³⁶ For another, Francoism’s common denominator were principles of “hierarchy,” “discipline,” “service,” and “honor.”³⁷ Like the fascist regimes of the 1930s, it presented a fantasy of an unblemished patriarchal society, where the youth, woman, workers, and ethnic minorities were purified of their “modern” transgressions and put back in place. In short, in its early years Francoism was an amalgam of fascist, traditionalist, and Catholic schools of thought, overlapping in most of their ethical premises.

Over the course of the 1940s, Francoism stepped up its efforts to influence Latin American politics. Francoism’s message to the Latin American far-right was simple: “Hispano-America begins at the Pyrenean Mountains.”³⁸ After all, Spain had created the Latin American “family of nations” during the 16th century; therefore, for the Spaniards, it was still “a part of America.” Or in Franco’s words, empire had given Spain “an American character.”³⁹ For him, Spain’s “mission

³⁶ The two Falange theorists of the 1950s were Raimundo Fernández Cuesta and José Luis Arrese. Their theorization of national-syndicalism built on the work of Ramon Ledesma Ramos, and identified the state as the harmonizer of the relations between labor and capital, see - José Luis de Arrese, *Política de vivienda* (Madrid: Ministerio de vivienda, 1959).

³⁷ This, is how the regime’s most loyal narrators depicted it in later years, see - José Zafra Valverde, *El sistema político en las décadas de Franco* (Madrid: Grafite, 2004), 34.

³⁸ In the words of his loyal interpreter, Alfredo Sánchez Bella, see - “Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por Hispanoamérica,” Archivo General Universidad de Navarra (hereafter cited AGUN), documento 15/102/6; AGA caja 82/11114.

³⁹ Francisco Franco, “España y el nuevo mundo,” *Pensamiento político de Franco* (Madrid: Servicio Informativo Español, 1964).

in Hispanoamerica” was unifying the continent in the spirit of the Spanish Civil War, against the external “materialist” ideologies of the Enlightenment.⁴⁰ True, after 1945 Franco and his ideologues refrained from uttering the word “empire.” Nevertheless, uniting the Latin American continent into one spiritual movement was not merely the regime’s “diplomacy,” as some historians have argued, but, at least at first, its self-declared *raison d’être*.⁴¹

During the late-1940s, the dictatorship founded several institutions designed to attract the Latin American elites. The first institution for ideological education was the Institute for Political Studies (Instituto de Estudios Políticos, or IEP). Established in 1939, it aspired to conceptualize Francoism for international readers. While perhaps hosting a myriad of Fascist intellectuals, most notoriously Carl Schmitt,⁴² it nonetheless presented a cohesive debate on Franco’s idiosyncratic “organic democracy,” and demarcated, even before the end of the Second World War, a clear line between Nazi “totalitarianism” and the Spanish dictatorship.⁴³ More important, the IEP was the first to address Spain’s mission in Latin America and invited Latin American far-right intellectuals to collaborate upon its publications.⁴⁴ Afterwards, Franco established an institution named the Superior Council of Scientific Research (El Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, or CSIC). Controlled almost entirely by the Opus Dei, it will be examined in Chapter 2.

⁴⁰ In Franco’s words, Spain was to become the “bridge transferring spiritual values” from one civilization to the other, see - Discurso en el Palacio del Senado, October 12, 1950, in - Francisco Franco, *Textos de doctrina política. Escritos y palabras de 1945 a 1950* (Madrid: Publicaciones Española, 1951), 712.

⁴¹ Here I refer to the work of historian Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, see - Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Diplomacia franquista y política cultural hacia Iberoamérica, 1939-1953* (Madrid: Editorial CSIC, 1988); Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel: acción cultural y política durante el primer Franquismo* (Madrid: Editorial CSIC, 1992).

⁴² According to historian Javier Tusell, this institution’s reputation of being a “breeding-ground of fascism” never “matched up to its reputation, see - Javier Tusell, *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy, 1939 to the Present* (Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2007), 38.

⁴³ Alfonso García Valdecasas, “Los estados totalitarios y el estado español,” *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, no. 5 (1942): 5–32.

⁴⁴ *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, *Cuadernos de Política Social*, and *Revista de Política Internacional* were the names of its chief publication, see for instance - Pablo Antonio Cuadra, “Política internacional y política universal de España,” *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, no. 9, (1943): 161-66.

Of all the ideological institutions that operated in Franco's Spain, however, few were as decisive to the regime's linkage with Latin America as the Institute of Hispanic Culture (Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, or ICH). Established on December 31, 1945, this was no ordinary organization for cultural interchange as its name implies, but the chief agency for the ideological cooperation with the Latin American Right.⁴⁵ Its intellectual cadre relied on figures from various affiliations, but overall saw the dominance of ACNdp members, who had not been tarnished by any fascist image, and who could, therefore, propagate Franco's message without alarming the Western Bloc.⁴⁶ Alfredo Sánchez Bella is a perfect example for this. One of Franco's most zealous statesman, he directed the ICH from 1949 to 1959. Born to a conservative Valencia family in 1916, Sánchez Bella, like Blas Piñar and Gregorio Marañón Moya who proceeded him in office, belonged to a generation who had served Franco as soldiers in the Civil War and who would remain loyal to their leader in years to come. Perhaps an unexceptional intellectual, Sánchez Bella was nonetheless a most efficient propagandist who epitomized the insatiable endeavor to establish networks with Latin America's anti-liberal reaction.

The ICH official definition was, perhaps deliberately, vague, as it called for the "promotion of the mutual consciousness between the Hispanic peoples."⁴⁷ And yet beneath the Commonwealth-like appearance transpired a concrete program of political action. By the end of the 1940s, Sánchez Bella began coordinating the establishment of ICH branches in Latin America.⁴⁸ These centers were designed to be autonomous "national entities," readily adherent to

⁴⁵ As has been mentioned several times in Spanish historiography, the ICH replaced a small organization by the name of "Consejo de la Hispanidad." Operating between 1941 and 1945, it had but a limited effect in Latin America, see - María A. Escudero, *El Instituto de Cultura Hispánica* (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1994), 41-106.

⁴⁶ José María Pemán is one example, see - Delgado, *Diplomacia Franquista y política cultural hacia Iberoamérica*, 109-111; Antonio Cañellas Mas, *Alfredo Sánchez Bella: un embajador entre las Américas y Europa: Diplomacia y política informativa en la España de Franco* (Gijón, Asturias: Ediciones Trea, 2015), 79-80.

⁴⁷ "Reglamento orgánico del ICH," *BOE (España)*, no. 115 (April 25, 1947): 2426.

⁴⁸ "Informe de actividades del director del instituto de cultura hispánica, Alfredo Sánchez Bella," August 10, 1949, AGA, caja 82/10727.

the center in Madrid but also financially linked to the Spanish embassies in each country.⁴⁹ Their mission, Sánchez Bella said, was to coordinate all local Hispanic movements towards “political action,”⁵⁰ exemplify loyalty to “Catholic principles,” and most important, “train men towards a new mentality, men who will later be able to reach a new state of consciousness.”⁵¹ The ICH quickly established a large publishing apparatus. The institute’s main journals, *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos* and *Mundo Hispánico*, proclaimed to be a “Madrid-Buenos Aires” and “Buenos Aires-Mexico-Madrid” collaborations, and regularly adorned their pages with intellectuals such as Mexican philosophers José Vasconcelos and Alfonso Junco, Romanian writer Vintilă Horia, and the Argentine fascist novelists Hugo Wast, to name but a few.⁵²

The ICH soon developed a range of other devices to reach Latin American audiences. A system of international fellows (*becarios*),⁵³ was to make Spain to the quintessential academic center for the Latin American elites, with a college system (*Colegios Mayores*) constructed for their accommodation. In Sánchez Bella’s words, “the moral and intellectual reality of our country [...] permeates deep into these young friends and companions for the road, who thus are liberated

⁴⁹ In a series of trips in 1949 and 1950, Sánchez Bella personally oversaw the establishment of most all twenty-three of these entities, mostly by means of local funding, which Sánchez Bella said was to “give them continuity and authenticity,” see - Alfredo Sánchez Bella, *Misión de los institutos de cultura hispánica: finalidades, organización y orientación* (Madrid: Ediciones Instituto Caldense de Cultura Hispánica, 1959), 19; In reality, Spain financed up to 25% of the initial costs, see - “Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por Hispanoamérica.”

⁵⁰ Sánchez Bella, *Misión de los institutos de cultura hispánica*, 28.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 14.

⁵² These journals targeted, however, dissimilar audiences. *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, edited by the Falange’s intellectual Pedro Laín Entralgo, arguably aimed to attract the sophisticated conservative intelligentsia. *Mundo Hispánico*, on the other hand, was a Francoist propaganda platform that appealed to a more generic far-right audience and displayed a mixture of Catholic liturgy, triumphalist militarism, and tacky folklore imagery. Sánchez Bella’s reports indicate that he put much effort in the dissemination of *Mundo Hispánico* in Latin America, insisting that despite selling only 30.000 copies, this journal could reach the popularity of mainstream magazines such as *Reader’s Digest* and *Paris Match*, see - “Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por Hispanoamérica.”

⁵³ *Balance y perspectiva de una obra: discursos pronunciados en el día de la Hispanidad, 1950* (Madrid: Edición Cultura Hispánica, 1950), 20-21; see also - “Para que la influencia española en América gravite y tenga la mínima densidad exigible, Una masa no inferior de 15,000 estudiantes hispanoamericanos” - in “Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por Hispanoamérica.”

from the dangerous erosion and collapse that the contact with other cultures inflicts on them.” In his opinion, in Spain, the student does not “become vulgarized, or become socially over-sensitive” but rather “tougher, and perhaps more Christian, more independent: in a word, more of a man.”⁵⁴ These words echoed not only a fascist cult of youth and masculine virility but also a strikingly teleological vision of the Spanish regime as a global spiritual guide. Additionally, the ICH afforded much attention to Latin America’s far-right intellectuals (“friends and sympathizers” in Sánchez Bella’s words).⁵⁵ As many of them paid tribute to Franco during the 1950s, the ICH’s texts proudly confirmed that “without exception, they all returned to their respective countries carrying with them something from here, along with the marvelous impression of our glorious past, and burgeoning current resurgence. The intellectual, political, and social realities of Spain have thus acquired spontaneous and persuaded defenders.”⁵⁶ Of course, there was nothing spontaneous about the way these figures became fascinated by Francoism; witnessing the regime first hand and collaborating with it was the sole purpose of their celebratory visits.

The ICH also coordinated its distinctive congresses.⁵⁷ On October 1, 1949, the first Spanish-Latin American convention assembled. “The 1st Ibero-American Congress of History” was its title, and the conception of a “general theory of [Latin America’s] independence” was the objective of this unusual summit. It is telling that the most burning issue the ICH felt a need to address was a

⁵⁴ *Balance y perspectiva de una obra*, 26.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 28.

⁵⁶ For instance, in 1947 and 1948, the ICH’s “Department of university assistance and cultural exchange” brought to Spain the following Argentine intellectuals: Juan Carlos Goyeneche, Juan Ramón Sepich, Ignacio Anzoategui, Octavio Derisi, Héctor Sáenz Quesada, José María Rosa, César Picó, Salvador Dana Montaña, Carlos Obligado, and Gustavo Franceschi; and from Chile: Sergio Fernández Larrain, Javier Vergara Barros, Oscar Larson, Jaime Eyzaguirre, Roque Esteban Scarpa, and Anibal Carvajal, see - *Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, resumen de actividades desarrolladas durante el curso de 1947-1948*, 10-12; “Balance cultural de 1947,” *La Vanguardia* (January 1, 1948); Scarpa, later enjoyed reflecting on his meeting with Franco, see - “Conversando con Franco,” *La Tercera* (April 19, 1981).

⁵⁷ Sánchez Bella later expressed pride over the quantity of the ICH conventions, held in Bogotá, Quito, Madrid, Caracas, and Cuba, see - Alfredo Sánchez Bella, “Diez años de cultura hispánica,” *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 83, (1956): 136.

historical narrative. Setting the record straight between the Mother Nation and the colonies, i.e. agreeing on the meanings of Spain's imperial legacies, were the basis for any ideological cooperation between the two sides. Latin America's Revolutionary Wars did not stem from a concrete political context, the congress concluded, but "from a complex spiritual process, linked to a universal history." Hence, neither the Spaniards nor the colonies were responsible for the bloody wars between them.⁵⁸ "The Hispanoamerican History Congress," reflected Sánchez Bella, "brought us to the awareness that there had never been a plurality of histories among our nations, but one unique sentiment."⁵⁹

The following ideological congresses of Education (1949) and Intellectual Cooperation (1950) gradually shifted from narrative to political action.⁶⁰ By this time it had become clear that the ICH was "not another cultural organization,"⁶¹ but rather an apparatus enabling Latin American ideologues to promulgate concrete political, social, and education programs. In Sánchez Bella's words, "the clear notion of shared origin, of a historical climate in which we now stir, of the education system that we need, demands also knowing which should be its projection towards the future."⁶² More congresses thus followed, the more prominent being the Hispanoamerican Feminine Congress (1951), Social Security Congress (1951), and the Economic Cooperation Congress (1953).⁶³ In other words, a decade of intimate encounters awaited Latin America's "hispanistas."

⁵⁸ "El congreso Hispanoamericano de historia," *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 13 (January-February 1950): 195-97.

⁵⁹ *Balance y perspectiva de una obra*, 20-21.

⁶⁰ For instance, they decided on the "castellanization" of Latin America's "autochthonic races" see - "Resoluciones de Congreso de Cooperación intelectual," *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 20 (March-April 1951): Appendix: ¿Adonde va Hispanoamerica?

⁶¹ *Misión de los institutos de cultura hispánica*, 23.

⁶² *Balance y perspectiva de una obra*, 23.

⁶³ *El instituto de cultura hispánica al servicio de Iberoamerica* (Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1953), 30-41.

While baring clear resemblance to the projects of the 1930s, the ideology of Hispanidad of the 1950s did see some change of emphasis. If for Maeztu Hispanidad it meant a melancholic yearning for a pre-modern harmony, then within the context of the Cold War, Hispanidad began symbolizing a more concrete anti-colonial alliance. Of course, Hispanidad was still profoundly associated with Catholicism, a fact that went hand in hand with Spain's parallel effort to lead the international Catholic organizations such as Pax Romana.⁶⁴ Yet, for its chief promoters, Hispanidad gradually meant a motion from revolution to restoration. Even nationalism, they claimed, needed to be voluntarily abdicated for the benefit of Latin America's collective wellbeing.⁶⁵ The Francoists thus advised their American audience to perceive themselves as victims of a bipolar imperial process. "Hispano-Americans of the world, unite! [...] we are the proletarians of the world, who have come late to the development of technology and industrialization," announced Sánchez Bella. For him, Hispanidad was synonymous with the third world's anti-ideological self-defense.⁶⁶ In turn, the Spaniards presented a multilateral initiative for the formation of the Hispanic Community of Nations, or "Hispanic Bloc." This "mutual Hispanic citizenship," Martín-Artajo stated, could be easily "incorporated into the norms of government" in each country.⁶⁷ Franco's intellectuals even spoke optimistically about the creation of an

⁶⁴ Sánchez Bella and Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez established Pax Romana in 1943. Designed to unite the Catholic world, it quite clearly encroached on the Vatican's sphere. However, Ruiz-Giménez's movement towards Christian-Democratic positions meant that immediately after 1945 this organization played a lesser role in attracting the Latin American far-right intellectuals. In Ruiz-Giménez's opinion, Pax Romana even served as a tool of Spain's reconciliation and democratic opening, see - Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, "Pax Romana en la posguerra española y Europa en su proyección en la actualidad," in Glicerio Sánchez Recio (ed.), *La internacional católica: Pax Romana en la política europea de posguerra* (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 2005), 307.

⁶⁵ Or in Sánchez Bella's words, "the 19th century philosophies produced the aberration of thinking of the nation as an absolute value. Today out mentality and dispositions towards it are different," in *Misión de los institutos de cultura hispánica*, 23.

⁶⁶ "Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por Hispanoamérica."

⁶⁷ The terms are taken from his speeches at the Día de la Hispanidad in Zaragoza (1954) and Barcelona (1955), see - Alberto Martín-Artajo, *Hacia la Comunidad Hispánica de Naciones; discursos de Alberto Martín Artajo desde 1945 a 1955* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1956), 101-30; "Hacia una comunidad iberoamericana de naciones," *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 70, (1954): 10-11.

“Iberoamerican economic community” and a shared currency.⁶⁸ That is to say, on the one hand, during the early 1950s Spain was “fascist” no more and fully committed to a political and economic alliance with the USA;⁶⁹ and on the other hand, it advocated a union that clearly defied the USA’s imperial aspirations, as it saw them at least.⁷⁰

Predictably, Latin America’s democratic transitions of the late-1940 were met with contempt in Franco’s Spain. For Sánchez Bella, this confirmed that the enemies of Hispanidad - be they Communists, Jews, Protestants, and Christian Democrats - were on the move, “joint and coordinated” as ever. Worse yet, he argued, Latin America’s Catholics too were now recklessly pinning their hopes on democracy. What was *his* alternative? an “authoritarian system with popular support,” was the answer; a regime that, unlike European fascism, would embrace the private sector, since “the autarchic industrialization [...] is uneconomical in the long run.”⁷¹ In effect, Latin America’s return to authoritarianism was imminent, Sánchez Bella thought. “They all want a regime like Spain, but which will not be deemed Falangist or fascist,” he stressed. Therefore, to assist them Spain would have to opt for a more aggressive “political” strategy: “the Spanish formula [...] must be shown, taught to its most intimate experiences [...] among all the ruling classes in Spanish America,” Sánchez Bella wrote. For this purpose, Spain would even need to “infiltrate state apparatuses” and “disseminate the ideological bases” of the regime fully, he

⁶⁸ “Hacia una comunidad económica iberoamericana,” *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 86 (May 1955): 2.

⁶⁹ This relationship has been well-documented in historiography throughout the years. For a succinct overview of the Spanish-American collaboration and treaties during the Cold War see - Stanley G. Payne, “Los Estados Unidos y España: percepciones, imágenes e intereses,” *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, no. 25 (January 1, 2003): 155-67; see also - Manuel Espadas Burgos, *Franquismo y política exterior* (Madrid: Rialp, 1988), 186-200.

⁷⁰ This approach clearly appeared in the texts of Falange intellectuals such as Raimundo Fernández-Cuesta, who defined the Hispanic bloc as a guardian against the western “atomizing liberalism,” see - Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, “Una política de autenticidad,” *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 73, (1954): 9; for more on the “Hispanic bloc” initiatives, see - Daniel Gunnar Kressel, “The ‘Hispanic Community of Nations’: The Spanish-Argentine fascist nexus and the Imagining of a Hispanic Cold War Bloc,” *Cahiers des Amériques Latines*, no. 79 (December 2015): 115-133.

⁷¹ “Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por Hispanoamérica.”

added.⁷² These recommendations are noteworthy if only for their conspiratorial nature. But who were Sánchez Bella's Latin American interlocutors? And did they accept this so-called Spanish "formula" in its entirety?

Argentine fascism and the "return to the Hispanic"

Ever since the turn of the 19th century, the Argentine reactionary elites had been fiercely defying the country's constitutional order. Argentina's filo-fascist revolutionary movement consolidated during the 1920s as a reaction to the liberal ethos of Argentina's Constitution of 1853, its parliamentary politics following the Sáenz Peña legislation of 1912, and consequent mass-based mobilization during the tenure of elected president Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922; 1928-1930). Self-labeled "nacionalistas," the Argentine fascists generally agreed that the late-19th century has been disastrous to Argentina's social and spiritual wellbeing, and promoted instead their own alternative modernity - one akin to the spiritual truths discovered by the Catholic Church and protective of the sacred spiritual essences of the Argentine nation. If there was ever a nacionalista ideological consensus, it most certainly included the notion that any "third position" between liberalism and communism was to be founded on hierarchic, "irrational," violent, and masculine action. In the same vein, the nacionalistas vaguely agreed on the need to replace parliamentary politics with a return to a "corporative" type of authoritarianism.⁷³

⁷² Sánchez Bella further recommended propagating "the writings of José Antonio and all the theorists inspiring the Movimiento Nacional," *ibid.*

⁷³ For recent analyses of the nacionalistas in these formative years, see - Devoto, *Nacionalismo, Fascismo y Tradicionalismo en la Argentina moderna: una historia*; Buchrucker, *Nacionalismo y Peronismo: Argentina en la crisis ideológica mundial (1927 - 1955)*; McGee Deutsch, *Las Derechas*, 9; Spektorowski, *The Origins of Argentina's Revolution of the Right*; Lvovich, *El nacionalismo de derecha: desde sus orígenes a Tacuara*; Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War*; for more classic accounts see - Enrique Zuleta Álvarez, *El Nacionalismo Argentino* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones La Bastilla, 1975); Marysa Navarro, *Los nacionalistas*. (Buenos Aires: Editorial J. Alvarez, 1968).

The nacionalistas had, however, disparate views on the precise myths of national origin on which to build their political platform. From the outset, a distinctive duality was apparent in the nacionalista mythological thinking between the emphasis on the Argentine (“autochthonous”) and Hispanic mythologies. Poet Leopoldo Lugones, arguably the first major nacionalista theoretician, neither showed signs of Hispanic inclination nor aligned with any traditionalist trends. In fact, some have even referred to Lugones as a “Hispanophob,”⁷⁴ and a “passionate anti-clerical”⁷⁵ - which both help to explain his veneration of Mussolini’s anti-traditionalist ideology. In the 1920s, nacionalistas such as Carlos Ibarguren further revised the history of Argentina’s 19th century, and more specifically, in reconfiguring the image of Juan Manuel de Rosas. Argentina’s quintessential 19th century Caudillo, he represented, for them, the authentic anti-liberal, Federalist, viral, and heroic nationhood to which Argentina was to return.⁷⁶ Not coincidentally, this brand of revolutionary nacionalismo exhibited an obsession with the racial purity of the Argentine nation, which went hand in hand with an unfaltering anti-Semitic sentiment. In this ideological brand one could include Juan E. Carulla’s journal *Bandera Argentina*, followed by the Enrique P. Osés’s notoriously anti-Semitic *Crisol*, and later, his even more popular nacionalista daily *El Pampero*.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Enrique Zuleta Álvarez, *España en América: estudios sobre la historia de las ideas en Hispanoamérica* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Confluencia, 2000), 314.

⁷⁵ Navarro, *Los nacionalistas*, 51.

⁷⁶ This narrative was apparent in text such as the following: Carlos Ibarguren, *Juan Manuel de Rosas* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Frontispicio, 1948 [1930]); Leopoldo Lugones, *Política revolucionaria* (Buenos Aires: Librería Anaconda, 1931); for more historiography on The Argentine right-wing revisionism, see - Arturo Jauretche, *Política nacional y revisionismo histórico* (Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo Editor, 1970); Tulio Halperín Donghi, *El revisionismo histórico argentino como visión decadentista de la historia nacional* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 2005); Amelia Galetti, *El revisionismo como historia oficial* (Paraná: Dictum Ediciones, 2013).

⁷⁷ Later this textuality was edited into Osés’s book *Medios y fines del nacionalismo* from 1941; for more on the nacionalistas’ anti-Semitic sentiments in the early 20th century - Daniel Lvovich, *Nacionalismo y antisemitismo en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Zeta, 2003).

It was this ideological milieu that soon thereafter informed the short-lived dictatorship of José Félix Uriburu (1930-1932).⁷⁸

Yet during the late-1920s Argentine nacionalismo also rediscovered Spain as a source of political myths and intellectual networks. This so-called “doctrinal nacionalismo”⁷⁹ - which by then relied on other sources of inspiration such as Charles Maurras’s *Action française* - evoked the notions of Hispanic spirituality and myth of empire. In truth, the nacionalista “return to the Hispanic” appeared even before then in the work of Argentina writers such as Manuel Gálvez and Ricardo Rojas, whose visits to Spain in the early 20th century produced first signs of anti-liberal sentiments.⁸⁰ Steadily, platforms such as the Argentine conservative daily *La Nación*, too, began showing interest in the Spanish intellectual world (especially that of “the generation of 98”) and even hosted Miguel de Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset as column writers. By the early 1930s, Hispanic nacionalismo had become conspicuous in various other far-right circles. One of them was the Cursos de Cultura Católica - an affiliation which, under the leadership of Atilio Dell’Oro Maini and César Pico, was one of the first platforms for Hispanic nationalism in Argentina.⁸¹ In 1928, Pico, along with several other far-right Argentines - Julio and Rodolfo Irazusta, Ernesto Palacios, Alberto Ezcurra Medrano to name a few - launched the journal *La Nueva República*, a publication that further redefined nacionalismo within traditionalist and Hispanic contours.

As has been detailed already in the literature, the presence of Ortega y Gasset and Maeztu in Buenos Aires in the 1920s left a clear imprint on the nacionalista milieu and the Spanish theorists

⁷⁸ More on the connection between these intellectuals and Uriburu, see - Spektorowski, *The Origins of Argentina’s Revolution of the Right*, 77; Federico Finchelstein, *Fascismo, liturgia e imaginario: el mito del general Uriburu y la Argentina nacionalista* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2002).

⁷⁹ Zuleta Álvarez, *El Nacionalismo Argentino*, 263-64.

⁸⁰ These include Manuel Gálvez’s *El diario de Gabriel Quiroga* (1910) and *El solar de la raza* (1913), and Ricardo Rojas’s *La Restauración nacionalista* (1909).

⁸¹ According to Finchelstein, this was one of the distinctive “theoretical breeding grounds for fascism in Argentina,” see - Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 125.

alike.⁸² The latter even collaborated with several nacionalista publications *Criterio* and *Crisol*, thereby making the discourse of Hispanidad appear as a truly Spanish-Argentine school of thought.⁸³ Rather than a colonizer, Spain reemerged here as a symbol of defiance of USA imperialism and the European Enlightenment at large. The eruption of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 further influenced the Argentine Right. By confirming their already steadfast Manichean world-view on an epic scale, Franco's "Crusade" was thereby a watershed moment in the history of the nacionalistas. If Hispanidad had been, until this point, a mere theoretic label, now it emerged as the omen of a palpable regime model.

To be sure, under presidents Agustín Pedro Justo (1932-1938) and Roberto María Ortiz (1938-1942) Argentina did not officially recognize Franco's Spain, so to not infuriate the United Kingdom and the USA. Yet surreptitiously these authoritarian Argentine governments aided Franco, primarily through trade.⁸⁴ Or as the Spanish ambassador in Buenos Aires wrote Roberto María Ortiz in 1939, Franco's demand to be "recognized de facto" by the Argentines was met in 1937 and included "exchange of commercial agents."⁸⁵ Furthermore, Argentine conservatives and military men rapidly linked with Franco's "new state."⁸⁶ The late-1930s saw many Argentine travelers in Franco's Spain. One of them was the Argentine General and writer Jorge Giovanelli, who wrote back to the Argentine Foreign minister praising the nationalist army's anhelation of the

⁸² Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, *Maeztu: biografía de un nacionalista español* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2003), 315-16; Navarro, *Los nacionalistas*, 123; Spektorowski, *The Origins of Argentina's Revolution of the Right*, 116-17.

⁸³ Although one could easily argue that the Spaniards did take over the Hispanidad message early in the 1930s, due to the political needs of the Second Republic, see - González de Oleaga, *El doble juego de la Hispanidad*, 186-88.

⁸⁴ The Argentines even had a secret commerce officer in Burgos – a type of economic collaboration that was to continue throughout the 1940s; Raanan Rein, *La salvación de una dictadura: Alianza Franco-Perón 1946-1955* (Madrid: Editorial CSIC, 1995).

⁸⁵ (Letter without title) January 26, 1939, AMAEC, Guerra Civil Española, caja 7, legajo 12, anexo 2; for more documentation on the Argentine commercial delegate, see - AMAEC, Guerra Civil Española, caja 16, legajo 70.

⁸⁶ These processes are detailed in - Mónica Quijada, *Aires de República, Aires de Cruzada: la guerra civil española en Argentina* (Barcelona: Sendai, 1991).

“Reds.” “The moral of the population is excellent and it supports its Caudillo enthusiastically,” he reported.⁸⁷ From 1937 onwards, the history of the nacionalistas hence became entwined with the teleology of the Spanish Civil War, as their publications sided unanimously with Francoism and against the Second Republic.

Mario Amadeo (born 1911), Juan Carlos Goyeneche (born 1913), and Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo (born 1913), were merely in their mid-twenties when the Civil War began. A product of the Cursos de Cultura Católica, the three toured Fascist Europe in the late 1930s and spent a vast portion of their time in Franco’s Spain.⁸⁸ Sánchez Sorondo even became *La Nación*’s correspondent in Burgos, from where he reported empathetically on Nationalist Spain along with Falange writers such as Jacinto Miquelarena. While Amadeo and Goyeneche linked with the more traditionalist Francoist intellectuals (Alfredo Sánchez Bella) Sánchez Sorondo linked with the Falange’s revolutionary inner circle (Pedro Laín Entralgo). Returning to Buenos Aires, in 1938 these youngsters began publishing the intellectual journal *Sol y Luna*. Here one could observe the burgeoning cooperation between the two Catholic fascisms, as Eugenio Montes, Franco’s ambassador to Argentina, propagated the Spanish “Crusade” in Argentina and praised the two countries’ young generations, for their “simultaneous discovery of a system of values.”⁸⁹ Presenting his guest speaker, Goyeneche declared that Spain’s war meant “the world’s rebirth.”⁹⁰ In the early 1940s, as war ravaged the European continent, the *Sol y Luna* milieu continued its collaboration with Franco’s intellectuals.⁹¹ The arrival to Buenos Aires of José María Pemán, one of the more distinguished *Acción Española* theorist, and his remarks about what European fascism

⁸⁷ “Informe: sobre un viaje al España nacionalista realizado entre 24 de octubre y 8 de noviembre 1938,” AMAEC, caja 7, legajo 12.

⁸⁸ Juan Carlos Goyeneche even resided in Spain from 1942 to 1947, see - Cosme Beccar Varela, *El nacionalismo: una incógnita en constante evolución* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Tradición, Familia, Propiedad, 1970), 45.

⁸⁹ Eugenio Montes, “De Granada a Rocroy,” *Sol y Luna*, no. 1 (1938): 63.

⁹⁰ Juan Carlos Goyeneche, “Eugenio Montes,” *Sol y Luna*, no. 1 (1938): 57.

⁹¹ Among them were Dr. Gregorio Marañón, Archbishop of Toledo Isidro Goma y Tomas, and Pedro Laín Entralgo.

could learn from Argentina's Catholic nacionalismo, indicated just how mutual the admiration between these two ideological currents had become by then.⁹²

The *Sol y Luna* group was not only a prominent supporter of Franco's Spain but the first to profess a "doctrinal unity" with this regime. As Goyeneche said then, "we are committed to 'hispanofiliation' rather than hispanophilia," and elaborated: "We uphold that we are, Spain and Hispanic America, one spiritual power, one unified culture, and one sole historical progression."⁹³ Interpreting the doctrine of José Antonio, Sánchez Sorondo stated similarly that Spain "responds to the law of dialectical gravity that is the historical law of empire."⁹⁴ Tellingly, *Sol y Luna's* ideology gradually disowned the Rosista mythology, rarely exhibited any anti-Semitic tendencies, and replaced jingoistic nationalism with a neo-imperial vision of Latin America's anti-modern "third path." In the same vein, upon the pages of the journal *Nueva Política*, Sánchez Sorondo depicted a zero-sum-game between the Hispanic essence and the Enlightenment. "Hispanoamerica is the most pathetic example of a community of nations disarranged by ideologies [...] When turning against Spain they turned against their reason of being which had united them in reverence for centuries," he said in 1942.⁹⁵ Not surprisingly, Argentina's fascist-friendly Officer Revolution of 1943 elevated the status of these young theorists. Mario Amadeo even became the political director of Argentina's Foreign Ministry but resigned shortly thereafter, once Argentina declared its neutrality in the Second World War in March 1945.

As it happened, Franco's first official linkage with the Argentine state was with Juan Perón - the product of the Officer Revolution, and in June 1946, the newly elected president. As

⁹² José María Pemán, *Seis conferencias pronunciadas en Hispano-América* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1941); see also – Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 117; The Falange, and the Consejo de la Hispanidad, both operated in Buenos Aires in this period, see - González de Oleaga, *El doble juego de la Hispanidad*, 43-48.

⁹³ "Fides interperta," *Sol y Luna*, no. 3, (1939).

⁹⁴ Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, "Dialéctica de imperio," *Sol y Luna*, no. 1, (1938): 107.

⁹⁵ "Hispano América o South América," in Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, *La revolución que anunciamos* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Política, 1945), 177.

historiography has established by now, this was no ordinary diplomatic bond but rather a timely economic rescue of Franco's Spain during its brief period of international isolation.⁹⁶ The famous Perón-Franco economic treaties of 1946 and 1948 were an expression of fraternity between two regimes that self-identified as the "pillars" of the Hispanic civilizing mission. While displaying dissimilar state-ideologies, Perón's Argentina and Franco's Spain reciprocally voiced their commitment for an alternative spiritual modernity. Indeed, the 1946 protocols reveal not only the sides' obligation to economic support but a commitment for intensive intellectual collaboration.⁹⁷

During his first two years in office, Juan Perón often identified with the Hispanic mission.⁹⁸ His speech on Día de la Raza of October 12, 1947, directed to the Spanish people and broadcasted on Spain's national radio, left a profound imprint on Franco's ideologues. After all, here the "Argentine Caudillo" stated openly that against any material impulse "Argentina - the co-heir of the Hispanic spirituality - opts for the significant supremacy of the spirit." In this speech, Perón exclaimed that the "nations of Hispanidad constitute a unity," a fact that must impel them towards "a universal enterprise." "Don Quijote must be resurrected, and the sepulcher of El Cid opened," he even pleaded in pathos.⁹⁹ Consequently, by the time of Martín-Artajo's 1948 visit to Argentina, the Spanish newspapers spoke of a so-called "Hispanic parallelism," whereby Argentina had joined Spain as the second guardian of Hispanidad already in 1810.¹⁰⁰ Upon his arrival, the Spanish Foreign Minister declared that the countries "preserved the inestimable good of Christian justice

⁹⁶ Rein, *The Franco-Perón Alliance: Relations between Spain and Argentina, 1946-1955*.

⁹⁷ For instance, the fifth cause in the 1948 treaty declares the "increase, reciprocally, and [...] exchange of books, magazines, newspapers and other publications," AGN, FNRP.CCA.C45.

⁹⁸ He was even labeled "the Paladín of Hispanidad" in these early years, see - Raanan Rein, "Hispanidad y oportunismo político: el caso peronista," *ELAL*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1991).

⁹⁹ *ABC Madrid* (October 14, 1947), see also - Jesús Evaristo Casariego, "Misión Hispánica de la gran Argentina," *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 9, (October 1948).

¹⁰⁰ Jesús Evaristo Casariego, "Misión Hispánica de la gran Argentina," *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 9 (October 1949): 68.

and charity for all nations.”¹⁰¹ Humberto Sosa Molina, Argentina’s interim Foreign Minister, responded by praising Franco for bringing “justice into the mind and victory in the heart.”¹⁰²

What motivated the Argentines to express such avid unity with the isolated Spanish regime? Eva Perón’s own exuberant visit to Spain in June 1947, and her “farewell speech” to the Spanish people on national radio reveal some of Perón’s motivations:

I earn your applause, Spanish workers, because they are an expression of your repudiation of those agitators who mobilize the people with utopian promises, and abandon them once they have secured their own fortunes [...] The day when General Perón triumphed in the fairest elections in Argentine history, [...] that day we visited our workers and celebrated together our triumph. That is why you applaud me: because we have not apostatized the people, the workers, the “descamisados.”¹⁰³

Evidently, during their first years in office, the Peróns sought to find parallels between the two regimes in order to send an unequivocal anti-communistic message to their more conservative constituency. This might also explain the somewhat overlooked visit of Argentina’s deputy Education Minister, Jorge Arizaga, to Franco’s CSIC, in November 1948. At a conference named “Towards an Argentine national education” Arizaga said that where positivism is concerned, his country was now “moving away from such errors and returns to the path of Spain’s spirit.” Addressing the aforementioned “parallelism,” Spain’s Education Minister, Ibáñez Martín, replied by saying that “the social policy of General Perón, like that of General Franco, has overcome the Marxist political myth.”¹⁰⁴ Similarly, Argentina warmly hosted Falange figures in the late-1940s, most conspicuously, José Antonio’s sister and Falange leader, Pilar Primo de Rivera.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Martín Artajo, *Hacia la Comunidad Hispánica de Naciones*, 29.

¹⁰² *Argentina y España* (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Culto, 1948), 12.

¹⁰³ “Mensaje de despedida al pueblo español,” *ABC Madrid* (June 27, 1947).

¹⁰⁴ “La restitución del Crucifijo en las escuelas argentinas es el símbolo del sentido católico, que aspiró la vida da la nación hermana durante la época española,” *ABC Madrid* (November 11, 1948).

¹⁰⁵ “Instrucciones para el señor embajador de España en Buenos Aires,” March 25, 1947, AGA, caja 82/06958; “Escrito del embajador de España en Buenos Aires, José María de Areiza, referente a la visita al país depilar Primo de Rivera,” November 1, 1949, FNFF, documento 12200.

On the other hand, as Eva Perón's speech also clearly shows, Argentina's populist leaders enjoyed underscoring that their democratic government was more just and, thereby, a more popular regime model than the Spanish so-called "organic democracy." Thus, the evolving collaboration between Spain and the USA – which meant that Franco depended on Argentine material resources no more, and on a symbolic level, had become aligned with Perón's antagonists – meant Peronism and Francoism drifted apart after 1948. In 1950, Perón even backed away from the Perón-Franco Treaties, according to the Argentine Foreign Minister, due to "Argentina's financial circumstances that compel its government to modify its credit politics and export commercialization."¹⁰⁶ Tellingly, next Perón jettisoned his rhetoric of Hispanidad, deliberately favoring the use of "Latinidad" instead.¹⁰⁷ By the early 1950s, the regimes' news outlets even exchanged insults - a feud that ended only once Franco sent Perón a personal message demanding he ordered his news agencies to halt their anti-Spanish campaign. "I appeal to your chivalry and honor as a soldier," he wrote, "so that, in the service of friendship among our nations, you will stop the campaign of slander and defamation undertaken [...] against the leader of a friendly nation whom you have distinguished with your friendship."¹⁰⁸ At any rate, by the time of Argentina's 1950 elections, it had become clear that the countries were presenting Latin America with different post-fascist formulas: Perón's democratic if anti-liberal populism, and Franco's dictatorship of "national-syndicalism." Peronism's contribution to the theorization of Hispanidad would be limited henceforth, and occur mainly in the 1970s, within the context of Perón's so-called "turn to the right," examined in chapter 6. This notwithstanding, the so-called "parallelism" between the

¹⁰⁶ Franco's dictated letter of reply to Argentine Foreign Minister Hipólito Paz was quite cordial and ended with the emphasis of the "indissoluble community of ideals and spirit" the countries shared, see - "Carta en borrador sin firma," January 14, 1950, FNFF, documento 13835.

¹⁰⁷ Rein, *The Franco-Perón Alliance*, 174.

¹⁰⁸ "Texto de telegrama al Embajador en Buenos Aires para hacerlo llegar al Presidente," FNFF, documento 9734.

countries never quite dissolved. Sánchez Bella, for example, never abandoned the belief that Argentina was Spain's key partner in leading the Hispanic world.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, the countries cooperated within the United Nations and maintained a constant military exchange.¹¹⁰

Following Argentina's democratization and Perón's rise to power, the nacionalistas experienced a period of decline in prestige and political influence. With many of their key intellectuals of the 1930s dead or absent from the public sphere, it was therefore up to the younger generation of *Sol y Luna* to lead this ideological movement, among other things, by reestablishing alliances with the residues of European fascism, the "authentic Europe" in words of nacionalista Father Julio Meinvielle.¹¹¹ Thus, the nacionalistas returned to Franco's Spain. Mario Amadeo, Juan Carlos Goyeneche, Máximo Etchebarri, César Pico, Carlos Ibarguren, and Juan R. Sepich all arrived in Madrid in the late-1940s to pay tribute to their main ideological counterpart, and throughout, to bolster their own movement by leading the new post-fascist Hispanic international.¹¹²

The nacionalistas were not merely collaborators in Franco's apparatus: they were the forefront spokesmen of the ICH and the promoters of the notion that Hispanidad was "an American reality,"¹¹³ born not in Castile, but with the "anxiety of a Spanish heart, dazed in the American landscape."¹¹⁴ The friendship and mutual admiration between Amadeo, Goyeneche, and Sánchez

¹⁰⁹ "Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por Hispanoamérica."

¹¹⁰ The Argentine Army even maintained close contacts with the Spanish embassy, see for instance - Ejército Argentino, Colegio Militar de la Nación, "Mes de la Hispanidad; con los auspicios de la embajada de España," FNFF, documento 8246.

¹¹¹ "Editorial," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 1 (June 1944).

¹¹² Carlos Ibarguren even served as the Vice-president of the Honorary Commission at the historical 1949 History congress, see - *Revista de Historia de América*, no. 27, (June 1949), 113; Sepich's visit to Spain correlated with the production of his texts *Misión de los pueblos hispánicos* (Madrid: Seminario de Problemas Hispanoamericanos, 1949) and *La hispanidad como problema y destino* (Cuyo: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1948).

¹¹³ César Pico, "Hacia La Hispanidad," *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, no. 17-18 (1944): 619.

¹¹⁴ Juan Carlos Goyeneche, "Hacia La Hispanidad (nota preliminar)," *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, no. 17-18, (1944), 593.

Bella was the key to the success of this network.¹¹⁵ These contacts meant that during Sánchez Bella's 1946 visit to Buenos Aires he met every prominent nacionalista intellectual in town.¹¹⁶ Goyeneche subsequently became the vice-president of the international Board of Directors of the ICH's Institute of Iberoamerican Culture.¹¹⁷ Amadeo, for his part, became the co-editor of *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos* together with Laín Entralgo.¹¹⁸ Hence, a unity of fate, rather than proximity of faith, led these two intellectuals, of somewhat dissimilar ideological orientations and temperament, to theorize Hispanidad upon this journal. Clearly, Laín's secular Falangism did not entirely correlate with Amadeo's doctrinal nacionalismo. But then again, this collaboration was precisely how ICH aspired to present itself to the Americas: as an inclusive platform, consensual in its overall mission to spiritually unite the Spanish speaking world.

One nacionalista became particularly identified with the new Hispanidad ideology: César Pico. His text "Hacia la hispanidad," from 1942, and "Nuestro Tiempo y la misión de las Españas" from 1946, both published in Spain, can be seen as the roadmap of this transnational project. The visit of this "champion of Hispanidad" to Spain in 1947, and his encounter with Franco, clearly left a mark on him. "My coming to Spain fulfilled a profound desire of a lifetime" he professed, thereafter praising his host for the "timely invitations of Latin American figures."¹¹⁹ By now devoid of any Fascist remanence, in Pico's words lay the unshakable mythical core whereby prior to the age of rationalism the European hemisphere was one of harmony and perpetual spiritual

¹¹⁵ Sánchez Bella was Goyeneche's thesis advisor during the latter's years of studying in Madrid.

¹¹⁶ From his correspondence with Goyeneche, we learn that these encounters included José María de Estrada, Father Julio Meinvielle, Father Luis María Etcheverry, Mario Amadeo, Cosme Beccar Varela, César Pico, Máximo Etchecopar, Basilio Serrano, Alberto Ezcurra, Alberto Espezel, and Héctor Saenz Quesada. The context behind the meetings was the establishment of ICH in Argentina and the coordination of an Argentine delegation to the Pax Romana conference in Spain, later in 1946. During his visit Sánchez Bella stayed at Goyeneche's home "various times," see - Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Juan Carlos Goyeneche, May 2, 1946, AGUN, documento 15/11/366.

¹¹⁷ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Juan Carlos Goyeneche, January 29, 1949, AGUN, documento 15/11/377.

¹¹⁸ This seeming coediting took place from September 1948 (volume no.5-6) until January 1950 (volume no. 13).

¹¹⁹ "Manifestaciones del ilustre hispanista argentino don César Pico," *La Vanguardia* (May 15, 1947).

elation.¹²⁰ The reason this “mystical” Europe gave way to the rational “a-historical” society, he said, was the *ancien régime*’s failure to grasp its social “dynamism” and “condensation.”¹²¹ For him, even the catastrophe of the world wars had been a symptom of the “atomization” of Europe’s “social body.”¹²² In this sense, Pico’s Hispanidad represented not a demand to go back in time but to adapt to the contemporary “social” condition. That Pico used scholastic terminologies, did not diminish from the fact that he ultimately relied on much “scientific” jargon, thereby appearing less as a teleological thinker and more as a sociologist.¹²³ The nacionalistas as a whole now defined the mission of the “Españas” in terms of a spiritual and material “equilibrium.” Or as Goyeneche’s put it, Hispanidad ought to repeat the Habsburgian “historical miracle” of an “equilibrium between reality and ideal.”¹²⁴

Underscoring that the miscalculations of European fascism had been fully studied was another salient tendency in these manifestos. Revolutionary nationalism, explained *Sol y Luna* theorist José María de Estrada, can lead to “over defensive” myopia. Alluding to Nazism, he explained that what seems as “salvation at start” ultimately propels a “sin of excess” and “hate towards Reason.” Estrada even dared to state that Latin America suffers from “tenuous nationalities,” and therefore had become the victim of rationalism, liberalism, and communism. Hispanidad, and its “universal Catholic culture,” was, for him, the only plausible solution for saving nations from communism *and* destructive chauvinistic inclinations.¹²⁵ By emphasizing that

¹²⁰ César E. Pico, “Hacia La Hispanidad,” *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, no. 17 (1944), 604.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 607.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 608.

¹²³ In 1946, for instance, he stressed that rationality does not hold individuals together in “social peace” the way a spiritual “collective belief” does, a generalization which arguably echoes the work of Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, and perhaps even classic sociologists such as Emile Durkheim, see - César E. Pico, “Nuestro Tiempo y la misión de las Españas,” *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 1 (1946), 45-46.

¹²⁴ Juan Carlos Goyeneche, “Hacia La Hispanidad” (nota preliminar), 594.

¹²⁵ Estrada further state that it is time for America to set an example for Europe, with a “style more pertinent to the exigencies of modernity,” see - José María de Estrada, “Reflecciones sobre hispanismo y lo nacional” *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 45, (1953) Appendix: ¿Adónde va Hispanoamerica?.

nations are ethically meaningless unless they discover a “vocation” within universal history,¹²⁶ paradoxically the nacionalistas were becoming less “nationalists” and more internationalists as the Cold War unfolded.

From the few correspondences between these nacionalistas from the late-1940s, it is evident that with the fall of the Axis Powers, the debate over a “third position” transcending liberalism and communism had changed considerably. “With the fall of the Axis, sank the last the last formally ideological political possibility,” wrote the ideologue Máximo Etchecopar to Amadeo in 1947.¹²⁷ Returning from a tour in Spain and Italy he expressed his fear of communism, but was even more preoccupied with the “Americanization” of post-war Europe. “America is transforming the Europeans. Their rich humanity [...] is volatilized in a generation,” he wrote.¹²⁸ Obviously, the nacionalistas did not abandon the idea of a “third path” to modernity. They agreed, however, on the need to give a new “political shape to this effort” while avoiding “polemical attitudes against the USA.”¹²⁹ That is to say, figures such as Etchecopar thought Latin America’s conservative forces should aim towards authoritarian models that would be simultaneously acceptable in the USA and protect the Hispanic societies from the detriment of the USA’s cultural influence.

Even so, in the 1950s, the nacionalistas were ambivalent over the question of the nature of their collaboration with the Western Bloc. On January 29, 1951, Amadeo and Goyeneche assembled in the city of Salta, Argentina, with associates from Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, to draft a declaration “setting in twenty-five points our hispanista ideals,” in Amadeo’s

¹²⁶ Pico, “Hacia La Hispanidad,” 615.

¹²⁷ Private collection of Horacio Sánchez de Loria Parodi, “Carta de Máximo Etchecopar a Mario Amadeo,” January 27, 1948; see also - Horacio Sánchez de Loria Parodi, *Máximo Etchecopar: un pensador tucumano olvidado* (Buenos Aires: Torre de Hércules, 2015), 284.

¹²⁸ “Carta de Máximo Etchecopar a Mario Amadeo,” June 2, 1947, *ibid*, 269; Later, he bore witness that in the “orient” the Americans “naively propose their arguments in terms of aircraft, frigidaires, cinema, etc, that is, in term of civilization”, see - “Carta de Máximo Etchecopar a Mario Amadeo,” September 10, 1947, *ibid*, 275.

¹²⁹ “Carta de Máximo Etchecopar a Mario Amadeo,” January 27, 1948, *Ibid*, 284.

words.¹³⁰ The so-called “Declaration of Salta” spoke of mutual historical, spiritual, and linguistic origins, and denounced “the intent to unify the countries of Hispanoamerica for the exclusive function of material configurations.” Similarly, the declaration flatly rejected the doctrines of the United Nations and the Organization of the American Nations as their representative entity. In 1951 this was a flagrant labeling of the Cold War blocs as Latin America’s enemy. In the ICH publications that followed the convention, the nacionalistas expressed a recovered anti-modern tone. “Either we let the modern world drag us down in its fall, or we form [...] a vanguard of a new world in which man does not undergo the abomination of his own existence,” Amadeo exclaimed in 1951.¹³¹ It was thus he, rather than the reticent Spaniards, who now attacked the false “East-West dilemma,” insisting that from a spiritual perspective these blocs are identically sinister. Goyeneche, too, mocked the capitalist “civilization of abundance and metaphysical misery.” What Latin America needed instead, he said, was to relieve itself from “the solutions of the masses, and the vanity of the ego.”¹³² To avoid any doubt, Amadeo declared: “a Hispanoamerica loyal to its own essence could never reach a profound intimacy with the USA.”¹³³

The quotations above indicate that the nacionalistas led the interpretation of Hispanidad as an anti-imperial struggle. Indeed, the Salta declaration clearly spoke of “decolonization,” and advocated a new policy of “regionalism.”¹³⁴ Equally, the nacionalistas dismissed the principle of “individual rights,” branding them foreign “interventionism.” In other words, in Amadeo’s ethical

¹³⁰ Mario Amadeo, *Por una convivencia internacional: bases para una comunidad hispánica de naciones* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1956), 218.

¹³¹ “Hispanoamerica 1950,” *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 21 (May-June 1951), Appendix: ¿Adónde va Hispanoamerica?

¹³² Juan Carlos Goyeneche, “Hispanoamerica y la unidad de cultura,” *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 21 (May-June 1951), Appendix: ¿Adónde va Hispanoamerica?

¹³³ Mario Amadeo, “Bases para una política Hispanoamericana,” *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos* no. 20 (March-April 1951), Appendix: ¿Adónde va Hispanoamerica?

¹³⁴ In his book *Por una convivencia internacional*, published by the ICH in 1956, he proposes this category as the only weapon to defy the new Cold War empires, see - Amadeo, *Por una convivencia internacional*, 79.

order, the right of collectives to follow their “spiritual hierarchy” held a supreme position vis-à-vis the emerging global conceptualization of human rights. His intransigence was followed by justifying the “use force as a political factor” and means of repression “once if they are used justly.”¹³⁵ And expectedly, the nacionalistas further underscored Franco’s Spain universal role. The Hispanic Bloc, Amadeo stated throughout the 1950s, “cannot be conceived without the presences of Spain.”¹³⁶ The role of Francoism in the continent’s future typically appeared through the usage of metaphors such as the civilizing “bridge” that could allow Argentina to “participate in Europe through Spain.”¹³⁷ The use of the maternal metaphor was even more common. At times the caring “mother,” in other times “the elder sister possessing the old family documents,”¹³⁸ the Francoists and nacionalistas alike portrayed Spain as the key for the Americans’ spiritual revival.

In 1954, while Peronism was wallowing in political crisis, Amadeo arrived in Spain to propagate the Hispanic Community of Nations.¹³⁹ The keynote speaker at the Fiesta de la Hispanidad in Zaragoza, Amadeo hailed Spain’s “spirit of crusade” and the “unforgettable morning of the 18th of July [1936].” More important, his speech was a frontal attack on both Eastern and Western Blocs. “We will speak our own language, which is neither the one of ‘the declarations of rights’ nor the dialectics of rational liberalism”¹⁴⁰ he stated, flagging thereafter that Latin America faced a decision whether to “unite under the name of ‘Hispanic Community of Nations’ or under the banner of ‘the Soviet Republics of Indo-America.’”¹⁴¹ Amid a period of

¹³⁵ Ibid, 215.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 90; “Hispanoamericanismo”, declared also the Salta document, “recognizes only the exceptional ties that bind the hispanoamerican community with Spain and Portugal [...]”

¹³⁷ Pico, “Hacia La Hispanidad”, 617.

¹³⁸ Artajo, *Hacia la Comunidad Hispánica de Naciones*, 34.

¹³⁹ Invited by Sánchez Bella and Lain Entralgo, Amadeo was the only Argentine representative since Perón had decided to boycott the event. According to Amadeo’s own account, the publication of his speech was prohibited in Argentina by Perón, and was followed by a Peronist “anti-Spanish campaign,” see- Mario Amadeo, *Ayer, hoy, mañana* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Gure, 1956), 32.

¹⁴⁰ Amadeo, *Por una convivencia internacional*, 217.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 216.

further Spanish international reintegration - with Franco's 1953 treaties with the Vatican and the USA, and shortly before being reaccepted into the UN in 1955 - flattering as it was, Amadeo's belligerent speech served Franco little. Indeed, this was the last time Spain invited Amadeo, or any Argentine nacionalista for that matter, to speak in this type of events.

His fascist slogans notwithstanding, in this period Amadeo and his group sought to articulate more tangible, and indeed post-fascist, theories of the state. The question of how nations should design a modernizing process to achieve maximal economic and technical sophistication, without succumbing to an alleged economic dependency, was not to be addressed in novel nacionalista platform. Parallel to the cooperation with Spain, Amadeo, Goyeneche, and Etchecopar became identified with two new journals: *Dinámica Social* and *Quincena*. As the correspondence between Sánchez Bella and Goyeneche reveals, the 1953 treaties between Spain and the USA may have stimulated the nacionalistas to produce these platforms.¹⁴² Breaking away even further from the filo-fascist style of the elder nacionalista generation - Meinville's newspaper *Presencia* for example - these projects set out to propose novel paths for authoritarian modernization.

Not surprisingly, Manuel Fraga, then the head of Franco's IEP, was an eager promoter of, and contributor to, *Dinámica Social*.¹⁴³ His texts were only one component in yet another transnational attempt to offer of an alternative to Peronism. *Quincena*, and more conspicuously, *Dinámica Social*, reveal how the transition from fascist corporatism to technocratic-authoritarianism occurred in Argentina. On the one hand, these journals defended the freedom of thought and attacked Perón's "totalitarianism." They wanted, so they argued, to retrieve the

¹⁴² Sánchez Bella still relentlessly demanded from his friend the "regrouping of our forces for a concrete and immediate action, in the political, economic and social fields," see - Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Juan Carlos Goyeneche," October 2, 1953, AGUN, documento 015/011/397.

¹⁴³ AGA, caja 42/08973; See also - Manuel Fraga, "Dinámica Social," *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 21, (May-June, 1951), 423; chapters of Fraga's book *El nuevo anti-maquiavelismo* appeared in *Dinámica Social* upon several volumes.

liberties lost by mankind in the world of crisis. On the other hand, they demanded a post-ideological authoritarian “new order.” Or as *Dinámica Social* put it:

It is known that a crisis is a state of disorder between two balances. The equilibrium on which modern society is founded emerged from the French Revolution. Given that our society is doubtlessly in deep crisis, the moral, political, economic, and social balance derived from that great event must be considered surpassed. For society to acquire a new balance - and since history never repeats itself but in increasingly higher forms - the need for a *new order* is imperative.¹⁴⁴

Amadeo and Goyeneche asserted here that this novel “functional system” depended on the masses forsaking their newly gained democratic power for the sake of the common good. An elite-oriented regime, this “new order” would prompt “private initiative” but would be also corporatist in its social functions, they said. And tellingly, *Dinámica Social* proclaimed this regime model was to adhere to the “primacy of the spiritual.”¹⁴⁵ In other words, while promoting an economically liberal setup, these publications clearly echoed the 1930s fascist world-view in that they defined Argentina’s future “authentic revolution”¹⁴⁶ as a spiritual crusade against the ideologies of the Enlightenment.¹⁴⁷ The ideological foundations for Onganía’s “post-ideological” order had been, in many ways, established then and there.

The Chilean “corporativist school” in Franco’s Spain

That Francoism was influential for the emergence of Chilean authoritarianism seems undisputed in the literature. Not only have historians linked Pinochet and Franco’s regimes in one ideological genealogy,¹⁴⁸ but this thesis has been a salient allegation of anti-Pinochet activists

¹⁴⁴ Carlo Scorza, “Nuestro Rumbo,” *Dinámica Social*, no. 13-14 (September-October, 1951).

¹⁴⁵ “En el tercer año de vida,” *Dinámica Social*, no. 25 (September 1952).

¹⁴⁶ “La revolución,” *Quincena*, no. 4 (October 28, 1953).

¹⁴⁷ Mario Amadeo, “La conferencia de Caracas,” *Quincena*, no. 10 (April 21, 1954).

¹⁴⁸ Isabel Jara Hinojosa, *De Franco a Pinochet: el proyecto cultural franquista en Chile 1936-1980*. (Santiago de Chile: Programa de Magíster en TEHA, 2006).

during the late-1970s.¹⁴⁹ Needless to say, Franco's agents proudly depicted their Chilean counterparts as mimetics of Francoism throughout the years.¹⁵⁰ The present study aims, however, to complicate this picture somewhat. I pose that the Chilean traditionalists did not merely imitate the Francoist formulas but, as in the case of the Argentine nacionalistas, struggled to lead the Hispanic movement, and along the way, to produce a uniquely Chilean authoritarian formula. In order to gain as complete an understanding as possible of Chile's 1970s authoritarian turn, it is thus essential to inspect this ideological production of the 1950s.

As in the case of Argentina, to understand the presence of Chileans in Franco's Spain in the 1950s one must return to the 1930s, the most formative era for Chile's Right. A nation ill-famed for its social inequalities and ongoing polarization over the meaning of its own liberal legacies dating back to the mid-19th century, during the presidency of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1932-1941) Chile saw the rise of numerous authoritarian ideological groups.¹⁵¹ By the late 1930s, the Chilean Right was divided between two distinctive associations: the Chilean corporatist traditionalists, centered mainly in Chile's Conservative Party; and the Falange Nacional - an allegedly "non-violent" filo-fascist movement that nonetheless postulated launching a spiritual "crusade" towards an authoritarian "organic democracy." The Conservative Party leaders, Horacio Walker Larraín for instance, drew insights from the work of Maurras and Maeztu, while the Falange's Manuel Antonio Garretón and Eduardo Frei took cue from José Antonio Primo de

¹⁴⁹ See for example - Hernán Ramírez Necochea, "El fascismo en la evolución política de Chile," *Araucaria de Chile*, no. 1 (1978): 9-35; Miguel Rojas-Mix, "El Hispanismo: ideología de la dictadura en "Hispanoamérica," *Araucaria de Chile*, no. 2 (1978): 28-47.

¹⁵⁰ "Publicación de Santiago de Chile titulada 'los católicos en la política,'" July 27, 1959, FNFF, documento 17850.

¹⁵¹ Most notoriously Jorge González's Movimiento Nacional Socialista, one of the only avowed Nazi-oriented movement to emerge in the Southern Cone during the 1930s; for more literature on the crisis of Chilean democracy in the early 20th century and the rise of the Chilean Right, see - Sofia Correa, *Con las riendas del poder: la derecha chilena en el siglo XX* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana, 2005); Brian Loveman, *Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

Rivera's Falange.¹⁵² "We were so enthusiastic about their leaders, their postulates, their methods, even the name of the party," said Alejandro Silva Bascuñan about his Spanish idols in later years.¹⁵³ Briefly put, both associations shared a fascination with anything "corporative," but were at odds when it came to their interpretation of Catholic spirituality and precise amount of inclusion of the "masses" in politics.

Since the 1930s, the journal *Estudios* was the epicenter of Chile's corporative and authoritarian thought. Its contributors included Osvaldo Lira, Jaime Eyzaguirre, Julio Philippi, Roque Esteban Scarpa, and Ricardo Krebs, who will appear in the following pages. These men were also leading figures in the Conservative Party, as well as in other reactionary groups such as la Asociación Nacional de Estudiantes Católicos (ANEC) and La Liga Social. Expectedly, *Estudios* firmly supported Franco's Spain during the Civil War years, and frequently published the work of Falange ideologues such as Laín Entraldo.¹⁵⁴ In the late 1940s and 1950s, it was here that Chile's so-called "corporativist school" resumed its task of modeling its own brand of authoritarian models.¹⁵⁵ Rather than land reform, a "sindicalization of the peasants" was, for example, its righters' solution to Chile's fundamental social crisis.¹⁵⁶ However, it would be misleading to argue that *Estudios* was seriously debating a corporatist state-ideology in these years. Rather, mirroring the ICH, this was the platform where Chile's far-right ideologues reiterated the mythological and

¹⁵² Frei met with both Spanish figures, see - Eduardo Frei Montalva, *Memorias (1911-1934) y correspondencias con Gabriela Mistral y Jacques Maritain* (Santiago: Planeta, 1989), 58; More on Garretón's connections with Spain, see - José Díaz Nieva, *Chile, de la Falange Nacional a la Democracia Cristiana* (Santiago de Chile: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2000), 98.

¹⁵³ Alejandro Silva Bascuñan, *Una experiencia social cristiana* (Santiago de Chile: Política y Espíritu, 1949), 70.

¹⁵⁴ See for instance - Pedro Laín Entralgo, "Raíz y misión de Europa," *Estudios*, no. 176 (Septmeber 1947): 5-12; "Idea de Europa," *Estudios*, no. 180 (January 1948): 16-23; Rodrigo Fernández Carvajal, "España como orden de amor," *Estudios* no. 171 (April 1947): 48-54.

¹⁵⁵ This is at least the narrative that Chilean historians such as José Manuel Castro have produced in recent years regarding Chile's so-called "corporativismo católico" see - José Manuel Castro, *Jaime Guzmán: Ideas y política 1946-1973* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2016), 27.

¹⁵⁶ *Estudios* (editorial), no. 168, January 1947.

ethical ground that was to guide the country's social organization. The crisis of the modern world, *Estudios* stressed, emanated not from the "age of machination" but from parliamentary politics, the eradication of the *ancien régime*'s social hierarchies, and consequent "infantilism" and "male impotence."¹⁵⁷ Thus, argued Phillipi, any future political order would comprise of "efficient pacifying action."¹⁵⁸ For him, unlike the fascist "totalitarianism," corporatism did not represent an all-intrusive statist apparatus but a subtle spiritual principle - a metaphysical "essence" that would oblige Chile's "inferior" communities to willingly consent to authority, hierarchy, and inequality.¹⁵⁹ That is to say, the corporative political myth appearing in *Estudios* proposed a return to a hierarchic pre-modern order, based on the family, "guilds," and most importantly, on a benevolent authoritarian peace-keeper.

In the late-1940s, the identification with Francoism and Hispanidad further defined the borderlines between the Falange Nacional - soon to be renamed the Christian Democratic Party - and the Conservative Party. The first to link the latter with Francoism was Father Osvaldo Lira. Born in 1904 to a Santiago aristocratic family, he arrived in Spain in 1940 to witness the establishment of Franco's regime first hand. In 1946, he moved to Madrid and became intimately acquainted with the ICH circle, as well as with the CSIC's philosopher and Opus Dei member Antonio Millan Puelles. He also met with Franco, and "admired and esteemed" him ever since.¹⁶⁰ In Spain, Lira published most of his early work, which pertained not only to Maritain's scholastic method of St. Thomas ("Tomismo"),¹⁶¹ but also to Spanish authoritarian traditionalism, namely

¹⁵⁷ "Complejo de inferioridad," *Estudios*, no. 231 (July-August 1953): 3.

¹⁵⁸ Julio Phillipi, "El orden politico," *Estudios* no. 206 (June 1950): 40.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁶⁰ He arrived there on May 16, 1940, in what became in his words "the best time of his life." Allegedly, he himself said that he felt "more Spanish than Chilean," see - *Padre Osvaldo Lira, en torno de su pensamiento: homenaje en sus 90 años* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1994), 27-28.

¹⁶¹ Elena Sánchez correa and Sara López Escalona, *R.P Osvaldo Lira P. SS.CC y Clarence Finlayson, bibliografía de dos pensadores chilenos* (Santiago de Chile: Anales de la Facultad de Educación, 1985); see also - "Pensamiento y medida de J. Maritain," *Estudios*, no. 147, (July 1947).

Juan Vázquez de Mella's anti-modern Carlism.¹⁶² Next, Lira became yet another avid promoter of Hispanidad, and theorized Chile's idiosyncratic connection to it. His "Visión de España" from 1948,¹⁶³ and later "Hispanidad y mestizaje" from 1952, are illuminating not only because they appeared upon the ICH publications,¹⁶⁴ but because of the clear transition they offer from theological abstractions to political action. Lira too was concerned by the lessons of the Second World War, and the meanings of nationalism. In his opinion, the war's lesson was that the European revolutions have failed entirely. The Hispanic "revolution" in America, on the other hand, was a consummate success, he held.¹⁶⁵ In actual fact, Lira argued that the chasm between "Hispania" and the "pseudo-civilization of Europe" cannot ever be bridged. The Hispanic "authentic European civilization," he proposed, should therefore be purged from foreign cultural influences - Islam, the Reformation, and 19th century "modern 'isms'" -¹⁶⁶ all the while preserving whatever it deems valuable from Europe's "techno-industrial and experimental sciences."¹⁶⁷ This, for Lira, was the true mission for a responsible "directing elite."¹⁶⁸ Laín Entralgo, then Lira's editor, repudiated these theories of Hispanic purism just a year later, as we will see in chapter 2.

The second pillar of Chilean authoritarian thought, present in Spain in the 1940s and 1950s, was Historian Jaime Eyzaguirre. Born in 1908, he was a key figure at the Catholic University of Chile, a member of the Conservative Party, and the editor of *Estudios* for many years. As his colleague and ICH member Hugo Montes noted, Eyzaguirre "endorsed a revision of the history of

¹⁶² Osvaldo Lira, *Nostalgia de Vázquez de Mella* (Santiago de Chile: Difusión Chilena, 1942).

¹⁶³ Osvaldo Lira, "Visión de España," *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 3 (May-June 1948): 407-39.

¹⁶⁴ The title for his work "Hispanidad y mestizaje" had actually been suggested to him by Sánchez Bella, see - Sánchez correa and Sara López, *R.P Osvaldo Lira P. SS.CC*, 43.

¹⁶⁵ Osvaldo Lira, *Hispanidad y mestizaje y otros ensayos* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1952), 58.

¹⁶⁶ In a narrative that goes back to the 8th century, he argues that Europe has developed "an irreconcilable hostility against Spain", in Lira, "Visión de España", 414.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 439.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 415.

Spain and its links with the new world.”¹⁶⁹ True enough, Eyzaguirre’s texts further articulated Chile’s inimitability as the vanguard of Castilian values, and even brought the notion of aristocratic rule to the extreme: “There is a firm and sober class in Chile, educated in austerity and effort, as the old nobility of Castile [...] able to impose a vigorous structuring of society and save it of anarchy,” he wrote.¹⁷⁰ His text “Hispanoamérica del dolor,” published in the IEP’s *Revista de Estudios Políticos* in 1945,¹⁷¹ is foremost a narrative of a collective Latin American victimhood. The Habsburgian era “had striven to live a perfect theological order” and thus gave all social classes “a harmonious sense and the whole social body a clear purpose,” Eyzaguirre determined. For this reason, “Yankee federalism, French Jacobinism and British parliamentarism,” could never replace this “Spanish justice,” which in Eyzaguirre’s words, was an “ascensional, mystical, transcendent movement.”¹⁷²

It is commonly argued that Eyzaguirre was an enthusiastic supporter of Franco, Salazar, and Mussolini. The correspondences between Sánchez Bella and Eyzaguirre complicate this picture. Sure enough, Franco’s agents courted the Chilean intellectual incessantly. Moreover, his presence in Madrid meant that Eyzaguirre played a role in the shaping of the ICH history conventions.¹⁷³ However, on an organizational level, Eyzaguirre was seldom involved in the ICH activities as his Argentine colleagues and maintained an aloof position in respect to the Hispanidad project throughout the 1950s. Apparently, in his opinion, the Chilean ICH branch was a problematic promoter of Hispanidad, precisely given its noticeable Francoist links.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁹ Eyzaguirre, *Hispanoamérica del dolor y otros estudios*, 8.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁷¹ Jaime Eyzaguirre, “Hispanoamérica del dolor,” *Revista de estudios políticos*, no. 19 (1945): 219.

¹⁷² Eyzaguirre, *Hispanoamérica del dolor y otros estudios*, 18-19.

¹⁷³ The director of the IEP offered him a position at the Complutense University of Madrid. Franco’s regime also made a point to decorate him with several of its highest honors and made him ICH’s “member of honor” in 1949, see - “Entrega de la Cruz de Isabel la Católica a dos profesores sudamericanos,” *La Vanguardia* (May 30, 1947).

¹⁷⁴ Carta de Jaime Eyzaguirre a Pablo Antonio Cuadra, August 10, 1948, AGUN, documento 15/106/22

Other Chilean intellectuals had fewer scruples when cooperating with Franco. The 1949 Congress of Intellectual Cooperation saw the presence in Spain of José Luis Lopez Ureta and Ricardo Krebs, of the Circulo de Profesionales Hispánicos.¹⁷⁵ Others, for example, the Spanish-born poet and *Sol y Luna* contributor, José María Souvirón, who had previously been the director of the Chilean conservative publishing house Zig-Zag, moved to Madrid in the early 1950s to work at the ICH.¹⁷⁶ Sergio Fernández Larraín was an even more salient case. A member of the Board of Directors Conservative Party, and a key member of Chile's ICH, he became Chile's ambassador in Spain. Fernández Larraín's loyalty to Franco was almost without precedent in Chile. In later years, he reflected that he "had the honor to fight in defense of Spain, from the very day of the National Uprising [...] against the error of some and against the bad faith of others."¹⁷⁷ I shall examine this figure further in Chapter 5.

Next, during the mid-1950s, a cohort of young Chilean authoritarian thinkers emerged as a consequence of the Spanish-Chilean cooperation. Born in 1923, Jorge Iván Hübner Gallo represented a new type of ideologues who now gave concrete meaning to the Hispanidad rhetoric. An ICH fellow, he completed his PhD in Law at the Central University of Madrid in 1950 and returned to Chile as an undisputed authority in Francoist state-ideology.¹⁷⁸ His texts *El nuevo estado español* and *Los católicos en la política* - the latter being sent to Franco with a personal dedication -¹⁷⁹ are illuminating for they illustrate the incisive fashion in which Francoist ideology emerged in Chile's 1950s public sphere.¹⁸⁰ His books present a frontal attack on any Catholic

¹⁷⁵ Ricardo Krebs was also the head of the Chilean ICH for several years, and one of the designers of the 1958 Bogota declaration (in what follows), see - FNFF, documento 9813.

¹⁷⁶ He became the sub-director of *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos* with Perdo Laín and Luis Rosales, in 1958.

¹⁷⁷ Jorge I. Hübner Gallo, *Los católicos en la política* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1959), 6.

¹⁷⁸ He had been known to study under Ortega y Gasset. His thesis, later published as "*El nuevo estado español*" was indeed dedicated to this subject matter.

¹⁷⁹ "Publicación de Santiago de Chile titulada 'Los católicos en la política,'" FNFF, documento 17850.

¹⁸⁰ *El nuevo estado español* praised Francoism even more bluntly. "To write about Spain, after having visited it and having studied its customs, its institutions and its laws, is to have the opportunity to fulfill the duty of every

political movement adhering to parliamentary politics. Instead of uniting against the Christian civilization's common enemy, the Chilean Catholics, Hübner Gallo remarked, "are worn out in internal quarrels provoked by the appearance of new revolutionary conceptions."¹⁸¹ Arturo Fontaine Aldunate is another case in point, of a "corporativist" who, as his correspondences with Sánchez Bella indicate, had been the driving force behind the establishment of ICH in Chile. Being the editor of the leading conservative newspaper *El Mercurio*, his responsibility for the propagation of Francoist ideology in Chile's public sphere was even more crucial. His letters to Sánchez Bella are typical for an ICH fellow. "Spain still resonates in my soul and I hope it will continue resonating all my life," he wrote of his once-tutor. This spiritual experience, he added, was "an accolade, and now you have me proclaiming right and left the good news of the emergence of our peoples in the universal history." Tellingly, in his letters, Fontaine Aldunate also asked Sánchez Bella for "political news from Spain" for his upcoming articles in the journals *Estanquero* and *Estudios*. Additionally, he scorned the Christian Democrats, and predicted that soon all Chilean conservatives will "concord with one another and with Spain."¹⁸² This remark was consistent with his attacks on the Christian Democrats in *Estudios* at the time, where he blamed them of "falling, without knowing, into the Marxist trap."¹⁸³

Indeed, by the mid-1950s the official relationship between Franco's Spain and Chile improved. Fontaine's prophesy materialized as President Ibáñez del Campo renewed Chile's ties with Spain by signing a treaty of "dual citizenship" with Franco. Obscure as Ibáñez's own ideologic orientation was, it is obvious that he saw in Franco a partner. Hence, it was the unique

Christian to give testimony of truth, [...] Spain, under the visionary and providential government of Generalísimo Francisco Franco, has overcome all difficulties, all dangers [...] reaffirming the destiny that calls it to be 'united, great, free'" he wrote, in Jorge Hübner Gallo, *El nuevo estado español* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1952), 11.

¹⁸¹ Hübner Gallo, *Los católicos en la política*, 10.

¹⁸² Carta de Arturo Fontaine a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, January 17, 1947, AGUN, documento 15/08/064.

¹⁸³ Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, "Marxismo y democratismo cristiano," *Estudios*, no. 174 (June 1947), 10.

“Ibero-american sentiment of the Chileans” that was highlighted in Chile’s parliament as the reason for the granting Spanish immigrants with special treatment. After all, the Spanish regime “has demonstrated that sentiments of brotherhood can exist despite all political contingencies,” declared the Chilean resolution.¹⁸⁴ Following Chile’s 1958 elections, which brought the independent Jorge Alessandri to power backed by a formidable conservative coalition, this relationship improved even more.¹⁸⁵ Being decorated with Spain’s highest honor, the Grand Collar of the Order of Isabel la Católica, Alessandri sent a regal letter to Franco. “My great and good friend,” it said: “I appreciate and thank you profoundly for this wonderful distinction.”¹⁸⁶

The Francoist regime, for its part, saw Chile as the frontline of Hispanidad. It was, therefore, genuinely worried with the “communistic influences” in Chile, and afforded much efforts to sway the Chilean conservative elites during the 1950s.¹⁸⁷ Under the guidance of ambassador and Hispanic intellectual José María Doussinague, the embassy sought to coordinate the Chilean Right.¹⁸⁸ It did so by cultivating intimate connections with the Chilean Foreign Ministry,¹⁸⁹ and linking with Chile’s conservative media, the Chilean Military, and local ideological groups adherent to the Hispanic ideology such as the far-right Instituto de Cultura Ibero-Americana,

¹⁸⁴ Rafael de la Presa, “Informe del proyecto de doble nacionalidad, Sesión 38 ordinaria, 1 Agosto de 1955,” *Discursos parlamentarios de exaltación hispánica: 1953-1965* (Santiago de Chile: Instituto Geográfico Militar, 1965).

¹⁸⁵ His election further pushed Chile into economic and political polarization in the following years, see - Peter Winn, *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile’s Road to Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Germán Gamonal, *Jorge Alessandri: el hombre, el político* (Santiago de Chile: Holanda Comunicaciones, 1987); Peter Winn, “A Workers Nightmare: Taylorism and the 1962 Yarur Strike in Chile,” *Radical History Review*, no. 58 (January 1, 1994): 4-34; Jody Pavilack, *Mining for the Nation: The Politics of Chile’s Coal Communities from the Popular Front to the Cold War* (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011).

¹⁸⁶ “Jorge Alessandri presidente de Chile agradece de Franco el Gran Collar Isabel la Católica,” Octubre 14, 1960, FNFF, documento 1200.

¹⁸⁷ “Memorandum sobre Chile,” FNFF, documento 14870.

¹⁸⁸ Doussinague even tried, at a certain point, to purchase a local radio station entirely for the propaganda efforts of the Spanish regime, in this case, with no success, see - “Memorandum sobre Chile.” More on the Spanish embassy as Spain’s “organizing center” of cultural operation see - Jara Hinojosa, *De Franco a Pinochet*, 61-75.

¹⁸⁹ According to Spain’s ambassador, his relationship with Chilean Foreign Minister Germán Vergara were particularly friendly, in “Nota confidencial no. 1,” January 7, 1961, FNFF, documento 6141.

Círculo de Estudios Hispánicos, and Círculo de Profesionales Hispánicos. Moreover, the Spanish embassy's financing of the local ICH was never secret but acknowledged in the ICH's own publications. "Our work" they stated, "has been possible thanks to the generosity of Spain, which through its Embassy in Chile, the ICH in Madrid, and the Directorate General of the ICH, has placed in our hands important means that have allowed us to stand out in the level of cultural diffusion, proclaiming our triple quality as Chileans, Americans, and Hispanistas."¹⁹⁰

But Franco aided the Chilean Right in even more direct ways. One memorandum sent to Franco from the Foreign Ministry during the late 1950s, even stated Spain's intentions openly: "in order to initiate a successful plan for reconquering the Chilean public opinion, it is necessary to send to that country a select Embassy, comprising of young people who have lived through the hours of the Liberation War and feel deeply involved in the Spiritual climate respired in Spain," it stated. Furthermore, the report complained about the "Maritainian influence in the Chilean Catholic sector" - a trend, it argued, that had not been "compensated with an effective presence of the Spanish Catholicism" due to the USA's labeling the Hispanic culture a "cunning sign of fascism." Thus, the report's writers advised the following action in Chile's public sphere: supporting *Estudios* financially, penetrating *El Mercurio*, and maintaining a presence in the Catholic University of Chile. But they also advised caution. Spain's "Hispanic action," they flagged, cannot be identified with the Chilean right-wing parties, for that would bring about "fatal consequences."¹⁹¹ These recommendations soon became concrete policy, when shortly thereafter Spain came to the rescue of the conservative newspaper *El Diario Ilustrado*, covering its debt in

¹⁹⁰ *Instituto Chileno de Cultura Hispanica, Tercera memoria, Julio 1953-Julio 1955*, 5; See also - "We will not have to fear excesses in the attributions, since, in addition to the Executive Board or Board of Directors that we will constitute, the Board and the [Spanish] Embassy will always be there," in *Libro de actas del patronato y asambleas del Instituto Chileno de Cultura Hispánica*, Acta del 22 julio 1948.

¹⁹¹ See - "Memorandum sobre Chile".

another act of “discrete aid.”¹⁹² In short, the Francoist “Hispanidad politics” in Chile took the form of covert financing of newspapers and behind-the-scene network building.

In sum, during the 1950s, amid growing social and political polarization, a distinctive group of Chileans conservatives avowedly linked with the Francoist ideological apparatus. Even so, suggesting that ideology simply “transferred” from Spain to Chile would be to overlook the interactive character of the ICH operation.¹⁹³ There is little proof that Lira, Eyzaguirre, or any of their younger followers, ever suggested importing the Francoist model of state to Chile; rather, these men believed they partook in an evolving international movement wherein Spain was perhaps a forerunner, but in which they were to add their own authentic chapter. Despite not achieving any noticeable political gains during the 1950s, these intellectuals lay the contours for Chile’s far-right movements of the 1960s and 1970s, as we shall see in chapter 5.

The waning of Franco’s “política de Hispanidad”

Spain’s treaties with the Vatican and the USA in 1953, complicated Franco’s “Hispanidad policy.” On the one hand, the regime was finally politically secure, and self-praising as ever. On the other hand, the new strategic ties with the Eisenhower administration meant that Spain’s ability to promote an official alternative to Pan-Americanism vanished.¹⁹⁴ In addition, by the mid-1950s and despite the undertakings depicted above, it had become clear that the ICH was hardly achieving

¹⁹² “Personal y confidencial: Carta del embajador de España en Chile, Tomás Suñer, al ministro de asuntos exteriores, Don Fernando María Castiella,” October 15, 1962, FNFF, documento 10627.

¹⁹³ For more on this alleged one-directional motion of ideology, see - Isabel Jara Hinojosa, “La ideología franquista en la legitimación de la dictadura militar chilena,” *Revista Complutense de Historia de América*, no. 34 (2008): 234.

¹⁹⁴ As Eisenhower set foot on Spanish soil, Castiella, Franco’s new Foreign Minister, thanked the “generosity of the North American people,” adding that the USA should “presents Iberoamérica with a constant, careful, and efficient attention respectful our spirituality and cultural profile,” see - “Solemne conmemoración del día de la Hispanidad en Santiago de Compostela,” *ABC Madrid* (October 13, 1959).

its declared goals. Sánchez Bella's reports even openly grumbled that of the institution's twenty-nine branches "only three have any content."¹⁹⁵ A change of strategy was thus imminent.¹⁹⁶

The late 1950s hence saw the ICH's "third phase" of action, as intellectual cooperation gave way to more "concrete" operations. For instance, in 1954 Sánchez Bella emphasized the importance of spreading Spain's news agencies EFE and Amunco in Latin America. He also shifted his attention to military cooperation with Latin America, given the armies' "predominant role" in the "development of the political life of our sister countries." However, training the Latin American militaries in Spain was not remotely as ambitious a plan as his strategy to impact international organizations such as UNESCO and The United Nation's Economic and Social Council. Sánchez Bella suggested a "massive penetration of Spaniards" into these bodies, "counting on previous American approval."¹⁹⁷

Following Spain's 1957 political makeover, which will be discussed shortly, the Francoist Hispanidad campaign further diminished in its visibility. As a result, the ICH's 1958 international congress in Bogota witnessed the Argentine nacionalistas dominating the event entirely. In the "Bogota Declaration," it was Goyeneche who reiterated the ICH's commitment to the Hispanic Community of Nations and repudiated the "benefitting international monopolies."¹⁹⁸ Ergo, while Franco's Spain was inviting American corporations to invest in Spain, its official state apparatus

¹⁹⁵ One of them was ICH in Mendoza, Argentina, "whose president is the Spanish Consul," see - "Notas sobre el informe reservado del viaje a América del Señor director del ICH," 1954, AGUN, documento 15/102/5.

¹⁹⁶ Historiography has depicted this period as Franco's first moment of international integration, with the USA's Cold War politics playing a crucial role in reintroducing the dictatorship into the family of nations, see - Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, *The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy: Spain's International Relations from Franco to Democracy* (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1987); Stanley Payne, *El Primer franquismo, 1939-1959: los años de la autarquía de España* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy), 1997; Boris Liedtke, "Spain and the United States, 1945-1975," in Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston (eds.), *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. (New York: Routledge), 1999.

¹⁹⁷ "Notas sobre el informe reservado del viaje a América del Señor director del ICH".

¹⁹⁸ *Itinerarios de cultura hispánica: memoria del segundo Congreso de Institutos de Cultura Hispánica, reunido en Bogotá del 6 al 11 de octubre de 1958* (Bogotá: Ximénez de Quesada, 1958), 34.

still collaborated with this effort to oppose the Western Bloc. This notwithstanding, with Matín Artajo retired, Francoism was by now clearly exploring more sophisticated strategies to spread its spiritual message. A diplomacy of dual citizenship agreements was, for instance, a new approach that set out to redefine the physical borders between Spain and the Americas.¹⁹⁹ Antonio Iturmendi, Spain's Minister of Justice and the main designers of this program, often presented it as the basis for a Hispanic "solid and enduring bloc."²⁰⁰ And yet, here too the Spaniards let others do the propaganda for them. For instance, Colombian law expert Jesus María Yepes was the one to promote the dual citizenship as a "Hispanic supranationality."²⁰¹ And in any case, by the end of the 1950s, also this type of rhetoric disappeared from the Francoist landscape, leaving Mario Amadeo to propagated the Hispanic Community of Nations worldwide in almost complete solitude.²⁰²

New apparatuses came into play at this point. Typically, the 1950s ICH congresses concluded with resolutions to establish specialized organizations to regulate the Hispanic ideological exchange, and which would "adhere to the ICH."²⁰³ For instance, the ICH's Office for Intellectual Cooperation purported to gather Latin America's hispanistas perennially to discuss the Spanish language and cultural patrimony.²⁰⁴ The Hispano-Luso-Americano Institute of International Law (IHLADI) was another example of this new strategy. From its inauguration in 1951, it was here that the legal expertise of Amadeo and Dell'Oro Maini came into display, as they

¹⁹⁹ Following Chile, between 1956 and 1963 Spain signed nine more treaties with the following countries: Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic.

²⁰⁰ "Doble nacionalidad," *ABC Sevilla* (September 24, 1954); for further analysis of this process see - Kressel, "The Hispanic Community of Nations", 119-20.

²⁰¹ "Doble nacionalidad o supranacionalidad," *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 141 (January 1960): 4.

²⁰² Mario Amadeo, "Hacia la comunidad hispánica de naciones," *El Diario de Nueva York* (February 27, 1959); see also - "Congreso de derecho internacional en quito," *ABC Madrid* (October 9, 1957); "Llamada a España," *ABC Madrid* (November 11, 1959).

²⁰³ *II congreso de cooperación intelectual* (Santander: Oficina de Cooperación Intelectual, 1956), 96.

²⁰⁴ "Proyecto de decreto del ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores por el se crea el Instituto Español de Cooperación Intelectual," AGA, caja 82/11114.

attacked the “pseudo-values” underpinning the emerging global international law.²⁰⁵ This institution advocated not only the “de facto” legality of counterrevolutionary regimes in Latin America²⁰⁶ but also the possibility of tailoring a legal system solely for the Hispanic hemisphere, based on its own spirituality and ethics.²⁰⁷

Ultimately, the most prominent organization to emerge from within the ICH was the Office of Ibero-American Education (Oficina de Educación Iberoamericana, or OEI). Another brainchild of Sánchez Bella, this body was an astute ideological agency precisely because it denied officially operating as one. Its official texts proclaimed that it was as an “intergovernmental body” designed to buttress “educational unity, within the Hispanic world.”²⁰⁸ The OEI had “no philosophy or political agenda” announced its first director and Sánchez Bella’s close friend, the abovementioned hispanista Carlos Lacalle. Still, the OEI’s headquarters were located at the ICH’s building in Madrid, and its founding documents stated that its norms and activities would be “regulated by the Director of the ICH.” Additionally, the OEI executives were all ICH intellectuals. Last, a closer look at the OEI’s inner communications reveals formulations such as the following: “The policy that governs the action of the OEI is inspired by the ideology that emerged from the pro-Hispanic Community of Nations [...] The OEI has three slogans: inform, document, and coordinate. These diverse forms of the same united action, aspire towards Catholic and Hispanist ideals.”²⁰⁹ Regardless of these words, the OEI achieved some important objectives. Reaching a treaty with

²⁰⁵ He called the UN, OEA, and UNESCO “the acronym organizations,” see - Mario Amadeo, “La transformación de la vida internacional y la comunidad regional hispano-americana,” in *Actas del primer congreso Hispano-luso-americano de derecho internacional*, 57-62.

²⁰⁶ Santiago Martínez Caro, “El reconocimiento de los gobiernos de facto,” *ibid*, 152.

²⁰⁷ Jesus María Yepes, the first director of the IHLADI, was especially keen to promote these notions.

²⁰⁸ “OEI, Generalidades,” AGA, caja 82/13946.

²⁰⁹ “Política de la OEI,” AGA, caja 82/13946.

UNESCO - “the ‘anonymous society’ of mankind’s cultural interests” according to Lacalle - ²¹⁰ in 1957, meant all international pedagogical organizations acknowledged the OEI, thus granting it the respectability Francoist institution seldom enjoyed. In other words, Sánchez Bella’s plans to utilize UNESCO symbolically and financially materialized in the case of the OEI.

At the start, the OEI displayed a hotchpotch of Francoist spiritualist and technocratic jargon. Shaping the Latin American youth into obedient and spiritual technicians seemed as its main calling.²¹¹ In the words of Spain’s minister of education Jesus Rubio García-Mina, the OEI aimed to “propose a spiritual and positive mentality [...] comprising simultaneously of idealisms without reality, and realities without ideal.”²¹² This paradoxical mixture of rational and spiritual education was further confirmed in the words of the aforementioned nacionalista priest Juan Ramón Sepich. Writing for the OEI in 1955, the Argentine theorized the spiritual mission of the Hispanic University students. “What shall we do so that young people do not yawn and discover the rigor of the discipline of science?” he pondered. The answer, he replied, was to grant them a proper “vocation”; a spiritual quest whereby one puts himself “at the service of science” and against “speculative values.” By “science,” Sepich meant accepting “the definite essence of all things” a-priori, or more aptly put, scholastic science.²¹³

For the most part, however, by the turn of the decade, the OEI’s officials opted to assuage such dogmatic rhetoric. The OEI second director, Rodolfo Barón Castro, merely hinted at

²¹⁰ Carlos Lacalle, “El OEI y su cooperación en el campo educativo,” *Plana: servicio informativo aéreo de la OEI*, no. 11 (May 15, 1956): 1; On the UNESCO collaboration treaty, see - *Plana: servicio informativo aéreo de la OEI*, no. 10 (April 30): 1956.

²¹¹ “An integral education that serves professionalism and [...] sets out to better attend their spiritual formation, to form their character, and their ideology” in “La familia y la educación,” *Plana: servicio informativo aéreo de la OEI*, no. 58 (January 15, 1959): 4.

²¹² Jesus Rubio García-Mina, “Por una mentalidad espiritual y positiva en lo educativo,” *Plana: servicio informativo aéreo de la OEI*, no. 40 (November 30, 1957): 9.

²¹³ Juan Sepich, “Destino de la universidad,” *Plana: servicio informativo aéreo de la OEI*, no. 3 (December 22, 1955): 5-7.

Hispanidad when stating that “the mission of the OEI [...] is born from the recognition of the existence of a clearly defined cultural community such as Ibero-america.”²¹⁴ Lacalle, for his part, was no less playful in articulating the mission of Hispanidad. In a text published in the Falange’s daily *Arriba*, he explained how he thought of his mission in the upcoming decade:

The men who in 1946 began the task of promoting cooperation among the Hispanic peoples arrive at 1958 truly satisfied [...] Hispanidad is reborn as a controversial eruption [...]. With anachronistic packaging, it is coated with a vague form and rigid sentimentality. Fortunately, it was possible to fluidize (“fluidificar”) its conception, to link it to the [modern] historical process and to consider it as continuity in time of a vital process born four centuries ago. This allowed us [...] to avoid - as much as possible - controversial situations, to disregard ideologies, and to constitute, in a short while, a group of organizations destined to orient and to stimulate the cooperation between the members of the family of nations that we constitute.²¹⁵

Evidently, Lacalle sought to define a more sophisticated, if paradoxical, form of Hispanidad - one that would be at the same time anti-ideological but also “fluid” so to harmonize the modern and pre-modern worlds of thought.

Despite this seeming moderation, the OEI was only modestly successful. By 1964, only seven Latin American countries had declared adherence to the organization, indicating that most of Latin America still mistrusted Franco’s apparatus.²¹⁶ Subsequently, in 1959, and just before leaving Spain to serve as Franco’s ambassador in the Dominican Republic, Sánchez Bella reflected on a decade of activity in frustration:

In all these countries, we are perceived as too conservative, too right-wing, excessively traditionalist [...] our Hispanism appears increasingly anachronistic and dated because the issues it raises are irrelevant to our times. The Left is winning (“llevando el gato al agua”)

²¹⁴ Rodolfo Barón Castro was himself on the UNESCO executive committee, see - Rodolfo Barón Castro, “El ‘proyecto principal’ de la UNESCO y la cooperación regional educativa,” *Plana: servicio informativo aéreo de la OEI*, no. 40 (November 30, 1957): 2.

²¹⁵ Carlos Lacalle, “La OEI y la cooperación iberoamericana,” *Arriba* (October 12, 1958), see also - *Plana*, no. 54, (October 15, 1958).

²¹⁶ These countries included Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru, see - *OEI, Balance de actividades durante el quinquenio 1964-1968* (February 17, 1969).

not by coincidence, but because they have more imagination, because their political agenda is novel, more attractive and stimulating.²¹⁷

Sánchez Bella, in other words, did not share Lacalle's optimism. Indeed, the ICH was to experience a decline in activity and predominance throughout the 1960s. As for Sánchez Bella, disconcerted over the Cuban Revolution, this key Francoist diplomat would continue to hold solid contacts with the Latin American Right, in a persistent effort to promote anti-communistic action.

Conclusions

The international ideological projects of the early 1950s were a transitional stage between the fascist projects of the 1930s and the technocratic-authoritarian state-ideologies, and, on the face of it, a somewhat failed endeavor. Neither did Hispanidad yield any concrete authoritarian political model in Latin America in these years, nor did the Hispanic Community of Nations materialize on a multilateral level. Clearly, as a political entity the so-called Hispanic Bloc belied an effort to benefit from the Western Bloc and was, therefore, an untenable political project. This, however, does not mean that the 1950s legacies were insignificant. On the contrary: the cooperation between the Francoist regime, the nacionalistas, and the Chilean far-right ideologues reaffirmed their common ideological ground and sense of shared mission. Moreover, once reiterated upon the ICH planforms, the refurbished narratives of Hispanic victimhood - from the hands of a coalition of "materialist" internationals - were crucial for the rise of a new generation of theoreticians who sought to articulate a more sophisticated "anti-ideological" modernity. Moving from the 1950s to the turbulent 1960s, these younger theoreticians would henceforth present a change in methodology rather than in their principal objectives. Spain's "technocracy" -

²¹⁷ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Ramón Sedó, director general de Política Exterior, February 2, 1959, AGA, caja 82/13975.

the topic of the next chapter - was not a *break from*, but rather a *novel interpretation of*, the Hispanidad ideology, I argue.

The second point to be taken from the texts and documents above is that the failures of Europe's fascist order had been studied seriously in Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula. In the context of the Cold War, the intellectuals discussed here not only aimed to neutralize their international fascist labeling but fundamentally sought to redefine their own nationalist revolutions. As we will see in the next chapters, this effort was to lead to crisis, as fissures between post-fascist authoritarians and the neo-fascist revolutionaries emerged in all three countries. Nevertheless, there is an obvious thread binding the 1930s filo-fascist revolutionaries, the 1950s "Hispanidad" projects, and the "technocrats" of the 1960s: All three projects agreed on what "ideologies" allegedly were, how they had plagued the Hispanic spiritual domain for more than a century, and how they could and should be purged from the state apparatus and society at large.

My last point touches on the question of agency and the transatlantic transference of knowledge. Franco's intellectuals clearly enjoyed a leading role in the ICH operations of the 1950s. Having an entire state-apparatus behind them, the actions and texts of figures such as Sánchez Bella could easily give the impression that ideology passed from Spain to the Americas in a one-directional manner. And true enough, the Francoist propaganda and apparatus influenced the Latin American right-wing audiences profoundly - a process that I will continue to touch on in chapter 3 and 5. However, as the nacionalistas and Chilean traditionalists own initiatives and texts indicate, they did not merely follow Francoist trends. Rather, they saw themselves, and indeed were, a powerful driving force within what was, in essence, a transnational movement of the Right, and would remain so throughout the 1960s when Franco's Spain modified itself considerably and "opened" to the Western Bloc.

Chapter 2: The Opus Dei and the Birth of the Francoist Technocratic-Authoritarian State Model

The Francoist post-fascist ideology of state and society emerged in its most coherent form within the intellectual apparatus of the Opus Dei. This chapter seeks to explain the ideological panorama of the 1960s “technocratic Spain,” and throughout, clarify what the Opus Dei was and how it sought to change Spain, Latin America, and the Catholic world at large. Unlike the Falange, the Opus Dei was never a party or a “movement.” While admittedly a “pressure group,” it never sought concrete political power, its spokesmen said, but rather lent itself to power holders as a possessor of a scientific and spiritual truth. The process this chapter portrays is thus one of a dictatorship delegating its ideological production to a vanguard within its civil society. During the 1960s the Opus Dei was the unmistakable leader of a coalition of reactionary forces seeking to replace the Falange’s corporatism with a new technique of spiritual sublime. As importantly, like the ICH, the Opus Dei quickly broadened its activity to Latin America and should therefore be defined as one of the more sophisticated ideologies to be “exported” from Franco’s Spain to the Americas.

Along the way, this chapter takes issue with arguments made in the Opus Dei’s own scholarly world. Historians affiliated with the Opus Dei tend to confuse *emic* from *etic* when analyzing the discursive tropes Franco’s technocrats used in the 1960s. That these figures belonged to the Opus Dei, wrote one historian recently, “did not imply any unity of political judgment, since this institution responds to strictly spiritual criteria.”¹ The statement is flawed for two fundamental reasons: for one, there was certainly a “political” unity between the Opus Dei members, I argue,

¹ Antonio Cañellas Mas, *Laureano López Rodó: biografía política de un ministro de Franco (1920-1980)* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2011), 164.

at least until the late 1960s; and for another, in Franco's Spain "spiritual criteria" was at the very center of political life and the source of dispute between the Falange and the Opus Dei. While not a "political" party - a term irrelevant to Franco's Spain in any case - the Opus Dei was still a coordinated ideological apparatus. In effect, pretending not to be a political actor was at the heart of the Opus Dei method of *soft power*, as it sought to persuade elites to think alike on issues that touched on collective action and public morality, and that were therefore fundamentally political.

The Opus Dei intellectuals have alleged that their spiritual message changed little with the years. This too, I will show, is only partially true. The Opus Dei's doctrine was a living construct. In 1945, the Opus Dei was the most glaringly anti-modern and authoritarian Francoist "family," promoting a global crusade against the Enlightenment. In the late-1960s, however, it presented itself as a spiritual movement of "liberty" and exultant "work." A change of emphasis perhaps, this is still a phenomenon worth exploring. But more important, in the 1960s the Opus Dei ultimately propagated an authoritarian state-ideology which it believed was bound to lead society to a state of social and spiritual perfection. Moving chronologically, the chapter will hence touch on the Opus Dei's basic spiritual message, and explore the formation of its intellectual apparatus and arrival in Latin America. Thereafter, I will present a two-part analysis of Spain's ideological panorama of the mid-1960s, within multiple social and cultural contexts.

The gospel of Escrivá de Balaguer: from civil war to spiritual perfection through "work"

In February 1947, the Catholic Church's *Provida Mater Ecclesia* announced the creation of a new type of society.² The Secular Institution (or "prelature") was to be an association of communal life that, unlike the Catholic Orders, would not contain solemn vows. The Opus Dei

² On the Opus Dei's politics within the Vatican, see - Juan Estruch, *Saints and Schemers: Opus Dei and its Paradoxes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

was the first Secular Institution to be approved by Pope Pius XII. On this, Spain's news agency EFE reported laconically:

The first approved Secular Institute, the Priestly Society of the Holy Cross and Opus Dei, was founded by the worthy and illustrious Aragon priest D. José María Escrivá de Balaguer. [...] Opus Dei comprises of members dedicated to the practice of Christian perfection. Its purpose is to achieve this perfecting of life through the sanctification of ordinary work and developing its apostolate within the intellectual sphere. [...] Opus Dei has spread throughout Spain, Portugal, and in other European nations and in some American countries, where it works in close connection with the ecclesiastical hierarchy.³

In this manner, the Opus Dei and its leader, Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer, appeared in the Spanish press for the first time. “Christian perfection,” and “sanctity in everyday life” would both be the cornerstones of the organization's official description in years to come. Intelligence reports sent to Franco were trying to make sense of these slogans. The Opus Dei is “a Catholic Association of men and women,” one account stated, “who, living in the middle of the world, seek Christian perfection through sanctification of ordinary work.”⁴ Indeed, from the outset, the Opus Dei sought to transfigure the role of lay Catholics by mobilizing them to serve the “evangelization” of the Christian world.⁵ Even at this early stage, there was barely anything secretive about the Opus Dei's tactics: years before the Second Vatican Council and the “Aggiornamento,”⁶ it sought to update the Catholic Church by creating an “apostolate” inside the secular “intellectual sphere.”

As its critics have argued throughout the years, the Opus Dei emerged within the context of the Civil War. Escrivá de Balaguer (born January 9, 1902), was an ordinary youngster who studied Law in Zaragoza and ordained to priesthood in 1925. Upon moving to Madrid in 1928 he

³ “El primero instituto secular de la iglesia,” *ABC Madrid* (March 15, 1947).

⁴ Based on the documents with which it was found, this text probably dates to 1951/1952, see - “s/f. Reglamento del Opus Dei (interesante),” FNFF, Documento 26459.

⁵ Opus Dei thus took much inspiration from previous Catholic orders, most notably from Francisco de Loyola's Society of Jesus, a point that had been addressed in the literature, see - Alberto Moncada, *Historia oral del Opus Dei* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1987), 131; Jesús Ynfante, *La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei: génesis y desarrollo de la santa mafia* (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1970), 88-89.

⁶ Pope John XXIII, at his address of January 25, 1959, coined this term, which essentially meant making the Catholic Church “up to date.”

established the Opus Dei with a group of followers.⁷ Here Escrivá linked with groups such as the Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas, and encountered those who were to be his most intimate followers in years to come: Álvaro del Portillo, his deputy, and Isidro Zorzano Ledesma, an Argentinian engineer whose financial backing was crucial for the Opus Dei's formation.⁸ Spending the Civil War near Franco's headquarters in Burgos, Escrivá wrote his book *Camino*, the founding text of his movement that echoed the belligerent *zeitgeist* of these years.⁹ In 909 stanzas, Escrivá spoke of "a crusade of virility and purity" (verse no. 121), "Caudillos" (32, 365, 411, 833, 913), the "love of war" (308, 311), of belonging to a "militia" (306, 496, 905), and of "the enemies of God" (35, 49, 64, 141, 434, 482, 616, 694, 836).

While unmistakably adherent the Francoist cause, *Camino* is nonetheless puzzling as an ideological whole. Like many Catholic orders, Escrivá offered his followers a technique of "perfection." Initially, this method relied on the principles of "poverty, chastity, and obedience," and thereafter evolved to glorify "ordinary work" in the "middle of the world."¹⁰ In a more profound sense, Escrivá offered his believers a mystical practice of "sanctity" that at times stipulated an almost hallucinatory act. Through self-denial and obedience, the thesis went, one can "become a saint" and experience the "supernatural" first hand. "No ideal can be materialized without sacrifice. Deny it [whatever it is you crave, D.K] from yourself! – It is so beautiful to be a victim!" was one of Escrivá's most famous verses (175). With it, came a demand for complete infantilization, or "spiritual infancy" in his words. "A child, when you truly are one, you are

⁷ The amount of narratives describing these events, negatively or positively, is staggering. For two lucid narratives from outside the Opus Dei's own academic sphere see - Daniel Artigues, *El Opus Dei en España* (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1971); Jesús Ynfante, *El santo fundador del Opus Dei: biografía completa de Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2002).

⁸ This fact has been presented in some quarters as a sign that the Opus Dei had a decisive Argentine influence from the start, see - Antonio Fontán, "Un ingeniero de dios: Isidoro Zorzano Ledesma," *Nuestro tiempo*, no. 1 (July 1954): 115-18.

⁹ Artigues, *El Opus Dei en España*, 36.

¹⁰ "Nuevos caminos de santidad," *Nuestro tiempo*, no. 65 (November 1959): 565.

omnipotent,”¹¹ he said. As Rafael Calvo Serer, the Opus Dei’s first prominent ideologue, testified, Escrivá persuasiveness stemmed from his ability to promote the notion of spiritual sublime. In a world that was still dominated by fascist slogans, Escrivá proposed instead a “revolution” within the interior worlds of its members. “He spoke only of a supernatural vision, of the sublime dignity of the Christian apostolate amidst the world, of the joy of feeling as the children of God. [...] Opus Dei only deals with the interior life, the supernatural formation of its members,” Calvo Serer remembered.¹² At no point can we infer that Escrivá spoke in metaphors when demanding “sanctification”; on the contrary: his method fundamentally meant abolishing the separation between Sacred and Profane.

The Opus Dei gained political power thanks to a combination of schemes, which together, magnified its appearance as an ideological movement. To begin with, it displayed a public social experiment. Unlike other Catholic religious orders, the Opus Dei placed its “sanctified” followers tangibly in the middle of society. Its *numerary* members, who vow to celibacy and live in special dorms or “houses” (*casas*), are otherwise “priests in everyday life,” and work in ordinary jobs.¹³ The same goes for the *supernumerary* members, who marry and lead ordinary lives, and only partake in the Opus Dei’s religious routine. Like any Catholic order, Opus Dei members pledge loyalty to a “constitution.” The amount of liberty they enjoyed within the organization is still a matter of much debate.¹⁴ One thing is certain: The Opus Dei was unbashful in its aristocratic

¹¹ For more examples of this tendency see also versus 557, 626, 852- 882; Here I would like to point out to Antoni Malet’s short but excellent analysis of Escrivá’s language, see - Antoni Malet, “José María Albareda (1902–1966) and the Formation of the Spanish Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,” *Annals of Science* 66, no. 3 (July 1, 2009): 307-32.

¹² “Perfil humano de Rafael Calvo Serer,” *Punta Europa*, no. 101 (1964): 8.

¹³ Some served as actual priests, others work in their vocations allegedly giving their salaries to the casa, see - Julian Herranz, “Sacerdotes del Opus Dei,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 16 (October 1955): 3-11.

¹⁴ Leaving the Opus Dei entirely was perhaps difficult, but still fairly common. I would argue, however, that one should take the Opus Dei seriously when saying that it always has been an association of voluntary believers. For stories of members leaving the Opus Dei, see - Moncada, *Historia oral del Opus Dei*, 77, 144-45, 150-51.

leanings, and thus appealed initially to reactionary-elitist societies, from the Carlists in Navarra to the British aristocracy. What is more, its message was far less rigidly Castilian, which helped it appeal to the Catalanian elites.¹⁵ Even so, it is important to note that the Opus Dei was hardly a noticeable public association before 1957. The first mention of Opus Dei in *ABC*, Madrid's prominent royalist daily, was in 1946. And the name Escrivá, for example, appeared barely five times in *ABC* during the entire 1950s, which meant the Opus Dei was hardly at the center of the Spaniards' consciousness then.¹⁶

Thereafter, the Opus Dei established ties within the Spanish business elites and began building its so-called "economic empire." Tellingly, over the years the mainstream Spanish press evaluated the Opus Dei's power mainly in financial terms, as by the early 1960s it allegedly owned several Spanish banks.¹⁷ The scholarly world, for its part, has been preoccupied with the question of whether the Opus Dei actually controlled these enterprises, which in many cases were merely managed or owned by one of its members. Here are two points to take into consideration: The Opus Dei obviously could not have established its publishing apparatus, colleges, and universities, devoid of resources originating from its financial network. Yet it is also important to note that its influence as a financial network should not be overstated as it was far from reaching the size of Spain's four big banking groups.¹⁸

¹⁵ Intellectuals Juan Jimenez Vargas and businessmen Valls Taberner and Felix Millet Maristany were the ones who operated the Opus Dei financial apparatus, for instance during the takeover of Banco Popular Español, see - Ynfante, *La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei*, 233; Moncada, *Historia oral del Opus Dei*, 42-43, 73.

¹⁶ The same goes for Barcelona's *La Vanguardia*, which thanks to its search engines allows us to calculate that between 1940 and 1957 Escrivá's name appeared on this prominent daily merely six times.

¹⁷ The list includes Banco Popular Español, Unión Industrial Bancaria, Banco Europeo de Negocios, Banco Atlántico, Banco de Andalucía, La Vasconia, and Banco de Salamanca.

¹⁸ More on the so-called "banking group Opus" see - "Significación religiosa, económica y política del Opus Dei," *Horizonte Español* 1966, tomo I, 232; García Delgado y Arturo López Muñoz, "El dominio industrial de la Banca," *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* (número extraordinario dedicado a la Banca), 17; Ynfante, *La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei*, 231.

The Opus Dei's power stemmed primarily from its ideological production. In concrete terms, Escrivá's contacts with the regime's higher echelons soon granted him and his followers to positions of power. In particular, his friendship with Minister of Education José Ibáñez Martín (1939-1951) brought him into Franco's inner orbit. In 1945, the Bishop of Madrid wrote Franco that Escrivá was a priest "chosen by God for the sanctification of many souls," to which Ibáñez added that Escrivá "would do a great service for the armed forces."¹⁹ Indeed, soon thereafter Escrivá's provided private Franco spiritual exercises to Franco, as well as to Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco.²⁰ In the 1950s, the Opus Dei leaders actively approached Franco, offering their services and asking for favors. For instance, in 1952, Álvaro del Portillo asked Franco for a credit line for the purpose of founding a new center in London. His presentation for the Opus Dei's mission to Franco was telling:

The external action of our members has been directed, primarily, to the intellectual field, since the most urgent thing had been to collaborate in the task of putting ideas in order. In this terrain, we seek to work [...] always through discreet and quiet personal intervention, which we consider the most effective. However, to better attend to the education of students it is necessary to establish some corporate institutions and today we have ten colleges in Spain [...] The influence of dark sects and subversive doctrines, [might hinder] the achievements of the New State, under the supreme direction of Your Excellency. [In Spain] there has been a complete restoration of a more Christian and just social order, and therefore we must devote ourselves to this difficult endeavor at all costs.²¹

There was nothing unusual in Portillo's request, or the language he used to appeal to his leader.

And yet, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his aspirations to serve the Francoist New

¹⁹ "1945?, s/f Curriculum de D. José María Escrivá de Balaguer Albás, P. Silvestre Sancho y D. Alfonso Ródenaz García," FNFF, Documento 26823,

²⁰ Moncada, *Historia oral del Opus Dei*, 62. While we know little of what these acts contained, Escrivá himself mentions them in a letter from 1969, see - "Secreto: febrero 1969, carta de nuestro embajador en la santa Sede, Antonio Garrigues: entrevista con Mons. Escrivá," FNFF, Documento 19244.

²¹ "1952, Julio 14: El Opus Dei por mediación del Procurador General D. Alvaro del Portillo," FNFF, Documento 10868.

State. His presentation also disclosed the Opus Dei's main strategy: a discrete infiltration into the intellectual elites, on a global level, in order to put "ideas in order."²²

The Opus Dei's "generation of 48" and the configuration of a post-fascist "third path"

During the 1950s, the Opus Dei instituted a web of publications and intellectual forums wherein a patently coherent message appeared. What might seem like a "succession of paradoxes" to some scholars²³ should be read, I maintain, as yet another post-fascist project aspiring to harmonize "rational" and "irrational," the modern and pre-modern. The link between Ibáñez Martín and the Opus Dei led to one of the first influential centers of ideological production: The Superior Council of Scientific Research (CSIC). The head of this institution, José María Albareda, was an Agronomist whose father and brothers had been executed during the Civil War, and one of Escrivá's first "twelve followers."²⁴ Under his leadership, the CSIC strove, as a part of the "spiritual energies of Hispanidad," to restore of the "Christian unity of the sciences, destroyed in the 18th century."²⁵ In his 1951 text *Consideraciones sobre la investigación científica*, Albareda advocated utilizing science to improve the material condition of mankind, but also to discover God's cosmic order. "Scientific research," he held, meant discovering "the footsteps that God has set for one to discover so that one can elevate himself towards Him."²⁶ Systematic "speculation,"

²² Some Opus Dei's members, Miguel Fisac for example, remember that in the 1930s Escrivá spoke of "four goals for infiltration," in the following order: intellectual, economic, political, and ecclesiastical, in Moncada, *Historia oral del Opus Dei*, 92.

²³ Estruch, *Saints and Schemers*, 260.

²⁴ Malet, "José María Albareda", 312-13.

²⁵ *Estructura y normas del CSIC* (Madrid: CSIC, 1947).

²⁶ José María Albareda, *Consideraciones sobre la investigación científica* (Madrid: CSIC, 1951), 21; here he paraphrased his Opus Dei colleague Ruimundo Paniker, see - Raimundo Pániker, "Investigación: En torno a un discurso," *Revista de Filosofía* (1942): 390.

on the other hand, meant, for him, only “anti-social dehumanization.”²⁷ In Short, only laboratory work and theological inquiries were allowed in the Opus Dei’s purified scientific project.²⁸

Through CSIC Albareda not only controlled the Spanish academic world in an increasingly hegemonic fashion,²⁹ but establish solid connections with the American, British, and German academy.³⁰ Still, overall the CSIC addressed primarily the Spanish speaking world. With more than a hundred different scientific journals, this was one of Franco’s more formidable ideological agencies.³¹ Expectedly, as any ideological apparatus in Franco’s Spain, CSIC declared it would foster a “firm presence of [Spain’s] spiritual vitality” in America.³²

It was in the CSIC’s journal *Arbor* that the Opus Dei’s first intellectual circle appeared.³³ Established in Barcelona in 1947, the journal was the brainchild of two of the Opus Dei’s most prominent ideologues: Florentino Pérez Embid (supernumerary, born 1918) and the aforementioned Rafael Calvo Serer (numerary, born 1916).³⁴ Self-labeled the “generation of

²⁷ “José María Albareda, Sacerdote,” *Actualidad Española*, no. 416 (December 24, 1959), 19.

²⁸ José María Albareda, “Valor Económico de la investigación científica,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 1 (July 1954): 15-27.

²⁹ Taking over the apparatus of the previous Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios, CSIC thus developed a hegemonic position within Franco’s state-led university system. The CSIC thus directed funds from the education ministry to the university chairs, based on personal connections and loyalties. For more, see - Malet, “José María Albareda”, 329-31.

³⁰ The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences annual meetings included CSIC representatives already in 1946. Albareda, was a frequent visitor at the British Council in London and spoke for the German Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, and was personally invited as representative of the CSIC to the 55th annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, on April 6, 1951, see – (Letter with no tittle), March 20, 1951, AGA, caja 54/12430; “CSIC y el Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft Bonn,” November 11, 1953, AGA, caja 82/09891; see also - José María Albareda, “Die Entwicklung der Forschung in Spanien,” *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen* (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956).

³¹ The CSIC openly boasted these achievements, see - Octavio Díaz Pinés, ‘Crónica cultural española: XXV aniversario de la fundación del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,’ *Arbor*, no. 227 (November 1964) 247-66; see also - José Ibáñez Martín, “Franco y el Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,” *Arbor*, no. 191 (November 1961): 397–403.

³² “Apuntes sobre el desarrollo de la acción cultural de España en los países hispanoamericanos, Instituto de Antonio de Nebrija,” March 1941, AGUN, documento 006.002.0032.

³³ A “General Journal for of research and culture” was its official title. This journal has received much attention in the Opus Dei’s own historiography, see for instance - Onésimo Díaz Hernández, *Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo Arbor* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2011).

³⁴ Calvo edited the journal until January 1947, when he was appointed the head of Franco’s Instituto de España in London. Pérez Embid replaced him as editor from that moment, see - Pérez Embid, “Breve historia de la revista Arbor,” *Arbor*, no. 75, (March 1952).

1948,” the *Arbor* writers included the Opus Dei members Ángel López-Amo, Vicente Rodríguez Casado, Álvaro d’Ors, Antonio Fontán, and Antonio Millan Puelles.³⁵ In line with the Hispanidad projects of the time, Calvo Sever underscored his commitment to “resume the history interrupted in the 16th century” - the most “creative moment” of the Occidental civilization.³⁶ Yet unlike the Hispanidad projects of the time, these writers gradually rejected Maeztu’s Castilian mythology,³⁷ embracing instead the more inclusive anti-modern thought of Menéndez Pelayo and Juan Donoso Cortés. In this vein, they attempted to popularize Carl Schmitt, highlighting the anti-democratic core of his political theory (“decisionism” versus “democratic ambiguity”).³⁸

While the Opus Dei cultivated its intellectual apparatus, the Falange ideological world began splintering into different segments. The official leaders of the movement were Franco’s so-called “collaborationists,” and comprised of figures such as José Luis Arrese, Manuel Fraga, and intellectuals such as Francisco Javier Conde and Luis Legaz Lacambra. Building, too, on Carl Schmitt’s legacies, these men labored to give meanings to Spain’s “national-syndicalist” corporatist model throughout the Cold War.³⁹ To their Right, a new extreme current of Falangism appeared in Spain during the late-1950s. Neo-fascist and clerico-fascist, it will be discussed fully in chapter 6. To their Left, there was the Falange’s “liberal” branch.⁴⁰ Led by the Falange’s original members, Dionisio Ridruejo and Pedro Laín Entralgo, it presented the regime with one of its

³⁵ According to Pérez Embid, *Arbor* sold 3500 copies mainly in Argentina, Canada, Chile, the USA, and Mexico, see - Florentino Pérez Embid, *Ambiciones Españolas* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1953), 184; these men were also linked with the ICH, as Calvo Serer’s and Alfredo Sánchez Bella were both natives of Valencia and close friends. The two were also the editors of Escrivá *Camino*, see - Díaz Hernández, *Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo Arbor*, 26.

³⁶ Rafael Calvo Serer, *España, sin problema* (Madrid: Rialp, 1957), 107.

³⁷ Florentino Pérez Embid. “Sobre lo castellano y España,” *Arbor*, no. 35 (November 1, 1948): 274.

³⁸ López-Amo and d’Ors work on Schmitt’s own interpretation of Donoso Cortés, exemplified how the Opus Dei and Falange were struggling over the legacies of the Nazi theoretician, see - Carl Schmitt, *Interpretación europea de Donoso Cortes* (prologo de Ángel López-Amo) (Madrid: Rialp, 1952). See also, Álvaro d’Ors, “Carl Schmitt en Compostela,” *Arbor*, no. 73 (January 1, 1952): 46–59; Carl Schmitt, “Tres posibilidades de una visión cristiana de la historia,” *Arbor*, no. 62 (February 1, 1951): 237–241.

³⁹ Francisco Javier Conde, *Representación política y régimen español* (Madrid: Subsecretaría de Educación Popular, 1945).

⁴⁰ Later known as the Acción Democrática group, see - Tusell, *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 15, 130.

earliest moments of internal opposition.⁴¹ In 1949, Laín published his book *España como problema*, where he stressed that rather than two antagonists struggling to lead the Occidental civilization, the pre-modern “Hispanic” and modern “European” civilizations could, and indeed should, cooperate and, in time, amalgamate.⁴² To the question whether “is it possible to connect the most authentic and Hispanic with the most modern and [...] European?” Laín Entralgo’s response was affirmative.⁴³

The debate over Spain’s essence (“ser de España”) captivated the Francoist intellectual world, as it soon escalated into an enmity between Laín Entralgo and Calvo Serer - the liberal Falange intellectual and the reactionary Opus Dei priest. It began with Pérez Embid’s diatribe of Laín Entralgo’s work in *Arbor* that separated the question of Spain’s material problems from its new condition of “spiritual unity.”⁴⁴ Soon thereafter, Calvo Serer published *España sin problema*, a book which validated the ontology of the Hispanic essence and its incompatibility with European modernism. For Calvo Serer, Spain was an entity “discordant to modernity,”⁴⁵ and the Civil War - a watershed moment signifying the end of the “liberal century”⁴⁶ and the start of a “new historical cycle.”⁴⁷ Laín Entralgo, both men thought, simply overlooked the birth of a singular “Hispanic

⁴¹ Ridruejo and Laín Entralgo edited *Escorial*, the most liberal journal of the time. Here they gradually negated the validity of Franco’s discourse of “crusade” and questioned Spain’s anti-modern and anti-European purism, see - “Historia de la Cruzada,” *Escorial*, no. 6, (Abril 1941): 159; more on this group see - Jordi García, *La resistencia silenciosa: fascismo y cultura en España* (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2004).

⁴² Using Americo Castro’s idea of “historization” (casticismo historicista), he argued that Hispanidad was a contingent cultural singularity based on “second-nature habits” that could be changed at will. “The historical identity of nations does not exclude the possibility of very important modifications in their functional structures of life,” he even said, see - Pedro Laín Entralgo, *España como problema* (Madrid: Seminario de Problemas Hispanoamericanos, 1948), 489.

⁴³ Carlos Castro Cubells, “España como problema,” *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, no. 13 (January-February 1950): 174.

⁴⁴ Florentino Pérez Embid, “Ante la nueva actualidad del ‘problema de España,’” *Arbor*, no. 45 (September 1, 1949): 150, see also - Florentino Pérez Embid, “Hacia una superación del patriotismo crítico,” *Arriba* (May 24, 1949).

⁴⁵ Calvo Serer, *España, sin problema*, 27.

⁴⁶ Pérez Embid, *Ambiciones españolas*, 14.

⁴⁷ Rafael Calvo Serer, *Teoría de la restauración* (Madrid: Rialp, 1956), 18; see also - Florentino Pérez Embid, “Mi 18 de Julio,” *Ateneo*, no. 13 (July 19, 1952).

Europeanness.”⁴⁸ Calvo Serer and Pérez Embid thus suggested an alternative to Laín Entralgo’s vision: to embrace the European materiality while denying its ethical and cultural outlooks. In so doing, Franco’s Spain, they believed, would teach the world how to spur material progress, under the guidance of “the theologist and the philosopher.”⁴⁹

Interestingly, by 1950 Calvo Serer believed he was living in a new era of “*managers* and businessmen”⁵⁰ and “naive neoliberalism,” which made the articulation of the precise relationship between material “technique” and the spiritual domain all the more important.⁵¹ Akin to the Cold War anti-totalitarian critique, the Opus Dei ideologues consequently underscored two paths for modernity: an erroneous “revolution” and a correct “restoration.” The former was a “totalitarian” statist solution based on unalloyed nationalism and a fascist workers party. The latter sought to “restore” components of the *ancien régime*, and, in turn, to bestow society with its lost “freedoms.” Or as Calvo Serer put it, the latter was to be “a middle-of-the-road” solution between “Fascist totalitarianism and a lame democracy.”⁵² This new state model, added Pérez Embid, would bring to closure the nation-state world division that had begun in the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia.⁵³ Despite rejecting nationalism and fascism, the Opus Dei’s position was by no means non-violent. Calvo Serer, for instance, justified “bloodily liquidating decades of errors and sins.”⁵⁴ Even so,

⁴⁸ Historians have already fully debated this inner-Francoist “polemic,” see for example - Carme Molinero and Pere Ysas, *La anatomía del Franquismo: de la supervivencia a la agonía, 1945-1977* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2008), 22-24; Díaz, *Pensamiento español en la era de Franco*, 50-60.

⁴⁹ Rafael Calvo Serer, “Europa sin San Sebastián,” *ABC Madrid* (September 26, 1950).

⁵⁰ Calvo Serer, *Teoría de la restauración*, 21.

⁵¹ His ideas of the “technical” aspects of societal development were followed by a new “reevaluation of politics,” in line with Carl Schmitt’s *Der Begriff des Politischen*, *ibid*, 18; see also “El espíritu y la técnica,” *ABC Madrid* (July 18, 1950).

⁵² Calvo Serer, *Teoría de la restauración*, 106; As he himself argues in his autobiography, the transition of his ideas from authoritarianism to democracy was a “gradual evolution” which began already in 1945 and came to their conclusion with his visit to the USA in 1958, see – Rafael Calvo Serer, *Mis enfrentamientos con el poder* (Madrid: Plaza & Janés, 1978), 102-3.

⁵³ “Westfalia is precisely what we are closing now,” he said, see - Florentino Pérez Embid, “Ante la nueva actualidad,” 151; see also - Florentino Pérez Embid, “1648-1848-1898-1948,” *Arriba* (June 10, 1949); “La resurrección de los vencidos,” *Arriba* (July 20, 1949).

⁵⁴ Calvo Serer, *España sin problema*, 143.

while Nazism was “paganism” and carried a “destructive character,”⁵⁵ in their opinion, Franco’s “Christian foundation” meant his regime was compassionate and could not allow the “extermination of the adversary.”⁵⁶ Calvo Serer’s determination to create a “third position” between fascism and democracy eventually led him to configure yet another milieu by the name of “Third Force” (Tercera fuerza) during the 1950s. Comprising of authoritarian thinkers such as José Permartín and Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora,⁵⁷ it was to be another of technocratic Spain’s ideological pillars.

Unexpectedly, Calvo Serer’s status in the regime diminished considerably after 1953 following his eagerness to criticize the Falange upon the French far-right journal *Ecrits de Paris*.⁵⁸ From then on, it was the more perceptive Pérez Embid who continued to define Spain idiosyncratic “Europeanism.”⁵⁹ His body of work included the 1953 *Ambiciones españolas* where he presented the aphorism “Spanish in the ends and European in the means” - a more fitting way for describing of hybrid the Opus Dei sought to establish between the “Hispanic” and “European.”⁶⁰ It meant the Hispanic nations were to cherry-pick techniques to “scientifically” improve their material condition, thereby making it easier for them to form a protected cultural-ethical sphere. Shortly thereafter, in *Nosotros, los cristianos*, he further defined this allegedly post-ideological society.⁶¹ By now, and as the foremost interpreter of Escrivá’s spiritual message, Pérez Embid turned *Camino* into a comprehensible ideology. The future Spanish state should strive for “Christian

⁵⁵ Calvo Serer, *Teoría de la restauración*, 38.

⁵⁶ Rafael Calvo Serer, *Política de integración* (Madrid: Rialp, 1955), 193

⁵⁷ Calvo Serer, *Teoría de la restauración*, 105.

⁵⁸ More on the intricate struggles in the Spanish Catholic media that led Calvo Serer to feel “jaded by the censorship” and publish his controversial text “La politique interieure dans l’Espagne de Franco,” see - Díaz Hernández, *Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo Arbor*, 529-35

⁵⁹ Calvo Serer, *España sin problema*, 343-44.

⁶⁰ “Españolización en los fines y europeización en los medios,” see - Pérez Embid, *Ambiciones españolas*, 12.

⁶¹ Florentino Pérez Embid, *Nosotros, los cristianos* (Madrid: Rialp, 1956), 36.

perfection, supernatural life of surrender, and life of holiness,” he stressed.⁶² The society Pérez Embid envisioned assumed an ideological interpellation devoid of “coercion, fear, or demagoguery;”⁶³ a society where one freely abides by a strict social hierarchy and yields his powers to a trusted spiritual ruling elite.⁶⁴ These formulas echoed Escrivá’s own notion of “liberty,” wherein one must be free to discover the truth, thus exploring one’s own unique path to Christian perfection. Or in Pérez Embid’s words:

A man before God needs to act freely to fulfill his destiny, and God has given, reconquered, and defended his freedom. [...] In the liberal century, when we talked about freedom, we spoke of freedom of association, of expression, of thought, of printing, of choosing political programs and ideals, of choosing parliament deputies [...] Today we see clearly that the world is not a massive juxtaposition of independent, autonomous, disjointed microworlds, but an organic architecture of interdependent men, [...] directed - according to objective and universal norms - towards the free realization of their individual and collective destinies.⁶⁵

Additionally, going against the “pessimism of the 98 generation,” the Opus Dei promoted an “optimistic” Christian,⁶⁶ who would replace melancholia with a different sublime experience. “Affirmation of optimism,”⁶⁷ and “supernatural joy,” were, for Pérez Embid, the true weapons of this future crusader.⁶⁸

“Liberty” aside, for the Opus Dei ideologues parliamentary democracy was anathema and deemed the “murder of culture”⁶⁹ and a “regression to pagan society.”⁷⁰ What is more, Pérez Embid held strictly Manichean world-views and a staunch intolerance to any left-wing orientation within the Catholic Church.⁷¹ The Opus Dei will have absolutely no dialogue with the moderate

⁶² Ibid, 48.

⁶³ “Sin adulación ninguna, sin demagogia blanca,” *ibid*, 76.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 82.

⁶⁵ Pérez Embid, *Nosotros, los cristianos*, 100-104

⁶⁶ Pérez Embid, *Ambiciones españolas*, 22.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 21.

⁶⁸ Pérez Embid, *Nosotros, los cristianos*, 178.

⁶⁹ Florentino Pérez Embid, *En la brecha* (Madrid: Rialp, 1956), 152.

⁷⁰ Ángel López-Amo, *La Monarquía de la reforma social* (Madrid: Rialp, 1952), 136.

⁷¹ Maritain’s ideology, was, in Pérez Embid’s opinion, an “archeological discourse, literally mummified,” see - Pérez Embid, *Ambiciones españolas*, 243.

left, he said.⁷² Not surprisingly, the Opus Dei ideologues also admired the military as such. For Pérez Embid it represented a “determined, passionate, violent defense if necessary, of our eternal metaphysics.”⁷³ Similarly, he spoke of “the weapon of letters and weapon of arms” as the two forces serving “hierarchy, honor, unity, patriotism, and discipline.”⁷⁴ While the military ensured the victory in the “defensive” civil war, the “militant Catholics,” he stressed, were a further guarantee of “peace, joyful work, understanding among nations, and effective service to their respective homeland.”⁷⁵

By late-1950s, the Opus Dei ideologues aligned decidedly with the Monarchist camp within the Francoist regime, and set out to outline what they thought was to be a “popular monarchy.”⁷⁶ Ángel López-Amo (numery), now proposed replacing the Falange’s “irrational” fascist political myths with a novel configuration of the authoritarian monarchy. His theory appeared in a text written especially for Prince Juan Carlos, the son of Don Juan and second heir to the throne of the displaced Bourbon monarchs. Here López-Amo depicted a regime wherein an “aristocracy of blood,” guided by the enlightened monarch, would finally solve Europe’s modern “social problem.”⁷⁷ This King, he insisted, was not a particular person but a general principle. In fact, for him, the King’s authority derived not only from the Grace of God, but from his constructive influence on “men of government, administrators and technicians” and, as a result, from his “popular authority.”⁷⁸

⁷² Pérez Embid, *En la brecha*, 52-53.

⁷³ Florentino Pérez-Embid, “La fuerza realizadora de las ideas,” *Arriba* (June 22, 1950); see also - Pérez Embid, *Ambiciones españolas*, 63.

⁷⁴ Jorge Vigón, *Lealtad, discrepancia y traición* (Madrid: Ateneo, 1956).

⁷⁵ Florentino Pérez Embid, *Libertad, tradición y monarquía* (Madrid: Ateneo, 1960): 32-33.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 37.

⁷⁷ This text eventually reached Franco, see- “Cartas Académicas de Angel López Amo, 1955-56,” FNFF, documento 26440; the concepts of “aristocratic traits” and “ideal of duty” appeared later in his published texts, see - Ángel López-Amo, *Sobre el estudio profundo de las revoluciones* (Pamplona: Estudio General de Navarra, 1956), 300.

⁷⁸ “Cartas académicas de Ángel López-Amo”.

The Opus Dei's elite-oriented ideology soon made its way to its expanding intellectual apparatus. One of Pérez Embid's first actions in the 1950s was reestablishing the elitist 19th century institution Ateneo de Madrid, with the intention to stimulate international dialogue with ultra-conservative intellectuals in Europe and Latin America.⁷⁹ Between 1951 and 1956 the Ateneo hosted prominent figures such as Gabriela Mistral, Christopher Dawson, Gustave Thibon, Carl Schmitt, and Otto von Habsburg.⁸⁰ More important, in the late 1950s the Opus Dei established a publishing industry unparalleled to any far-right organization in the Spanish speaking world at the time. Initially, it was the Opus Dei's book publishing Rialp that disseminated its ideology to global audiences.⁸¹ Pérez Embid, the head of the board of administration, personally directed two of the publishing's prestigious series.⁸² Additionally, the Opus Dei's penetration into the academic world was further aided by the establishment of Navarra General Studies Center. Directed by Ismael Sánchez Bella (numery), Alfredo Sánchez Bella's brother, in 1960, this center transformed into Spain's only private university: The University of Navarra (UNAV).⁸³

Ultimately, for Pérez Embid, the most urgent task of all was generating a truly "catholic press,"⁸⁴ in the Spanish speaking world, a mission for the purpose of which the Opus Dei founded a special corporation in 1951.⁸⁵ Throughout the 1950s, the journals *Actualidad Española* and *Nuestro Tiempo* were the platforms where the Opus Dei ideology now appeared in a more cohesive

⁷⁹ Pérez Embid, *Ambiciones españolas*, 182; see also - Florentino Pérez Embid, "Crónica cultural española: el Ateneo, tribuna abierta de la cultura española," *Arbor*, no. 61 (January 1, 1951): 119.

⁸⁰ Alfonso Candau, "Una vuelta por el Ateneo," *Arbor*, no. 134 (February 1, 1957): 229; *Cinco años del ateneo de Madrid* (Madrid: Ateneo, 1960).

⁸¹ Named after Rialp mountains, through which Escrivá fled during the Civil War with his followers, see – Florentino Pérez Embid, "Biografía de Monseñor José María Escrivá de Balaguer," *Actualidad Española* no. 460, (October 27, 1960)

⁸² Named *Biblioteca del Pensamiento Actual* and *O Crece o Muere* they included texts by Carl Schmitt, Christopher Dawson, Von Kuehnelt-Leddih, and even the USA's ultra-conservative Russell Kirk.

⁸³ *Estudio General de Navarra* (Pamplona: Editorial Gomez, 1959); also in <https://www.unav.edu/en/web/conoce-la-universidad/historia>

⁸⁴ Pérez Embid, *Nosotros, los cristianos*, 185.

⁸⁵ The company's name was La Sociedad Anónima de Revistas, Publicaciones y Ediciones (SARPE), for more on this body see - Ynfante, *La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei*, 274.

manner,⁸⁶ followed by a particularly sycophantic brand of praising of Franco.⁸⁷ Antonio Fontán, the director of the UNAV's Institute of Journalism, edited both journals.⁸⁸ As importantly, the Opus Dei now formed alliances with other newspapers, for instance the Monarchist daily *ABC*,⁸⁹ and the journal *Punta Europa*, which despite denying "belonging to Opus Dei,"⁹⁰ gave ample stage to its key intellectuals as well as to Argentine nacionalista thinkers such as Sepich.⁹¹

While the Falange still conceptualized "politics" as an "organic" system of representation within a revolutionary one-party system, by the late-1950s the Opus Dei spoke of "politics" quite differently. Andrés Vázquez de Prada (numery) for instance, spoke of "the politics of the disinterested interest," which meant, in reality, sustaining politics through partnership rather than antagonism. To achieve this type of harmonious politics one must *render unto Caesar*, he thought, but also deny the state absolute power. "Politics from within," he held, derived not only from the dictator's charisma but from an autonomous altruistic elite.⁹² In a more profound sense, Vázquez de Prada alleged that political action must stem from the spiritual individual:

The political effort must be born within the individual, as a family man, as a professional [...] If men and women do their duties well, quietly, we will see a miracle: a nation rising to its feet [...] external change must be the product of inner renewal. There will be no advances via revolutionary bursts if transformation does not occur 'from within.' The secret of

⁸⁶ For example, while historian Federico Suárez Verdeguer advocated a post-Westphalian modernity, Albareda restated the need for a purified scientific research for the sake of economic growth, see - Federico Suárez Verdeguer, "Génesis del Mundo Moderno," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 6 (December 1954): 35-47; José María Albareda, "Valor económico de la investigación científica," *Nuestro Tiempo* no.1 (July 1954): 15-27.

⁸⁷ "Presentación," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 1 (July 1954) 3; Antonio Fontán, "En servicio a España," *Actualidad Española*, no. 415, (December 17, 1959).

⁸⁸ Antonio Fontán, "Los Españoles y Europa," *Actualidad Española*, no. 1 (January 12, 1952); Antonio Fontán, "Valor de España," *Actualidad Española*, no. 4, (February 2, 1952).

⁸⁹ It gave disproportionate platform to intellectuals such as Calvo Serer, López-Amo, Pérez Embid, and Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora; many in the Spanish public were under the impression that *ABC* and the Opus Dei worked in a coordinated manner, see - "Le Transmite el rumor de que la campaña de *ABC* contra la Universidad está inspirada por el Opus Dei," AGUN, Fondo Torcuato Luca de Tena, 01-07-1964/31-07-1964, caja 2.

⁹⁰ "Punta Europa: una revista del Opus Dei?" *Punta Europa*, no. 55-56 (July-August 1960): 5-8.

⁹¹ Juan Sepich, "Itinerario de hispanoamérica," *Punta Europa*, no. 1 (January 1956), 71-84; "La significación de Newman," *Punta Europa*, no. 16 (April 1957); Enrique Zuleta, "Notas sobre la cultura argentina," *Punta Europa*, no. 7-8 (July-August 1957).

⁹² "Amistad y política," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 7 (January 1955): 6-7; "Amistad y política, II," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 8, (February 1955): 9.

maturity is continuous perseverance that will give us the metamorphosis from the chrysalis to a butterfly. [...] monarchy or republic, authoritarianism or liberalism - these are all empty shells once the fruit goes inside.⁹³

The Opus Dei thus advised moving the spiritual revolution from the battlefield - where the Falange thought it should be - into man's home and even his own body. And while the Falange idolized Don Quixote's "poetic" madness, the Opus Dei believed the Hidalgo from La Mancha reached a spiritual sublime through pure "elite" servitude. "Against this healthy idea of madness," said Vázquez "we should talk about what is known as the *elite politique* [...] where a few people deal with public chores while the rest graze as a flock of sheep."⁹⁴ These words are indicative that, by the end of the 1950s, the Opus Dei had begun voicing an increasingly holistic theory of the elite Christian man, beginning from the harmonized home and ending with optimal political agency.

The Opus Dei in Latin America

The Opus Dei's international expansion began, officially at least, in 1946 with Escrivá's own relocation to the Vatican. Despite willingly promoting an international image by then, until the mid-1960s the Opus Dei was nonetheless a predominantly Spanish organization.⁹⁵ As such, and in direct continuation to the Hispanidad ideological projects, the Opus Dei intellectuals underscored the likeness between Spain and Latin America's social realities, and thus saw in Latin America a more urgent ideological battlefield.⁹⁶ Calvo Serer, Pérez Embid, and Vicente Rodríguez Casado (numery) were all historians of the Spanish Empire by training. Not surprisingly, they too

⁹³ Ibid, 10.

⁹⁴ Andrés Vázquez de Prada, "Don Quijote caballero político," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 15 (September 1955): 4-5.

⁹⁵ According to one estimation, in 1964, eighty percent of its members were Spaniards, see - Ynfante, *La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei*, 339.

⁹⁶ In his 1955 *Los Cambios sociales y políticos en España e Hispanoamérica* Rodríguez drew the parallels between the Spanish and Latin American social crises; Pérez Embid too saw himself as a Historian of Latin America as his book *La acción de España en America* indicated, see also - Florentino Pérez Embid, "Panorama del americanismo español actual," *Arbor*, no. 22 (1947): 79-90; Florentino Pérez Embid, "Conceptos históricos de la formación de Hispanoamérica," *Arbor*, no. 74 (February 1952): 212-16.

stressed Spain “must orient its life [...] towards Hispanoamerica, not for a mere egoistic instinct of self-salvation, but because all the Spanish-American countries need to be fused into a third great bloc.”⁹⁷ For Calvo Serer, this meant establishing a truly independent third “international of minorities.”⁹⁸ Pérez Embid agreed. “The projection towards America,” he said, “is more than an anecdote in our international relations but a constant effort born of the very roots of our selfhood as it had developed historically.”⁹⁹

In fact, the Opus Dei intellectuals proposed a broader and more inclusive interpretation of the Hispanidad mythology.¹⁰⁰ This was evident in the way they approached the 18th century Bourbon Reforms. A period previously disdained in the Hispanidad narratives, the Bourbons - and in particular, the reign of King Carlos III - returned in Rodríguez Casado’s texts as “modernizing traditionalists,” who skillfully merged scientific “technique” and Catholic spirituality, thereby modernized their imperial administration and adapting it “to the progressive growth of the middle classes.”¹⁰¹ Tellingly, by paralleling the Falange’s 1940s nationalist-syndicalist autarchic economy to the failed Hapsburgian 16th century mercantilism, Rodríguez Casado further identified the Bourbon reformers with Spain’s upcoming neoliberal opening, the Opus Dei, and the forthcoming restoration of the Bourbon King.

More concretely, like the ICH the Opus Dei sought to link with the Latin American elites through multiple channels. For example, it too designed an apparatus to accommodate Latin American students in Spain. Under Rodríguez Casado’s direction, the Universidad Hispanoamericana de Santa María de la Rábida, and later in the 1960s the UNAV, served this type

⁹⁷ Calvo Serer, *España sin problema*, 65.

⁹⁸ Rafael Calvo Serer, “La Internacional de las minorías,” *ABC Madrid* (April 29, 1950); Rafael Calvo Serer, *La configuración del futuro* (Madrid: Rialp, 1953).

⁹⁹ Pérez Embid, “Ante la nueva actualidad”, 159.

¹⁰⁰ See for example - Rafael Calvo Serer, “España es más ancha de Castilla,” *ABC Madrid* (April 23, 1952).

¹⁰¹ Vicente Rodríguez Casado, *La política y los políticos en el reinado de Carlos III*, (Madrid: Rialp, 1962), 16; see also Florentino Pérez Embid, *Libertad, tradición y monarquía*. (Madrid: Ateneo, 1960), 44.

of function. However, it was the opening of the Opus Dei branches in Latin America that was to prove crucial for its ideological operation. The Opus Dei's method of international expansion was simple: First, it opened "houses" throughout the continent; second, it established publishing apparatuses identical to those operating in Spain.¹⁰² Mexico, Argentine, and Chile were to be the first countries for this type of penetration. In the case of Argentina, according to the Opus Dei's own narratives, Cardinal Antonio Caggiano, a Franco sympathizer who had made his pilgrimage to Spain already in 1946, upon becoming archbishop of Rosario in 1949 encountered Escrivá in Rome and readily helped the Opus Dei open a center in his town.¹⁰³ Ismael Sánchez Bella, the person chosen by Escrivá for this mission, arrived in Buenos Aires in March 1950 with a diplomatic passport, and sponsored by the ICH,¹⁰⁴ albeit with limited financial resources. Thus it was Caggiano's network of Catholics and Hispanistas¹⁰⁵ that enabled Sánchez Bella to finance the first Opus Dei residency in Argentina, in 1950.¹⁰⁶ The story repeated itself in Chile, where Adolfo Rodríguez Vidal (numery) arrived to be embraced by Archbishop José María Caro Rodríguez, paving the way to the Opus Dei's operation in the country.¹⁰⁷ Like Caggiano, Caro Rodríguez had

¹⁰² This was by no means a covert process, but a public and proud endeavor. In the case of Cuba, the local newspapers reported the arrival of the Opus Dei figures José María Hernández and Alberto Ullastres, and detailed their mission, see - *Diario de la Marina (Habana)* (December 24, 1954); The Spanish ambassador in Habana duly reported back to his superiors that the Opus Dei aimed to "project its activities in the country," see - "Carta de Juan Pablo de Lojendio embajador de España en La Habana a Relaciones Culturales América," and "Declaraciones Padre Hernández Garnica y Dr. Ullastres, miembros del institución Opus Dei," January 1, 1955, AGA, caja 82/12281.

¹⁰³ Based on José Miguel Cegas's interview with Ismael Sánchez Bella, "Los comienzos del Opus Dei en Argentina", see - <http://www.conelpapa.com/historiasdelavidamisma/sanchezbella.htm> (see appendix); for more details on this process, see - Juan Claudio Sanahuja, *Los comienzos del Opus Dei en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Edita S.A, 1988).

¹⁰⁴ "Invited by the Argentine universities, and sponsored by this institute, my brother Ismael will travel there" wrote Alfredo Sánchez Bella to the Foreign Ministry. "The Argentine embassy itself has advised that any inconvenience would be avoided if they were granted an official passport," he also wrote, see - "Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Antero de Ussaía, Jefe de Gabinete Diplomático," March 3, 1950, AGA, caja 82/10727.

¹⁰⁵ His conferences were filled with "Hispanistas, doctors, engineers, young professionals," Sánchez Bella recalled later, see - Sánchez Bella, "Los comienzos del Opus Dei en Argentina".

¹⁰⁶ "When he conducted the first Mass, the Cardinal spoke with much affection of the Opus Dei and asked everyone to collaborate with its apostolic work," said Sánchez Bella, see - *ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ This knowledge is based on interviews with Bernardino Bravo Lira, carried out by María Mönckeberg, see - María Olivia Mönckeberg, *El imperio del Opus Dei en Chile* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones B, Grupo Zeta, 2003), 144; for the Opus Dei's official narrative see - "60 años de la llegada del Opus Dei a Chile," in <http://opusdei.cl/es-cl/article/60-anos-de-la-llegada-del-opus-dei-a-chile>.

encountered Escrivá in Rome and approved the Opus Dei's arrival beforehand.¹⁰⁸ A similar process took place in the early 1960s when Escrivá decided to establish the first Opus Dei university in Latin America. Here it was the bishop of Piura, Erasmo Hinojosa, who endorsed the Opus Dei.¹⁰⁹ In short, Escrivá's networking at the Vatican with figures sympathetic to Franco's Spain facilitated the establishment of the Opus Dei's Latin American centers, based on the assistance of local elites, and with further support by the ICH and the Spanish government.¹¹⁰

By 1960, the Opus Dei already operated an international publishing network that brought the Francoist intellectual production to broader audiences. The journals *Istmo* (Published in Mexico) and *Arco* (Published Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador) appeared simultaneously in the Spring of 1959. Resembling *Nuestro Tiempo* stylistically, they published the texts of the Opus Dei's key intellectuals.¹¹¹ Apart from attacking Marxism and calling to "Christianize society,"¹¹² these writers elucidated Francoist authoritarianism to the Latin American readers, many of whom still lived under parliamentary democracies. The Opus Dei ideologue Álvaro d'Ors, for example, spoke of authority "regaining its privileges" and of the "authority of men of science" curbing political rights within the context of a blessed motion towards "decentralization and denationalization."¹¹³ Political parties were detrimental to the liberty of thought, he further stressed, since they become irrational groups of "pressure and conquest." But more fundamentally, for him "the technification

¹⁰⁸ Isabel Larraín, "Entrevista a Monseñor Adolfo Rodríguez, Obispo de Los Ángeles," *El Sur de Concepción* (May 17, 1992).

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Alberto Moncada; also – Moncada, *Historia oral del Opus Dei*, 88-89.

¹¹⁰ That the ICH was an essential component in the Opus Dei's intellectual work in the 1950s and 1960s should not surprise us given the fact that this was almost the only available institution to accommodate most any Spanish intellectual in these years. Víctor García Hoz, for instance, frequently spoke at Chile's ICH. Vicente Rodríguez Casado, too, held a lecture tour at the ICH of Argentina, Chile, and Peru, in 1952, see - AGUN, Fondo Rodríguez Casado, primera parte, documentos 1941-1947.

¹¹¹ Colombian David Mejía Velilla was one example, see - David Mejía Velilla, "El comunismo en Hispanoamérica," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 69 (March 1960); this article appeared simultaneously in *Istmo*, no. 8 (March- April 1960): 76-81; José Orlandis, "La mentira política," *Arco*, no. 8-9 (May-August 1960); appeared later in *Istmo* no. 14 (May-June 1961).

¹¹² José Luis Illanes Maestre, "Reflexiones sobre la edad moderna," *Arco*, no. 1 (March-April 1959): 5-14.

¹¹³ Álvaro d'Ors, "Autoridad y libertad," *Arco*, no. 16 (September-October 1961): 333-37.

of the modern state” meant the need to compromise political “free will.” His authoritarian vision was not totalitarian, he said in his defense, but Christian. “The Church offers us an effective doctrine to overcome this difficulty - a pluralistic structuring, in which freedom is constituted as a discharge of natural powers, instead of a concentration of power by a necessarily totalitarian state,” he wrote.¹¹⁴ To put it simply, Álvaro d’Ors promoted a non-democratic state wherein technology and Christian “pluralism” guarantee man’s material and spiritual development, without having to resort to violence. In the same vein, Francoism appeared in these texts as a place where the public had freely chosen to commit to a Christian spiritual order. According to the Opus Dei priest José Orlandis, Spain was a place where “extensive sectors of the population,” freely live “a fully Christian existence.” Tellingly, he also stated that “there are also many members of Opus Dei [...] who are in open opposition to the Franco regime.”¹¹⁵ In 1959, this was a false statement, which nonetheless attested to how the Opus Dei promoted its “apolitical” image by then: first, its spokesmen praised the achievements of Francoism; then they implied that the Opus Dei is not political and even opposes Franco.

Eventually, these journals brought to the fore the Opus Dei’s Latin American recruits. The next chapters will explore the activities of two of them: Chilean José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois and Argentine Ernesto García Alesanco. Barely twenty years old when they encountered Escrivá, the two soon enthusiastically joined their leader in Rome. Or as Ibáñez Langlois wrote his mentor and ICH director, Roque Esteban Scarpa: “It will be difficult for you to imagine what it is like to be here: the immense joy of living the spirit of the Opus Dei fully. From Chile, I saw things clearly

¹¹⁴ Álvaro d’Ors, “Libertad individual y social,” *Istmo*, no. 16 (September-October 1961): 19-24.

¹¹⁵ José Orlandis, “El catolicismo en la España de hoy,” *Istmo*, no. 6 (November-December, 1959): 61.

but here in Rome, together with the founder, they look wonderful.”¹¹⁶ As for García Alesanco, his inclusion into Opus Dei was a “supernatural deed” he says. His story went as follows:

As the Founder of Opus Dei wanted to have at his side many of the first *vocations* that were arriving from the countries where, at that time, [the Opus Dei’s] work began, Francisco Polti and I went to the Roman College of the Holy Cross. I met José Miguel Ibáñez in Rome, as he too was one of the first *vocations* from Chile. [...] I continued to the University of Navarra to pursue a career in Communication Sciences [...] During the years in Navarra, José Miguel Ibáñez and myself formulated the project, which later crystallized in the journal *Cuadernos del Sur*. In those years, I cooperated a lot with Antonio Fontán and Rafael Alvira, who were my teachers in Communications.¹¹⁷

What emerges from this narrative is a fairly simple system of ideological training that began with Escrivá’s promotion of Argentine and Chilean students and continued with their education at UNAV, where they acquired the skills that were to serve them later upon returning to their native countries.

After being ordained to priesthood at the Opus Dei’s Moncloa collage in 1960,¹¹⁸ the two began publishing on the pages of *Nuestro Tiempo*. García Alesanco analyzed the political instabilities in Argentina, while Ibáñez devoted himself to prose and issues of public morality. In his writing, García Alesanco repeatedly contested parliamentarism. “Democracy,” he said “is only a myth in the name of which different groups interfere with the government’s freedom of action. It produces a profound economic, political, and military crisis.”¹¹⁹ In a review to Orlandis’s book *la vocación cristiana del hombre de hoy*, Ibáñez Langlois, for his part, criticized the modern “*homo tecnicus*” who “refuses to worship anything” and is thus committing a sin of “idolatry of man.” The message of the church, he inferred, could answer this crisis by becoming intertwined with

¹¹⁶ Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, Archivo Roque Esteban Scarpa, Carta de José Miguel Ibáñez a Roque Esteban Scarpa, March 6, 1956.

¹¹⁷ Ernesto García Alesanco, written testimony, April 20, 2016.

¹¹⁸ Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, Archivo Roque Esteban Scarpa, tarjeta 1960.

¹¹⁹ Ernesto García Alesanco, “Reacción antimilitar en argentina,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 64 (October 1959), 443; see also - Ernesto García Alesanco, “El futuro de la Argentina,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 71 (May 1960): 608-11.

“earthly realities” and “the sanctification of the profane.”¹²⁰ In short, by the early 1960s, the Opus Dei’s ideology began making its way to the Latin American public. A seemingly freewheeling discussion over the technological age and the role of the Christian elite within it, this corpus of texts was still striking in its unequivocal rejection of parliamentary democracy and overall demand to design a novel system to replace it in Latin America.

In power: The Opus Dei and the turning point of the Francoist regime (1957-1961)

The Opus Dei’s road to political power was not easy at the outset. Despite allying with the cause of the Bourbon monarchs - who by the mid-1950s had further aligned with Francoism -¹²¹ the Falange still held its centers of power in the Movimiento. In addition, the appointment of the ideologically moderate Joaquín Ruíz-Giménez as minister of education instead of Ibáñez Martín meant a setback for the Opus Dei. Whereas Pérez Embid, and another Valencia Opus Dei affiliate named José Luis Villar Palasí, did manage to obtain prominent positions in the Ministry of Information and Tourism,¹²² overall during the mid-1950s, the Opus Dei failed to undo the Falange’s ideological and political grip over the regime.

This changed in 1957 due to a conjuncture of economic and political crises. While Western Europe saw its speedy economic recovery thanks to the Marshal Plan, in 1956 Spain’s economy was on the verge of bankruptcy. Worse yet, Francoism saw its first - and definitely not last - student unrests. Following years of animosity between the Falange and the new authoritarian and Catholic

¹²⁰ José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “El signo de los tiempos,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 64 (October 1959) 499-501.

¹²¹ Following the negotiations in Estoril in 1955, Don Juan de Borbón decided aligning with the regime, after many years of anti-Francoist rhetoric. In 1955, in an interview to *ABC*, Don Juan even adhered to the “ideales of the Movimiento,” and shortly thereafter sent his son Juan Carlos to be educated in Franco’s Spain. For more on the Opus Dei’s involvement in this process see - Antonio Cañellas Mas, *Laureano López Rodó*; see also - José María Toquero, *Franco y Don Juan: la oposición monárquica al franquismo* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1989).

¹²² Pérez Embid served as General Director of Information (1952-1957), the highest rank an Opus Dei intellectual has reached up until this point.

elements in the academy, an initiative to democratize the Falange's Student Syndicate (SEU) led to unprecedented manifestations in Madrid, which were, in turn, violently crushed by Franco's brutes. The subsequent sacking of Ruíz-Giménez and Laín Entralgo (then the rector of the University of Salamanca) signaled the end of the regime's "liberal" trends.¹²³ Next, pressured to produce an original state-model, the Falange leadership initiated the regime's "re-falangistization."¹²⁴ In February 1957, José Luis Arrese, the Secretary-General of the Movimiento, declared a new "constitutional phase" wherein he and his followers were to draft "Fundamental Laws" in hope to lead Spain back to its nationalist-syndicalist path. Dialectically, it did just the opposite: led by Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the Falange's antagonists quickly articulated an alternative authoritarian project. As a result, it was this reaction that was to design Francoism's new constitutional base. The Catholic Church had an important role in frustrating the Falange's new project, equating it with "totalitarian" programs of National Socialism and Peronism.¹²⁵ Indeed, against the backdrop of the downfall of Peronism in Argentina, the Catholic elements in Franco's society, too, had been wary of any further statist and autarchic experiments.¹²⁶

At this crucial point in the struggle over Franco's heart, it was Carrero Blanco and the Opus Dei who won the upper hand. "Arrese," reflected then a relatively anonymous Opus Dei numerary by the name of Laureano López Rodó, underestimated the Admiral's "unique position with Franco."¹²⁷ In November 1956, even before Arrese announced his constitutional project, López

¹²³ For more on the 1956 events see - José Álvarez Cobelas, *Envenenados de cuerpo y alma: la oposición universitaria al Franquismo en Madrid (1939-1970)* (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 2004); Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer, *El Sindicato Español Universitario (SEU), 1939-1965: La socialización política de la juventud universitaria en el Franquismo* (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1996); Miguel Boyer and Antonio López Pina (eds.), *La generación del 56* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2010).

¹²⁴ Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*, 391.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 425-30.

¹²⁶ For more on this Falangist project, see - Álvaro de Diego, *José Luis Arrese o la Falange de Franco* (Madrid: Actas Editorial, 2001).

¹²⁷ Laureano López Rodó, *Memorias, vol. 1* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1990), 89.

Rodó met with Carrero Blanco to discuss this alternative ideological path.¹²⁸ Born in 1920, the Opus Dei priest in everyday life was a son of Barcelona industrialists and an apt example of a Catalan who, following the Civil War, found Escrivá's message appealing. Influenced by Salazar's Portugal's Estado Novo,¹²⁹ in the 1950s he made a reputation for himself as a theorist of "administration." Building on his friendship with Carrero Blanco, López Rodó was thereby to embody the quintessential Francoist technocrat of the 1960s. On December 20, 1956, he was appointed General Technical Secretary of the Presidency of the Government - a body created especially for the sake of a profound "administrative reform."¹³⁰ A few months later, Franco reshuffled his government entirely, appointing Opus Dei members Alberto Ullastres (Minister of Commerce) and Mariano Navarro Rubio (Minister of Finance) to lead Spain's economic reform along with López Rodó. Thus, began the Opus Dei's technocratic-authoritarian era.

A word is due on Luis Carrero Blanco. More than merely an *éminence grise*, this navy Admiral was the most powerful man in the Francoist regime from the mid-1950s.¹³¹ He was also an exceptionally authoritarian figure, who believed wholeheartedly in the "divine will" sustaining Francoism,¹³² and in the need to "capture and annihilate" any subversive elements.¹³³ Additionally, he too promoted a "Catholic-nationalist" monarchic restoration.¹³⁴ From 1957, he and the Opus Dei worked as one unit, along with other closely tied allies such as Alfredo Sánchez Bella, against the Falangist power centers in the regime. Interestingly, some have gone as far as labeling Carrero

¹²⁸ The interview, said López Rodó later, "was the beginning of an intimate collaboration for seventeen years, with that great figure of our history that was Luis Carrero Blanco," see - *ibid*, 66.

¹²⁹ López Rodó was a fellow at the University of Coimbra, where he became acquainted with Marcelo Caetano of the Law Department in Lisbon, later the last prime minister of Portuguese dictatorship, in *ibid*, 126-27.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 67.

¹³¹ A term used by Spanish historian Javier Tusell, in Javier Tusell, *Carrero: la eminencia gris del régimen de Franco* (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 1993).

¹³² "Consideraciones sobre el momento actual en España," September 1945, AGUN, caja 49/1/31.

¹³³ "Notas sobre la actual campaña sobre el régimen," October 9, 1946, AGUN, caja 49/1/64,

¹³⁴ "Consideraciones sobre el momento actual en España".

Blanco an Opus Dei member.¹³⁵ This assertion cannot be substantiated. But undeniably, he and the Opus Dei worked in a symbiotic manner: they gave him a coherent ideological platform, while he granted them vast executive power to put ideas into practice - ideology into a state ideology.

Upon assuming office, the Opus Dei team reorganized the regime around their administrative center. López Rodó's 1957 Law of the Juridical System of the Administration, aimed to grant supreme executive power to the administrators of Spain's forthcoming economic plans. It established a "special article" giving the last word to the Head of the Government, "who incarnates with the Head of State the unity of the Administration, and for that reason channels and coordinates the activity of the remaining Ministries, keeping them within the limits of the common government program." López Rodó would thereby have the final word over much of Spain's future legislation, with only Franco having the power to veto his actions.¹³⁶ Next, on May 17, 1958, Spain's Principles of the National Movement Law (*Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional*) was finally published. Written under the supervision of Carrero Blanco and López Rodó, it was the definitive blow to the Falange's ideology. Including no remanence of the José Antonio Primo de Rivera's "points," it instead declared Spain as "traditionally Catholic, social, and representative Monarchy," where a corporatist-sounding system of "political participation via family, municipality, and unions," was to supersede parliamentarism. Expectedly, the law also redefined Spain as the "spiritual axis of the Hispanic world."¹³⁷

It was at this moment that Escrivá wrote Franco a personal message from Rome, expressing his satisfaction with the law:

With the perspective acquired in Eternal Rome, I have been able to better observe the beauty of that beloved daughter of the Church that is my Fatherland, [...] serving on so many

¹³⁵ Emilio J. Corbière, *Opus Dei: el totalitarismo católico: acerca del integrismo y del progresismo cristiano* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2002), 193.

¹³⁶ "Ley de Régimen Jurídico de la Administración," *BOE (España)* no. 187 (July 22, 1957): 603-607.

¹³⁷ "Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional," *BOE (España)* no. 119, (May 19, 1958): 4511-12.

occasions as an instrument for the defense and propagation of the Catholic faith in the world. Although removed from all political activity, I have been able to rejoice, as a priest and as a Spaniard, [your] proclamation that ‘the Spanish Nation regards as a sign of honor the compliance with God’s Laws, akin to the doctrine of the Holy Catholic Roman Church [...]’. Our nation’s fidelity to the Catholic tradition - together with the divine blessing of the persons now in position of authority - is the best guarantee of the government’s success, as well as the security of a just and lasting peace within our national community.¹³⁸

The letter reveals that despite his seeming “apolitical” position Escrivá fully endorsed the Francoist regime, and even acknowledge Franco divine inspiration. The undertones of the letter, however, are no less important: obviously, both Escrivá and Franco knew that there was an exceptional meaning to the presence of the Opus Dei ministers in the new government, as well as to the fact that López Rodó had drafted the law. Arguably, the letter is Escrivá’s expression of gratitude to Franco for choosing his men for positions of leadership.

The international press was quick to grasp the meaning of the 1957 political change. Ullastres, in later years, said he and his companions “benefitted from the impossibility of labeling us politically.”¹³⁹ This was perhaps true during their first months in office. Yet no sooner had the Opus Dei ministers been appointed than the international press began scrutinizing the nature of the mysterious “cult” running the Spanish state. *The New York Times* reported that “the influence of the movement over the strictly censored Spanish press and inside the government agencies that control public opinion is steadily growing.”¹⁴⁰ And the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera* added that “one of the aims of Opus Dei is to achieve through its members a moralization of Spanish public life.”¹⁴¹ By 1962, the British journal *The Statist* declared that Opus Dei was “the

¹³⁸ “1958 mayo 23. carta de José María Escrivá de Balaguer felicitando a Franco por los Principios de Movimiento Nacional,” FNFF, Documento 957.

¹³⁹ López Rodó, *Memorias vol. II*, 91.

¹⁴⁰ Benjamin Welles, “Franco’s posts go to church group,” *New York Times* (March 7, 1957).

¹⁴¹ “1959, febrero 26 Copia de un artículo del periódico italiano Corriere della Sera,” FNFF, Documento 23297; Another report worth mentioning is *The Times* article from of August 20, 1959 titled “Spanish Founder of Opus Dei” - a flattering coverage that was to be debated by the Opus Dei intellectuals in the following months, see - Rafael Calvo Serer, *Table Ronde* “Notes sur un article du Times” (October 1959): 144-54.

power behind Franco's throne," alleging that Franco's daughter, Carmen, "is a leading member on its women's branch."¹⁴² Hitherto a seemingly anonymous society, in a fairly short period of time the Opus Dei markedly captivated the imagination of tabloid readers worldwide.

Somewhat reluctantly, thus began the Opus Dei's period of public relations management. In April 1957, Julián Herranz (numerary) published an article titled "the Opus Dei and politics," which for a long time served as the Opus Dei's official narrative. Appearing simultaneously in *Istmo*, *Arco*, and the French journal *Table Ronde*,¹⁴³ the text stated that the Opus Dei "is not involved in the public life of any country," as it is concerned only with training its members to a "supernatural goal of holiness."¹⁴⁴ Still, with the founding of UNAV in 1960, the Opus Dei's unique status in the regime became even more apparent. One of the only bodies officially belonging to Opus Dei, this university represented the Opus Dei perfectly: a "Christian University," it symbolized both novelty (with its School for Journalism) and spirituality (the school for Canon Law and theology). Its inauguration hence saw a wave of Opus Dei public-relations publications.¹⁴⁵ In fact, Pérez Embid now took it upon himself to explain the Opus Dei to the public. Being Escrivá's "official biographer," he tailored a new image for his spiritual leader, portraying him as a modest man living a joyous life of self-denial.¹⁴⁶ Defending the Opus Dei on every possible platform, Pérez Embid went as far as approaching American journalists

¹⁴² Copies of such newspapers apparently reached Franco's archive, see - "1962 noviembre 30. Fotocopia de un artículo pub en The Statist, 'Opus Dei: the power behind Franco's throne'," FNFF, Documento 1439.

¹⁴³ Julián Herranz, "El Opus Dei," *Arco*, no. 16 (Septemver-October 1961) 350-64; appeared with the same title on *Istmo*, no. 15 (July-August 1961) 67-76; see also Julián Herranz, "Naturaleza del Opus Dei y actividades temporales de sus miembros," *Arco*, no. 25 (September 1962): 522; Manuel Cabrera Tejada, "La objetividad del New York Times," *Arco* no. 43 (April 1964): 180-82.

¹⁴⁴ Julián Herranz, "El Opus Dei y la política," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 34 (Abril 1957): 389-91.

¹⁴⁵ For a full review of the positive coverage of this event see - *El Estudio General de Navarra: eco de su constitución como universidad de la iglesia, en la prensa española* (Madrid: P.E., 1961).

¹⁴⁶ Florentino Pérez Embid, *José María Escrivá de Balaguer y Albas* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1961).

complaining about their negative coverage.¹⁴⁷ In 1961, he ultimately appeared upon several magazines with answers to the question “what is Opus Dei?”¹⁴⁸ There are “no secrets,” no “infiltrations,” and no “ownership of newspapers,” was the gist of his presentations. On the contrary, he said: Opus Dei members are “free to follow any ideological path they so choose,” as the movement does not coerce an “ideological stance” on anybody.¹⁴⁹

The defense of the Opus Dei was an endeavor taken upon all affiliates internationally. For example, when in September 1962 British historian Hugh Thomas reported the struggles within the Francoist dictatorship, it was García Alesanco who immediately responded upon the Argentine conservative daily *La Nación*. “That Opus Dei is identified with a political position, is an erroneous assertion,” he said, adding that the Opus Dei was just an “association of faithful [...] committed to an intense spiritual life.”¹⁵⁰ With these remarks, García Alesanco neatly changed the question from ideological production to political agency. That is to say, he diverted the debate from the precise beliefs of the Opus Dei ministers to whether they operated according to guidelines of their spiritual leader.¹⁵¹ True enough, there is little evidence to sustain the claim that Escrivá, or Álvaro de Portillo, influenced Franco’s ministers from Rome. Yet stating that the Opus Dei had no “political position” was clearly a misleading statement.

¹⁴⁷ “12-01-1960 (130) Carta de Florentino Pérez Embid a Benjamin Welles, protesta por las inexactitudes sobre él y sobre el Opus Dei que contiene su artículo de *The New York Times* del 04-01-1960,” AGUN, Caja 3/10/(Enero).

¹⁴⁸ “¿Que es el Opus Dei?” *Actualidad Española*, no. 487 (May 4, 1961): 39-40; “¿Que es el Opus Dei?” *Vida Mundial*, no. 13 (April 29, 1961).

¹⁴⁹ Not all Opus Dei members were pleased with this diminutive portrayal of their organization, see for instance - “14-06-1961 Tarjetón de Antonio Garrigues a Florentino Pérez Embid, agradece sus artículos sobre el Opus Dei y su trabajo sobre el periodo de entreguerras, pero cree que no ha expresado la verdadera naturaleza de la Obra sino que la ha empuqueñecido,” AGUN, caja 3/11/(Junio).

¹⁵⁰ Ernesto García Alesanco, “Aclaraciones sobre Opus Dei,” *La Nación* (September 26, 1962).

¹⁵¹ What Sociologist José Casanova has framed as the element of “denial of responsibility for the worldly activities of its members,” see - José Casanova, *The Opus Dei Ethic and the Modernization of Spain*, 1982, Dissertation: The New School for Social Research, 87-92.

The media's attention to the Opus Dei changed its members' behavior if not ideologically then strategically. According to some reports, Escrivá was "shaken by the international critique of the Francoist politicization," of his movement.¹⁵² In tandem with the opening of the Second Vatican Council, he and his followers began shifting the Opus Dei's public message from "obedience," to that of "work" and "freedom." More striking, in the 1960s Escrivá calculatingly refused to partake in any public political discussion - to the surprise and dismay of Antonio Garriguez, Spain's ambassador to the Vatican. In a secret memo, the latter reported to Franco on what Escrivá allegedly told him:

"I want to know nothing of politics. Priests must not be involved in politics [...] I have had and still have a good friendship with the Caudillo, who calls me frequently and speaks to me with great confidence. This had been precisely one of my reasons not to be involved in Spanish politics, to move my residence from Madrid to Rome. [...] Opus Dei has preceded the Second Vatican Council in many things, although our enemies do not recognize it - on the contrary, they want to put the Opus Dei in the opposite position of the spirit of the Council [...] Opus Dei is not founded on 'cadaverous obedience' but on freedom."¹⁵³

By the late-1960s, these words of frustration reveal the true scale of Escrivá's anguish of being identified with Francoism and consequently becoming a pariah at the very moment of the Catholic Church's most history transformation.

At any rate, in complete contrast to the 1950s, in the 1960s Escrivá appeared in public as an international luminary. Embarking on international tours and giving elaborate interviews to the press, he conveyed a simple spiritual message of personal liberty, joy, and above all, love of work "in the midst of the realities and interests of the world."¹⁵⁴ On authoritarianism and obedience, Escrivá spoke evasively: "there can be no such thing as truly Christian obedience unless it is

¹⁵² According to memory of numerary Antonio Pérez, in Moncada, *Historia oral del Opus Dei*, 50.

¹⁵³ "Secreto: febrero 1969, carta de nuestro embajador en la santa Sede, Antonio Garrigues: entrevista con Mons. Escrivá," FNFF, Documento 19244.

¹⁵⁴ Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer, *Conversations with Monsignor Escrivá de Balaguer* (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia, 1972), 23; Perdo Rodríguez, "Entrevista con Mons. Escrivá de Balaguer," *Palabra*, no. 26 (October 1967): 20-30.

voluntary and responsible,” he said. When *The Times* reporter Peter Forbarth asked him whether Francoism ever “contributed to Opus Dei’s growth in Spain,” Escrivá responded that the opposite was true: “In Spain we have had the greatest difficulties in making the Work take root,” he exclaimed, given “the opposition of the enemies of personal freedom.”¹⁵⁵ I will return to Escrivá’s figure later in this study, but for the moment one should highlight the following point: while the Opus Dei ideologues changed the regime’s identity Escrivá publicly denied any connection to it. This notwithstanding, only a tiny few of his followers ever chose to side with Franco’s democratic opposition as I will explain in chapter 6.

Franco’s “technocrats”: the technocratic-authoritarian state-ideology in 1960s Spain

The Opus Dei economic team worked swiftly. In 1958, they incorporated Spain into the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, thereby receiving substantial credits from these international agencies and even of the US government itself. Soon thereafter, they orchestrated Spain’s 1959 Stabilization Plan.¹⁵⁶ This included several aggressive economic measures, which were later to be repeated in Latin America, and which began with anti-inflation measures (devaluation and a salary freeze) and continued to the raising of interest rates and slashing of tariffs. “There can be no development without eliminating the drug of inflation,” declared López Rodó throughout the years.¹⁵⁷ More important, the reforms lifted most limits on the movement of foreign capital into the country. From now on, Spain was to become a haven for foreign investment, “comprising of low taxes, a disciplined and inexpensive workforce, and a captive

¹⁵⁵ Escrivá de Balaguer, *Conversations with Monsignor Escrivá de Balaguer*, 48.

¹⁵⁶ Officially named “Decreto-Ley 10/1959, de 21 de julio, de ordenación económica,” *BOE (España)* no. 174, (July 22, 1959): 10005-07.

¹⁵⁷ Bernardo Neustadt, “Mi conversación mayor,” *Extra*, no. 76 (November 1971).

consumer market,” in the words of historian Antonio Cazorla Sánchez.¹⁵⁸ Or as López Rodó’s himself explained this neoliberal turn:

No economy can cook in its own sauce. I believe that integration into the supranational economic sphere is a great factor of development and, furthermore, that this development, this intensification of growth rate, is done without detriment to any of the countries that are integrated into a supranational zone [...] According to the well-known phrase that ‘the big fish eats the little one,’ one could think that Germany was going to eat in Italy. However, the Italian economy has not suffered from integration into the Common Market.¹⁵⁹

Indeed, with a working-class devoid of the legal right to strike, low taxation, a booming touristic economy, the geographic proximity to Europe’s industrial centers, and, important of all, the USA’s blessing and special treatment, Spain soon became the industrial backyard of the European continent.¹⁶⁰ But before this shift could take place, the Spanish society would need to endure the more traumatic aspects of “stabilization,” namely the termination of any unprofitable form of production and the laying off thousands of public workers. With sky-rocketing unemployment, 1960s Spain thus saw a massive exodus of its young workforce to rest of Western Europe. The hard currency these men sent back home further contributing to the country’s GDP hike.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Cazorla Sánchez, *Fear and Progress*, 15

¹⁵⁹ Bernardo Neustadt, “Mi conversación mayor”.

¹⁶⁰ Between 1959 and 1973, the Spanish economy saw a flow of Foreign Direct Investment, mainly from the USA, West Germany, France, and Switzerland, going from 100 to 1000 million US dollars between 1960 and 1972, see - Andreu Mayayo, *Economía Franquista y corrupción* (Barcelona: Flor del Viento Ediciones, 2010), 133; for further analyses of the Spanish “economic miracle”, see - Sima Lieberman, *Growth and Crisis in the Spanish Economy: 1940-1993* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Ángel Viñas, *En las garras del Águila: los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe González (1945-1995)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003); Carme Molinero, *Productores disciplinados y minorías subversivas: clase obrera y conflictividad laboral en la España Franquista* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1998).

¹⁶¹ Historians estimate that well over three million Spaniards left the country to Western Europe, from where they sent their salaries thus supplying the regime with a constant flow of foreign currency, see - Cazorla, *Fear and Progress*, 107-15; also see - Ana Fernández Asperilla, “La emigración como exportación de mano de obra: el fenómeno migratorio a Europa durante el Franquismo,” *Historia Social*, no. 30 (1998): 63–81; Axel Kreienbrink, “La lógica económica de la política emigratoria del régimen franquista,” in: Joseba de la Torre and Gloria Sanz Lafuente (eds.), *Migraciones y coyuntura económica del franquismo a la democracia* (Zaragoza: Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2008), 221–35.

It is worthwhile noting that there was no separation between the Opus Dei “technocratic” ministers and its intellectuals. While not appearing often in public together, they still cooperated intimately towards mutual political goals. In 1960, Franco’s agents reported on one such meeting:

There was a large number of Opus leaders with current political influence, including Fernández de la Mora, Pérez Embid, Rodríguez Casado, López Rodó and others. They addressed the next meeting of [Don Juan’s] Private Council in Estoril, and the current internal political situation. As we know, Hotel Richmond is controlled by the aforementioned Institute [Opus Dei]¹⁶²

Hence, in the next pages, when discussing of the “technocrats” I will be referring to this group of Opus Dei members and allies who consciously strove to produce a novel state model, and who included López Rodó, Navarro Rubio, and Ullastares, as well as Pérez Embid, Villar Palasí, Rodríguez Casado, and last, the theorist Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora.

Spain’s economic “miracle” is a phenomenon that should be read primarily through the lenses of Francoist propaganda.¹⁶³ Whereas Spain merely followed, *grosso modo*, the footsteps of similar economic reforms in Italy, France, and Germany, Franco’s technocrats merged components from Europe’s nascent neoliberal jargon with the Francoist political mythology, thereby producing a hybrid that was to captivate the imagination of Latin American elites at the time. This language took several years to develop fully. In 1960, for instance, Ullastres did not seem entirely sure about his own agenda: “It is impossible to say exactly what the situation is now, and what will be the policy after the first stage of the stabilization plan,” he said. Advising integration with the Western Bloc, he nonetheless contended that “Stabilization is not a rigid concept.”¹⁶⁴ It was only from 1961

¹⁶² “Madrid, 17 de Marzo de 1960, Nota informativa,” FNFF, Documento 3661.

¹⁶³ The trope itself was identified with the work of Waldo de Mier, who in 1964 published one of the most distinctive propaganda texts in Francoist history, named “The Spanish change of skin,” see - Waldo de Mier, *España cambia de piel: (Nuevo viaje por la “España del Milagro”)* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1964); for more on this label see Tatjana Pavlovic, *The Mobile Nation: España Cambia de Piel (1954-1964)* (Chicago, IL: Intellect, 2011).

¹⁶⁴ “Tenemos que estudiar la manera de hacer compatibles la expansión y la estabilización económicas,” *ABC Sevilla* (February 2, 1960).

that the technocrats' rhetoric was to reach its fullest form, within the context of Spain's "Development Plans."

The social costs of the "stabilization" notwithstanding, the technocrats stressed they were creating a new reality of "social peace." In the 1960s, few terms were as important in Franco's Spain as this trope. "Peace," stated López Rodó, was the "starting point" of any development plan.¹⁶⁵ In 1964, peace eventually became associated with Franco's "25 years of peace" campaign.¹⁶⁶ Rather than the outcome of political violence, "social peace" almost always appeared as an accolade of the Spanish people, for their readiness to endure economic strains for the common good. "This peace that we enjoy, this expansion and this development," said Franco in 1967, "demands the unity of the Spaniards, [...] that we all sacrifice something."¹⁶⁷ Yet "peace" was ultimately the paramount achievement of authoritarianism. López Rodó readily brought W.W. Rostow's development theories into the Francoist context to make this point clear. The American economist, he argued, conditioned any "economic take-off" on the presence of "an exceptional man who knows how to catalyze the latent energies of a people and give them confidence in themselves." Needless to say, for López Rodó, it was "the Caudillo" who alone "succeeded in getting us Spaniards regain our confidence."¹⁶⁸ Briefly put, "social peace," for López Rodó, was an outcome of an authoritarian leader de-politicizing the nation and thus uniting it into effective collective action.

¹⁶⁵ *Discurso del ministro y comisario del Plan de Desarrollo en defensa de la Ley que aprueba el II Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social*, February 7, 1969.

¹⁶⁶ A campaign studied by historian Carolyn Boyd, see - Carolyn P. Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875-1975* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

¹⁶⁷ "Tarragona votó sí," *La Vanguardia* (July 7, 1967); see also - "La evolución pacífica de España," *ABC Sevilla*, (July 18, 1962); "No somos totalitarios ni liberales, Madrid, IX Consejo Nacional", March 9, 1963, in Franco, *Pensamiento político*, 243.

¹⁶⁸ Laureano López Rodó, *Política y desarrollo* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1970), 53; his reference was Walt Whitman Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).

The other side of the coin of “social peace” was “rationalization” (or alternatively, “realism”).¹⁶⁹ Again, while taking inspiration from the texts of French economists such as Pierre Masse and Jean Monnet, to name a few, the Opus Dei’s motivation to deconstruct the Falange’s statist corporatism imbued this term with a distinctive meaning. The point was simple: given that capitalist development has no alternatives, any arrangement that includes the direct intervention of the state in economic activity is dysfunctional and therefore “irrational.” López Rodó’s “administrative rationalization” thus merely meant “taking the state out from where it is not called for.”¹⁷⁰ In practical terms, this meant a paradoxical “decentralization” of the state bureaucracy through the swift operation of a “central coordinating body.”¹⁷¹ López Rodó expected each ministry to work for its own objectives, disconnected from any Government deliberation over the course of the economy, thereby granting optimal executive power to his elite of specialist. In a dictatorship where separation of powers barely ever existed, this arrangement was, for the Opus Dei technocrat, the epitome of the abovementioned “politics without rivalries.” In short, López Rodó’s theory of administration rationalization was dictatorial as it was *anti-bureaucratic* and *de-regulatory*.¹⁷²

There was another reason “rational” administration was important for the Opus Dei, and this was the alleged “vertigo” of technological “complexity.”¹⁷³ “With the steam engine, electricity, telegraph, aviation, biochemistry” modern man, stressed Pérez Embid, was, in 1960, a “very

¹⁶⁹ In Pérez Embid’s words, Spain aimed for a “reality credential,” see - Pérez Embid, *En la brecha*, 178.

¹⁷⁰ Neustadt, “Mi conversación mayor”.

¹⁷¹ By doing so, he frequently referred to pre-enlightenment Padre Marquez who opposed Bodin and Maquiavelli by stating that their doctrine not only “goes against the evangels of Jesus Christ” but also because the same efficiency can be achieved in less quarrelsome ways, by a directing elite that would be above the selfish aspiration of every individual. In other words, López Rodó’s rationality was spotted with pre-modern dogmatic thought, see - López Rodó, *Política y desarrollo*, 11.

¹⁷² The reform was presented in *Nuestro Tiempo* in 1956, see - Laureano López Rodó, “La reforma administrativa del Estado,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 27 (September 1956): 3-23; also in López Rodó, *Política y desarrollo*, 123-37.

¹⁷³ López Rodó, “La reforma administrativa del Estado,” in *Política y desarrollo*, 123.

different human than before.” This leap forward, he warned, posed formidable spiritual problems, as the flawed human nature cannot keep pace with technology. That is to say, the more sophisticated technology is, the less one could rely on the masses to opt for the right path of collective action, Pérez Embid thought. Modern life, warned López Rodó similarly, in its “dizzying pace of new collective needs, demands from the administration executing the national policy an increasing *efficiency*.” This unique state of affairs, he said, required from the administration to be “aerodynamic” - a “simple and modern organization” that would throw away “as scrap, outdated and useless mechanisms.”¹⁷⁴

But who was the apt agent to navigate society through this supposed tempestuous technical era? The Opus Dei’s response to this question was, at times, mysterious. On the one hand, this person must be a specialist. On the other hand, effective governance depends on “the intelligence predominantly of the directing minorities,” said Pérez Embid,¹⁷⁵ who acknowledge the “business sense of the administration,” but also are not “aristocratic” by definition.¹⁷⁶ Here López Rodó evoked the mythology of the Bourbon reformers and pre-Napoleonic administration: “for good or bad, the administration of the 18th century was homogeneous,” he noted.¹⁷⁷ Similarly Pérez Embid spoke of a person “who does not depend on any social faction - neither the dictatorship of the proletariat, nor the dictatorship of the aristocracy, nor the dictatorship of the capitalist bourgeoisie - and who is also Christian and willing to do justice.”¹⁷⁸ In the 1960s, as López Rodó became Franco’s main speech-writer, one could locate this enigmatic agent even in the Caudillo’s rhetoric. “For Spain to stay a living organism,” stated Franco, “there must be a minority [...] who has faith

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 126.

¹⁷⁵ Pérez Embid, *En la Brecha*, 169-72.

¹⁷⁶ *La administración pública y las transformaciones socioeconómicas: discurso de recepción en la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, pronunciado en la sesión de 29 de mayo de 1963*, 83.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 46

¹⁷⁸ Pérez Embid, *En la Brecha*, 93.

and enthusiasm for the job, who decides to become the channel where the ideals and aspirations of the people reach the duties of the state.”¹⁷⁹ This statement was indicative of how commonsensical the technocratic language had become by then in Spain. For Franco in 1967, Spain’s future depended on altruistic agents who adhered only to the laws of “science,” “technique,” and the “spirit.”

Remarkably, Franco’s technocrats were rarely renown specialists in their field. And when asked about the role of the state in modern terms, López Rodó tended towards rather rudimentary formulations: “The state must provide infrastructure, because the private productive system cannot stay hanging in the air [...] This is, in my opinion, the one thing the state should do,” he said in 1971.¹⁸⁰ Spain’s Development Plan of 1964-67 added several other concepts to this naïve point of departure, such as “regionalism” and “poles of growth” (or “poles of development”). Inspired by the French precedent, in this case, the technocrats aspired to direct investments to Spain agrarian countryside, thereby creating “new nuclei of manufacturing and service companies.”¹⁸¹ This scheme, which in the Francoist case also echoed traditionalist notions of the cantonization of the state, was not only simplistic but also paradoxical in that it stripped the state from much of its regulatory authority, while at the same time insisting the industrial “poles” were to be the embodiment of social engineering.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ “Tarragona votó sí”.

¹⁸⁰ Neustadt, “Mi conversación mayor”.

¹⁸¹ López Rodó, *Política y desarrollo*, 224.

¹⁸² The term regionalism was actually predominantly used by traditionalist Juan Vázquez de Mella, see - Juan Vázquez de Mella, *Regionalismo y Monarquía* (Madrid: Rialp, 1957); scholarly literature on the Spanish “poles of growth” is still relatively scarce, but overall historians tend to agree that this format did not live up to expectations, see - Pablo Corral Broto, “Sobreviviendo al desarrollismo. Las desigualdades ambientales y la protesta social durante el franquismo (Aragón, 1950-1979),” *Ager: Revista de Estudios sobre Despoblación y Desarrollo Rural*, no. 10 (2011); María Ángeles Sánchez Domínguez, “Los polos de crecimiento en Andalucía: una visión crítica del polo de Huelva,” in Joseba de la Torre and Mario García-Zúñiga (eds.), *Entre el mercado y el estado: los planes de desarrollo durante el franquismo* (Pamplona: Universidad Pública de Navarra, 2009), 321–46.

Curiously enough, with these deregulations, the technocrats purported to transform Spain into a “welfare society.”¹⁸³ Given Spain’s ongoing GDP hike, its population, they thought, was soon to undergo a technical and mental metamorphosis. López Rodó stated repeatedly that, for him, economic growth was just a means to an end. “As Raymond Aron has written, the creation of the new man matters much more than the construction of factories, although these are also necessary,” he said humorously.¹⁸⁴ But this was no joke. For this Opus Dei numerary, spiritual perfection was the definite goal of Spain’s economic progress. “Once one underestimates the spiritual values economic development must serve, many societies react to it with disenchantment,” he still warned in 1972.¹⁸⁵ Conversely, for him, spiritual work was hardly a passive byproduct. In some cases, it was the answer to the alleged alienations of industrial society - the crux of Marxist theory if we will. This unique mental degradation could be effectively answered through “a revalorization of the life of the spirit that, in the end, always implies the same thing: sacrifice,” López Rodó said.¹⁸⁶

López Rodó’s Development Plans dovetailed with yet another unique ideological trend, namely the Francoist narratives of “the end of ideology.” A trite already in the 1960s, this did not prevent Francoist intellectuals to reclaim the term thus granting it fresh meanings.¹⁸⁷ As we have seen, the technocrats agreed that Franco’s success stemmed from having “neutralized the political passions of the Spaniards and creating a policy based on a broad national ‘consensus.’”¹⁸⁸ In the mid-1960s, it was the work of Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora that stood out as the most conspicuous effort to theorize Francoism as a global “post-ideological” state-model. Fernández de

¹⁸³ López Rodó, *Política y desarrollo*, 74.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 77.

¹⁸⁵ Laureano López Rodó, *Nuevo horizonte del desarrollo* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1972), 10.

¹⁸⁶ “Entrevista recogida en el libro ‘Conversaciones en Madrid,’” in *Política y desarrollo*, 396.

¹⁸⁷ For more on this scholarly trend see Stewart Iain, “The Origins of the ‘End of Ideology?’ Raymond Aron and Industrial Civilization,” in *The Companion to Raymond Aron* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015), 177–90.

¹⁸⁸ López Rodó, *Política y desarrollo*, 21.

la Mora's point of departure was that while democracies "atomizes" the individual and communism "terrorizes" him, there exists a global demand for a novel concept of the state. The masses, he argued, are at last willing to exchange political agency for "security."¹⁸⁹

Fernández de la Mora criticized the dialectic motion from secularization back to mythical thought in ideologies such as communism, liberalism, and fascism. Then, he too highlighted the need for "scientific treatment of public affairs" and motion from "the hegemony of intellectuals" to the one of "administrators and economists." The masses, for their part, he believed, "are no longer asking for ideologists, but experts."¹⁹⁰ That is to say, Fernández de la Mora thought one should act democratically and grant the masses what *they* want: security and prosperity. In his 1965 bestseller, *El crepúsculo de las ideologías*, this thesis reaches its apex. Published by the Opus Dei, the book opens with the outright rejection of any alleged Quixotic Spanish mystical irrationality, announcing that Cervantes's book was indeed "ironic and absurd."¹⁹¹ Additionally, Fernández de la Mora portrayed the Enlightenment's ideologies as products of "mass consumption," a pure "emotion", and therefore, intrinsically violent.¹⁹² To make matters worse for parliamentary democracies, the masses, he stressed, are marked by political apathy, which belies collectively deciding on the correct path for modernization.¹⁹³ Therefore, he argued, they should be given full freedom of expression, but be denied universal suffrage.¹⁹⁴ With these notions, Fernández de la Mora thus turned the notion of freedom on its head: the masses should be granted

¹⁸⁹ Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, "De la libertad a la seguridad," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 75-76 (September-October 1960): 354-61.

¹⁹⁰ Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, "Distensión y crisis de las ideologías," *ABC Sevilla* (December 31, 1963).

¹⁹¹ Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, *El crepúsculo de las ideologías* (Madrid: Rialp, 1965), 10.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 34-41.

¹⁹³ In his words, the "leisure de-politization," see - *ibid.*, 54.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 91.

freedom *from* the burden of politics and ideologies. The fantasy at the bottom of his proposition was one of an infantile regression and a return to a life of carefree leisure.¹⁹⁵

Fernández de la Mora's book was thoroughly discussed in the Francoist public sphere.¹⁹⁶ This occurred in tandem with the beginning of the appliance of the term "tecnocrats" to depict the Opus Dei ministers. Interestingly, Fernández de la Mora took issue with these labels. In an opinion column from 1965, he said that this old American coinage merely qualified to a more sophisticated way to manage the economy. This rationalization of the state was the "active" technocratic theory, he said. Yet he agreed that those technocrats who cannot define what economic growth "is good for" in the first place are merely "substituting politics for technology." This, he stated, was "a-moralism," and a "passive" technocracy.¹⁹⁷ In a word: for him, the Spanish spiritual technocrat was fundamentally dissimilar from the western a-moral capitalist one.

At any rate, neither Fernández de la Mora nor López Rodó identified themselves as "technocrats" but as the authentic spokesmen of the Francoist regime. Given that Spain's development now relied on the political nexus between Carrero Blanco, López Rodó, and Fernández de la Mora, they might have been correct to assume so. In the mid-1960s the three proceeded to formulate Franco's final "constitution," or more accurately, the state-model that would replace Franco after his death.¹⁹⁸ Again within the context of the power struggles between Carrero Blanco's group and the Falange's moderate Minister of Information and Tourism Manuel Fraga, Spain saw the beginning of new age of reforms. Fraga's Press Law of March 1966 was one

¹⁹⁵ Fernández de la Mora evoked the idea of "vacation" in his book twice, see – *ibid*, 53, 83; Of course, he merely reiterated what the Opus Dei intellectuals had been saying about the masses for decades, see – Pérez Embid, *En la brecha*, 175.

¹⁹⁶ Carlos Mario Lonoño, "El crepúsculo de las ideologías," *Arco*, no. 58 (August 1965): 489-91; Miguel Boyer, "Expertos en medios, expertos en fines," *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* (December 1966).

¹⁹⁷ Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, "La tecnocracia," *ABC Madrid* (July 21, 1965).

¹⁹⁸ José Luis Villar Palasí, "Las técnicas administrativas de fomento y de apoyo al precio político," *Revista de Administración Pública*, no. 14 (1954): 111-22.

of the regime's most notable instances of liberalization. While lifting Franco's censorship only slightly,¹⁹⁹ it nonetheless positioned Fraga as the champion of the Spanish political opening, once again forcing Carrero Blanco to act.²⁰⁰ The result was Spain's State Organic Law (Ley Orgánica del Estado). Arguably mirroring the French Fifth Republic, the technocrats were the obvious authors of this law, approved by yet another referendum in 1966. "The State's Organic Law is really our Constitution," reflected López Rodó. The referendum, he even suggested proudly, clarified there was an "overwhelming majority in favor of the law."²⁰¹ In truth, the law's importance stemmed from the fairly more concrete meaning it gave Franco's "organic" democracy, as it allowed a limited electoral process on the municipal level and for the Cortes - a system of representation I will debate briefly in chapter 6. On this, López Rodó said that he too believed in "grassroots politics, with participation [...] but ensuring continuity."²⁰²

Behind the scenes, however, Carrero Blanco's team began laying the foundations for Spain's future authoritarian monarchy. Fernández de la Mora and López Rodó were the main designers of this ideological project, along with Luis Sánchez Agesta - an Andalusian jurist who was associated to neither of the prominent ideological Francoist families but cooperating mostly with the Opus Dei monarchist network.²⁰³ For Sánchez Agesta, by 1966 it was clear that in Europe there were indeed three types of regime-models: "the liberal," the "totalitarian," and the "pluralist/corporate," the latter referring to the Iberian regimes, and the only ones to nourish the "natural character of the intermediary associations." That is to say, Sánchez Agesta believed in an

¹⁹⁹ Law no. 14/1966, meant newspapers were not required to submit their editions the censor prior to publication. More on Fraga's Tourism propaganda and Free Press reform, see - Justin Crumbaugh, *Destination Dictatorship: The Spectacle of Spain's Tourist Boom and the Reinvention of Difference* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009).

²⁰⁰ See for instance - "Un paso al frente," *La Vanguardia* (March 16, 1966).

²⁰¹ Neustadt, "Mi conversación mayor".

²⁰² Neustadt, "Mi conversación mayor".

²⁰³ See, for instance, his text presented at the Ateneo de Madrid - Luis Sánchez Agesta, *En torno al concepto de España* (Madrid: Ateneo, 1956).

authoritarian model that nurtured a spectrum of liberal civic activity beneath it. But was this regime a *final* condition? For these theorists the answer was clear: Francoism was not a transitional entity but the definitive stage of perfection. Sánchez Agesta even said that by allowing “pressure groups” to operate within it, Francoism is “more pluralist than liberal democracies.” Unlike the atomizing liberal regimes, in Spain such free associations allow the “social nature of man” to develop more fully, he stressed, since “liberal individualism gives every man the task of creating his own entire world” whereas Franco’s “pluralism situates man in the concrete world in which there are already certain channels for his activity.” Hence, he alleged that since authoritarianism provides its citizens with a firm theoretical grounding, it serves their creativity better, and therefore has “a great future ahead of it.”²⁰⁴

While openly critical to both communism and parliamentarism, in the mid-1960s technocratic Spain did endorse a more apolitical façade, and even established friendly relationships with socialist regimes across Eastern Europe, with Castro’s Cuba, and Allende’s Chile - a topic I will return to in chapter 5.²⁰⁵ This approach facilitated the investments of Spanish firms and banks in Latin America,²⁰⁶ most saliently Spanish car companies (Seat and Pegaso). At the same time, under the guidance of the moderate Falangist Gregorio Marañón Moya, the ICH too turned to propagating Spain’s “development.”²⁰⁷ In fact, by then Spanish diplomats openly demanded a replacing Hispanidad politics with a more pragmatic approach. Spain’s ambassador in Chile during the late-1960s, Miguel de Lojendio, went as far as demanding his superiors that considering the

²⁰⁴ Luis Sánchez Agesta, *Principio de teoría política* (Madrid: Editorial Nacional, 1966), 499-503.

²⁰⁵ For more on this change of diplomacy see - Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España hacia Iberoamérica*. (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1994), 47-57.

²⁰⁶ A process analyzed already by several historians, see for instance - Oriol Malló, *El cartel español: historia crítica de la reconquista económica de México y América Latina (1898-2008)* (Madrid: Foca, 2011); Pollack, *The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy*.

²⁰⁷ See for instance - *Curso sobre el desarrollo económico y social en España* (Madrid: Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, 1964).

“well-deserved admiration” for Spain’s economic miracle worldwide, the regime should relax its “anachronistic line of conduct” and find a “more flexible, broader, and more generous formulas” for dealing with Latin America.²⁰⁸ His complaints notwithstanding, in truth by 1970 little had remained of the pompous Francoist pathos of the 1950s ICH events.

Producing spiritual subjects: The Opus Dei morality in the 1960s

According to one familiar argument in the literature, during the “long-1960s” the Spanish population underwent a rapid cultural transformation, caused by urbanization, consumerism, western tourism, and profound secularization.²⁰⁹ The picture, however, might have been more complex. In truth, during the 1960s Franco’s Spain witnessed the surge of spiritual agencies and extreme far-right movements that did not obey the deterministic causality between economic well-being and secularization. Certainly, the Opus Dei’s own spirituality represented the conscious effort to prove this thesis wrong. The effort to influence the subjectivity of the Spanish public in an age of economic growth did not occur only in the Opus Dei’s intellectual platforms but upon its youth and women publications and television programs. Here, its ideologues confronted the 1960s youth rebellion for the first time, offering instead its own alternative “rebellion.”

The Opus Dei was far from being the only Spanish spiritual agency with international aspirations. As we will see in chapter 6, in the 1960s Spain saw a wave of clerico-fascist activity. In other cases, these were spiritual movements more adapted to the context of middle-class consumption. The *Cursillos de la Cristiandad* (Short courses in Christianity) was a good example

²⁰⁸ “Miguel de Lojendio, Santiago, Septiembre de 1969,” AGA, caja 42/08982,

²⁰⁹ Walter Brekner, “The Change in Mentalities during the Late Franco Regime,” in Nigel Townson (ed.), *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-75* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 67-84; Cristina Palomares, “New Political Mentalities in the Tardofranquismo,” *Ibid*, 118-139; For more on this mental transformation see - Crumbaugh, *Destination Dictatorship*.

of this new type of associations. Established in 1944, it offered a method of “spiritual exercises” for laymen in everyday life. The genealogy of the Cursillos was, in truth, intimately linked to the Opus Dei as its founder, the Bishop of Mallorca Juan Hervás, was a close friend of Escrivá and admittedly inspired by him. Hervás and his followers saw the potential of mobilizing the “lay apostolate,” and hence imitated the Opus Dei in Spain and in Latin America.²¹⁰ “Without messianism, but also without conformism,” they offered yet another technique for achieving a spiritual sublime and overall “evangelization and conversion of modern man.”²¹¹ In the words of Hervás, the Cursillos “comprise of three days of joyful, fraternal, and intimate Christian coexistence.”²¹² As the Opus Dei, the Cursillos sought “ascetic, pastoral, and apostolic principles.” Its method of “mystical rolls” was likewise an exercise in obedience and servitude. While seemingly having little political content, the Cursillos clearly adhered to Franco’s state and even celebrated their first National Congregations of Ecclesiastical Directors at the Valley of the Fallen - Francoism’s utmost monument. In short, like the Opus Dei, the Cursillos were yet another sub-genre of Francoist mysticism.²¹³ Recognized by the Vatican in 2004, this “prelature” published little and had negligible influence within Spanish politics. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, it would achieve notoriety during Onganía’s dictatorship, as I will discuss in chapter 4.

The Opus Dei, contrariwise, had an overwhelming presence in Spain’s public sphere in the 1960s. By now, it owned or controlled intellectual journals (*Arbor*, *Atlántida*, *Nuestro Tiempo*),

²¹⁰ In an article from 1978 he said that the contact with Escrivá “rejuvenated my own spirit and at the same time was an approach to the field of lay apostolate [...] Monsignor Escrivá de Balaguer, inviting me to the centers of The Work, made me participate in the treasures that God himself had placed in his hands so that with complete freedom I could take what interested me to guide my work in the field of the apostolate of the laity,” See - <http://www.conelpapa.com/quepersigue/opusdei/obispomallorca.htm>

²¹¹ Juan Hervás y Benet, “Prologo,” in Clemente Sánchez and Francisco Suárez, *Cursillos de Cristiandad abiertos al futuro* (Madrid: Ediciones Euramerica, 1971), 10.

²¹² After the Cursillo, the attendants would normally arrange a private “post-cursillo” - e.g. continue to meet in small groups throughout the years, *ibid*, 11.

²¹³ Juan Hervás, *Leaders’ Manual for Cursillos in Christianity* (Madrid: Euroamerica, 1964), 18-19.

dailies (*Madrid, Diario Nuevo, El Alcázar*), weeklies (*Actualidad Española, Actualidad Económica, Mundo*), religious journals (*Mundo Cristiano, Palabra*) and student journals (*Moncloa, Gazeta Universitaria*). Along with its publishing houses Rialp and Pomaire, and presence on Spanish national Television (TVE), this apparatus is suggestive that the Opus Dei sought to address many audiences, within Spain's elites and middle-class alike.²¹⁴ In particular, the Opus Dei now aimed to impact three interconnected dominions: the youth, women, and public morality at large.

Indeed, 1960s Spain displayed a paradoxical cultural sphere. On the one hand, Manuel Fraga promoted the country as a site of free speech, cultural effervescence, and leisure. As some have argued in the past, the "change of skin" the country presented to the outside world aimed to show that the regime had become both pluralist and popular. On the other hand, Franco's ideologues aggressively opposed the 1960s cultural trends, believing they had already formed a new "Spanish consciousness." According to Pérez Embid, "the Spaniards of twenty, forty and sixty years" appeared as a "differentiated strata of collective conscience."²¹⁵ To their disappointment, throughout the 1960s it was becoming apparent that this was perhaps true, but not in the optimistic sense insinuated in Pérez Embid words: the Spanish youth was not dissimilar from any youngsters in the 1960s and rebelled against authority, especially on the university campuses. In turn, the Opus Dei set out to configure the phenomenon of the global youth "rebellion."

In Pérez Embid's opinion, Spain's 1956 student riots were a sign not of political unrest but of spiritual deficiency.²¹⁶ "Rebellion," he argued, is an attitude typical of youth, but "when it

²¹⁴ It is almost impossible to produce an entire mapping of the texts such as "what is the Opus Dei?" here. Ever since Pérez Embid launched the self-defense campaign in 1961, the newspapers contained almost weekly references to Escrivá's message and the mission of the prelature that ultimately made it to the edited volume *Conversaciones con Escrivá de Balaguer*.

²¹⁵ Pérez Embid, *Libertad, tradición y monarquía*, 7.

²¹⁶ Pérez Embid, *En la Brecha*, 28.

crystalizes in combative violence, it is only positive if it is directed against an illegitimate order.”²¹⁷ Vaguely echoing the fascist cult of youth, Pérez Embid envisioned instead a society of constant spiritual checks and balances. There are two cultures in Spain’s history, he explained: One follows the Catholic tradition and the “truth”; the other, is “a small discrepant tradition” filled with “flashes, instrumental values, but also of successes and nuances, to which we cannot give up and do not want to do without.” Therefore, he opined, what was needed were spiritually vigorous “bridge keepers” (*hombres-puente*) to decide which western components should be integrated into the Hispanic spiritual realm, as had been done in the past “to the great reality of paganism.” After all, bridges can be crossed in both directions, and “when the enemy attacks - aided, as always, by silly collaboration who conform to any peace [...] – there is no time to apologize to the friendly peacemakers.”²¹⁸

The youth, and the university students in particular, were now given a new mission. The Opus Dei expected them to “freely” choose their vocation in society, and in doing so, to serve a global crusade. “Fascism unleashed a strange political mythology of Youth: heroism, impulse, songs of war [...] personal messianism, the revolutionary thaumaturgy of dark impulses and prerational intuitions. [...] this must end,” Pérez Embid confirmed.²¹⁹ Instead of the fascist cult of youth, the Opus Dei proposed a seemingly tolerant discussion on “liberty in education.” José María Albareda, Ismael Sánchez Bella, and Álvaro d’Ors²²⁰ all contributed to this paradoxical effort to both “liberalize” the university and mobilize the youth into a spiritual movement. By now, they had agreed that the youngsters of the 1960s were strikingly different to those of the 1940s and

²¹⁷ Ibid, 42.

²¹⁸ Ibid, 68-72.

²¹⁹ Ibid, 142.

²²⁰ José María Albareda, “Posición de la Universidad en el mundo de hoy,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 78 (December, 1960): 563-75; Ismael Sánchez Bella, “El comunismo y la renovación de la universidad,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 79, (January 1961): 21-37.

should be treated with novel approaches. Víctor García Hoz (numerary), a pedagogue and an early *Arbor* member, was to become the key theoretician of the 1960s youth rebellion. In previous years, he had promoted theories of “Pedagogy of the ascetic struggle,” akin to the Opus Dei theory of sanctity.²²¹ Man must “live armed” he maintained, “even in periods of apparent peace,” since the enemies “wages different types of battles.”²²² By the 1960s, he proposed a somewhat less belligerent method for creating a “new man” through “obedience power.” Putting Escrivá’s theology to practice meant García Hoz demanded from the 1960s youngster to “become a child; because the child is simply the new man.”²²³ Whether it was for God or for society, subordination, pledged García Hoz, “serves man’s freedom best.”²²⁴ It might seem an utter irony that this pedagogue would later become an international theorist of “personalized education,” promoting “singularity and creativity.”²²⁵ But there was no contradiction: he, and the Opus Dei at large, aimed to channel the global youth rebelliousness towards a crusade of obedient and spiritually elated technicians.²²⁶

But what were the actual objectives of this crusade? For one thing, it meant impeding any communist infiltration into the intellectual domain. In the struggle against communism, opined Ismael Sánchez Bella “we cannot aspire to compete with other more economically or technically powerful nations, but we can undertake missions of a spiritual nature such as the formation of the university elite.”²²⁷ Indeed, the Opus Dei student journals derided anything from Marxism to

²²¹ Víctor García Hoz, *Pedagogía de la lucha ascética* (Madrid: Bolafios y Aguilar, 1942).

²²² “Artículo 4: extensión de la lucha,” in García Hoz, *Pedagogía de la lucha ascética*, 37.

²²³ “The more he is a child, the more his life in new,” García Hoz promised, see - Víctor García Hoz, *La tarea profunda de educar* (Madrid: Rialp, 1965), 22.

²²⁴ *Ibid*, 191.

²²⁵ Víctor García Hoz, “Un problema complejo: el de la libertad,” *Telva*, no. 50 (October 15, 1965): 59.

²²⁶ Pérez Embid also blamed the Civil War for Spain’s “technical delay” and demanded from the youth to “earn back that lost time,” in Florentino Pérez Embid, “El futuro como empresa,” *Moncloa*, no. 11 (October 1957): 6.

²²⁷ Sánchez Bella, “El comunismo y la renovación de la Universidad”.

Darwinism,²²⁸ and exhibited pugnacious manifestos of Francoist fidelity.²²⁹ In the same vein, intellectuals such as Álvaro d'Ors were truly bothered by the rise of the 1960s anti-war movement. "Love peace, and be truly peaceful, but beware of professional pacifism, of this murky pacifism in which 'all cats are gray.' Know that there are still worse things than war: the [communistic] *checas* for example," he advised his young students.²³⁰ On top of that, the Opus Dei was perceptive of the changes in global youth culture. By 1960, its thinkers agreed that the Western Bloc was not possessed by any ideologically-driven rebellion but rather by "a rebellion without a cause" marked by neologisms such as "Teddy boys," "Teen-agers," and "blousons noir."²³¹ Nihilism, bitterness, apathy, and irreverence to heroic pathos, appeared in these analyses as the direct outcomes of the 1960s youth culture and as immediate threats to society.²³² Juan José López Ibor, a psychiatrist and an Opus Dei ally, was one of the most vocal critics of the youth's disrespect to its mission. "What is constructed on one side is destroyed on the other by irony. We must encourage enthusiasm and erase skepticism," he proclaimed.²³³ In other words, López Ibor demanded to turn apathetic and ironic youngsters into reverent and "restless" crusaders.²³⁴ The following opinion column, published by a student named Julián Aznar, suggests that some Opus Dei students were fairly receptive to this message:

²²⁸ Regarding Darwinism, López Ibor said that "nobody is able to give a convincing explanation of this theory, however many people 'believe' in it [...] it should thus be considered a form of belief," in Covadonga O'Shea, "López Ibor: en el estudiante actual predomina la indiferencia," *Gaceta Universitaria*, no. 1 (November 1, 1962).

²²⁹ The Opus Dei's *Moncloa* published in 1956 a series of distinctively belligerent texts claiming "A hundred of years of struggle" against the liberal intrusion "could not merely end in apathy," see - Jorge Collar, "Cien años de lucha en la universidad española," *Moncloa*, no.4 (November 1956): 2.

²³⁰ By "checas," Ors referred to the Soviet-led purges, or "Red Terror," in the Republican held zones during the late phases of the Spanish Civil War, see - Álvaro d'Ors, "Cartas a los universitarios españoles," *Gaceta Universitaria*, no. 40 (July 15, 1965): 10.

²³¹ Leandro Benavides, "Juventud en rebeldía," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 70 (April 1960): 410-11.

²³² After all, bitterness was the other side of nihilism, and was to be answered by "optimism." Following the 1956 riots, *Moncloa* demanded from its readers to remember that they are "standing on a terrain taken in a victory [...] Optimism, whatever happens, will always be the index that marks a truly young attitude to the vital contour," see - "Juventud: Amargura? Optimismo?" *Moncloa*, no.5-6 (December-January 1956-57): 1.

²³³ O'Shea, "López Ibor: en el estudiante actual predomina la indiferencia".

²³⁴ López Ibor, "Discurso a los universitarios españoles," *Moncloa*, no. (April 1957): 8.

The knowledge of the transcendental truths gives a firm, total, and harmonic vision of the objective world. From this solid starting point, a restless march begins, with joyful eagerness, towards the contingent truths, towards the knowledge and mastery of what God has left to the free deliberation of men. This search is not strict, and admits, with pleasure, dialogue, and collaboration. It has no problem in recognizing that the argument of a colleague is more exact and objective and, then, endorses it, incorporates it quietly [...] be restless, but not rebellious (“inquietudes sí; inquietorros, no”).²³⁵

This statement is striking in its plainness: Franco’s Spain, and the Opus Dei’s as its spiritual vanguard, hold the evangelical “truth,” it argues; Only once accepting this ontological ground, could one pursue perfection through dialogue with those who agree on the same philosophical setup. Or as another student wrote: “Rebellion is good,” as it is a “proof of vitality” - a quality greatly needed for victory against communistic “treason.”²³⁶

In a parallel vein, the Opus Dei perceived western feminism as an unmitigated threat to the Hispanic spiritual domain. Needless to say, technocratic Spain still perceived women through a strictly patriarchal prism. In fact, one of the sole channels for women’s political agency in this period was the Falange’s Feminine Section. Led for decades by Pilar Primo de Rivera, this was a somewhat anachronistic propaganda organ that nonetheless served the regime faithfully with publications such as *Revista para la mujer* and *Medina*, wherein it advocated women’s participation in society within the household and in the education system.²³⁷ The Opus Dei, on the other hand, believed itself to be the promoter of novel forms of womanhood. In its quest to oppose the global influence of feminism - a movement it believed sought to fundamentally alter Hispanic gender hierarchies - it therefore advocated a more sophisticated conception of feminine participation in society and at the workplace. One of the most successful publications the Opus

²³⁵ Julián Aznar, “Inquietudes” *Moncloa*, no. 18-19 (March-April, 1959).

²³⁶ The emphasis in the original text, see - José Julio Periado, “Cartas desde la Universidad: la rebelión y el amor,” *Moncloa*, no.11 (October 1957).

²³⁷ On this organization and its ramifications, see - Inbal Ofer, *Señoritas in Blue: The Making of a Female Political Elite in Franco’s Spain* (Portland, Or: Sussex Academic Press, 2009); Aurora G Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood: Gender Ideology in Franco’s Spain* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000).

Dei controlled in the 1960s was the women's magazine *Telva*. Under the direction of numeraries Covadonga O'shea and Pilar Salcedo, *Telva* promoted itself as the forefront of feminine empowerment, and a platform where women spoke exclusively to women on topics that were an absolute novelty:

Winds of renovation are blowing throughout the world; of economic development; new horizons open up to women and it is necessary to live up to the circumstances. That of "Women's rights" sounds good but one has to be the tough ones, the mature ones. You need to be well informed so that when you learn your rights you will see in them the duty to work - at a European level - with greater seriousness.²³⁸

Telva thus purported to make women "serious" - unlike the western feminists who demanded "rights" without meriting them. It therefore constantly pondered on women's unique psychological condition, and their aptitude to mentally straining vocations. Even more so than the youth, the Opus Dei treated women as melancholy beings, who need to be "joyful" and perceptive of their surroundings.²³⁹

Sure enough, *Telva* advocated women's professionalization as a means to develop their spirituality, and the nation's economic productivity as a whole. Contemporary women "cannot live waiting for a mythical prince charming," argued its editors.²⁴⁰ The intellectual and journalistic arenas, appeared in *Telva* as new optional spheres of women agency.²⁴¹ Still, women were also to realize the delicate balance between their roles as mothers and their vocational ambitions. "Men and women have equal civic rights, but different missions," *Telva* stated, as women are the "collaborators" of their husbands.²⁴² The first volumes in *Telva* included a section by the name "Una familia." Clearly a fictional representation, this was nonetheless a transparent image of the

²³⁸ Pilar Salcedo, Editorial, *Telva*, no.1 (October 1963).

²³⁹ See for example - "Feliz feliz feliz," *Telva*, no 53 (December 1, 1965); "El test del optimismo," *Telva* no. 41, (June 1, 1965): 59-60.

²⁴⁰ Isabel Celma, "Profesionalización para la mujer," *Telva* no. 55 (January 1, 1966): 25.

²⁴¹ The University of Navarra, in particular, boasted being attentive to the needs of women see - "Apertura de curso en la universidad de Navarra," *Telva*, no. 2 (October 15, 1963): 29-30.

²⁴² "La mujer en el trabajo: la mujer, colaboradora del marido," *Telva*, no. 38 (April 15, 1965): 16.

modern gender roles as the Opus Dei saw them. At the center of the family stood a man and his wife, who embraced “whatever children God had given them.” Interestingly, the family’s daughters were already different from their mother: they had been given a choice to a career path. “Paloma,” said the report, “wants to be a writer, but practical people tell her that it would be more lucrative owning a pharmacy.”²⁴³

Despite these alleged novelties, the Opus Dei also idolized the housewife, and took special pride of its Feminine Section’s centers for “housework education.” This so-called “professionalization of housework,” it proclaimed, comprised of “an academic structure that brings education of the house to the levels that today’s life requires.”²⁴⁴ In this vein, guiding women on how to find enjoyment in serving others through daily chores eventually became the Opus Dei’s specialty. A *Mundo Cristiano* section by the name “Carlota open her doors for us,” was a case in point of a fictional stereotypical housewife who lets the journal’s readers join her through her daily routine. In the face of dull domestic work, she was told to remember that “knowing that the smallest most hidden task can give life value, once it is done with a spirit of service - to God, to those around us” was the “antidote to routine and boredom.”²⁴⁵ In short, whereas the Opus Dei ideologues claimed to advance women’s social agency, as an alternative to the ill-advised western “women’s rights” movement, they nonetheless questioned women’s psychological abilities,²⁴⁶ and even offered them spiritual techniques for coping with their inferior positions in society.

Lastly, the Opus Dei texts betrayed a profound concern over changes in public morality. By the mid-1960s, the global cultural revolution, and more concretely the palpable changes in sexual

²⁴³ A.J. Sandoval, “Una Familia,” *Telva* no. 1 (October 1963): 31.

²⁴⁴ Celma, “Profesionalización para la mujer,” 25.

²⁴⁵ Mercedes Serra, “Saber Descansar; Carlota nos abre las puertas,” *Mundo Cristiano*, no. 3 (April 1964): 34.

²⁴⁶ Some could be found ridiculing women driving cars, see for example - Jesús Urteaga, “La mujer al volante,” no. 10 (November. 1964): 34.

norms, where on everybody's minds. The case of the Beatles can serve as one example of such anxieties. At first, in 1963-64, *Telva* barely mentioned the rock-&-roll phenomenon. When it finally did, in April 1964, it ridiculed the Liverpool band for being ugly "as bugs" and the "result of a good advertising."²⁴⁷ In 1965, another arguably fictitious "report" appeared in *Telva*. It told the story of "Michael and Patricia," an unmarried couple dwelling in a deserted beach club in Catalonia. She was twenty-five years old, he only eighteen; she was the "normal" one, he was a "Beatle mimetic" who "neglected the basic rules of hygiene." This imitation of the Beatles, *Telva* taunted, "is spreading alarmingly among the strong sex." Notably, *Telva*'s concern was primarily with male feminization, which called, it said, for further "psychological study."²⁴⁸ Last, in 1965, once the members of the respectable Spanish pop group Los Pekenikes endorsed the Beatles,²⁴⁹ the Opus Dei media relax its assaults. And once the Beatles performed in Franco's Spain in July 1965, *Telva* and *Actualidad Espanola* depicted the band members as self-made-men, who now honored the regime with their presence.²⁵⁰ Briefly put, the British rock-&-roll group was first ignored, then mocked, and finally, acclimatized and cherished.

Curbing the popularity of rock-&-roll was a perhaps lost battle. However, the Opus Dei's struggle to protect public morality has just begun. That the Spanish population, and the Catholics at large, were changing attitudes towards sexuality and family planning was no secret. In what would become its trademark, during the 1960s the Opus Dei hence led a crusade against this new sexual "promiscuity." It began with the affirmation that the modern "Christian family" was a "school of perfection,"²⁵¹ and the basic kernel upon which societal harmony depends. In 1963, the

²⁴⁷ María Elena Leguina, "Beatelmania," *Telva*, no. 14 (April 1964): 22-26.

²⁴⁸ Engracia A. Jordan, "No a esto," *Telva*, no. 33, (Febrary 1, 1965): 38-39.

²⁴⁹ Interestingly, Los Pekenikes were graduates of the Opus Dei's own Instituto Ramiro de Maeztu, see - "El disco de Oro Español 1964," *Telva*, no. 33, (February 1965): 8-9.

²⁵⁰ In fact, *Telva* let John Lennon speak for his defense in an alleged "interview," see - "Los Beatles," *Telva*, no. 45, (October 1965): 12.

²⁵¹ Víctor García Hoz, "La familia cristiana," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 37 (July 1957): 2.

Opus Dei then launched its campaign against “birth control” (always in English, derogatively) and neo-Malthusianism as its theoretical basis.²⁵² Divorce, birth control, and abortion - all strictly illegal in Franco’s Spain - were not only frequent themes on the Opus Dei popular publications: they were now their main leitmotifs. There was nothing particularly original in the theological arguments the Opus Dei priests presented: “fill the earth,” they said, was the “command of our Lord.” Yet the fight against “birth control” was primarily ideological and carried out through sociological and psychological argumentations. “Today, sociologists and economists are already backing from the benefits of Malthusianism,” announced *Telva*. The reason? Low growth rates and a shortage of labor force.²⁵³

Drugs, delinquency, and pornography, were other vices that the Opus Dei made its foremost preoccupation. *Playboy* magazine, also banned under Francoism, is a case in point of an object that the mere reports on its smuggling into Spain spurred an outcry in *Gazeta Universitaria*. “Now begins the sexual-economic colonization of Spain,” declared one of its writers, and explained:

One could give endless statistics of the consequences of the sex-economic invasion in the USA in 1966: at least a third of the Middle School students who were married were pregnant at the wedding. Girls aged 16 and under contribute a quarter of illegal births. Nearly 500,000 abortions in 1965 among girls of school age. About a million Americans are infected with venereal diseases every year, [...] The rate of suicides is increasing [...] What we ask for is [...] less sex-economic imperialism and more creative freedom. They are here knocking on the door. And an irrepressible cry comes from our throats: ‘Go home!’²⁵⁴

This campaign appeared as one cohesive formula in the exhortations of Spain’s most prominent spiritual actor of the 1960s: Jesús Urteaga. Known as the “television priest,” he was the more

²⁵² The attacks on Margaret Sanger, Neo-Malthusianism, and Birth Control, was one of the Opus Dei’s most recognizable staples, see for instance - Manuel Fernández Areal, “Limitaciones a la población mundial,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 4 (October 1954): 74-83; José y Saranya, “Malthus, José Pla, y España,” *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 148, (October 1966): 365-68; José María García Hoz, “Conferencia mundial de planificación familiar,” *Nuestro Tiempo* no. 157-158 (July-August 1967): 110-16.

²⁵³ “Los que no nacen,” *Telva*, no. 10 (February 15, 1963).

²⁵⁴ Sebastian V. Sibecas, “Empieza la colonización sexo-económica de España,” *Gazeta Universitaria*, no. 114 (December 15, 1968): 12-15.

charismatic of Escrivá's followers and presented a particularly extreme call for battle against western morality. In his books and articles, he sought to guide the sexuality even of married couples. Interfering with natural procreation, for him, deserved nothing but contempt. "They are transforming marriage - blessed by Christ - into a poor, vulgar, and creeping flesh trade. [...] Should God not throw them from the bed, and whip them? Calculators! Cuckoos! Cowards! Selfish! Complimentary! Greedy! Lustful! Lazy!" he ranted.²⁵⁵ This outrage was, once again, coupled with a demand for a spiritual revolution through "joy." On Spain's national television, Urteaga delivered Escrivá's gospel daily as he spoke of willing servitude "for the other." Or as Urteaga himself suggested: "Put to work this advice of the founder of Opus Dei - this is the order of benevolence: God, others, and me. Try it and see - I assure you that you will glow with joy."²⁵⁶ In short, in Urteaga's world, there was barely any place for restlessness - only for sexually abstinent joyful willing servants.²⁵⁷

Conclusions

What began as an abstract post-fascist ideology in the 1950s was translated in the 1960s into one of the more sophisticated state-ideologies of the Cold War era. Technocratic Spain did not, however, present a complete break either from the corporatist political myths of the 1930s or the traditionalist theory of Hispanidad - as noted before, the two ideological pillars of the regime. For one thing, from a mythological perspective, technocratic-authoritarianism presented a direct continuation to Hispanidad, as it constantly evoked and further developed the Spanish pre-modern

²⁵⁵ Jesús Urteaga, *Dios y los hijos* (Madrid: Rialp, 1960), 31.

²⁵⁶ Jesús Urteaga, *Siempre alegres* (Madrid: Rialp, 1967), 50.

²⁵⁷ "The restless and the rebels, for those who are dissatisfied with their own lives and the lives of others [...] those capable of violent passions: it is they who will anguish from the sons of Satan their ill-gotten glory," were his precise words, see – Jesús Urteaga, *Man, the Saint* (Manila: Sinag-Tala Publishers, 1977), 8; originally titled *El valor divino de lo humano* (Madrid: Rialp, 1948).

imperial mythologies, in order to justify its dual method of economic modernization and spiritual perfection. For another, the technocrats perhaps derided the fascist pathos but readily readjusted the corporatist “organic” jargon for the neoliberal era. They were also avid supporters of principles such as civil war and the urgent need to retrieve spiritual sublime into the modernizing process. The novelty of the Opus Dei technocrats was, therefore, the spiritual technique they presented as a substitute to fascism’s revolutionary violence and virility; a holistic setup whereby man’s most intimate deeds become meaningful and “enjoyable” within the context of a collective “internal” crusade of willing subordination. Thus, ironically, while alleging to being “anti-totalitarian,” the Opus Dei fundamentally sought to revise the western perception of individual liberty, thereby controlling every aspect of its followers’ behaviorisms.

As mentioned throughout the chapter, the theories Franco’s ideologues tailored in respect to the crisis of modernity were hardly novel for the mainstream western reader. As Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, they pointed to the dialectic motion from the 19th century of rational secularization back to irrational mythical in fascism.²⁵⁸ And similar to one other Frankfurt School member, Erich Fromm, the technocrats believed the masses were willing to give up their “freedom” for economic benefits and security.²⁵⁹ The innovation in the texts López Rodó, Pérez Embid, Fontán, Fernández de la Mora, and Sánchez Agesta disseminated was how they answered the crisis of totalitarianism with a tangible new state-ideology. Rather than a ruthless dictatorship, the “post-ideological” state these men envisioned was to be a silent and sagacious modernizer, conscious of both the *economic* and *spiritual* rudiments of mankind, and thus, entirely different

²⁵⁸ Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Gunzelin Noeri, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002 [1944]).

²⁵⁹ Fromm’s 1941 *Escape from Freedom*, deals precisely with the difference between “freedom to” and “freedom from.” Modern man, he says, is “tempted to surrender his freedom to dictators of all kinds, or to lose it by transforming himself into a small cog in the machine, well fed, and well clothed, yet not a free man but an automaton,” see - Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961 [1941]).

from that the capitalist technocrats operating in Europe at the time. There is no question that the technocrats changed the Spanish economy and society in a most profound way. I will debate the economic and social consequences of these policies in chapter 6. The important point is, however, that the emergence of technocratic Spain, and the Opus Dei as its ideological vanguard, meant Francoism acquired an entirely new foundational narrative. As we shall observe shortly, to the Latin American spectators Spain represented a country that skillfully dismantled its own statist-totalitarian ideological impediments, thereby demonstrating that an sovereign post-ideological society of consumption - “European in the means; Spanish in the ends” - was indeed possible within the Cold War system. Amid a period of growing anxieties over the pace of technological and economic complexities, Spain’s state-ideology further presented Latin America not only with a political myth about an anti-communistic “crusade,” but with a distinctive toolkit of tropes such as “social peace,” “rationalization,” “twilight of ideology,” “regionalization,” “polls of growth,” “intermediary societies,” etc. The ensuing chapters will indicate just how significant this image was to become in Argentina and Chile.

Chapter 3: The Emergence of Argentina's Technocratic-Authoritarian Ideologies, 1956-1966

Between the downfall of Juan Perón in September 1955 and the rise to power of Juan Carlos Onganía in June 1966, Argentina witnessed the emergence of its own unique technocratic-authoritarian ideologies and intellectual milieus. While this post-fascist phenomenon appeared in a very different context than in Franco's Spain - namely a liberal democracy known in Latin America for its vibrant free press - the two ideologies nonetheless shared several basic traits. As I have mentioned earlier, Peronism and Falangism lost political power simultaneously in the 1950s. The reason for this was analogous: the contexts of the Cold War and the evolving power of the global economy did not favor statist protectionism, whether it was "nationalist-syndicalist" or post-fascist Peronist. It was the question of what ideological project should replace this economically corporatists state, however, that would become the defining conundrum of the post-Peronist era. This third chapter explores the intellectual projects that paved the way for Onganía's technocratic-authoritarian experiment. As I have mentioned in the introduction, Guillermo O'Donnell used Onganía's regime as a key case study of "Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," understood as the moment when a well-defined oligarchy, frustrated from its inability to integrate into the global markets due to the populist manipulation of the political arena (what O'Donnell defines as "el pueblo"), decides to eliminate parliamentarism and embrace authoritarianism.¹ This chapter sets out to complicate this narrative. I will show that Onganía's regime was not merely an improvised reaction to Peronist mobilization but the materialization of a well-defined post-fascist theory of the state. Developed between 1955 and 1966, this ideology promoted replacing Argentina's

¹ Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

democracy with a final post-ideological society of technological development and spiritual perfection.

Onganía's dictatorship emerged against the background of a parliamentary democracy entangled in an unsolvable conundrum. Despite Perón's exile, his outlawed movement did not ebb from Argentine politics after 1955. Rather, through his control of the labor unions, and thanks to the earnest leadership of Augusto Vandor, Perón successfully influenced the Argentine electoral system from afar.² For the post-Peronist democracy, the question was thus a philosophic one that touched on the very essence of parliamentarism: could one protect democracy from authoritarianism by preventing a vast portion of the population from partaking in the political game? Behind this question lay other essential challenges, which defined the borderlines between Right and Left during the 1960s, in Argentina and Latin America as a whole. The most obvious one was the question of Argentina's integration with, and possible complete reliance on, global financial markets. Argentina's Economic Plan of 1955 was to be first of several attempts to solve the paradox of stimulating economic growth without succumbing to "dependency" on foreign capital.³ Thus, unable to reconcile their corporatist political myths with market-oriented modernization, and against the backdrop of their still ambivalent attitudes towards the Peronism - a movement with which many had cooperated intimately - during the 1960s the nacionalistas

² The powerful secretary general of the Union Obrera Metalurgica and leader of the CGT, whose deeds fill the pages of several monographs, see - Osvaldo Calello, *De Vandor a Ubaldini* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1984); James W. McGuire, *Peronism without Perón: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); for more on the Peronist influence on Argentine politics in the 1960s see - Carlos Altamirano, *Bajo el signo de las masas (1943-1973)* (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 2001); Daniel James, *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988)

³ He served for many years as Executive Secretary of the United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). For more on this figure and his economic theories see - Arturo Jauretche, *El Plan Prebisch: retorno al coloniaje* (Buenos Aires: Peña Lillo, 1984); Gastón Parra Luzardo (ed.), *Raúl Prebisch: pensamiento renovador* (Caracas: Banco Central de Venezuela, 2006).

thereby splintered into distinguishable neo-fascist and post-fascist camps. It is the latter that is the subject matter of this chapter.

Argentina's right-wing ideologies in the Post-Peronist era (1955-1962)

Following an acute economic crisis, a bitter clash with the Catholic Church, and a state of near-civil war, in September 1955 the Argentine Armed Forces ousted Juan Perón, sending him to eighteen years in exile.⁴ Branded the “Liberating Revolution,” the coalition of forces sustaining this new regime agreed upon one enterprise: purging Argentina from Perón’s idiosyncratic movement. But what was the type of state that was to overcome the popular Peronist mobilization? For a brief moment, the nacionalistas, who had actively conspired against Perón in recent years, assumed the answer was to be a revolutionary military dictatorship.⁵ Indeed, Argentina’s new interim president, General Eduardo Lonardi, was everything a nacionalista nostalgic of the 1930s could wish for. An authoritarian leader from a traditional Catholic orientation, he disclosed his ideological leanings by appointing Mario Amadeo as Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Atilio Dell’Oro Maini as Minister of Education, and Juan Carlos Goyeneche as his own Press Secretary.

Ever since the 1920s, the Argentine Armed Forces favored nacionalista and ultra-catholic attitudes. León Justo Bengoa, Juan Francisco Guevara, and Eduardo Señorans, were merely the

⁴ Historiography has produced numerous books on the history of Peronism and the reasons for Perón’s downfall; the important ones would include: Lila M. Caimari, *Perón y la iglesia católica: religión, estado y sociedad en la Argentina, 1943-1955* (Buenos Aires: Ariel Historia, 1995); Mariano Ben Plotkin, *Mañana Es San Perón: A Cultural History of Peron’s Argentina* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Raanan Rein, *Peronismo, populismo y política: Argentina, 1943-1955* (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1998); James P. Brennan, *The Politics of National Capitalism: Peronism and the Argentine Bourgeoisie, 1946-1976* (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009); Loris Zanatta, *Perón y el mito de la nación católica: iglesia y ejército en los orígenes del Peronismo (1943-1946)* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1999); Tulio Halperín Donghi, *La larga agonía de la argentina Peronista* (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 1994); Tulio Halperín Donghi, *The Peronist Revolution and Its Ambiguous Legacy* (London: University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998).

⁵ Together with General Bengoa, Amadeo was one of many plotting to oust Perón in 1955, see - María Sáenz Quesada, *La libertadora: de Perón a Frondizi (1955-1958) Historia pública y secreta* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2011), 78.

more salient examples of Generals avowedly supporting the nacionalistas, and who would play a role in Argentine politics in later years.⁶ What is more, the generals truly believed they were the purest and most loyal servants of Argentina's common good. Yet Lonardi's government was to reveal precisely how profoundly the Cold War context had altered Argentine politics and the Armed Forces within it. The historical affinity of Lonardi's ministers with Nazism and Francoism was met with discomfort in the USA. Worse yet, his conciliatory attitude towards Peronism - embodied in his "generous" pledge to reunite "winners" and "losers" -⁷ prompted a powerful anti-Peronist and economically-liberal fraction in the military to act. On November 13, 1955, a group led by General Pedro Aramburu unseated Lonardi without resistance.⁸ The Argentine press reacted to this chain of events by ridiculing Lonardi and Amadeo's "Francoist" leanings. "Gladly", they confirmed, the latter was "Argentina's Foreign Minister no more"⁹

Despite his personal disappointment, for Amadeo there was a valuable lesson to be learned from these events. A simple *Deus ex machina* military intervention, as in the 1930s, had become unfeasible in the Cold War circumstances, he concluded. Rather, a profound intellectual work was due, he thought, to prepare Argentina's ruling elite for its future mission. When circumstances would be ripe, Amadeo believed, it would be civilians rather than generals who will replace democracy with an entirely original "popular" authoritarian system. A week after being ousted, Amadeo spoke of Perón as an "irresponsible despot," but depicted Aramburu's liberals in even worse terminologies: they represented a "tyranny of ideologues," he said. Amadeo, in short, now

⁶ These men are the main object of inquiry of many books about the Argentine Armed Forces, most notably - Robert Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina: 1962-1973; From Frondizi's Fall to the Peronist Restoration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

⁷ Mario Amadeo, *Al día siguiente* (Buenos Aires: 1955), 4, located at - Biblioteca Nacional Argentina, BNA-ARCH-CEN-ARQué, Carpeta Mario Amadeo.

⁸ Henceforth, for many nacionalistas Lonardi would come to symbolize Argentina's last authentic revolutionary leader, see for instance - Ramón Doll, "A 4 años de la última revolución," *Azul y Blanco* (no.173, October, 1959); "Lonardi," *Azul y Blanco*, no. 16 (September 9, 1956).

⁹ "Mario Amadeo ratifica su franquismo," *El mundo* (May 6, 1956).

began entertaining the vision of a post-ideological regime, and saw Peronism as a misguided yet potentially valuable ally.¹⁰

Lonardi's downfall made it obvious that the Armed Forces would not engage in a military dictatorship, but rather design a political system to their liking through intimidation and sporadic surgical interventions. "The Revolution does not seek to win votes or sympathies. It simply wants to avoid illusions, and save the country from moral and material chaos," said Aramburu once in power.¹¹ Despite murderously purging the country from Peronism,¹² Aramburu's tenure still saw a growing consensus within the Armed Forces that the days of the 1930-styled dictatorship were over; "The current Argentina is not the one of 1943 nor of 1930," Aramburu stated.¹³ Liberated from "a totalitarian system," added vice-president Isaac Rojas, meant Argentina could only return to being a protected democracy, purged from communism and Peronism.¹⁴ In short, as far as the Armed Forces were concerned, at this period at least, their role was to buttress the control of groups that could navigate Argentina away from these two ideological aberrations.

In 1955, nacionalismo thus entered a new era in its history, characterized by increasing ambiguity over the movement's ideology in a post-Peronist age. In his 1956 book *Ayer, hoy, mañana* Amadeo began raising doubts whether there was a point in reviving the 1930s fascist fantasy. According to his follower Cosme Beccar Varela, by then he had abandoned the nacionalista camp entirely. "The time has come for *synthesis* [...] nationalism must disappear,"

¹⁰ Amadeo, *Al día siguiente*, 4; see also "El día siguiente se atrasó Amadeo," *Que*, no. 59 (November 30, 1955): 4.

¹¹ "Discurso en Ciudad de Rioja," September 9, 1956, Archivo General de la Nación, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión, Partes de prensa (hereafter cited AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp), caja 83.

¹² Opening with the June 1955 Casa Rosada bombing and ending with the 1956 León Suarez massacre, the Armed Forces killed tens of Peronists in a matter of one year. For more on Argentina's anti-Peronist purge, see - Marcelo Cavarozzi, *Autoritarismo y democracia (1955-1983)* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1987), 30, Sáenz Quesada, *La libertadora: De Perón a Frondizi*, 221-24; Daniel Rodríguez Lamas, *La Revolución Libertadora* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1985).

¹³ "Mensaje desde la residencia presidencial de Olivos," December 12, 1956, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 87.

¹⁴ "Mensaje de navidad," December 24, 1956, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 87.

was his interpretation of Amadeo's message.¹⁵ Similarly, José María de Estrada depicted nacionalismo as "superb but confusing volksgeist" and announced the arrival of "the hour of synthesis and unity."¹⁶ What type of regime did Amadeo and Estrada envision at this point? The answer was twofold. Primarily, they attacked Aramburu's pledge to retrieve the parliamentary system. Political parties are "aggressive and bellicose" and thus "responsible for the failure of the national unity," argued Amadeo.¹⁷ Secondly, Amadeo made a new crucial emphasis: Argentina must rid itself from revolutionary "messianism" and instead choose a "new force of national hierarchy."¹⁸ While identifying this new agent with "technique," Amadeo further advised replacing a "confessional" regime with a more moderate one, loyal to Argentina's "Christian physiognomy." More important, a military government, he stressed, "could be nominally presided over by a civilian, just as a purely civilized government could be headed by a senior military chief."¹⁹ In 1956, this was a preliminary forecast of Argentina's 1966 technocratic experiment.

Other nacionalistas joined Amadeo in attacking the revolutionary jargon and contemplating on Argentina's historical "ruling elites." According to Carlo Scorza, an Italian fascist exile and the editor of *Dinámica Social*, only these elites could "make and demolish dictatorships." Peronism, he further implied, was the failure of the ruling elites who neglected their duty. "The ruling class, when it feels powerless to solve a situation of crisis, delegates to one leader the responsibility of government that belongs strictly to its own historical function," he said.²⁰ Máximo Etchecopar added much to this discussion. His 1956 *Esquema de la Argentina* outlined what he thought would be Argentina's novel third position. Nacionalismo, he said, originally had three goals: "1) a

¹⁵ Cosme Beccar Varela, *El nacionalismo* (Buenos Aires: Tradición, Familia y Propiedad, 1970), 208.

¹⁶ José María de Estrada, *El legado del nacionalismo* (Buenos Aires: Edición Gure, 1956), 73.

¹⁷ *Frente a los hechos: conferencia pronunciada en el Teatro Cómico, el 20 de agosto de 1956*, 8-11, in - BNA-ARCH-CEN-ARQué, Carpeta Mario Amadeo.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 9.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 15.

²⁰ Carlo Scorza, "Las clases dirigentes crean y derrumban las dictaduras," *Dinámica Social*, no. 69 (June 1956): 2.

concrete sense of the Argentineness vis-à-vis the anachronistic ideological vagueness of the so-called democratic parties [...] 2) recognition and evaluation of our Spanish past; 3) revision of Argentine history.” In other words, anti-Enlightenment, Hispanidad, and a historical revision of Argentina’s Federalism were, for Etchecopar, the basis for any future state.²¹ Relying heavily on Ortega y Gasset, Etchecopar then described Argentina’s elites as a “latently social aristocracy” that could assume a role as the agent of development.²² Indeed, what concerned Etchecopar most was material progress. Rather than putting ideology “in a supreme position over functionality,” it was time, he said, for a “technological and functional organization of the society.” This meant discarding the illusion that parliamentary democracy can function in Latin America and moving from a “political” to a “social” democracy.²³ “Today, democracy is the technological organization of society,” stated Etchecopar,²⁴ in what was, in essence, yet another preliminary technocratic-authoritarian scheme.

Amadeo and Etchecopar’s post-fascist “synthesis” was far from being either intelligible or trendy in the late 1950s. Meanwhile, Perón’s downfall signaled a renaissance of several revolutionary-corporatist nacionalista platforms, in newspapers such as *Bandera Popular* and *Azul y Blanco*. Edited by Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, the latter began as an integrative effort and even presented, if for a while, Amadeo and ICH fellow Mariano Montemayor.²⁵ As a result, *Azul y*

²¹ This book was a conclusion of several of his theoretical works published in *Quincena* between 1954 and 1955, see – Máximo Etchecopar, *Esquema de la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Club de Lectores, 1966), 70.

²² According to historian Tzvi Medin he was the nacionalista “most linked to Ortega,” see - Tzvi Medin, “Ortega y Gasset en la Argentina la tercera es la vencida,” *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y El Caribe*, vol. 2, no. 2 (April 13, 2015).

²³ Máximo Etchecopar, *De la democracia política a la democracia social* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Sigla, 1958), 16.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 30.

²⁵ Even Alfredo Sánchez Bella was invited to collaborate here, under the pseudonym Alfredo Molina Valencia, see - Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Gonzalo Sánchez Sorondo, September 1, 1959, AGUN, documento 15/29/217.

Blanco became one of the most popular nacionalista publications of its time.²⁶ It is difficult to establish whether the nationalists then attracted a “substantial popular constituency” as some historians have argued,²⁷ but with Perón gone they were as vocal and conspicuous in the public sphere as they had ever been. Soon thereafter, however, things went awry, as a public feud appeared between Sánchez Sorondo and Amadeo within the context of the rise to power of one man: Arturo Frondizi.

While the nacionalistas attempted to define their ideological brand, other ideological projects appeared on Argentina’s political horizon offering alternative configurations for both neutralizing Peronism and integrating Argentina into the global economy. Ricardo Balbín’s party Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo (UCRP) and Arturo Frondizi’s Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente (UCRI) were the two obvious examples. Once elections were called in 1958, it was Frondizi’s model of “developmentalism” (“desarrollismo”) in particular that captivated the imagination of the Argentine public. Ostensibly acknowledging the prevalent Dependency Theory, Frondizi’s political platform offered an intricate formula for state-sponsored industrialization, presenting it as a guarantee for Argentina’s modernization and national sovereignty.²⁸ More specifically, he envisioned a market-based formation of heavy industries, buoyed up by a government intensively investing in infrastructure.²⁹ The way Frondizi saw it, only thereby was the Argentine society to

²⁶ Sánchez Sorondo boasted selling 140,000 copies of the journal every week, a figure that remained uncontested in the Argentine media until this day, see for example “Murió el pensador y escritor Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo,” *La Nueva* (June 27, 2012); See also - Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, *Libertades prestadas* (Buenos Aires: ATPE), 258.

²⁷ David Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, its History, and its Impact* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 184.

²⁸ At times, he even dared standing up to the American president, as in the case of the visit of D. Eisenhower, where Frondizi declared that Argentina’s development “cannot depend on external assistance,” see - “Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la Nación en el banquete ofrecido esta noche en honor del Presidente de los EEUU, General Dwight Eisenhower,” February 26, 1960, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 91.

²⁹ “Discurso del Presidente de la Nación,” February 8, 1960, AGA, PN.SPD.pp, caja 91.

transcend its condition of “under-development” towards a “cultured” society where Peronist despotism could not reappear.³⁰

His seeming sophistication notwithstanding, on May 1, 1958, Frondizi won a landslide victory in the general elections only after receiving Perón’s official endorsement.³¹ By then, Frondizi was also clearly catering to the traditionalist sector of the Argentine society. Periodically echoing corporatist themes, he pledged a “unity of workers,”³² “nacional pacification,” and the restorations of “social peace.”³³ His official secular policies aside,³⁴ and perhaps resonating the tradition of Hipólito Yrigoyen, Frondizi constantly evoked Christian symbolism, for instance by proclaiming that the Catholic faith “has been one of the fundamental factors of Argentina’s national unity”³⁵ as well as the source of its “primordial” mission.³⁶ It is no wonder, then, that his ideology attracted some nacionalistas. Once Amadeo joined Frondizi’s staff as Argentina’s ambassador to the UN, this sympathy became a political bond. There are many reasons to speculate why Amadeo chose this path. As his correspondence with Alfredo Sánchez Bella reveals, his main goal was political reputation. The nacionalistas had not abandoned their “cause,” he wrote, but were in need of an “increase of prestige,” as statesmen with proven governmental record.³⁷ Like

³⁰ “Discurso del Presidente de la Nación ante de delegados al congreso de universitarios latino-americanos,” September 9, 1959, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 91.

³¹ This is an argument several historians have made by now, see for instance - Richard J. Walter, “The Right and the Peronists, 1943-1955,” in Sandra McGee Deutsch and Ronald H. Dolkart, *The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present* (Wilmington, Del.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 121-24; for key monographs on Frondizi’s tenure see - Roberto Gustavo Pisarello Virasoro, *Cómo y por qué fue derrocado Frondizi* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, 1996); Celia Szusterman, *Frondizi and the Politics of Developmentalism in Argentina, 1955-62* (London: Macmillan, 1993); Nicolas Babini, *Arturo Frondizi y la Argentina Moderna: la forja de una ilusión* (Barcelona: Gedisa, 2006); Emilia Edda Menotti, *Arturo Frondizi: Biografía* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1998).

³² “Noventa días de gobierno,” AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 89.

³³ “Mensaje del Presidente de la República: dos años de Gobierno,” May 1960, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 92.

³⁴ Especially the Argentine education system, see - “Discurso antes la comisión promotora de la libertad de enseñanza,” September 15, 1958, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 89.

³⁵ “Discurso pronunciado en Córdoba por el Presidente de la Nación, Dr. Arturo Frondizi,” October 11, 1959, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 91.

³⁶ “Mensaje del Presidente de la República: Dos años de Gobierno,” May 1960, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 92.

³⁷ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, March 22, 1959, AGUN, documento 15/35/207,

the Spanish dictatorship, by now Amadeo and his followers accepted the rules of the Cold War and the USA's hegemony. "Our old ideal of friendlier relations with the USA, while committed to mutual respect, now does not seem to be a utopia," he told Sánchez Bella elsewhere.³⁸

The clash between Sánchez Sorondo and Amadeo erupted immediately. As Amadeo aligned with Frondizi, Sánchez Sorondo attacked the new Argentine President's policies, demanding instead an "organic" fascist-oriented state. As mentioned in chapter 1, Sánchez Sorondo perhaps admired Franco; yet he was absent from the Hispanidad projects of the 1950s. From this moment he became Argentina's key theorist of revolutionary-syndicalism, as well as of the mythology of Juan Manuel de Rosas - in his words, Argentina's sole moment of "authentic physiognomy."³⁹ In other words, the animosity between Amadeo and Sánchez Sorondo was symptomatic of the growing abyss between a neo-fascist revolutionary and a post-fascist authoritarian technocrat and touched on the political myth of the "corporative" society. For Sánchez Sorondo, corporatism was synonymous with a "national-syndicalist" revolution, wherein the state militantly mobilizes the working-class into a "front" - "clear, nationalist, and popular, beyond all parties"⁴⁰ - towards a totalized "new order."⁴¹ For Amadeo, "corporatism" meant a traditional elite retaking its historic role and organizing society around autonomous - if licensed by the state - guild-based associations, thereby fostering rapid market-oriented growth. In short, while both men aspired for a post-ideological order, they disagreed profoundly over the strategy to achieve this goal.

Sánchez Sorondo's circle never reached positions of political power.⁴² Nevertheless, these men were highly important in the public sphere in particular when it came to shaming Frondizi

³⁸ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, February 9, 1959, AGUN, documento 15/35/205.

³⁹ Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, "Discurso a los militares," in *La revolución que anunciamos* (Buenos Aires: Nueva Política, 1945), 257.

⁴⁰ Sánchez Sorondo, *Libertades prestadas*, 6.

⁴¹ What Sánchez Sorondo deemed "social suffrage," *ibid*, 107.

⁴² For further analysis of *Azul y Blanco*'s influence see - Valeria Galván, *El nacionalismo de derecha en la Argentina posperonista: el semanario Azul y Blanco (1956-1969)* (Rosario: Prohistoria Ediciones, 2013).

and stirring the anti-Peronist generals (known as the “Gorilas”) against him.⁴³ With the start of Frondizi’s December 1958 Stabilization Plan, which comprised of austerity measures in exchange for loans from the International Monetary Fund, Sánchez Sorondo deemed him an illegitimate president, portrayed him in caricatures with an elongated nose in a sickle shape, and brazenly demanded the Armed Forces to overthrow him.⁴⁴ Now the fissure in the nacionalista movement separated those who were once close friends. Goyeneche sided with Sánchez Sorondo, thus breaking apart from Amadeo, and for a while, also from Franco’s Spain.⁴⁵ International events were henceforth to exacerbate Frondizi’s economic and political distresses.

The Cuban Revolution and the revitalization of the Argentine far-right, 1959-1963

There is a consensus among historians that the 1959 Cuban Revolution was a turning point in the course of the Cold War in Latin America.⁴⁶ This is particularly true in the case of the Argentine Right. The fact that this revolution had been led by an Argentine nourished even further the Argentines’ anxieties over the possibility of his revolutionary movement reaching Southern America.⁴⁷ In the words of historian Tulio Halperín Donghi, this event thus “spurred the political

⁴³ See for instance - Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, “El espíritu gorila,” October 1, 1957, in *Libertades prestadas*, 188-89.

⁴⁴ See for instance - “Discurso a las fuerzas armadas,” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 109 (July 1958); “Contra este gobierno o contra este país,” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 132 (February 11, 1959).

⁴⁵ In fact, Goyeneche was prosecuted by Aramburu’s administration for violating his authority as Lonardi’s press secretary. The so-called “Goyeneche case” was discussed widely in *Azul y Blanco*, see - “Goyeneche fue absuelto por la justicia,” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 9 (August 1, 1956): 2.

⁴⁶ Historians Gilbert Joseph and Daniela Spencer have debated the Cuban Revolution as one of the central junctures of Latin American Cold War history, see - Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spencer, *In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 23; This is also the overall approach of historian Hal Brands, see - Hal Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010), 3.

⁴⁷ As has also been argued in the work of historian José Zanca on the Catholic church in Argentina, see - José A. Zanca, *Los intelectuales católicos y el fin de la cristiandad: 1955-1966* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006), 73; José A. Zanca, *Cristianos antifascistas: conflictos en la cultura católica Argentina, 1936-1959* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores S.A., 2013); see also Michael A. Burdick, *For God and Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).

climate that brought the Frondizi experience to its end.”⁴⁸ While the Armed Forces and conservatives expected Frondizi to take a bold stance against communism, others - the Peronists for instance - expected him to express his sympathies with the Cuban struggle against the USA’s “imperialism.” In Amadeo’s opinion, Fidel Castro’s victory damaged Frondizi’s administration simply in that it gave Sánchez Sorondo’s nacionalistas further ammunition to attack the President. “The Cuban revolution, was the only reason for the revolutionary nacionalistas to stay in opposition to Frondizi; [thereafter they became] a much more violent opposition, devoid of any objectives,” he lamented.⁴⁹ Indeed, from 1959 *Azul y Blanco* portrayed Frondizi as an outspoken communist.⁵⁰

The Catholic church, under the leadership of the aforementioned Cardinal Caggiano, seized the opportunity to promote its own “combat against communism.”⁵¹ While addressing the first Inter-American Marian Congress in November 1960, Caggiano dedicated his pastoral message to attacking Marxism - the “Church’s total antithesis.”⁵² Frondizi attended this event. Here, he too sounded like a nacionalista, when stating the following:

The unalterable union of the Cross and the Sword is the basis of our long and difficult national epic [...]. In the face of communism’s ‘confusionist’ propaganda, which under the pretext of a real need for social justice introduces into nations the seed of hatred and of disintegration, the Christian social doctrine exhorts all men to unity and peace.⁵³

The pressure to appease the Armed Forces, while at the same time depending on Peronist voters, drove Frondizi further to the right. This could be clearly seen in 1960, as he embarked on his first European trip and decided to visit Francisco Franco. On July 7, 1960, Frondizi arrived in Madrid

⁴⁸ Tulio Halperin Donghi, *Argentina en el callejón* (Montevideo: ARCA, 1964), 221-23.

⁴⁹ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, February 9, 1959, AGUN, documento 15/35/205.

⁵⁰ “El comunismo de Frondizi,” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 161 (July 14, 1959): 3.

⁵¹ “Caggiano: los pueblos oprimidos serán libres,” *Clarín* (July 25, 1960).

⁵² Antonio Caggiano, *María, madre de la iglesia, su defensora, carta pastoral*, Noviembre 1960 (Buenos Aires: unknown publisher, 1960), 5.

⁵³ “Mensaje del Presidente de la Nación en la ceremonia de clausura del Congreso Mariano Interamericano,” November 13, 1960, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 93.

in what was the first official visit of an Argentine president to Spain in history. The Argentine press was delighted rather than appalled. *Clarín*'s editor Renato Ciruzzi, for example, stated that "if Arturo Frondizi embodies Italy, Francisco Franco is Spain; and Italy and Spain are nothing more and nothing less than the Argentine self."⁵⁴ On this visit, Frondizi behaved like a true Francoist: he paid tribute to the Alcazar in Toledo and the Valley of the Fallen, the regime's key monuments, compared Don Quixote to Argentina's fictional gaucho character Martín Fierro, and stated that the Spanish essence had set the Latin American nations on "the general process of civilization."⁵⁵ Franco, for his part, again gave Frondizi what only he could grant a Latin American leader: a right-wing stamp of approval. In the case of Frondizi, it came in the shape of Spain's highest honor: The Grand Collar of the Order of Queen Isabel.⁵⁶ Reflecting on this event, Sánchez Bella confirmed that "the Grand Cross [...] which the Generalísimo consider very appropriate, was the only way to maintain [Frondizi] spiritually with us," and demanded that Frondizi united with Spain and Portugal, to "stop the demagoguery from Cuba."⁵⁷

Nevertheless, Frondizi's rule began to deteriorate soon thereafter. Despite the anti-communistic slogans, his appointment of the conservative Álvaro Alsogaray as Minister of the Economy under the military's pressure, and even his anti-communistic Law of National Defense, the inconstancies in his ideology were obvious.⁵⁸ For starters, he was unable to maintain a balance between the Peronist mobilization and the economic stipulations of the global markets. Worse yet, in August 1961, his insistence to meet with Ernesto "Che" Guevara in Buenos Aires, and his refusal to partake in the American embargo on Cuba, further angered the nacionalistas and the

⁵⁴ Renato Ciruzzi, "Argentina: Hija dilecta," *Clarín* (July 7, 1960).

⁵⁵ "El presidente argentino en el Instituto de Cultura Hispánica de Madrid," *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 149 (August 1960): 5

⁵⁶ This event was followed by an exuberant coverage in *Mundo Hispánico*, see - "Cita de la Argentina con España: las puertas abiertas de par en par," *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 149 (August 1960): 8-11.

⁵⁷ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Mario Amadeo, August 5, 1960, AGUN, documento 15/35/223.

⁵⁸ "Explicación y motivos del anteproyecto de Ley de Defensa de la Democracia," BNA-ARCH-CEN, caja 1681.

generals.⁵⁹ Hereafter, the more Frondizi emphasized development as the “antidote against communist penetration,”⁶⁰ the more the nacionalistas attacked him. “Frondizi is like the portrait of the Dorian Gray,” Sánchez Sorondo wrote sarcastically, and demanded he be replaced by a “pending revolution” and a novel “organic democracy” - authentic movements that would undo Frondizi’s “petroleum contracts and the stipulations of the IMF.”⁶¹

The military *coup d’état* that ousted Frondizi, it is important to note, had little to do with Sánchez Sorondo’s neo-fascist slogans, but rather with the persistent power of Peronism.⁶² In reality, by the time of the Cuban Revolution began, the original filo-fascist nacionalista movement of the 1930s - whose members included Virgilio Filippo, Gustavo Franceschi, Carlos Ibarguren, and Leonardo Castellani, to name but a few - were either dead or barely visible in the Argentine public sphere.⁶³ Aside from Sánchez Sorondo, the other ideologues to voice any coherent neo-fascist ideology then were Julio Meinvielle and Jordan Genta. A neo-fascist and director of the journal *Combate*, in 1963 the latter published a seminal book by the name of *Guerra contrarrevolucionaria: doctrina política* - a text directed at the Armed Forces that divided the

⁵⁹ Even events such as Eisenhower’s visit to Buenos Aires could not persuade the insatiable *Azul y Blanco* commentators that Frondizi was not a communist. His insistence on protecting freedom of education (Law 1420), even before the 1958 elections, meant that despite his spiritualism, the Catholic sector was suspicious of the Radical leader, see - “La visita de Eisenhower,” *Azul y Blanco* (March 8, 1960); see also - “Entrevista del Che Guevara con el Dr. Frondizi en la residencia de Olivos,” August 18, 1961, BNA-ARCH-CEN, caja 1381.

⁶⁰ “El Gobierno y el comunismo. Mensaje pronunciado hoy por el presidente de la nación Dr. Arturo Frondizi, por Radiofonía y Televisión,” November 23, 1960, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 93.

⁶¹ “Hacia la reconquista,” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 230 (November 16, 1960): 1; He referred to Frondizi’s famous “petroleum battles” of 1958-60, which saw Frondizi opening Argentina’s oil production to foreign companies as a part of Argentina’s 1959-60 Stabilization plan, see - Szusterman, *Frondizi and the Politics of Developmentalism in Argentina*, 79.

⁶² As the regime finally closed *Azul y Blanco*, Sánchez Sorondo’s clique tried to return to its prominence by launching the journal *2da República*, where they promoted a similar neo-fascist ideology.

⁶³ Julio Meinvielle, for his part published mainly upon his journal *Presencia* throughout the 1950s; other elder nacionalistas could be found publishing sporadically, also in *Azul y Blanco*, see - Leonardo Castellani, “La mentira política,” *Azul y blanco* no. 199 (April 12, 1960); Julio Meivielle, “Todavía hay tiempo,” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 151 (May 5, 1961); for more details on the activity of Father Meivielle during the 1960s and his influence on neo-fascist revolutionary gangs during the 1960s, see - Luis Alberto Herrán Ávila, “Anticommunism, the Extreme Right, and the Politics of Enmity in Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico, 1946-1972,” Ph.D., The New School, 2017.

world into simple “positive” and “negative” “doctrines” and that voiced proposals for a “corporativist or syndicalist” state and staunch anti-Semitic assertions.⁶⁴

Argentina’s more noticeable neo-fascist phenomenon appeared during Frondizi’s tenure but within different milieus: the neo-fascist paramilitary bands.⁶⁵ Established in 1957, and led for the most part by two youngsters named Ignacio Alberto Ezcurra Medrano and Joe Baxter, the Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara (MNT) in particular achieved notoriety for its attacks on members of the Argentine Jewish community. Allegedly inspired by neo-fascist figures such as the French fascist and future member of the neo-Nazi movement CEDADE Jacques De Mahieu,⁶⁶ Tacuara propagated, however, a rather insipid neo-fascist ideology, comprising of appeals for a “national-syndicalist revolution.” It is almost redundant to speak of a link between Tacuara’s “basic revolutionary program” and the Falange’s Twenty-six Points as the former quite obviously plagiarizes the latter, in a genealogy leading back to Mussolini.⁶⁷ A somewhat short-lived episode in nacionalista history, Tacuara was nonetheless important as it was symptomatic of the urge within a younger conservative generation to reintroduce both the nationalist-syndicalist lexicon and the fascist cult of violence into Argentine politics in the early 1960s.

As the neo-fascists turned to street violence, other figures on the Argentine Right pursued more respectable ideological affiliations. Ciudad Católica, Cursillos de la Cristiandad, and Opus Dei, were several examples of international associations that arrived in Argentina at this point,

⁶⁴ Jordan Genta, *Guerra contrarrevolucionaria: doctrina política* (Buenos Aires: Nuevo Orden, 1963), 91, 170.

⁶⁵ These included Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista (GRN), Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara (MNT), Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Tacuara (MNRT) and Legion Nacionalista Contrarrevolucionaria (LNC). For a full description of each of these groups, see - Leonardo Senkman, “The Right and Civilian Regimes, 1955-1976,” in McGee Deutsch and Dolkart, *The Argentine Right*, 126-30.

⁶⁶ For more on this Spanish far-right group, see - Xavier Casals Meseguer, “La Renovación de La Ultraderecha Española: Una Historia Generacional (1966-2008),” *Historia y Política*, no. 22 (2009): 233-58.

⁶⁷ As several scholarly and non-scholarly texts have noted, see - Daniel Lvovich, *El nacionalismo de derecha*, 81-82; Daniel Gutman, *Tacuara: Historia de la primera guerrilla urbana argentina* (Buenos Aires: Vergara, 2012), 57-65.

offering new approaches to elite political action. In the early 1960s, the *Cursillos* opened several centers for “spiritual exercises” in Argentina that quickly attracted conservatives and Military personnel alike. Ciudad Católica (Cité Catholique) assumed a more aggressive role. Founded in France in 1946 by Jean Ousset, this anti-modern movement was introduced in Argentina in 1959 by George Grasset and Roberto Gorostiaga. Upon their journal *Verbo*, they promulgated the work of various traditionalists, including the abovementioned Vásques de Mella.⁶⁸ By obeying the “rights of God” rather than the “right of man,” they vowed to eradicate what they believed was an interconnected revolution that included “Renaissance, Reformation, The French Revolution, and Communism.”⁶⁹ Strikingly, whereas the Catholic Church and its conventional organizations (Acción Católica, for instance) moved increasingly towards progressive stances,⁷⁰ these three spiritual affiliations posed a clear call for immediate “elite” anti-revolutionary militancy.⁷¹ Thus, rather than the revolutionary nacionalistas, it was they who attracted members of Armed Forces the most, frequently serving as a new nexus between the generals and “civil” intellectual world.

In the same vein, other youngsters sought to lead nacionalismo towards new directions. Cosme Beccar Varela (Jr.) and Federico J. Ezcurra are a case in point. Since 1956 the two edited the journal *Cruzada* (to be joined by *Reconquista* in 1962). Not by coincidence, these men were also intimately linked to the Francoist apparatus. Cosme Beccar Varela senior, a nacionalista himself, was a friend and business partner of Sánchez Bella,⁷² and as a result, in 1957, Beccar

⁶⁸ See for example - Juan Vásquez de Mella, “Refutación sistémica del liberalismo,” *Verbo*, no. 15 (August 1960): 38-42.

⁶⁹ “¿Que es la revolución?” *Verbo*, no. 2, (June 1959): 2.

⁷⁰ In the 1960s, the Argentine mainstream media presented Acción Católica members as avid readers of Henri Lefevre and Teilhard de Chardin, see for instance - “La política de los católicos,” *Confirmado*, no. 10 (July 9, 1965): 12.

⁷¹ “We believe in the value of the ‘elites’ and in the power of the Truth,” stated *Verbo* in 1960, see - “Después de nuestra jordana,” *Verbo*, no. 9 (Januray-February 1960): 5.

⁷² Beccar Varela Senior, like Amadeo, sided with Frondizi. He and Alfredo Sánchez Bella had mutual projects, such as the promotion of the Spanish book publishing AIZA in Argentina, see - Carta de Cosme Beccar Varela a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, October 30, 1957, AGUN, documento 15/40/67.

Varela Jr. and Ezcurra arrived in Madrid as the ICH's guests of honor.⁷³ Unlike Tacuara, the *Cruzada* youngsters were anti-revolutionary to the extent that they accepted neither Perón's Constitution of 1949 nor Argentina's Constitution of 1853 as valid texts, since "neither conformed to the Hispanic and Catholic spirit of our Nation."⁷⁴ As far as they were concerned, they abided only to "the Spanish way of life" and its unique vision of the "Orthodox Catholic Cosmos."⁷⁵ Similarly to Amadeo, Beccar Varela believed that Argentina was witnessing a rise of new spiritual youth. Suddenly, in this "country dormant in its secular liberalism," he said, a young generation arises that "speaks of something else, that speaks of God, [...] a generation that rescues its authentic ancestry from the past."⁷⁶

Tellingly, *Cruzada* did not identify as a nacionalista group but as yet another third position,⁷⁷ seeking a "synthesis of the national and the social."⁷⁸ And like Amadeo, they too parted company from *Azul y Blanco* in the late 1950s. "By no means would we want to join the long list of their fanatical and unpopular detractors," they said.⁷⁹ As a new source of inspiration, the group aligned with the work of Brazilian intellectual Dr. Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira, and his movement, Tradição, Família e Propriedade.⁸⁰ Having found his ideology equivalent to Hispanidad - as a transnational anti-modern movement that would save Argentina from revolution "caused by an explosion of

⁷³ Carta de Cosme Beccar Varela al Instituto de Cultura Hispánica Departamento de Intercambio," March 21, 1957, AGUN, documento 15/40/64.

⁷⁴ They argued that "the position adopted by *Azul y Blanco* with respect to Sarmiento is not Catholic," see - "De la confusión no nace el orden," *Cruzada*, no.5 (March 1957).

⁷⁵ Jorge Labanca Domínguez, "En torno al ser nacional", *Cruzada*, no. 5 (March 1957).

⁷⁶ "Por una nueva generación," *Cruzada*, no. 38 (March 1963).

⁷⁷ "Ni con unos ni con otros," *Cruzada*, no. 31 (April 1962).

⁷⁸ "Nacionalismo marxista," *Cruzada*, no.9 (October 1957).

⁷⁹ "*Cruzada* repudiates the sarmientista and freemason disfiguration of our national history" was the exact phrasing, see - "Sarmiento y *Azul y Blanco*," *Cruzada* no. 4 (October 1956).

⁸⁰ In 1960, Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira established *Sociedade Brasileira de Defesa da Tradição, Família e Propriedade* in São Paulo. His book *Revolución y contra-revolución* from 1959 was a prominent point of reference for many post-fascist Argentines. For more on the rise of this movement in Brazil and its role in society see - Benjamin Cowan, *Securing Sex: Morality and Repression in the Making of Cold War Brazil* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 43-46.

pride and sensuality”⁸¹ - the *Cruzada* group and Amadeo would be thereafter central in sponsoring the opening of a Tradición, Familia y Propiedad branch in Argentina.

Sánchez Bella, by then Franco’s ambassador in Rome, watched these activities with delight.

Writing Beccar Varela, he said:

I just received last May’s *Cruzada* and I wish to convey my cordial congratulations to you for the excellent ideology it contains [...] You cannot imagine how much we appreciate this orientation and the clear defense of our principles, which the anachronistic and rambling liberalism has been trying to remove from the history and the life of our nations. [...] your task is essential and must be continued, possibly extended to the whole continent [...] The Yankee takeoff has begun, as has the decline of the USSR, but our America cannot become either. The revolution of the middle-class, which seems inevitable, must be done on the basis of firm respect for the Catholic religion and Hispanic traditions.⁸²

Clearly, even before the rise of the Cold War Détente, this quintessential Francoist thinker was urging his confidants to commit to a market-oriented “revolution of the middle-classes,” adherent to Hispanidad principles.⁸³ Sánchez Bella was therefore bothered by Amadeo’s ongoing affiliation with Frondizi. These “false democratic scruples [...] lead nowhere,” he told him.⁸⁴ Amadeo agreed. His working with Frondizi, he replied, was not a break from the nacionalista values but from *coup d’état* tactics (“golpismo”). Sánchez Sorondo’s “impotence to consolidated into something solid and organic seems irremediable,” he said - “their ‘golpismo’ has no horizons.”⁸⁵ Nacionalismo, in other words, was to discover “solid and organic” ways to attain power, Amadeo believed. These changes in Amadeo’s positions could further be seen in 1960 as he returned to

⁸¹ Augusto José Padilla, “Hispanidad y revolución,” *Cruzada*, no. 20 (August 1960).

⁸² Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Cosme Beccar Varela, September 10, 1960, AGUN, documento 15/40/81.

⁸³ Later, Alfredo Sánchez Bella promoted Beccar Varela’s journal *Reconquista*, see - Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Cosme Beccar Varela, April 10, 1962, AGUN, documento 15/40/88.

⁸⁴ Being in good terms with all nacionalistas, Alfredo Sánchez Bella tried to unite them through a collaboration with the Madrid IEP. “Through the IEP [...] we could distribute in the Spanish-American press an entire series of orienting articles on the current Argentine policy, that Mariano and yourself will be responsible for drafting and distributing,” see – carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Mario Amadeo, February 23, 1959, AGUN, documento 15/35/206.

⁸⁵ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, August 10, 1959, AGUN, documento 15/35/210.

Madrid, now as an Argentine official, and met with Franco,⁸⁶ an encounter that left him unimpressed. “The interview with the Caudillo lasted exactly 4-3 minutes,” he reported to Sánchez Bella: “[Franco] spoke almost exclusively [and presented] a severe criticism of demo-liberalism with an exposition of a somewhat anachronistic corporatist thought.”⁸⁷ Apparently, Amadeo felt he had transcended the Caudillo’s own corporatist rhetoric by then.

The schism between Argentina’s far-right ideological positions became more severe as Frondizi’s regime began swirling into crisis in 1961. Amadeo and Sánchez Sorondo were now conducting a battle of words. When it was revealed that Sánchez Sorondo had been a part of a Peronist plot to topple Frondizi, it was Amadeo who, despite their rivalry, helped to discharge his colleague. Ungratefully, “Marcelo [Sánchez Sorondo] responded with a press article ‘disowning’ my administration and personally criticizing me for ‘selling out’ the country,” Amadeo complained to Sánchez Bella.⁸⁸ Evidently, by then Amadeo could not conceal the fact the movement he had once led had splintered into two antagonistic camps. Reflecting on *Azul y Blanco* he then concluded: “I think that the hatred of Frondizi blinds them so that they refuse to see the obvious: [...] the government will not fall by a military coup, but if that happens it would be a disgrace.”⁸⁹

Amadeo’s predictions were erroneous. Frondizi’s inability to incorporate the ever-powerful Peronist movement meant that by then the Armed Forces began doubting to the democratic order altogether. More specifically, when Frondizi allowed the Peronists to run for office in the March 1962 municipal elections, a faction within the Armed Forces finally decided to act, as we shall see in the next section. The point to be taken from the Frondizi-Amadeo relationship is that ultimately

⁸⁶ Amadeo’s connection with Franco and Salazar, as well as with Otto of Habsburg ostensibly put him in the first line of authoritarian thinkers by then. One of the meetings took place in NY on April 24, 1960 see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 26, 1960, AGUN, documento 15/35/220.

⁸⁷ He had an “Emotional meeting” with Salazar too, see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 2, 1960, AGUN, documento 15/35/219.

⁸⁸ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, February 5, 1961 AGUN, documento 15/35/226.

⁸⁹ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, June 10, 1961, AGUN, documento 15/35/231.

Frondizi was a conservative politician who maintained intimate links with authoritarian leaders such as Franco, and later, even with Sánchez Bella personally.⁹⁰ Frondizi was neither a communist nor a zealous democrat. If anything, he was the Argentine middle-classes' faint response to Perón's intrinsic ideological fluidity. Ultimately, Sánchez Bella was more insightful than Amadeo when observing that Frondizi lacked "a doctrine and political mysticism." Therefore, Argentina's future, he told Amadeo, "does not belong to this type of democratic freedom." His letter ended with yet another advice: "If our nations aspire to live they will have to accept authority as a lesser evil and as the only means to preserve their true liberties."⁹¹

Ateneo de la República, and Argentina's "Hispanic" revival

On March 29, 1962, the commanders of Argentina's three Armed Forces overthrew Dr. Arturo Frondizi from the presidency, placing instead an interim government designed to lead the country through a new electoral process. Shortly thereafter, the Argentine public became acquainted with two epithets that represented two sides of an ideological struggle within the Armed Forces: Azules ("blues") and Colorados ("reds"). Save for a few exceptions, ever since 1955 the generals agreed that the Peronist movement was an aberration from Argentina's national spirit. They differed considerably, however, over the question of whether they themselves should permanently take over the state, or rather sustain a "legalist" protected democracy instead. Ideologically, the Colorados were the extreme faction, and vaguely reverberated the attitudes of the neo-fascist nacionalistas. Their precise far-right leanings would become apparent in 1976, as members of this very group took over the state. The Azules, for their part, were no less

⁹⁰ Their correspondences from the late-1960s and early 1970s are beyond the scope of this analysis. However, one thing to be said is that they reveal a much more traditionalist version of Frondizi, see - AGUN, documento 15/57/57.

⁹¹ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Mario Amadeo, April 10, 1959, AGUN documento 15/35/208.

ideologically nebulous, and agreed mainly on the principle of keeping the Armed Forces “out of politics.” As their emerging leader, Juan Carlos Onganía, explained in later years: “the army supported the thesis that ‘the people want to vote’ but, at the same time, [wanted to achieve] a truly democratic system that would ensure peace, freedom, and well-being.” The Azules, he insisted, believed in “a right to vote but not to restore a criminal regime.”⁹² Following two deadly showdowns, in September 1962 and April 1963, the Azules finally overpowered the Colorados. From this moment, with the parliamentary system as their mercy, further authoritarian interventions lay in store for the Argentine democracy.⁹³

There was an immediate sense of mutual recognition between the Azul faction and Amadeo’s technocratic-authoritarian affiliation. During the 1963 general elections, the two sides partook in a failed initiative that, at one point, considered endorsing Onganía as a candidate against the Radical Party candidate Arturo Illia.⁹⁴ Yet it would take three more years for this collaboration to finally coalesce into solid political action. From Amadeo’s letters, it is clear that rather than communism, the Colorado’s “golpismo” was the more immediate threat he saw to the Argentine society. “I wish to point out to you that my preference for a constitutional regime is not based on any fetishism towards liberal institutions, but because I believe that the rule of law is the only element that can preserve us from chaos,” he explained to Sánchez Bella. Then he noted:

⁹²“Azules y colorados,” in - Juan Carlos Onganía oral history with Robert A. Potash: questions and notes, 1984, Robert A. Potash Papers, UMass Amherst University Archives; Onganía was allegedly the author of the famous “Comunicado no. 150 de Campo de Mayo,” the text in which the Azules declared their allegiance to the constitutional order, see - Gerardo Bra, *El gobierno de Onganía: crónica* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1986), 11.

⁹³ The most comprehensive work on the so-called 1963 Argentine Navy revolt is, again, Robert Potash’s book, *The Army & Politics in Argentina: 1962-1973*; for others narrations of this event, see - Marvin Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930–1966: An Interpretation* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014 [1972]), 188-203; Rodolfo Pandolfi, *Azules y colorados: el conflicto político y militar a comienzos de los sesenta* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría, 1994).

⁹⁴ This entity, which Amadeo tried to lead, consisted of Juan Carlos Onganía, Justo León Bengoa, Eduardo Señorans, Oscar Alende, Emilio Donato del Carril, and Basilio Serrano - at least according to the press’s speculation, see - “Frente: ¿Llegó el momento de elegir candidatos?” *Primera Plana*, no. 21 (April 2, 1963).

The struggle is not between those who are for ‘representative democracy’ and those who are against it, but between those who understand that what is necessary is a profound renovation of collective consciousness under an essentially Christian insignia, and those who want to maintain, violently, the old economic-social structures.

Dictatorship, he thus contended, must be market-oriented and spiritualist in order to thrive.⁹⁵

Even before the 1963 elections, Amadeo and his group had begun designing an alternative to Argentina’s fifty-years old parliamentary system. For this purpose, towards the end of 1962, they founded a colloquium by the name of Ateneo de la República. Like Pérez Embid’s Ateneo de Madrid - albeit doubtfully inspired from it - Amadeo’s Ateneo was, in the simplest terms, an elite forum designed to outline Argentina’s authoritarian future, and comprising of technocratic-authoritarian nacionalistas such as Máximo Etchecopar, Santiago de Estrada, Eduardo Roca, and Basilio Serrano. To the press, the Ateneo presented itself as a body that would not serve “any political sector but rather the superior interests of the Argentine public, always identified with the unalterable Christian tradition and national sentiment.” It aspired, it stated, for a “democratic” future, “through elections,” but also believed that “important political, social, and economic transformations must be undertaken before that.”⁹⁶ In its opening session, on December 21, 1962, Amadeo was even more candid about the fundamental right “to be ruled by a dictatorship,” along with a “civil government.” This regime, he assured, will be a legal one given its “authentic and realistic” pledge. In contrast, he stressed that “parliamentary systems” are not authentic, and therefore should be jettisoned. Only this new integrative movement could successfully incorporate

⁹⁵ The “consensual” dictatorship, was an idea Amadeo held for the rest of his life, see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, May 2, 1962, AGUN, documento 15/35/239.

⁹⁶ “Ateneo de la República: ¿Tribuna de doctrina o futuro factor de poder?” *Primera Plana*, no. 4 (December 4, 1962): 6.

Peronism, he predicted optimistically. In short, Amadeo's nacionalismo had transformed into a call for a civic post-ideological dictatorship.⁹⁷

The Ateneo featured a new brand of young technocratic thinkers, many of whom were Amadeo's disciples. Mario Díaz Colodrero was the more striking example. Not only was he Amadeo's declared "protégé,"⁹⁸ but he was also an ICH fellow who studied in Madrid in 1949, and who along with intellectuals Mariano Montemayor and Cleremiro Ledesma, befriended Sánchez Bella.⁹⁹ Another similar case was Nicanor Costa Méndez, the Ateneo's future director and another ICH fellow. Then, there were the young publicists Enrique M. Pearson, Enrique Peltzer, Jorge Mazzinghi, and Samuel W. Medrano - all of whom studied at the ICH in Madrid and were to serve as functionaries in Onganía's regime. Not by coincidence, Díaz Colodrero, Mazzinghi, and Medrano joined the Opus Dei as supernumeraries. Thus, there was a recurring pattern in these men's biographies, starting with an early Francoist political education and ending with a distinctive pattern of political activism in the 1960s.

In 1963, the Ateneo reached out to other ideological groups overseas with new initiatives. In one case, Amadeo contacted Sánchez Bella asking for assistance in organizing a "two-week symposium in Buenos Aires, with Italian and Spanish specialists" to discuss the "process of economic and social recovery, held in their countries."¹⁰⁰ The event's planners, Díaz Colodrero, Dr. José Rafael Trozzo, and Monsignor Gerónimo Podesta, were "especially interested in Mr. López Rodó," Amadeo wrote.¹⁰¹ Trozzo, a banker from a prestigious Argentine family, was

⁹⁷ "Por una solución nacional: discurso pronunciado en la comida del ateneo de la Republica, el 21 de diciembre 1962," *Cuadernos del Ateneo de la Republica*, no. 2, located at BNA-ARCH-CEN-ARQué, Carpeta Mario Amadeo.

⁹⁸ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, November 1, 1966, AGUN, documento 15/35/264.

⁹⁹ Sánchez Bella had even communicated with the Argentine ambassador on Díaz Colodrero's behalf in 1949, see - Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Perdo Radio," February 2, 1949, AMREC, Embajada en Madrid II, caja 25.

¹⁰⁰ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, March 12, 1963, AGUN, documento 15/35/247; see also - carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, March 27, 1963, AGUN documento 15/35/248.

¹⁰¹ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, June 3, 1963, AGUN documento 15/35/253.

another Ateneo affiliate, who had been ICH fellow in the past and Opus Dei supernumerary in the present.¹⁰² That he and Díaz Colodrero sought the knowledge of Franco's key Opus Dei "specialists in economic development,"¹⁰³ was illuminating as it was predictable.

By then, Amadeo had no illusions that the future of Argentina lay in the hands of the Azules. "When the military process is over," he said to Sánchez Bella, "the political process will begin [...] This means that the next president must be the leader of the triumphant group [the Azules], or the person he designates."¹⁰⁴ Hence, Amadeo and Etchecopar resorted to the tactic of presenting their association as a think-tank in the service of the Azules in the eventuality of a military takeover. It is difficult to assess what type of intellectual activity took place at the Ateneo, since many of its meetings were not documented or published. Speaking later of the Ateneo's "magnificent achievements" Amadeo told Sánchez Bella that it began with a "ghostly existence," but later on, displayed "a remarkable cultural and social activity."¹⁰⁵ Amadeo, for once, was not exaggerating. With the incisive Etchecopar as its director, by 1965 the Ateneo de la República was one of the more respected think-tanks in Argentina's far-right intellectual panorama.

The Ateneo's activity cannot be understood disconnected from the further upsurge of Hispanidad ideology in Argentina at the time, and the new bridges between Argentina and

¹⁰² José Rafael Trozzo would become known in the late-1970s as head of the Banco de Intercambio Regional (BIR). In 1980, after almost being appointed as Argentina's Minister of the Economy, he would be entangled in one of the more serious financial scandals of the 1976-1983 dictatorship. For a full account of this case, see - "The amazing career of José Rafael Trozzo," *Euromoney* (June 1980): 13-22; also see - Klaus Friedrich Veigel, *Dictatorship, Democracy, and Globalization: Argentina and the Cost of Paralysis, 1973-2001* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 73-75; We know that the Italian conferences took place as planned, but no texts survived to indicate whether a Spanish one took place as well. We do know, however, that Trozzo arrived in Rome to discuss this convention with Sánchez Bella too, see - Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Mario Amadeo, October 4, 1963, AGUN, documento 15/35/254; Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, October 23, 1963, AGUN, documento 15/35/255; Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, December 20, 1964, AGUN, documento 15/35/257; As for the Italian specialists, Amadeo recommended hosting Giuseppe Petrilli, Guido Gonella and Giuseppe Vedovato, see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 4, 1963, AGUN, documento 15/35/249.

¹⁰³ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Mario Amadeo, May 6, 1963, AGUN, documento 15/35/252.

¹⁰⁴ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 4 de 1963, AGUN, documento 15/35/249.

¹⁰⁵ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, December 30, 1965, AGUN, documento 15/35/260.

Francoism. If in the 1950s a politician visiting Franco was considered a political outcast, then following Frondizi's celebratory visit to Spain the relationship between the nations blossomed. Two things demonstrate this. The first was the establishment of Argentina's Nuestra señora de Lujan College in Madrid. On February 5, 1963, Spain and Argentina's vice-ministers of Education, Luis Legaz y Lacambra and Francisco Eduardo Trusso, signed the delivery of this institution in Madrid.¹⁰⁶ Later named "Casa de la Argentina," it was designed to accommodate hundreds of Argentine students in Madrid.¹⁰⁷ Next came the opening of the ICH center in Buenos Aires, in November 1965. Argentina's top officials and the ICH director, Gregorio Marañón Moya, all attended this event.¹⁰⁸ That the Ateneo was intimately linked with the new ICH center can be inferred from the fact that Mazzinghi served as one of its General Secretaries, while Amadeo, Díaz Colodrero, and José Mariano Astigueta were its board members.¹⁰⁹ In 1965, these men were even the guests of the ICH in Madrid. As Mazzinghi recalled in later years, "in January of 1965, several friends had resolved to participate in the trip: Astigueta, Goyeneche, Díaz Colodrero, Pearson." There they experienced "conferences, night walks, and a climate of great joy and friendship."¹¹⁰ The Madrid dailies, for their part, praised Mazzinghi's "fervent pilgrimage" to Spain, and spoke of his mission to "reinvigorate traditional relations with the Mother Nation."¹¹¹ The Buenos Aires ICH branch presented its students with a host of activities, ranging from nacionalista indoctrination

¹⁰⁶ Archivo del Ministro de Educación de España, caja 78217; this was preceded by a visit in 1963, see - "El subsecretario argentino de educación, en Madrid," *ABC Madrid* (February 3, 1963).

¹⁰⁷ "Anteproyecto de reglamento, Casa de la Argentina en Madrid "nuestra señora de Lujan," Archivo del Ministro de Educación de España, caja 78217.

¹⁰⁸ Including Argentina's Education Minister, Bernardo Alberto Houssay, head of Argentina's Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), and other distinguished Catholic figures such as Octavio Drisi, see - *ibid*.

¹⁰⁹ All belonging to the ICH's alumni association, see - *Instituto Argentino de Cultura Hispánica, veinticinco años de labor cultural* (Buenos Aires: Cultura Hispánica, 1990), 12.

¹¹⁰ Jorge Mazzinghi, *Ni memorias ni olvido* (Buenos Aires: el autor, 2015), 104.

¹¹¹ Mazzinghi, in his tenure as head of the Culture Department of the Municipality of Buenos Aires, was the key initiator of the Argentine-Spanish Pedro de Mendoza Foundation, aimed "to disseminate in this country and in other Spanish-speaking republics values of our culture," in the words of *ABC*, see - *ABC Madrid* (July 17, 1966).

to “proper” pedagogical training. The courses taught at the ICH were overall a reflection of the Ateneo’s priorities and included lectures by Amadeo, Sepich, Serrano, José Maria de Estrada, and Catholic pedagogues such as Luis Zanotti and Alfredo Van Gelderen.¹¹²

What is more, the Ateneo and the ICH both held a direct contact with the Spanish embassy, which as in the case of Chile, had become a nucleus of Francoist ideological and military education by the mid-1960s. Significantly, Spain’s military attaché in Argentina during the 1960s was Jaime Milans del Bosch, the planner of Spain’s February 1981 failed *coup d’état*. And tellingly, the ambassador, José María Alfaro, and the embassy’s cultural attaché, José Ignacio Ramos, were both active members on the Buenos Aires ICH board.¹¹³ Additionally, the embassy attracted several Argentine generals - General Sánchez de Bustamante, for instance - to whom Amadeo referred to as a “great friend of Spain.”¹¹⁴ Briefly put, while publishing fairly little, the Ateneo played a crucial role in Argentina’s elite politics, as a promoter of novel ideologies of the state, and as importantly, as the nexus with the ICH and technocratic Spain.

Cuadernos del Sur: The design of a post-ideological state and society

In 1964, the Opus Dei initiated one of its most ambitious intellectual collaborations: The Argentine-Chilean journal *Cuadernos del Sur*. Officially a “Southern Cone” project, it brought together Argentine, Chilean, and Spanish intellectuals with the avowed intention of crafting a comprehensive “development” strategy for Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Retrospectively, critical voices have spoken of the Opus Dei as a “mysterious group” promoting a military coup

¹¹² The titles of the courses were as follows: “Curso de perfeccionamiento docente” (1966), “La educación en la Argentina: situación actual y visión prospectiva” (1967), and “La escuela de nuestro tiempo” (1968), in *Instituto argentino de Cultura Hispánica, Veinticinco años de labor cultural*, 31-36.

¹¹³ “The Institute maintains, naturally, the closest of ties with the Embassy of Spain, and especially with its Cultural Office,” stated its own texts, see - *Instituto argentino de Cultura Hispánica, veinticinco años de labor cultural*, 12-13.

¹¹⁴ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 28, 1970, AGUN, documento 15/35/27.

against the democratic regime.¹¹⁵ As I will demonstrate shortly, there was hardly anything mysterious about the way *Cuadernos del Sur* disseminated its ideology. Still, it is important to examine the intellectual work of this journal for two essential reasons. For one, here we can assess the similitude and the differences between the Opus Dei's ideology inside and outside of Franco's Spain. After all, *Cuadernos del Sur* shrewdly suggested undoing the democratic order in the countries in which it appeared - a context dissimilar from that of Franco's dictatorship. Secondly, as the *Cuadernos del Sur* editors were to become Onganía's ministers and functionaries, it is worthwhile comparing their hypothetical theories of state with the actual state-ideology they put forward later, once in power.

Cuadernos del Sur was the brainchild of the two aforementioned Opus Dei priests José Miguel Ibañez Langlois and Ernesto García Alesanco. Returning from Spain, the two sought to launch an original Argentine-Chilean intellectual project that would assemble, and hopefully unite, the right-wing networks of the Southern Cone. Ibañez Langlois maintained a close relationship with his tutor Florentino Pérez Embid, who encouraged his disciples to broaden their activities in Chile.¹¹⁶ On May 7, 1964, Ibañez Langlois turned to Pérez Embid with an unusual request. "A cultural magazine of contemporary problems will soon appear, [...] in the area that includes Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. The 'South American Europe', not?" the letter opened. Then, Ibañez Langlois expressed his desire to borrow texts from Pérez Embid's own journal *Atlántida*, given the "whirlwind blowing in these cultural areas" of Latin America. His appeal is revealing as it indicates not only that the initiative to establish ideological publications originated at the Opus Dei's Latin America branches, but also that under the guise of "cultural journal" its intellectuals

¹¹⁵ Gregorio Selser, *El Onganiato: la espada y el hisopo* (Buenos Aires: Carlos Samanta Editor, 1973), 15.

¹¹⁶ His precise words were: "de eso que se llama 'hacer votos por chile,'" see - Carta de Florentino Pérez Embid a José Miguel Ibañez Langlois, March 15, 1963, AGUN, caja 03/14 (febrero).

aspired to solve “problems” that were political in essence. Ibañez Langlois concluded his letter with a pledge to “shock the bourgeois” (*épater le bourgeois*); referring to the 19th century Decadence Movement, he thereby sought to define his own spiritual crusade against America’s middle-class moral decay and apathy.¹¹⁷

Like *Arco* and *Istmo* before it, *Cuadernos del Sur* was identical to *Nuestro Tiempo* and *Atlántida* structurally and aesthetically. While never officially admitting its linkage to the Opus Dei apparatus, it tellingly published the work of Opus Dei intellectuals such as José Orlandis, Antonio Fontán,¹¹⁸ García Hoz, Amadeo de Fuenmayor,¹¹⁹ Frederick Wilhelmsen,¹²⁰ and even Escrivá de Balaguer himself.¹²¹ Later, the journal’s readers were further introduced to the work of Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Jesús Urteaga.¹²² In this sense, this was by far the most visible Opus Dei intellectual project in Latin America at the time.

Despite being Ibañez Langlois’s initiative, wealthy Argentine families financed and directed *Cuadernos del Sur*, and according to Ibañez’s own recollections, it was therefore essentially an Argentine publication.¹²³ Its chief editor was Eugenio Antonio Brusa, one of Ismael Sánchez Bella’s first recruits at the Opus Dei’s Argentine center.¹²⁴ Its board of directors comprised of Díaz Colodrero and Carlos Mendioroz, as well as other Catholic intellectuals such as Enrique Mario Mayochi, Thomist thinker Raul Echauri, and Chilean intellectuals Fernando Orrego Vicuña and

¹¹⁷ Carta de José Miguel Ibañez Langlois a Florentino Pérez Embid, AGUN, caja 003/016.

¹¹⁸ Antonio Fontán, “En el sentenerio del nacimiento de Unamuno,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 8 (March 1965): 181-82.

¹¹⁹ Víctor García Hoz, “Motivación y personalidad,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 35 (June 1967): 442-48; Amadeo de Fuenmayor, “La universidad y el diálogo de la iglesia con el mundo,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 39 (October 1967): 829-38.

¹²⁰ Frederick Wilhelmsen, “Los EEUU y la cultura occidental,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 13 (August 1965): 676-83.

¹²¹ “Documentación: declaraciones del fundador del Opus Dei,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 27 (October 1966): 865-71;

“Documentación: ¿Que es el Opus Dei?,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 51 (October 1968): 880-98; Víctor del Reina, “Camino y el Opus Dei,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 61-62 (August-September 1969): 655-58.

¹²² Jesús Urteaga, “Gritos Angustiosos,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 61-62 (August-September 1969): 731-34.

¹²³ Interview with José Miguel Ibañez Langlois, April 25, 2016.

¹²⁴ According to the Opus Dei’s own narrative, see - <http://opusdei.org.ar/es-ar/article/historia/>

Carlos Ruíz-Tagle. Being Ateneo members, Díaz Colodrero and Mendioroz were the obvious tie between the two associations.¹²⁵ Nicanor Costa Méndez, while not contributing to *Cuadernos del Sur*, was linked to the Opus Dei apparatus as the head of Argentine Editorial Pomaire, and could, therefore, be included in this network.¹²⁶ As always, the Opus Dei sought to assemble different far-right elements into one ideological and political action. Its collaborators included, on the side of the Chilean far-right, the hispanistas Arturo Fontaine,¹²⁷ Hugo Montes, Guillermo Blanco, Ricardo Krebs, and Julio Phillipi. They were joined by the Opus Dei's historian Bernardino Bravo Lira (numeryary) and ultra-conservative ideologues such as Armando Roa. On the Argentine side, the journal presented a collaboration with *La Nación*. Argentina's leading conservative daily, its columnists Carlos Alberto Floria and Jorge Brinkmann often appeared in *Cuadernos del Sur*.

From its opening declaration, it was obvious that high culture was not entirely what this journal fostered. Rather *Cuadernos del Sur* took upon itself to answer the "great conflict" of contemporary society. More concretely, it spoke of the "Catholic's paradox" wherein one is "immersed in one's period and country," but is at the same time is a "universal citizen par excellence." *Cuadernos del Sur* hence aimed to bring together "all those who sincerely yearn for the effective unity of the countries of Southern America, whose cultural integration must be pursued, given the moral and ethnic kinship that binds them."¹²⁸ This assuaged version of Hispanidad *a la* Opus Dei, presented the Catholic as a universal crusader, only then to stress that

¹²⁵ The Ateneo's Jorge Mazzinghi and Samuel Medrano published upon the journal too. According to Ernesto García Alesanco these men joined the Opus Dei only in the early 1970s. This claim is supported, in the case of Mazzinghi, by his own autobiography. Still, there is a reason to suspect these claims, in particular in the case of Díaz Colodrero who was one of the founders of *Cuadernos del Sur* and who clearly was aligned with the Opus Dei's ideological trends during the mid-1960s. Moreover, according to Argentine publications, Medrano and Mazzighi already were Opus Dei members as early as 1967, see - "El Opus Dei, aquí y ahora," *Análisis*, no. 308 (February 2, 1967); can be also located at AGA, caja 42/09060.

¹²⁶ "Editorial Pomaire, sociedad de responsabilidad limitada," *BOE (Argentina)*, no. 20,811 (November 2, 1965): 36.

¹²⁷ Arturo Fontaine, "Sobre el proceso revolucionario en América Latina," *Cuaderno del Sur*, no. 9 (April 1965): 306-10.

¹²⁸ Editorial, *Cuaderno del Sur*, no. 1 (August 1964): 1.

the South Americans should unite due to their ethnic singularity. But *Cuadernos del Sur* did not only speak to conservative elites. Instead, it was one of many publications addressing what historian Sebastián Carassai has labeled the “non-Peronist middle classes” - those who had abandoned the “hope of a country [...] governable without a Peronist majority.”¹²⁹ In the last section of this chapter, I will touch on the new types of journalism that appeared in the mid-1960s in the Argentine public sphere. For now, suffice it to say that *Cuadernos del Sur* was original in the way it replaced the nacionalista textuality with a “civilized” debate over what was, at heart, a roadmap for an authoritarian regime.

From the outset, *Cuadernos del Sur* honed in on two aspects of state ideology as it saw it: the political-economical arrangement of society and the spiritual order that should guarantee its social harmony. Again, political action appeared here as an altruistic “service:” the technocratic-authoritarian agent serves society through efficiency, was the thesis. “The vocation of the politician implies the wish to serve a community. The service of the politician is not only a renunciation but the social utility of that surrender,” proclaimed Carlos Floria. “The political leader must justify his ideology with effective action. If it fails in practice, the very justification of his rule is upset,” he clarified. Next, Floria spoke of economic “development” in the following manner:

This is more than a necessity: it is a collective belief and, in the end, a form of legitimation of power. Beyond the rhetorical mentality, today a technical mentality is imposed on us. [...] politics has been rationalized. And the political leader is concerned with the conciliation between that high level of humanity that personalized power implies, and this demythologization of power that rationalized power assumes.¹³⁰

Thus, *Cuadernos del Sur* espoused two positions: first, only an exceptional and ideologically neutral leader can serve the “rational” and “technical” common good; second, this agent obviously

¹²⁹ Sebastián Carassai, *The Argentine Silent Majority: Middle Classes, Politics, Violence, and Memory in the Seventies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 33.

¹³⁰ Carlos A. Floria, “Fisonomía actual del dirigente político,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 1 (August 1964): 25.

is a spiritual Catholic, aware of his universal duty. Gradually, *Cuadernos del Sur* also detailed the specifics of its development “technique.” A special volume dedicated to the topic saw Opus Dei and traditionalists figures advising future governments on the “purposes of development” and the “most appropriate ‘techniques’ to produce it.” On the one hand, Amadeo and Phillipi underscored a Hispanic spiritual and hemispheric unification as the basis of economic progress.¹³¹ On the other hand, Díaz Colodrero, Santiago de Estrada, and Ibáñez Langlois promoted a technocratic-authoritarian mindset, whereby “planning requires power - a centralized power to a degree which the old absolutisms would envy” - a unique condition that unfortunately “will certainly undermine personal freedom.”¹³²

In a similar fashion, Ibáñez Langlois stated that ideologies, or the “classical *isms*,” have been “transformed and blended to an indefinitely complex and subtle point.” Subsequently, the technician, he said, was to be the “true author of the material progress of our days.” Yet Ibáñez Langlois also posed a caveat: this agent might also “bring to the social order his professional deformation [...] wanting to apply to society the mechanical concept of his world.” Therefore, what is needed, suggested the Opus Dei priest, was a regime that would transcend the duality of “technocracy” versus “statism.” Ultimately, he thought, technocracy is futile without spiritual guidance. In his words:

The future of freedom depends on the spiritual force capable of teaching us to use the tools of power and technology without self-destruction. [...] But who will inject into the souls of the masses who drive machines, [...] who exercise technical or bureaucratic functions, that inner space of freedom, warning, deliberation, of intimacy that redeems humanity from the immense machinery? The problem is, ultimately, religious.¹³³

¹³¹ Mario Amadeo once again emphasized the crucial need to amalgamate the Hispanic world as a stipulation for economic development – for instance through the rectification of ALALC - and the “harmonization of political economies” in the continent, a process that demands a “revolution of the spirits,” see - Mario Amadeo, “Desarrollo nacional e integración internacional,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 6-7 (January-February 1965): 166-72.

¹³² José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “Planificación y libertad,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 6-7 (January-February 1965): 7-17; see also - José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “Progresismo, integrismo y socialización,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 10, (May 1965): 385.

¹³³ Ibáñez Langlois, “Planificación y libertad”, 16.

This was, by far, one of the more cunning texts to be written by an Opus Dei ideologue, as Ibáñez Langlois clearly anticipated the anti-capitalist critique. Therefore, he himself scolded the “empty specialist” and capitalist “dehumanization,” only thereafter to propose adding the “spiritual force” to the neoliberal formula, as the precondition to any successful social development.

Cuadernos del Sur often debated the very essence of mankind. Primarily, its intellectuals afforded much effort to deconstruct both the crux of Marxist historical materialism and the 19th century capitalist “homo economicus” commonsense. “Human nature suffers an intrinsic tension, a kind of intimate dialectic [...] anchored and compelled towards the community, by an imperious necessity of the spirit,” observed Argentine pedagogue Marcos Ronchino, a numerary and yet another original member of the local Opus Dei branch. This traumatic dependence on society, was, for Ronchino, the core of the human “spirit.” Next, Ronchino suggested that this very ontology of the human spirit should become the basis for the design of modern economies. Alienation can be answered, he said, through spiritual “improvement” (perfeccionamiento), wherein production of material goods “serves to improve the spiritual nature of man.” Failing to do so, he warned, would mean, “technology or economic development cease to be human.”¹³⁴ Ronchino’s spiritual alternative to the Marxist and capitalist materialisms was never answered here in programmatic terms. The only hint to what this so-called “development” meant came from Díaz Colodrero, who similarly to French and Spanish technocrats of the time, theorized “development” in terms of administrative “rationalization” and territorial “integration.”¹³⁵

Cuadernos del Sur’s writers were somewhat more lucid when rebuking parliamentary democracy as an inauthentic “fiction,” thereby presenting the post-ideological dictatorship as its

¹³⁴ Marcos Ronchino, “Persona, comunidad y desarrollo,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 6-7 (January-February 1965): 18-30.

¹³⁵ Mario Díaz Colodrero, “Desarrollo Regional en la Argentina,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 1 (August 1964): 43-47.

indisputable substitute. Brussa, for example, plainly denounced Argentina's parliamentary system and pinned its crisis not on military interventions but on the "political immaturity" of the masses, which, by 1965, has created an "exclusively formalist" democracy.¹³⁶ Other "anti-ideological" undertones soon followed. García Alesanco, like Fernández de la Mora, advocated "freedom" as an opposite to "ideology." "In Latin America we pay a high price for an ideological political life [...] a theoretical fabrication that sought visions of infallibility often without connection to reality. This is a dictatorship of abstractions [...] the totalitarianism of ideologies," he proclaimed.¹³⁷

In turn, the Opus Dei spokesmen presented themselves as mediators who could transcend this ideological deadlock. "Technology, economic development, the awakening of the proletariat, are facts," Ibáñez Langlois admitted. However, under the guise of "Christian social reform," what he in fact advocated was a regime that would replace parliamentarism altogether.¹³⁸ The future demands, he said, "a political regime of undoubtedly authoritarian but not despotic character, which renounces the formal values of democracy and preserves its essential content, thus purifying the socialist state from aphorisms and assimilate its technical efficiency and planning dynamism."¹³⁹ To complement what was essentially a call for technocratic-authoritarianism, he explained that only Christianity possess the "secret of that fragile and precious balance."¹⁴⁰ In a word: the Southern Cone's authoritarian technocrats believed themselves to be technicians of the *economy* and of the *spirit*, simultaneously.

Cuadernos del Sur also spoke of education, a field the Opus Dei felt comfortable providing its abundant pedagogical theorization. The recurrent appearance of Víctor García Hoz upon the

¹³⁶ Eugenio Antonio Brussa, "Las elecciones en la Argentina," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 8 (March 1965): 234.

¹³⁷ Ernesto García Alesanco, "En defensa de la libertad," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 10 (May 1965): 382.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 394.

¹³⁹ José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, "El futuro de la revolución social," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 15 (October 1965): 898.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 899.

journal's pages was a clear indicator of who their main point of reference was.¹⁴¹ As we have seen in the previous chapter, this Opus Dei pedagogue epitomized the enterprise of producing a balanced theory of "liberty" within "order" in Spain's education system. By the late 1960s, García Hoz had also become one of UNESCO's chief executives and, as a result, an even bigger authority on matters of education. His interlocutors in *Cuadernos del Sur* were Ronchino and Samuel Medrano, once a Cursos de Cultura Católica member and a historical revisionist in the present, who was famous for demanding to rediscover Argentina's "spiritual principles."¹⁴² With them came other reactionary educators, who, in the late 1960s, would serve as a distinctive pedagogical think-tank in Onganía's regime. One example was Jorge Luis Zanotti, a *La Nación* commentator and a fierce Catholic. These figures all contributed to a debate over the formation of reverent, obedient, and technically-efficient men.¹⁴³

Above all, *Cuadernos del Sur* was exceptional even for an Opus Dei journal for struggling in the name of public morality. In so doing, it touched on issues that until the mid-1960s had been relatively overlooked in far-right publications. The 1960s brought with them, the Opus Dei thought, extraordinary moral threats, inseparable from the political debate. Given that Chile and Argentina were democratic societies and unquestionably more pluralist than Franco's Spain - and thereby more susceptible to the influence of 1960s cultural trends - the campaign *Cuadernos del Sur* waged is understandable. Yet interestingly rather than a religious crusade, public morality appeared on its pages as a crucial component in a quasi-scientific, psychological, and even

¹⁴¹ Víctor García Hoz, "Educación: libertad y dogmatismo," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 11 (June 1965): 469-79.

¹⁴² Samuel W. Medrano, "Reforma educacional y cultura cristiana," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 9 (April 1965): 91.

¹⁴³ A special issue dedicated to "Education in the technical era" appeared in *Cuadernos del Sur* in January 1968 and included the concentrated work of the abovementioned theorists, see - *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 42-43 (January-February 1968).

environmental debate.¹⁴⁴ For the Opus Dei, children were a societal, economic, and spiritual blessing, and therefore the mere option to contain human reproductions was not only a sin but counterproductive for society at large.¹⁴⁵ True, these were not unusual positions for a Catholic journal. Only that *Cuadernos del Sur* never presented itself as one. “Divorce is problematic in the light of faith, and also in the light of pure natural law as well as social hygiene,” declared its editors.¹⁴⁶ Later in 1967, a special volume dedicated to “marriage and family today” saw Ibáñez Langlois leading the pseudo-scientific discussion on the destruction divorce could inflict on modern society. Under the guise of a “cultural journal” *Cuadernos del Sur* hence debated extremely polemical issues in a monolithic voice, and in the name of science and economic progress. “Development is inseparable from the increase in population,” were the telling words of Brazilian Opus Dei affiliate Isídoro D. Cuervo.¹⁴⁷

As could be expected, Ibáñez Langlois used his own journal to attack the use of contraceptives.¹⁴⁸ Even more so than in Spain, his anti-Malthusian rhetoric betrayed a powerful sense of self-victimization. “Family planning in Latin America is an act of ‘cultural colonialism,’” he opined. In a world sensitive to the rights of “self-determination,” Latin America’s “cultural substratum” was nonetheless invaded “with all the weapons of science and technology,” he further explained.¹⁴⁹ Put differently, *Cuadernos del Sur* depicted birth control as a crisis of regional

¹⁴⁴ Edmundo Carbone, “El divorcio en la Argentina,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 12 (July 1965): 600-609; “Editorial: La familia, eximia obra de Dios,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 58 (May 1969): 1-2; Armando Roa, “Psicología del matrimonio moderno,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 22 (May 1966): 377-88.

¹⁴⁵ Adolfo Isoardi, “¿Para qué tontas hijas?,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 12 (July 1965): 573-78.

¹⁴⁶ “El divorcio en Chile,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 2 (September 1964): 132.

¹⁴⁷ Isídoro D. Cuervo, “Control de natalidad, genocidio americano,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 40 (November 1967): 897.

¹⁴⁸ José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “Progestágenos,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 1 (August 1964) 17-18; This article quickly made its way to other Opus Dei journals, see - José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “Progestágenos,” *Arco*, no. 195 (April 1965): 198-207.

¹⁴⁹ José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “Más sobre el control del nacimiento,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no.9 (April 1965): 315-17.

sovereignty. To this, Ibáñez Langlois added even more cunning feminist argumentations. Women's "redemption by contraception," he said, was false:

It does not solve the problem of abortion, and possibly tends to exert it; contraception does not solve world hunger; contraception does not liberate women nor promote a happier motherhood: contraception erodes the foundations of the family institution: contraception promotes the spiritual aging of a society, gerontocracy, and premature sclerosis; contraception has the effects of a classist, monopolistic, colonialist, paternalistic policy.¹⁵⁰

One can notice here feminist theory - as Ibáñez Langlois perceived it at least - blending with anti-colonial rhetoric in a rant against what had been, in essence, a private matter between adults. Again, *Cuadernos del Sur* was not the only middle-class journal at the time questioning the impact of birth control on society.¹⁵¹ Yet it was the particular sense of being ill-treated by an "other" modernity that was the Opus Dei's emotional device, and the basis for a concrete call to legally and politically protect Latin America idiosyncratic spirituality.

Sexuality in and of itself concerned Ibáñez Langlois even more than the limitation of population growth. Unlike Urteaga, he treated the separation of sexuality from procreation not in theological terms but in psychological and sociological ones. Man's interference with sexuality is an "intervention in the metaphysical structure of the psyche," he argued, which led to "social and psychic mutations." By breaking the "biological laws that envelop their metaphysical origin," man is not freed from anything but becomes a "slave" to the "pressures of desire," was Ibáñez's intransigent stance. For him, even sexual liberation within wedlock was harmful. Or in his words: "what is really unleashes, is not love but pleasure - a sexual energy liberated from responsibility,

¹⁵⁰ José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, "El pronunciamiento católico sobre la natalidad," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 50 (September 1968): 786.

¹⁵¹ As historian Isabella Cosse has shown in her groundbreaking research, the 1960s "discrete" sexual revolution in Argentina was met by various forms of resistance, not only from the Catholic sectors of society, see - Isabella Cosse, *Pareja, sexualidad y familia en los años sesenta: una revolución discreta en Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2010); see also - Isabella Cosse, "Cultura y sexualidad en la Argentina de los sesenta: usos y resignificaciones de la experiencia transnacional," *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y El Caribe*, vol. 17, no. 1 (February 12, 2014); Valeria Manzano, *The Age of Youth in Argentina: Politics, Culture, and Sexuality from Perón to Videla* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014).

which revolves around itself in a closed circle of delight and leads to selfishness.”¹⁵² This pointless sexuality, he implied, could cause immense confusion and, subsequently, homosexuality.¹⁵³ Again, these were not surprising words coming for a Catholic priest. What was extraordinary were Ibáñez’s conclusions: that any misgivings regarding “demographic explosion” or “underdevelopment” should be ignored in the name of this alleged spiritual “economy.”¹⁵⁴ In confronting the 1960s sexual excess, the Opus Dei also proposed concrete strategies. Fernando Jacobelli, one of the first Opus Dei priests in Chile, suggested eliminating sexual education in schools, fostering instead “education for purity.” By accepting chastity, he suggested, one becomes a participant in a universal “total war.” In other words, for Jacobelli the Latin American youngster was nothing less than a crusader of the modern age, with his own body as the battlefield, and with “work” and “sacrifice” as his weapons.¹⁵⁵

As in Spain, *Cuadernos del Sur* familiarized its audience with young and ambitious female publicists, predominately from Chile, who rapidly took the lead in theorizing women’s role in the future modern and technological society. This evolving brand of Catholic feminism was to become identified with the intellectuals María Elena Aguirre (supernumerary), Elena Vial Correa (numerary), Lilian Calm (supernumerary), and Carmen Echeverría - herself a graduate of the Navarra school for journalism.¹⁵⁶ Ibáñez Langlois’s recruits, for the most part, these thinkers began their careers in *Cuadernos del Sur*, writing on issues concerning women, education, and the youth. In the case of María Elena Aguirre, her inspiration from *Telva* was blatant.¹⁵⁷ “This wonderful

¹⁵² José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “El pronunciamiento católico sobre la natalidad,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 50 (September 1968): 762.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 787-8.

¹⁵⁴ José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “Matrimonio y fecundidad,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 30-31 (January 1967): 37, 42.

¹⁵⁵ Fernando Jacobelli, “Sobre la educación sexual,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 24, (July 1966): 584.

¹⁵⁶ On the position of these women in the Opus Dei, see - Mönckeberg, *El imperio del Opus Dei en Chile*, 604, 644,

¹⁵⁷ María Elena Aguirre, “La mujer ante el problema de ser mujer,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 17 (December 1965): 1089.

women's age," she quoted the Spanish journal, meant that it was time for women to "raise their head from their pots, and stick their nose out of the house." From this ostensibly "feminist" point of departure, Aguirre's continued to exclaim that women must "reclaim the work of the housewife." To put it succinctly, these Opus Dei feminists believed woman must be able to choose and then freely opt for the household as their social epicenter. "First, your home, your husband, your children. But 'first' does not mean 'only,'" Aguirre clarified. What she meant was that women could be "interesting" without becoming men; rather than being like a "beautiful Cadillac without gasoline," women could read the news, have a "hobby," and ultimately become vivid social actors.¹⁵⁸ "Margaret Sanger announced the birth of a new age with the entry of women into the social nucleus," said Aguirre elsewhere, and immediately chided the British thinker's feminist theories:

None of this has happened, because women made it impossible when trying to seize all the professions and jobs men. Against their nature, they worked as men and lost the battle. It is time for women to realize that there are hundreds of small unknown jobs for them to discover.¹⁵⁹

These texts reveal, for one, how seamlessly the ideology produced in Madrid inspired writers in Chile. As importantly, Aguirre's texts indicate that she was answering directly to what she believed was the intrusive western feminist ideology. To be sure, Aguirre supported women's right to social agency and, overall, praised the "economic value" of their work. Still, in the Opus Dei's feminism women were given the free choice to agree to a strictly patriarchal order of things.

Elena Vial Correa "Reforma educacional chilena," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 21 (April 1966): 270-73; Lilian Calm, "Indira Gandhi," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 22 (May 1966): 363-65;

¹⁵⁸ Elena Aguirre, "La mujer ante el problema de ser mujer", 1089.

¹⁵⁹ María Elena Aguirre, "Funciones sociales de la mujer actual," *Cuadernos del Sur* no. 28 (November 1966): 969-73.

Aguirre and her colleges had even more to say on the youth and its cultural and moral inclinations.¹⁶⁰ While the Opus Dei pedagogues discussed spiritual education of “liberty” within order, Aguirre, Vial Correa, and Calm led an aggressive exhortation against the 1960s youth culture, as can clearly be seen in the following report:¹⁶¹

It is Saturday midnight [...] tiny miniskirts in purple, green, orange [...] Boys dressed in same colors but wearing pants. Long, sloppy hair. [...] A different youth, scandalizing, walks on Providencia Avenue on Saturdays to shop, walk, and show off. [...] they have no other rebellion to learn from the magazines, the TV, the movies, the tapes used on Carnaby Street. In that mass of youngsters dancing there is no age, no difference between one and the other, no gender. [...] youth of abundance [...] of boredom, of dullness, of nothingness.¹⁶²

Evidently, multiple factors brought Aguirre to a state of outrage. The feminization of men, nihilism, and irreverence, were, for her, even more bothersome than the prospects of the Chilean youth leaning towards ideological rebelliousness.¹⁶³

In summation, *Cuadernos del Sur* was a journal that catered to conservative elites and middle-classes, rebuking both parliamentary democracies and the various ills of 1960s culture. The Opus Dei ideologues truly believed that they were at the verge of “total war” against the most disastrous forms of excess, and were ready to act in order to defend the spiritual “health” of their national communities. Furthermore, *Cuadernos del Sur* was clearly more than a propaganda tool; rather, in the mid-1960s this was Argentina’s second major post-fascist think-tank, designed to articulate an authoritarian state-ideology in the broadest sense of the word. Once in power, Juan Carlos Onganía hence turned to the alleged expertise of these very intellectuals when forming his regime of development.

¹⁶⁰ After all, she was not the only one. As the case of Constance Mary Whitehouse in the United Kingdom indicates, in the 1960s moral campaigns in the name of Christianity were often led by women figures, see - Mary Whitehouse, *Cleaning-up TV: From Protest to Participation* (London: Blandford, 1967).

¹⁶¹ Luis Fernandez-Cuervo, “Al nirvana por la droga,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 26 (October 1966): 841-49.

¹⁶² María Elena Aguirre, “La juventud de la abundancia,” *Cuadernos del Sur* no. 38 (September 1967): 713-16.

¹⁶³ Other such reports appeared on *Cuadernos del Sur* regularly, see for instance: Ana María Aguirre, ¿“Adonde van los Teenagers?” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 39 (October 1967): 803.

The tenure of José María Guido and Artur Illia, and the groundwork for Onganía's regime (1963-1966)

Following the Azul-Colorado confrontation of April 1963, Argentina's de-facto center of power moved decidedly to the Azules headquarters. José María Guido (UCRI), once Frondizi's deputy and the pragmatic interim Prime Minister, was to lead a delicate transitional phase under the eerie eye of the so-called "legalist" generals Juan Carlos Onganía, Julio Alsogaray, and Alejandro Agustín Lanusse. Guido's official declaration of purpose tellingly stated that "an attempt had been made to make Peronism disappear through the absorption of its supporters into different political parties" and that "this original sin destroyed the possibility that the resumption of institutional life would be authentic."¹⁶⁴ Hereafter, restructuring yet another political system purged from Peronism would mean ever more restrictions on Argentina's democratic process.¹⁶⁵

A reluctant president, Guido appeased the Azules with several gestures. To start with, like Frondizi, Guido approached Francisco Franco via a personal letter spotted with flattery. "The essence of Argentine nationality finds its spiritual, cultural, and historical roots in the Mother Nation, Spain" he told the Caudillo. Franco's answer was also expressive: "Your words [...] has made me emotional," it said.¹⁶⁶ Despite ongoing disputes over Spain's alleged debt to Argentina, going back to the Franco-Perón treaties, the relationship between Francoism and the UCRI politicians was, by now, warm as ever. Additionally, Guido's administration provided the Ateneo with a valuable opportunity to put its "knowledge" to practice. This goes for Education Minister José Mariano Astigueta, and foreign minister Bonifacio del Carril - an ICH collaborator and a

¹⁶⁴ "Declaración política del gobierno nacional," May 19, 1962. AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 96.

¹⁶⁵ These events have been fairly well documented in Potash's book *The Army & Politics in Argentina*, as well as in monographs such as: Altamirano, *Bajo el signo de las masas (1943-1973)* and Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966*.

¹⁶⁶ The pretext was the Spanish-Argentine economic negotiations, regarding the dispute over Spain's alleged debt to Argentina. This message was carried by Luis Otero, the head of the Argentine Nacional Bank, see - "Información," May 24, 1963, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 97.

“passionate hispanista” -¹⁶⁷ who publicly rejected Argentina’s return to democracy. In Astigueta’s case, the ideological differences between him and Guido ultimately led to the former’s dismissal. “You do not seem to share [my] way of directing this process, and even express what seems as a lack of positive conduct leading to a deterioration of the electoral process,” Guido wrote Astigueta angrily.¹⁶⁸ A somewhat more successful promotion was that of Costa Méndez. Guido’s ambassador in Chile, his entry into Argentina’s diplomatic arena was symptomatic of the Ateneo’s growing prestige and its ties with the Azules generals.

Despite efforts to persuade Onganía to partake in Argentina’s 1963 elections, he rejected the offer not believing that he could assemble a coalition large enough to overcome both Peronists and the Radicals.¹⁶⁹ In April 1963, Perón granted his support to candidate Vicente Solano López thereby making the election of Onganía virtually impossible. With the formal prohibition of the latter’s candidacy and the Peronist voters casting blanc votes, subsequently the UCRP’s candidate, Arturo Umberto Illia, won the October 12, 1963 elections with only twenty-five percent of the popular vote. Illia, a physician from Córdoba province, was neither unfit politically, nor did he lead Argentina into a colossal economic crisis, as many Argentine’s still believe today.¹⁷⁰ His misfortune was primarily ideological: he was trapped between the power-craving Peronists on one side, and ever-more authoritarian conservatives on the other, both voicing the fantasy of overtaking Argentina’s political system. That is to say, the image of Illia’s impotence, as the antithesis of the

¹⁶⁷ In the words of the Argentine ambassador in Madrid, see - “Monumento iconográfica de la República Argentina,” March 29, 1965, AMAEC, Embajada en Madrid II, caja 108.

¹⁶⁸ “Texto de la carta enviada por el presidente de la nación al Dr. José Mariano Astigueta”, June 25, 1963, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 97.

¹⁶⁹ Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina*, 76-81.

¹⁷⁰ If anything, the opposite is the case: his tenure was generally characterized by a tenuous economic growth and elevation in life quality, see - Rodolfo Pandolfi and Emilio Gibaja, *La democracia derrotada: Arturo Illia y su época* (Buenos Aires: Lumiere, 2008), 1-12.

“strong leader” Argentina needed, was pure fiction, originating from the Peronists and authoritarian elites.¹⁷¹

Between 1964 and 1966 a prevailing narrative thereby appeared in the Argentine public sphere wherein Argentina was on the verge of being “left behind” in the global modernization race.¹⁷² As Díaz Colodrero put it, “countries that do not commit to rapid transformation ultimately become mere satellites of the big world powers.”¹⁷³ Or as Onganía’s future Economy Minister Adelbert Kreiger Vasena further explained it, Argentina could have easily been “a rich country, one of the most important in the New World,” but “fell aback” after 1945.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, by 1966, Kreiger Vasena contended, “there was a sensation of a huge frustration [...] in all sectors of society” so that when democracy vanished in 1966 “nobody shed a tear.”¹⁷⁵ The narratives of Argentina’s so-called “frustration” were perhaps not entirely new; still, tellingly this peculiar sense of paranoia - of lagging behind and being “enslaved” - would be a central feature in Onganía’s own rhetoric.

If the ousting of Frondizi threw Argentina into more than a year of political uncertainty, then Illia’s victory in the July 1963 elections represented, for many, a breakdown of the Argentine democracy’s very legitimacy. Naturally, the Peronists were vastly responsible for this state of affairs. And yet, as Guillermo O’Donnell also admitted later, “the crisis that preceded the 1966

¹⁷¹ In the words of Onganía’s minister Dardo Pérez Guilhou, Illia was perhaps “a good man,” but under his rule “the country was a farce,” see - Dardo Pérez Guilhou oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1984, Robert A. Potash Papers, UMass Amherst University Archives, 6-7.

¹⁷² For O’Donnell “the paternalists, advocates of ‘order,’ ‘authority’ and depoliticization, wore a modern stripe in their fascination with *tecnicos*”, see - O’Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, 55.

¹⁷³ *Dos políticas, dos argentinas: palabras pronunciadas por el Secretario de Gobierno de la Nación, Dr. Mario Díaz Colodrero por la red de radio y televisión el 15 de marzo 1968* (Buenos Aires: Secretaría de Estado de Gobierno, 1968).

¹⁷⁴ Adelbert Kreiger Vasena oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1984, Robert A. Potash Papers, UMass Amherst University Archives, 27.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 35.

Argentine Bureaucratic Authoritarianism was quite mild [...] if by no means insignificant.”¹⁷⁶ The crisis O’Donnell described was, too, essentially ideological and concerned the discrepancy between the Argentines’ actual material condition, and *what they thought it should be* under stronger leadership. Unlike Frondizi, Illia owed nothing to Perón, and on the face of it, respected the Azules by maintaining Onganía as his Chief of Staff. Illia also rolled back some of Frondizi’s legislation in the oil industry, hence acquiring a more “nationalist” image in the public eye.¹⁷⁷ This notwithstanding, throughout 1964 Illia’s government tumbled from one crisis to another, destabilized by the Peronists, nacionalistas, and Frondizists.¹⁷⁸

The further the popularity of Illia waned, the more Juan Carlos Onganía appeared as Argentina’s chief statesman. A person who wanted to talk about issues “of power,” reflected Díaz Colodrero later, “wasted time not speaking with Onganía.”¹⁷⁹ Not only did the fifty-year-old General not bother denying his influence over the political establishment, but he refused to pledge allegiance to his President. On August 6, 1964, in a speech at West Point before Latin America’s heads of armies, Onganía proclaimed that his army will be loyal to “the Constitution and the laws” and “never to political parties who could circumstantially hold power.” Indeed, by pledging to defend Argentina from “exotic ideologies” Onganía further established himself and the Armed Forces as agents of realism and economic progress.¹⁸⁰

This message was commensurate with the ideological climate emerging by this time amongst members of the Argentine media, who despite being “liberal” in their own minds, did not conceal

¹⁷⁶ O’Donnell participated actively in Onganía’s regime as he himself explains in his writings, see - O’Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, 28.

¹⁷⁷ His decrees 744/63 - 745/63, issued on November 15, 1963, nullified the contracts with international oil corporations.

¹⁷⁸ This process has been well accounted for, see for instance - César Tcach Abad, *Arturo Illia: un sueño breve: el rol del Peronismo y de los estados unidos en el golpe militar de 1966* (Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2006).

¹⁷⁹ Mario Díaz Colodrero oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1986, Robert A. Potash Papers, UMass Amherst University Archives, 4.

¹⁸⁰ “Sin ninguna fe en el gobierno,” *Primera Plana* (June 22, 1965): 12.

their fascination with authoritarian hiatuses. Within the panoply of these figures, the striking example is that of Mariano Grondona. An eccentric *La Nación* columnist, and later the key columnist of the immensely significant magazine *Primera Plana*, Grondona was an anti-Peronist and avidly supported Frondizi in the early 1960s. He had also studied at the IEP in Madrid and was a friend of Mario Amadeo's circle. This is not to say that Grondona was a traditionalist or a Franco sympathizer; it does mean, however, that he could be fairly ambivalent when debating the legitimacy of parliamentary systems. His concept of the "political" revealed both contempt to mass politics and adoration of elite-oriented action. "Primera Plana was born as a joint idea between Timerman and the members of the Azules [...] Timerman had been Frondzista, [...] an Azul, and very anti-Ilia," he maintained in later years.¹⁸¹ Evidently, ideology mixed with personal intrigues flared the political climate that preceded Onganía takeover. Grondona's role in preparing the Argentines for their authoritarian future was considerable. After serving as Deputy Minister of the Interior under Guido - where he sought "the return of the constitution and the incorporation of Peronism"¹⁸² - by October 1963 his opinion changed radically. "One said to himself, is this country going to wallow in this terrible mediocrity?"¹⁸³ he tried to justify his actions later. For him, Onganía, who he knew was "greatly influenced by the Cursillos de la Cristiandad," was the country's "last reserve." In later years he further confessed that "everyone, myself included, contributed to creating a kind of myth with Onganía. [...] this attitude was almost childish, as if he were a father who would solve all our problems."¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Mariano Grondona oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1986, Robert A. Potash Papers, UMass Amherst University Archives, 33.

¹⁸² Believing the "Peronist citizen had to vote for someone who was not a Peronist candidate," *ibid*, 9.

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, 36.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 19.

Bernardo Neustadt was another example of a journalist captivated by the notion of authoritarian leadership. Perhaps Argentina's most famous television host and publicists of the time, in the 1960s he directed the magazine *Todo*, from where he frequently juxtaposed the efficiency of the military with "the political parties."¹⁸⁵ Next, appeared the magazine *Confirmado*, which fiercely attacked Illia's supposed political ineptitude. The aforementioned ICH fellow Mariano Montemayor was one of *Confirmado*'s more prominent columnists, and could be seen here implying that Argentina is ready to "cross the Rubicon, leaving behind its fictitious legitimacies and incompetent management."¹⁸⁶ In the same mold, *Confirmado* occasionally complimented Franco's Spain economic achievements.¹⁸⁷ The anti-democratic sentiments in *Primera Plana*, *Todo* and *Confirmado* are noteworthy since these were journals that by stylistically copying the *Newsweek* model, and by presenting a cunning non-ideological image, appealed to much broader middle-class audiences than, say, the nacionalista platforms.

As for Onganía, some of his followers have argued that he conspired to take over the state as early as 1963. The primary challenge, as he saw it in 1963-64, was preventing the return of Peronism, "without being gorilas," recalled Costa Méndez.¹⁸⁸ And yet, even Onganía understood that there was still much work to be done before he could take over the state apparatus legitimately and without repercussions. More than anything, Onganía knew he needed to present the public with a swift and effective economic and ideological program. He also believed he needed to attain

¹⁸⁵ See for example - Bernardo Neustadt, "Proceso a la duda," *Todo*, no. 8 (November 19, 1964): 4; "Las armas y los votos," *Todo*, no. 19, (February 11, 1965): 2; Bernardo Neustadt, "Ref.: un hurto al país." *Todo*, no. 19, (February 11, 1965): 3; Bernardo Neustadt. "Ref.: ¿analfabetos políticos?" *Todo*, no. 23. (March 11, 1965): 1.

¹⁸⁶ Mariano Montemayor, "Al: el señor presidente," *Confirmado*, no. 26 (October 23, 1965): 5.

¹⁸⁷ Thus aligning with *La Nación* and other traditionalist platforms, see for example – Julian Marías, "Meditaciones sobre la sociedad española: planificación y libertad," *La Nación* (January 30, 1966/February 20, 1966); "España: ¿una nueva potencia?" *Confirmado*, no.78 (December 1966): 36-38.

¹⁸⁸ Onganía was friendly with the Ateneo at least from 1963 when he encountered Costa Méndez while the latter was the ambassador in Chile. Apparently, already then, he said to him that the y must prepare "for our cause," see - Nicanor Costa Méndez oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1986, Robert A. Potash Papers, UMass Amherst University Archives, 6.

international prestige and backing. His visits to the USA, Japan, China, and Europe in 1965 aimed to achieve just that. Apparently, even before taking off, he ordered General Alejandro Lanusse to begin contacting and mobilizing civilians in the eventuality that the government would fall.¹⁸⁹

Onganía opened his European tour with a week-long visit to Franco's Spain. On July 13, 1965, he arrived in Madrid, apparently for the second time in his life.¹⁹⁰ There, he encountered several of the regime's highest figures, most importantly Franco's vice-president Agustín Muñoz Grandes. The commander of Franco's Blue Division during the Second World War, and a neo-fascist in the present, Muñoz Grandes clearly impressed Onganía. "Spain," the latter told his host candidly, "is the essence of Argentina's interior and exterior politics."¹⁹¹ Significantly, Onganía made the same type of declarations to the Spanish press. "An authentic Argentineness," he said prior to his arrival, is "inconceivable without Spain's essence." He also confessed that his "entire spiritual formation is fundamentally Spanish" and that he would rather think of himself as having "Basque blood running through the veins [rather than Italian]."¹⁹² In turn, Onganía demanded that the Argentine, Spanish, and Brazilian Armed Forces form a pact to defend "the unity that exists between the spirits of their people."¹⁹³ Identifying himself with Hispanic values and anti-communistic action was, in 1965, Onganía's simple but effective public relations strategy.

These international activities fascinated the Argentine press. *Primera Plana* reported that in a press conference, held at the War Secretariat on August 31, 1965, Onganía remarked that he "found in Spain and Brazil, anxiety identical to ours" and pledged that their armies will make the

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, 8-9.

¹⁹⁰ From what we know, during his visit he was accommodated mostly by military personnel - Defense Minister Camilo Menéndez Tolosa, Chief of staff Rafael Cabanillas Prósper, for instance, see - "El general Onganía en Madrid," *ABC Sevilla* (July 14, 1965).

¹⁹¹ "Audiencia precedida por el presidente de la Nación Argentina, General Onganía y el comisario del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, don Laureano López Rodó," August 19, 1966, AGUN, documento 005/397/22.

¹⁹² *ABC Sevilla* (July 11, 1965).

¹⁹³ *ABC Madrid* (September 2, 1965).

“necessary bonds, in order to safeguard [...] the unity existing in the spirit of our nations.” The Argentine Army, Onganía said, “is open for this major bonding,” as a part of an alleged “assemblage of forces to oppose communism.”¹⁹⁴ It is not clear whether Onganía really believed that Argentina is facing a communistic revolution. Even so, it is obvious that he saw in Franco’s Spain and the newly-born Brazilian dictatorship his immediate allies. While *Primera Plana* and *Confirmado* deconstructed the image of Illia, *La Nación* and *Cuadernos del Sur* further established Onganía’s image as an “austere and lonely strong Basque.” Referring to *La Nación*’s depiction, Antonio Brusa highlighted the General’s moral high ground. Onganía could have “taken power by force at any point,” he said, but instead decided to retire, and was thus the utmost Argentine leader.¹⁹⁵ For *Primera Plana*, this diplomacy meant there were now “two Ongánias:” the “Azul strategist” and the “Latin American strategist,” who upon meeting General Costa e Silva in Brazil, “consolidated a political-military front between Argentina and Brazil.”¹⁹⁶ For Grondona, these deeds meant Onganía had turned himself into an independent leader: “Who rules then in Argentina? And, even more, who is going to rule it over the next few years? Because the country resembles a body with two heads,” he wrote.¹⁹⁷

Onganía’s retirement from the Military on November 22, 1965, did not produce any major political shock, however. The reasons for his leaving have been well documented over the years and stemmed from Illia’s irritation of his disobedient General.¹⁹⁸ Immediately thereafter, Onganía began designing contingency plans for his future regime. By the end of 1965 and early 1966, his

¹⁹⁴ “Un nuevo Onganía,” *Primera Plana* (September 21, 1965): 10.

¹⁹⁵ Antonio Brusa, “Onganía: el hombre y su circunstancia,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 18 (January 1966): 30-33.

¹⁹⁶ *Primera Plana* (September 21, 1965).

¹⁹⁷ Mariano Grondona, “Quién manda,” *Primera Plana* (September 7, 1965), 7.

¹⁹⁸ “The President’s selection of Brigadier General Eduardo Castro Sánchez, the current Undersecretary, to be the new Secretary of the Army, was followed immediately by General Onganía’s announcement that he was retiring from his post, a sequence of events that many observers then and later have viewed as cause and effect,” see - Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina*, 151.

own home had become the center of recurrent consultations. The content of these meeting is a matter for much speculation. We can say for a fact that Onganía was probing the most consistent and coherent ideological actors in the Argentine right-wing intellectual world. “These were not strictly conspiratory meetings, but a gathering of people who understood that the situation was already unsustainable,” remembered Díaz Colodrero.¹⁹⁹ Conspiratory or not, the more concrete meetings took place in the first months of 1966 and were dominated by the Ateneo de la República.²⁰⁰

In essence, Onganía aimed to recruit two teams. Aided by General Julio Alsogaray, he first went in search for a person in the business sector who could design an economic “take-off,” and who was likewise spiritually trustworthy. Through General Señorans, and his own membership at the Cursillos de la Cristiandad, Onganía came to choose the relatively anonymous businessman Nestor Salimei.²⁰¹ Señorans was, according to some, active in the Opus Dei and the Cursillos - possibly both.²⁰² To design his social policies, Onganía’s chose a team comprising mainly of Ateneo members. In January 1965, he met with Mario Amadeo and Nicanor Costa Méndez, a seminal encounter where the actual content of the new regime was debated. “I think some Catholic groups had influence on him [...] at that time I considered the Ateneo group as the direct influence on Onganía” said Costa Méndez, then the Ateneo’s chairman. “Mario Amadeo was the person who spoke,” he recalled, and was the one promoting the idea “that a coup was necessary,” and that this government “of mediocracies” should be replaced by “capable men.”²⁰³ Costa Méndez’s memory

¹⁹⁹ Mario Díaz Colodrero oral history with Robert A. Potash, 7.

²⁰⁰ Nicanor Costa Méndez oral history with Robert A. Potash, 3.

²⁰¹ Señorans “who was very good friend of Onganía, respected by Onganía, one of the very few who used to tutored himself with Onganía and that was Salimei’s partner [...] Señorans was the staunch Catholic [...] he brought Onganía in the Cursillistas,” see - Nicanor Costa Méndez oral history with Robert A. Potash, 2.

²⁰² Paul Lewis, “The Right and Military Rule, 1955-1983,” in McGee Deutsch and Dolkart, *The Argentine Right*, 164-65.

²⁰³ Nicanor Costa Méndez oral history with Robert A. Potash, 9-10.

matches what Amadeo wrote Sánchez Bella at the time. “I believe that the Ateneo can fulfill a great role of nucleation and of civil orientation in the uncertain times that are coming,” he told his friend, and elaborated:

I personally am not a ‘golpista’ and I contemplate cautiously [...] any use of force because it is difficult to predict the course of events that such a scenario would take. But not wanting something does not mean refusing to see the facts, which clearly indicate that the Argentine crisis does not have a solution within the framework of the current formats. Juan Carlos surely spoke to you about it during his recent trip to Rome.²⁰⁴

Seemingly, a meeting even took place between Sánchez Bella and Onganía during his summer 1965 visit to Rome - an encounter of which we know nothing more.

In short, when designing his future state ideology, Onganía sought the faculty of various types of “spiritualized” members of Argentina’s elite, almost solely from the post-fascist ideological strata, while completely eschewing neo-fascist revolutionary nacionalistas of any type. Whenever considering previous authoritarian models, Onganía’s inclinations were clear to his followers. “Onganía’s ideal was Franco, but he realized quite well that Argentina was not Spain and that Franco was anachronistic,” said Costa Méndez.²⁰⁵ Indeed, despite being inspired by the Spanish state model, Onganía’s regime was to be consciously a more updated brand of Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism. By June 1966 Onganía’s dictatorship was ready on paper. Soon thereafter, his Azules companions were to grant him the “presidency,” launching Argentina’s seven-year-long authoritarian experiment.

²⁰⁴ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, December 30, 1965, AGUN, caja 15/35/260.

²⁰⁵ Nicanor Costa Méndez oral history with Robert A. Potash, 14, 25-26; That Onganía “wanted to be Franco” was a customary recollection in his followers’ accounts, see for example - Mariano Grondona oral history with Potash, 8.

Conclusions

By June 1966, a decade of political struggle between the Peronists and the anti-Peronist had brought vast portions of Argentine political elite and middle-class to lose hope in their parliamentary system and willingly embrace alternative “solutions.” By convincing the Argentine public that democracy could easily be replaced with a modernizing authoritarian regime, the theorists debated in the pages above propagated, so they thought, a noble vision. Yet the *Ateneo de la República* and *Cuadernos del Sur* intellectuals envisaged not merely a brief period of economic and technological modernization. Rather, they thought they could at the same time change the mentalities of the Argentine population via distinctive spiritual guidance. In other words, stating that the 1960s Argentines merely suffered from an alleged “authoritarian mentality,”²⁰⁶ does not suffice entirely to explain the formation Onganía’s coalition. A generation of conservative men and women believed that unless they devised novel models of the state, their country would imminently become subjugated to foreign economic powers, or worse yet, be ruined by the intrusive forces of international communism and the 1960s western culture.

The second point to be taken from the texts and correspondences above is that in the early 1960s, Argentine fascism witnessed a distinctive split into two ideological schools, which, more often than not, relied on different mythologies and perceptions of the enemy. Whereas the neo-fascist nacionalistas became increasingly isolated within the realm of gangs and intransigent journals, a clearly more respectable technocratic-authoritarian milieu managed to bring its scheme for a post-ideological authoritarianism to the center of the public eye, and more crucially, to the Armed Forces’ attention. That the label nacionalista could not encapsulate both neo-fascist and

²⁰⁶ I am referring here again to the debate in the introduction on the word “authoritarian,” as it appears in the work of political scientist Juan Linz, see - Juan José Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 53-56.

post-fascist positions by now, was obvious. Nonetheless, and almost identically to the case of the Falange and the Opus Dei, these two groups shared a common denominator: the utmost commitment to replace parliamentary democracy - and the Peronist aberration it had allegedly bred - with a post-ideological spiritual “revolution.” By focusing on this technocratic-authoritarian coalition, this chapter has provided several clues as to their Francoist ties and sources of inspiration. This relationship was soon to unfold into a conspicuous dialogue between the Spanish and Argentine dictatorships, as the next chapter will further spell out.

Chapter 4: The “Argentine Revolution” as a State Ideology, and its Francoist Lineages

On June 28, 1966, Army General Pascual Pistarini, Air Force Brigadier Adolfo Álvarez, and Navy Admiral Benigno Varela, overthrew Arturo Illia in a bloodless *coup d'état*. Hours later they granted complete extra-constitutional powers to Juan Carlos Onganía, with no stipulations. Therefore, technically Onganía did not seize power militarily but was given the presidency from his colleges from the Azul Army, making this one of the more bizarre takeovers in Latin American Cold War history. It allowed Argentina's retired Chief of Staff to perform as a civic “President” who did not answer to neither to a Junta nor to a constitution. Still, Onganía's regime was, by all standards, a military dictatorship, and, one may add, one of the more ideologically sophisticated Argentina had witnessed up until this point.

While Onganía's non-lethal takeover of the state took inspiration from the Brazilian dictatorship of 1964, his state-ideology showed stark lines of continuation with the ideologies promoted in technocratic Spain at the time. This notwithstanding, deeming Onganía a forthright mimic of Francoism would be an exaggeration too. This chapter will underscore that despite its initial inspiration, the Argentine Revolution aspired to design its own unique technocratic-authoritarian regime model. Moving chronologically, I will explain how Onganía defined his regime as a post-ideological phase of economic modernization. Thereafter, I will examine how under the auspice of the Ateneo de la República and *Cuadernos del Sur* intellectuals, the regime sought to alter the subjectivity of the Argentine population, and further debate the nature of its relationship with Franco's technocrats. Last, the chapter will explain the contexts and reasons for the calamitous failure of Onganía's technocratic-authoritarian experiment.

The Argentine Revolution: defining the Hispanic technocratic-authoritarian foundation

From reading the mainstream Argentine press from the first days of Juan Carlos Onganía power grab one may induce that he led one the most popular regimes in Latin American. Whilst not pleased with military interventions as such, the newspapers' editorials could barely hide their spirit of optimism, in expectation for economic stagnation and Peronist ploys to be replaced with decisive executive action. *La Nación*, for instance, launched a series of purely technocratic editorials, justifying the dictatorship from an economic and technological point of view:

In merely fifty years, man's living conditions have changed so radically that the present world bears only a slight resemblance to that of 1920 [...] Today's political mentality [...] has very little connection to that of the immediate past [...] Science and technology have revolutionized our collective habits creating needs that no one could conceive in the first two decades of the century. [...] [they] force politics and the economy to go in different directions from those that have been there until recently.¹

Therefore, concluded *La nación*, Onganía "has a wide scope of action" to "rectify any process" within the political, social, and economic spheres, without constraining the labor unions.²

More supportive commentaries ensued. On August 5, 1966, the exiled Spanish philosopher Salvador de Madariaga published an open letter to Onganía in the daily *La Prensa*, in which he declared that the Hispanic character was not suitable for democracy. A liberal thinker, albeit evidently no big democrat, he stressed that the intervention of the Armed Forces in politics may be "indispensable" in certain cases. The new regime Madariaga portrayed was a third path of a new sort. "The employer's anarchy, or the workers' anarchy, will be replaced with a regime of authority," was the gist of his vision of this new revolutionary order "from above." With a new constitution and a system of "federation of federations," Onganía, he promised, could now "profoundly transform Argentine life" merely by recognizing the "demand of our time and

¹ "Exigencias de la vida actual," *La Nación* (July 1, 1966); see also - "Política educativa, para nuestro tiempo," *La Nación* (July 14, 1966).

² "Los objetivos del Gobierno," *La Nación* (July 16, 1966).

structure the economic life.” Thus, he thought, Onganía could rescue Argentina from the “vicious cycle in which it has been suffering for more than a generation.”³ Madariaga’s words exemplify even further the consensus amongst liberals that democracy in Argentina could be suspended for the sake of a modernizing leap forward.

In the first days of August 1966, Laureano López Rodó arrived in Buenos Aires, a visit that immediately disclosed the new regime’s ideologic inspiration. The meeting between the Argentine dictator and Franco’s chief technocrat began with López Rodó granting Onganía an edition of Spain’s 1964-69 Development Plan.⁴ López Rodó’s memorandum indicates the Onganía was full of pathos. After reminiscing his encounter with General Muñoz Grandes in Madrid, Onganía spoke of Spain’s role in Latin America: “Spain has compensated the leadership of the Spanish-American nations. I know that you do not want to be leaders, but simply sisters. [...] but the fact that once a daughter leaves her mother [...] does not mean that the mother leaves her daughters,” López Rodó reported him saying. Similarly, Onganía explained that “nations need more than just material progress. They require spirit to inspire them. Here they need Argentinidad. Spain must give this *spirit* its form.”⁵ López Rodó thanked his host “for the thrilling words” and immediately went on to express his enthusiasm to “discussed the various problems that affect economic cooperation between the two countries.” Yet Onganía could not stop praising the Spanish regime, as López Rodó’s hand-written minute continues to account:

[Onganía] mentioned his interest in the Spanish formula of the Economic and Social Development Plan. “Modifying the structures of the government,” he said “is relatively simple, but the participation of the community in the current situation in Argentina is very

³ Salvador de Madariaga, “Carta abierta al General-Presidente,” *La Presna* (August 5, 1966).

⁴ Onganía and López Rodó convened at the presence of Spanish ambassador José María Alfaro and Nicanor Costa Méndez. In an interview with the Argentine press López Rodó reflected that Onganía had been “so affectionate with Spain, he esteems our country so much, that I was really excited about this meeting”, see – “Declaraciones del ministro sin cartera del plan de desarrollo económico social de España Dr. Laureano López Rodó luego de su entrevista con el presidente de la nación,” August 19, 1966, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 101.

⁵ “Audiencia precedida por el presidente de la Nación Argentina, General Onganía y el comisario del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, don Laureano López Rodó,” August 19, 1966, AGUN, documento 005/397/22.

difficult. The political parties,” he continued “are absolutely artificial and their leaders, although in many cases they were unobjectionable people, live totally separated from reality.

At this point, Onganía even suggested sending senior officials to Spain to “study the Argentine problems with the Spanish experts.” The leaders concluded their meeting with debating an “anti-imperial” collaboration against the British occupation of Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands.⁶

The activities of López Rodó in Buenos Aires during these days are also noteworthy. For instance, he met with Argentina’s economic staff, led by Deputy Finance Minister Evaristo Piñón Filgueira and Alejandro Lanusse, the Minister of Transportation. López Rodó presented the two with “operation Pegaso,” which included immediate exportation of Spanish trucks to Argentina and their eventual production there. The Spanish minister also promised funds for the research of the “agricultural diversification” in Tucumán.⁷ The visit continued to include a television interview with Bernardo Neustadt, where López Rodó advocated “the economic liberalization and the consequent elimination of controls and obstacles in foreign trade.”⁸ Mario Amadeo, then Onganía’s newly appointed Ambassador to Brazil, commented that “Rodó’s presentation was extraordinarily brilliant [...] and made a great impression on everyone.”⁹

These events, went hand in hand with Onganía’s efforts to establish a symbolic nexus between Franco’s regime and his. The Argentine Revolution published several texts detailing its missions. While the so-called “Revolution Acts” were vague texts that said scarce little of the character of the new regime - pledging instead, for instance, the “consolidation of spiritual and

⁶ Ibid; López Rodó, in later years, recalled that “General Onganía seemed to me to be a man of little political talent. As the subject of Gibraltar and the Falklands came up, he asked his assistant to bring him a map to see where the Rock was,” see - López Rodó, *Memorias*, vol. II, 68-69.

⁷ Memorandum 227, August 31, 1966, AMREC, Embajada en Madrid II, caja 25.

⁸ “Otherwise, I said - the national industry will become a ‘junk museum’ (museo de chatarra)” see - López Rodó, *Memorias*, vol. II, 69.

⁹ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, August 27, 1966, AGUN, documento 035/262.

moral values and raising of [Argentina's] cultural, educational, scientific and technical levels”¹⁰ - the one concrete international policy declaration came on July 13, 1966 when Onganía published the text “National Government Policies” stating his objective to “strengthen Argentina’s traditional relations with the Mother Nation and with the other European nations that have nurtured the Western Christian culture.”¹¹

Next, on October 21, 1966, Onganía delivered a “personal letter” to Francisco Franco to be handed to him personally by his Education Minister, Carlos María Gelly y Obes - the only letter he wrote to foreign leaders in his first months in power that we know of. In less than three-hundred words Onganía defined his regime to Franco:

The Argentine Revolution has emphasized in its initial documents the singular value it attributes to the spiritual community with the Mother Nation, and its willingness to translate this appreciation into the concrete lines of its foreign policy, which will be characterized by a growing linkage with the countries that constitute the Hispanic American community, and with Spain, the key to that community. The trip of the Secretary of Culture and Education has as its object [to pronounce] the adhesion of my country to the Ibero-American Office of Education. We believe that this initiative will contribute to the orientation of our youth in line with the spiritual tradition that has guided the formation of our nation, and will contribute to the identity, values, and goals that are typical of our cultures. But I think that we should strive to constitute an increasingly richer relationship between Spain and Argentina also in other respects. The spiritual essence requires the support of economic and political means, [...]. I am convinced that Your Excellency will interpret the meaning of this message, dictated by the desire [...] that the substantive values that have given meaning to our national movements would translate into the effective action of our governments.¹²

Markedly, in his letter, Onganía barely asked Franco for anything concrete. In a sense, he explained his regime to Franco, and in so doing, to himself. Onganía wanted the Spanish dictator to know that he was a believer in the spiritual crux that is Hispanidad, and sought to define novel ways to

¹⁰ Of the three annexes of the “Revolution Act,” the most important was the third one. Titled “Political Objectives: The Revolution’s Aims,” and officially still signed by Pistarini, Varela, and Álvarez, it promised to “eliminate the root causes of the current economic crisis, achieve adequate labor relations; ensure social welfare and strengthen our spiritual tradition inspired by the ideals of freedom and dignity of the human person that are patrimony of Western and Christian civilization,” see - AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 101.

¹¹ “Políticas del Gobierno Nacional,” AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 101.

¹² “Información,” October 21, 1966, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 102.

merge this essence with tangible economic techniques. Yet since Onganía could not simply state that he identified with Francoism ideologically - after all, the letter was sent to the Argentine press - he declared his adherence to Franco's aforementioned OEI instead, for the sake of the "spiritual orientation" of the Argentine youth.¹³

Despite these suggestive words, from the outset, it was clear that Onganía had no intentions to imitate Franco. For one thing, he neither saw himself as a traditionalist autocrat *sensu stricto* nor established a cult of personality by referring to his authority as stemming from "Grace of God," as Franco had done in the past. As importantly, Onganía refrained from initiating a new constitutional process, but saw himself as a part of the "order within the law." Even years later he proclaimed that "it would have been easy for the Revolution to use force, to ignore the law and sweep away justice. But this was not our way."¹⁴ Hence, paradoxically Onganía was at the same time the writer of the law, and above it entirely, loyal only to his spiritual principles. On the one hand, he made no effort to pledge allegiance to the Constitutions of 1868 or 1949, dismissed the Supreme Court, outlawed political parties, and ousted the governors in the provinces. On the other hand, he refrained from officially declaring a State of Emergency, outlawing the unions, or purging the press. This was a part of a calculated move to give the public the impression that the "people" were not the regime's enemy but rather the political "elites." Again, in his own eyes, Onganía's was legitimate modernizer against a "fraudulent" democracy.¹⁵ In a country famous for its vibrant public arena, presenting himself as the guardian of the "free press" was an essential component in

¹³ We do not know whether Franco ever answered this letter. We do know however, that Franco's ministers were all aware of it, see page 219.

¹⁴ *Discurso pronunciado por el Señor Presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía en la comida de camaradería de las Fuerzas Armadas realizada el 6 de julio de 1967* (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, 1967).

¹⁵ Dardo Pérez Guilhou oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1984, 1-2

his theory of popular authoritarianism. “A constructive press,” Onganía declared, “helps the common man understand contemporary processes and contribute to world peace.”¹⁶

In his first months in office, Onganía defined his regime primarily in terms of efficiency. A response to the “debilitation” and “chronic frustration” plaguing Argentina, it was to be led, he said, by “a group of men willing to give the country the best of themselves, homogenous in their conception of national interest and outstanding for their intelligence and qualities.”¹⁷ Soon thereafter, however, he began describing the regime in more teleological anti-modern terms. Commemorating hundred-fifty years to Argentina’s Declaration of Independence, Onganía told his fellow generals that “a cycle of Argentine history has now reached its conclusion.”¹⁸ Traveling to Tucumán, on July 9, 1966, he further explained what the Argentine Revolution meant for him: a future of “political and social peace [...] so that a harmonious solidarity can be possible without subaltern divisions.”¹⁹

In the case of his regime, it was to become patently clear that the price of “social peace” was to include police brutality. In what came to be known as “night of the long batons” (*La noche de los bastones largos*), on July 29, 1966, the federal police stormed the University of Buenos Aires violently repressing protests against the regime’s decision to revoke academic freedom. While Gelly y Obes maintained in later years that this incident was, in fact, a haphazard instance of local “policing” getting out of control, there is little doubt that Onganía saw the universities as one of

¹⁶ “Discurso pronunciado por el Excmo. Señor Presidente de la Nación en la XIV comida anual de la asociación de la prensa extranjera,” August 18, 1967, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 104.

¹⁷ “Mensaje del presidente de la Nación, teniente general Juan Carlos Onganía al pueblo de la republica,” June 30, 1966, AGN, PN.SPD.pp, caja 100.

¹⁸ “Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la Nación teniente general Juan Carlos Onganía en la comida de la camaradería de las fuerzas armadas,” July, 6, 1966, AGN, PN.SPD.pp, caja 101.

¹⁹ “Discurso del presidente de la Nación pronunciado hoy en la casa de Tucumán,” June 9, 1966, AGN, PN.SPD.pp, caja 101; see also - “Onganía en Tucumán,” *Política Internacional*, no. 78 (August, 1966).

his regime's utmost ideological foes, and showed no sign of remorse over of this somewhat redundant use of violence and the international outcry that followed it.²⁰

In his "Directive for the Planning and Development of Government Action" of August 4, Onganía further illustrated the meanings of the "spiritual development" he had in store for the Argentine population. Here he vowed to purge the nation from both "erroneous individualism" and "dangerous ideological infiltration," and even revealed several of his own technocratic formulas. For example, like López Rodó, Onganía rebuked any form of "statism" that might "limit the creative spirit." In the future, he stressed, the Argentines could expect "integral rationalization" and "participation of the citizenship through the basic organizations of the community," all the while enjoying a substantial "spiritual development."²¹ Amadeo, too, was planning ahead: "We are in an extremely critical moment for the implementation of a democratic and representative system," he wrote Sánchez Bella, "based, not on political parties [...] but on natural institutions."²²

With the appointment of his cabinet of ministers, the ideological identity of the regime was further clarified. After appointing Nestor Salimei as Minister of the Economy, Onganía chose the moderated Catholic Dr. Enrique Martínez Paz for his Minister of the Interior and Gelly y Obes as Minister of Education. By committing to a particularly small government, Onganía thereby aimed to achieve maximal centralization of executive power. His next appointments were all Ateneo and ICH members. Costa Méndez became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Mazzinghi as his deputy minister. "Members of the Ateneo de la República continue to occupy important positions. Now they have appointed Minister of Interior to a disciple of mine - Mario Díaz Colodrero," wrote

²⁰ According to Gelly y Obes, "the intervention in the University of Buenos Aires [...] came undoubtedly from the local military commands." Still, Onganía's University law (16.912) was the official legitimation of this action, see - Carlos María Gelly y Obes oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1984, Robert A. Potash Papers, Special Collections University Archives UMass Amherst, 4; for more on this event and its repercussions see - Sergio Morero, *La noche de los bastones largos: 30 años después* (Buenos Aires: Editorial La Página, 1996).

²¹ "Conferencia de prensa," August 8, 1966, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 101.

²² Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Mario Amadeo, September 20, 1966, AGUN, documento 15/35/263.

Amadeo to Sánchez Bella, in excitement.²³ Amadeo was somewhat mistaken: Onganía appointed Díaz Colodrero Secretary of Government (Secretario de Estado de Gobierno). A seemingly less important sounding position, it was, in truth, crucial. Echoing López Rodó's title from 1957, Díaz Colodrero, an Opus Dei member too as we saw, was to be Argentina's invisible administrator, bringing together the different branches of the government towards effective development. "The philosophy was that the ministers are some sort of managers within their domain, but that executive power stayed is in the hands of the state secretaries," he explained later. In other words, the deputies of the social ministries were to operate in a coordinated manner under Díaz Colodrero supervision. Thus, in his words, "the State Secretariat was to take over everything that had to do with executive action from the Interior Ministry."²⁴ This concentration of executive power was to be fundamentally *anti-bureaucratic*, as its main objective was to deregulate the state, thus freeing Argentina from its alleged excessive red tape.

Onganía's government only fully stabilized, however, half a year later with a significant minister reshuffle. With little to show for from an economic standpoint, in January 1967 Onganía replaced Salimei with the more capable Adelbert Krieger Vasena. Moreover, he replaced his Education and Interior ministers with the Ateneo's own José Mariano Astigueta and Guillermo Borda, respectively.²⁵ For Amadeo, this action meant that Onganía finally fathomed the Ateneo's ideological cohesiveness. "Most of the new officials are personal or political companions of mine - Borda, Krieger, Medrano, Puigbo, [...] apart from Díaz Colodrero, Pearson, Mazzinghi, and

²³ "He knows you, even if you do not remember him, he was a fellow in your time. On the other hand, poor Goyeneche has not received any 'piece of the action,'" Amadeo wrote Sánchez Bella, indicating further that Onganía did not favor revolutionary nationalists such as Goyeneche, see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, November 1, 1966, AGUN, documento 15/35/264.

²⁴ In his exact words, "todo lo que es la faz de conducción ejecutiva," see - Mario Díaz Colodrero oral history with Robert A. Potash, 8.

²⁵ "Evidently ideologically I was not a useful person for the regime's future," Gelly y Obes said later, see - Carlos María Gelly y Obes oral history with Robert A. Potash, 54.

others who were before,” he wrote. “The revolutionary government, because of its political, social, and spiritual orientation, could not find a more suitable and coherent team in the civil sphere than ours,” he even told Sánchez Bella, and added:

Argentina suffers a spiritual - almost psychic - crisis which is manifested in a state of collective spirit of discontent, frustration, and a destructive attitude to every established thing. [...] Argentina is a country that has been stuck without collective energy, and through sacrifices that our people were not accustomed to bare. [...] this government - with a civilian list of the best that the country has to offer - has the essential conditions to fulfill its mission of order (*misión ordenadora*) which, if fulfilled properly, might take years to accomplish.²⁶

That is to say, now that the *Ateneo* and *Cuadernos del Sur* intellectuals were in charge, Amadeo saw the restoration of the Argentine society and spirit as imminent.

From this moment onward, Onganía’s administration was divided into two sectors: an economic team directed by the Krieger Vasena; and the “social” ministries in the hands of the spiritual technocrats. With General Señorans as Secretary of State Information (SIDE) and even *Cuadernos del Sur* editor Eugenio Brusa in a high-ranking position in the Ministry of Interior, the latter ministries were entirely the domain of the *Ateneo*, *Cursillios de Cristiandad*, and the *Opus Dei*. Whereas Krieger Vasena and his fellow economic “technicians”²⁷ labored to stimulate economic growth, the latter group was in charge of both deregulating the state and altering the “mentalities” of the Argentine citizens through spiritual guidance.

The “economic phase”: Krieger Vasena’s neoliberal economic reforms

Krieger Vasena’s previous affiliation with the *Ateneo* was an important factor for him being offered the position of Minister of Economy to begin with.²⁸ While not a zealous Catholic, he still

²⁶ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, January 28, 1967, AGUN, documento 15/35/266.

²⁷ According to O’Donnell, this was their nickname, see - O’Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, 55.

²⁸ I disagree with Paul Lewis, who has argued that Onganía chose the *Ateneo* “to balance Krieger Vasena’s influence.” If anything, it seems that Amadeo was involved in bringing Krieger Vasena into government in the first

adhered to the work of ultra-conservative ideologues such as Carlos Moyano Llerena - a neoliberal economist, a devoted Catholic, and coincidentally a *Cuadernos del Sur* commentator.²⁹ Inspired by the French and Spanish precedents, Krieger Vasena's neoliberal economic plan aimed to rapidly open the economy to foreign investment, primarily by curbing inflation and "putting the country into a state of mind of austerity."³⁰ The workers, Krieger Vasena believed, would willingly endure this period of economic "rationalization" for the sake of economic growth, better-paying jobs, and "modernized" manufacturing.³¹ Persuasion and harsh, albeit always "legal," anti-strike methods, Krieger Vasena said proudly, would save the Argentine economy from ruin, without "taking anybody prisoner and without casualties." If to ask Krieger Vasena, his plan worked brilliantly. As he himself stated years later:

For more than two years inflation fell to normal figures not seen in Argentina in decades; the budget was balanced, and so was the payment ratio. Foreign investment began pouring into the country [...] This was a miracle [...] the IMF was 'very pleased' (in English) with our balance and spoke of an "Argentine Model." [...] by the end of 1968 one could change Argentine pesos in Zurich or New York. It seemed like a miracle and the country lived in peace, there were no bombs, no state of emergency.³²

Even years later, Krieger Vasena still sounded surprised that despite such achievements so many in the Argentine society rebuked his economic policies. This was an ideological struggle he decided; Argentina's economic opening faced solely the unwarranted resistance of neo-fascist and

place, see - Paul Lewis, "The Right and Military Rule, 1955-1983" in McGee Deutsch and Dolkart, *The Argentine Right*, 163.

²⁹ "His thought was very influential on me. [...] he also offered me the collaboration of all his students from the faculty," Krieger Vasena admitted, see - Adelbert Krieger Vasena oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1984; Others on Onganía's economic team, for instance, the head of the Argentine National Bank Pedro Real, were also renown Ateneo members.

³⁰ As in France and Spain, his plan consisted of "one big devaluation" and thereafter, "leave it as is and not move anymore," thereby hoping for currency stabilization, see - *ibid*, 43; for more on these initial economic policies see William C. Smith, *Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 74-90.

³¹ This, at least, is how the Argentine financial press presented things then, see - "Pasos en el camino de la racionalización," *La Cronista Comercial* (February 10, 1968); "La racionalización y las expectativas," *La Cronista Comercial* (February 15, 1968).

³² Adelbert Krieger Vasena oral history with Robert A. Potash, 57-58.

post-fascist statist (or “corporatists”) elements in society, namely the Peronists and the nacionalistas. “Sánchez Sorondo [...] made a lot of noise,” he complained.³³

There is no question that from a narrow economic point of view Krieger Vasena’s policies were a success. Between 1967 and 1970 his reforms stabilized the Argentine currency, thereby producing a steady flow of foreign investment into the economy and a hike in the country’s GDP. That the Argentine workers paid the price for this reform, due to the devaluation of the peso, wage freeze, and unemployment, was a part of a calculated move to propel the country’s alleged modernization.³⁴ Yet by attributing any opposition to his policies to “ideological” groups, Krieger Vasena conveniently disregarded both the oppressive character of the regime and the dire social consequences of his own strategy. If Spain had its 1959 Stabilization Plan, then Krieger Vasena’s equivalent was the 1967 “Plan of Ordering and Transformation” - a phase that even Onganía admitted then comprised of “drastic solutions” and hit the lowest strata in society the most:

The economic recovery plan demands sacrifice from the humble sectors, especially those who have little economic power. You must understand, and I know you understand, that it is not an isolated and meaningless sacrifice. It is a sacrifice that hurts us and we would have wished we could have avoided it. But you cannot do distributive justice when there is nothing to be distributed [...].³⁵

Yet underpinning the justification for the allegedly temporary sacrifices of the working class was a far more ambitious vision than an immediate influx of foreign investment. In Borda’s words,

³³ “I believe Frondizi’s desarrollismo of was ultimately a political attitude, because my program had many similarities to his,” he said, in Adelbert Krieger Vasena oral history with Robert A. Potash 67; “The only ones to oppose my plan were desrollistas, nacionalistas, and Peronists [...] who all had political aspirations still,” Ibid, 70.

³⁴ For more on the economic transformations Argentina underwent throughout this period, see - Juan Carlos de Pablo, *La economía argentina en la segunda mitad del siglo XX* (Buenos Aires: La Ley, 2005); Aldo Ferrer, *La economía argentina: desde sus orígenes hasta principios del siglo XXI* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2004); Paul H. Lewis, *The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Geoffrey Maynard, “Argentina: Macroeconomic policy, 1966-1973,” in Guido Di Tella and Rudiger Dornbusch (eds.) *The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-83* (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), 166-89; see also - *Argentina Building for the Future; Economic Programme for 1968* (Buenos Aires: Ministry of Economy and Labour, 1968).

³⁵ *Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía, en el acto de clausura de la Primer a Junta de Gobernadores de la Patagonia* (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, 1967), 7.

ridding Argentina of “all that is expired,” was to make imminent the emergence of a “highly technified and complex society” and, in turn, Argentina’s motion from the “under-developed” to the “developed” world.³⁶ The concrete implications of this rhetoric were the elimination of all statist protectionism. As in 1959 Spain, the first measure of “stabilization” was abolishing economically “declining industries,” most infamously the sugar industry in Tucumán Province.³⁷ That is to say, to “rationalize” meant to expurgated any economic activity that did not immediately serve the GDP statistical criteria, by deeming it “anachronistic” and making it a symbol of failure.³⁸

For Onganía, “rationalization of the administration” also meant eliminating the “bureaucratic burden,” and “decentralization.” Akin to the nacionalista revisionist commonsense, he declared that the Argentine Revolution seeks “the authentic exercise of federalism.”³⁹ However, to achieve maximal administrative effectiveness, Díaz Colodrero simultaneously purported to coordinate an act of national “integration.” As in López Rodo’s plan, this meant a paradoxical method of centralized decision making, for the purpose of eradicating “unwanted” state regulations and services. “The decentralization of national services is one of the key aspects of the territorial integration policy assumed by the Argentine Revolution,” Díaz Colodrero stated.⁴⁰ Thereafter, tax-free “development poles” supported by a “territorial integration fund,” were to be the main stimulant for regional modernization. These poles, assured Díaz Colodrero elsewhere, will

³⁶ “Discurso pronunciado por el doctor Guillermo Bordaberry el 24 de Abril de 1968, ante la asociación de Prensa extranjera,” *Cinco discursos y una revolución* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Movimiento Humanista de Derecho, 1968).

³⁷ On the struggle of the sugar mills in Tucumán, see - Roberto Pucci, *Historia de la destrucción de una provincia: Tucumán, 1966* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Pago Chico, 2007); Silvia Nassif, “La lucha obrera en Tucumán: del ingenio Los Ralos a la fábrica Textil Escalada (1966-1973),” *Coordenadas: Revista de Historia Local y Regional*, vol. 3, no 1, (2016): 30-52.

³⁸ *Discurso pronunciado por el Señor presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía en la comida de camaradería de las Fuerzas Armadas realizada el 6 de julio de 1967* (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, 1967)

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ “Discurso pronunciado por el doctor Mario Díaz Colodrero el 16 de Mayo 1968 en la unión industrial Argentina,” in *Cinco discursos y una revolución*, 33-34.

“drastically correct the concerted growth distortion in the metropolitan area.”⁴¹ That Díaz Colodrero’s formulas echoed the Spanish development plans - with its “poles of growth” and “regionalization” - is fairly clear.⁴² In an interview to Spanish journalists in 1967, he even admitted that his administration had devised its development plan “taking into account the modules used by the Spanish development plan, especially the system of industrial promotion and development poles.” On this occasion, he also mentioned his visits to Spain and praised “the impressive Spanish industrial development of recent years.”⁴³

While theorizing Argentina’s development, Díaz Colodrero was one of the first officials to hint on the nature of the country’s political future, when in May 1967, *Primera Plana* featured him explaining his “political plan.” Despite vaguely mentioning an “electoral” process in the future, for now, he said, Argentina was in a status of “rest-cure” against its political “anachronisms.” This unique condition, he explained, was to allow “modernizing the country in a profound sense, making an example to the world with new, realist, revolutionary concepts.”⁴⁴ His formulas were analogous with the ones used in *Cuadernos del Sur*, now virtually the regime’s mouthpiece. Opus Dei theorist Adolfo Isoardi, stated here that the regime was not a simple coup “but something much deeper [...] that affects the institutional structure of the country.” Reflecting on *Cuadernos del Sur* - as noted before, Díaz Colodrero’s own journal - Isoardi assured his readers that insinuating that the Opus Dei is “intervening in the process of the Revolution” is based on “ignorance

⁴¹ *Dos políticas, dos argentinas*, 32.

⁴² For more on these plans see - Wolf Grabendorff, “Perspectivas y polos de desarrollo en América Latina,” *Estudios Internacionales*, vol. 13, no. 50 (1980): 252–78; Patricio Narodowski, *La Argentina pasiva: desarrollo, subjetividad, instituciones, más allá de la modernidad: el desarrollo visto desde el margen de una periferia, de un país dependiente* (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros Editorial, 2007); Martín Fiszbein, “Crecimiento desbalanceado y estructura productiva desequilibrada en Argentina (1945-1976): problemas e ideas del modelo industrial en retrospectiva,” *Estudios sobre la industria argentina* vol. 3, no. 3 (2013): 49.

⁴³ “Argentina necesita grandes contingentes de mano de obra latina y especialmente española,” *La Vanguardia* (June 14, 1967).

⁴⁴ “Gobierno: el plan político,” *Primera Plana*, no. 230 (May 23 1967): 12-13.

regarding this association.” Catholics like him, he said, merely partake in the “new order” believing it to promote a more just, prosperous, and “moral society.”⁴⁵ These words exemplify yet again how the Opus Dei operated as an intellectual apparatus: while denying collaborating with the regime, it theorized the latter’s guidelines and praised the militant Catholics who served it.

The Ateneo’s ideological backing of the regime was even more direct than this. As his correspondences indicate, by mid-1967 Amadeo believed he and his followers were the ideological understructure of the new order. “Although it is by no means the ‘power behind the throne,’” he said, the Ateneo “is fulfilling, under the direction of Maximo Etchecopar, a very fine cultural work and maintains quite well the cohesion of our group.”⁴⁶ Amadeo also maintained intimate contacts with Onganía, and openly discussed the unique role of the Ateneo within the regime. “We have come to a clear understanding of the role of our institution, on the basis of coinciding objectives [with the regime], that rigorously preserve our independence and freedom of action,” he told Sánchez Bella of these conversations.⁴⁷ In short, unlike Sánchez Sorondo’s powerless nacionalistas the Ateneo was the ideological group closest to Onganía. Tellingly, in March 1967 it even received the status of a “legal association.”⁴⁸

Unfortunately for Onganía, by then his regime gradually came under public criticism. While a new liberal magazine by the name of *Inédito* started labeling him a “fascist,”⁴⁹ ironically the nacionalista *Combate* and *Azul y Blanco* moved from support to harshly attacking Onganía, even leading Borda to close the latter for months.⁵⁰ Officially, the neo-fascist nacionalistas turned

⁴⁵ Adolfo Isoardi, “Los católicos y la Revolución Argentina,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 25 (August 1966): 665-69; see also - “Actualización legislativa,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 32 (March 1967): 127-32.

⁴⁶ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, July 14, 1967, AGUN, documento 15/35/269.

⁴⁷ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 22, 1970, AGUN, documento 15/35/291.

⁴⁸ Resolución 460/1967, *BOE (Argentina)*, no. 21139 (March 2, 1967).

⁴⁹ *Inédito* argued that Onganía plagiarized one of his speeches entirely from José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s texts, see - “Plagio?” *Inédito*, no. 11 (January 25, 1967): 2-3.

⁵⁰ “Si se va Onganía...” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 58 (October 23, 1967): 1; Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, November 2, 1967, AGUN, documento 15/35/271.

against the regime due to Onganía's liberalization of the economy and treaties with the IMF and the World Bank. In Amadeo's opinion, they did so out of sheer envy. The "hard-liners," he said, were a group of frustrated men, "less valid even than the traditional political parties."⁵¹ Be that as it may, after one year in power Onganía's future objectives were finally questioned upon most media platforms. With the unions still collaborating with the regime,⁵² and feeling self-confident given the first signs of economic growth, Onganía thus made public his general plan for the future. It comprised of a three-phase (or "tiempos") evolutionary process: "economic phase, social phase, political phase." The first "phase" was synonymous with Krieger Vasena's economic stabilization; the second one, with a profound "social" metamorphosis; and the third, with the advent of yet-to-be-decided original model of popular representation.

On July 6, 1967, Onganía gave a speech to his generals, this time ideologically unequivocal. While promising to "restore democracy in its true values" he also exclaimed that the "spiritual unity of the country" demands the "renunciation of a political generation." Strikingly, he even presented himself as a leader chosen by the people, when stating that "the whole citizenry had said: Enough! and thus, without violence, a worn-out order of things disappeared into history." Here, for the first time, Onganía alluded to his perception of the "political phase." Democracy, he said, "should not be confused with the mechanical act of voting nor with the political parties now dissolved." Indeed, he stressed, the "political phase" would consist of neither an "electoral plan" nor of a "party system," but of a new "concept of community" aimed solely to "efficiently" raise

⁵¹ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, July 14, 1967, AGUN, documento 15/35/269; By then, Juan Carlos Goyeneche, who had aligned with *Azul y Blanco* in the early 1960s, returned to Amadeo's camp, and even tried to get to position of power, thus leaving Sánchez Sorondo in solitude at the front of the ideological struggle against Onganía's regime.

⁵² There are several assessments as to why the Peronist unions chose to collaborate with Onganía's dictatorship in its first years, see - Darío Dawyd, "El nuevo autoritarismo burocrático y el sindicalismo peronista. Análisis de la 'participación' junto al gobierno militar de Onganía en la Argentina de los años sesenta," *Estudios Sociales*, vol. 30, no.1 (2006): 127-144; for a broader debate on the Peronist inner politics during the late 1960s see - McGuire, *Peronism without Perón: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina*.

the Argentines' living standards. In short, for Onganía, the "spiritual process of rebuilding the unity of the nation" meant that a new generation of Argentines would discover entirely novel ways to conduct politics through "community participation."⁵³

Argentina's technocratic state-ideology: the "social phase" and the "change of mentalities"

The precondition of political participation was, however, that the Argentines undergo a profound, if enigmatic, "social" transformation. As Guillermo Borda - a Peronist in the past, and Ateneo member in the present - put it: "we cannot settle for mere economic prosperity, because in its deep essences the Revolution is spiritualist, and has as supreme goals justice and solidarity."⁵⁴ Strikingly, the "social phase" represented a fantasy of dramatically changing the Argentine "mentalities," i.e. reconstructing the habitus of men, women, and youngsters, thereby making them not only more "spiritual," but also obedient, productive, and, in turn, "unified." There was, of course, a deterministic sociological thesis at work here: consumption alone, Onganía suggested, was bound to change the Argentine's mindsets. Even so, his ideologues held diverse ideas as to what this "change of mentalities" really entailed. For Borda, this meant actively altering public morality. Paternalistically protecting society of its own moral "decays" were the key motivation behind his new Civic Code (Law 17.711), setting new restriction on marriages and divorce.⁵⁵ For the Opus Dei, even this law was too liberal.⁵⁶ In turn, in 1968 Borda announced his "Cinema Law"

⁵³ *Discurso pronunciado por el Señor presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía en la comida de camaradería de las Fuerzas Armadas realizada el 6 de julio de 1967* (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, 1967).

⁵⁴ "Discurso pronunciado por el señor ministro del Interior Borda Dr. Guillermo A. Borda, III Reunión nacional de ministros de educación," *Reunión nacional de ministros de educación*, December 12-14, 1966.

⁵⁵ The code granted the last verdict on any divorce to a special "judicial decree" (Art. 66), i.e. Argentine couples could not divorce at will in 1968. The code also granted the right to "oppose the celebration of marriage due to established impediments" to "relatives of any of the future spouses within the second degree of consanguinity," as well as to the priest guardians (Art 21), meaning fathers could legally object to their daughter and son's matrimony, see - *BOE (Argentina)*, no. 21554 (November 4, 1968).

⁵⁶ Edmundo J. Carbone, "Divorcio por mutuo consentimiento," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 49 (August 1968): 666.

- the regime's assuaged method of cultural censorship.⁵⁷ "One thing is art," he said, "and the other is commerce with pornography."⁵⁸ Hence, despite hailing "free press" the regime regularly undermine expressions of thought in the name of public morality.

Still, the main effort to change the Argentine mentalities was to occur in the education system. Following the 1966 "night of the long batons," the regime continued generating "anti-communistic" initiatives. It began with Carlos Gelly y Obes's University Law, which drastically limited the universities autonomy.⁵⁹ As he himself put it, "the mistaken concept of autonomy, which transformed the university into a separate territory, segregated from the entire national life, has to be overcome."⁶⁰ In March 1967, the Argentine public learned that the regime decided to gradually shift from a mixed-schools to a gender-separated public-school system.⁶¹ Other reforms were the privatization of Argentina's higher education, which sought to transfer students from secular "ideological" public universities, to private and elite-oriented establishments. Throughout this period, Onganía and Astigueta laid bare their intentions to "spur awareness of duty in the citizens" through the alteration of their "conscience and habits of religious and moral life."⁶² In December 1966 Onganía exclaimed that he wanted to "correct the orientation of the Argentine behavior," or better - raise their "intellectual condition" as a source of "peace and social harmony."⁶³ Other members of his regime soon followed suit in describing the mental

⁵⁷ Law 17.741, "substantially modifies the regime of control sanctions in the cinematographic activity," by establishing government control of in the National Institute of Cinematography, in *BOE (Argentina)*, no. 21.550 (October 28, 1968)

⁵⁸ "Censuramos la censura," *Extra*, no. 43 (February 1969); also at http://www.bernardoneustadt.org/contenido_126.htm.

⁵⁹ "Ley Orgánica las Universidades Nacionales," *BOE (Argentina)* no. 17.345 (April 21, 1967).

⁶⁰ *Mensaje del Secretario de Estado de Cultura y Educación, Señor Carlos María Gelly y Obes, transmitido por radios y televisión con motivo de la sanción de la Ley Orgánica de las Universidades Nacionales, El 21 de Abril de 1967.*

⁶¹ "La lucha de las clases," *Primera Plana*, no. 219 (March 7, 1967): 46.

⁶² *Consudec*, no. 83 (January 2, 1967).

⁶³ "Discurso del Excmo. Señor presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía," December 12-14, 1966, *III Reunión nacional de ministros de educación* (Buenos Aires: Centro Nacional de Educación e Información Educativa), 21.

metamorphosis in store for the Argentine youth. “Our country,” said Gelly y Obes, was forming “a man conscious of his place in the world,” who sought, “physical perfection and improvement in the technical and economic [fields].” Following years of “anarchy” and “inefficiency,” now was the moment, he argued, to return to “Christian and Hispanic roots,” along with a “normative centralization and operational decentralization of the school system.”⁶⁴ Once again, the spiritual technocrat espoused ideological cohesion, while paradoxically demanding to liberalize society from the grip of the “centralized” state apparatus.

The most ambitious reform the regime orchestrated was its 1967 “education reform.” Titled the Organic Law of Education, it targeted Argentina’s century-old Law 1420 of Common Education, as well the youth’s rebellious tendencies, through a mixture of spiritual and technical methods. José Mariano Astigueta, as we know, was a key member of the Ateneo and ICH, and had intimate ties with Spain. Ever since his short tenure in Guido’s administration, he had been the propagator of an educational reform and the advocate of a mandatory Argentine “mentalities change.”⁶⁵ Following the January 1967 minster reshuffle, the education reform was to be his brainchild. In tandem with Díaz Colodrero’s rhetoric, Astigueta constantly advocated “administrative rationalization,” which, for him, meant the purification of any 19th century ideology from Argentina’s education system.⁶⁶ To the Argentine youth, Astigueta offered a simple ideological interpellation: “It is now imperative that man and especially the young man return to

⁶⁴ “Discurso del secretario del estado de cultura y educación, Prof. Carlos maria Gelly y Obes,” *ibid*, 21-23.

⁶⁵ His exact words were: “Esta es la meta que debe buscar la Revolución en la escuela argentina: la transformación de una mentalidad y de un sistema,” see - “Mensaje de Astigueta: Aboga por una transformación total de los métodos de enseñanza,” *El Mundo* (August 25, 1966).

⁶⁶ As far as Astigueta was concerned, the mission of public education was to only to serve “the most pressing requirements of the process of development, modernization, and social change,” see - “Texto del discurso pronunciado por el secretario del estado de cultura y educación, Dr. José Mariano Astigueta,” December 12-14, 1966, *III Reunión nacional de ministros de educación*, 94-95.

interiority,” he said.⁶⁷ At the regime’s first educational convention, he was even blunter about his aspirations. “We must teach the value of austerity, of manhood, which is the heritage of our ancestors,” he proclaimed.⁶⁸ Besides echoing the ethical principles of Hispanidad, Astigueta also often quoted Opus Dei theorists Millan Puelles and Víctor García Hoz, while theorizing his own notions of “bio-psychic and spiritual development.”⁶⁹ Man, he stressed, is a “substantive compound of body and spirit,” and therefore is “realized in fullness once he transcends towards God.”⁷⁰ It is telling that Argentina’s Education Minister could move from debating “rationalization” to pondering over the human spirit’s linkage to God. It was this ubiquitous hybrid language of “technique” and “spirituality” that was the crux of Onganía’s “social phase.”

Vague mysticism aside, Onganía’s educators addressed several concrete issues: Gender roles for instance. Juan Rafael Llerena Amadeo, Astigueta’s deputy and *Cuadernos del Sur* commentator, held a firm opinion on separated education for men and woman: “Essential equality between men and women does not mean functional sameness,” he said, and further explained:

An education [...] that does not mark this difference, would create perfectly interchangeable humans who, by assuming a functional identity, are the cause of the paralysis of the social process. It is necessary that the feminine potential remains intact: its contribution must be made by functioning in a differential and complementary character, starting from the qualities that make woman distinct from men. [...] The complexity of knowledge and self-discipline involved in home management make the role of the housewife an authentic profession, whose preparation is like that of any other profession [...] women can enrich science, technology, and the arts, especially when working in a team.⁷¹

⁶⁷ *Mensaje a la Juventud: Discurso pronunciado por el Secretario de Estado de Cultura y Educación, Dr. José Mariano Astigueta, durante el homenaje a los congresales de Tucumán. San Miguel de Tucumán, 8 de Julio de 1968* (Buenos Aires: Secretaría de Estado de Cultura y Educación, 1968).

⁶⁸ “Discurso del Señor presidente del Consejo Nacional de Educación, Dr. Mariano Astigueta,” *III Reunión nacional de ministros de educación*, 97.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 29.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 43.

⁷¹ Juan Rafael Llerena Amadeo, “Fin de la educación, objetivos del sistema y estructura,” *ibid*, 51.

A personal friend of García Hoz, Llerena Amadeo thus voiced stances that were not dissimilar to the Opus Dei's feminism. Women, he suggested, should be educated to celebrate their "difference" and "complementary character," either as housewives or assistants to men.

With the passing of Law 16,981 of October 14, 1966, Onganía's pedagogical point of reference officially shifted from collaboration with the Inter-American education institutions to a collaboration with the OEI.⁷² Carlos Gelly y Obes's speech at the OEI's Madrid headquarters clarified early on what this collaboration meant. "Argentina seeks the common good by focusing on the 'primacy of the spiritual,'" he opened. Then, he spoke of technocratic Spain:

Spain is once again our example. As an expression of a strong and prolific nation, it is reborn from its crises with new vigor and impulse. It is the trajectory of the ruling western countries, which, after moments of search or restlessness, take their ideal position in their own right. The spiritual cohesion of Spanish America is enhanced by having as a contemporary example the means of development performed by the Mother Nation.⁷³

It is interesting to note that despite praising the Spanish regime, Gelly y Obes did not refer to Hispanidad in particular, but to Spain's economic and social achievements. Replacing him in office, Astigueta too maintained intimate contacts with the OEI and even met with Villar Palasi and the OEI Board of Directors in Madrid.⁷⁴ Tellingly, in 1967 Argentina hosted the OEI's II Ibero-American Conference of Technical Education. It saw Astigueta lecturing on the need to "train technicians" for the benefit of development, and Onganía advocating an education system that would buttress both "spiritual and moral values" along with science and technology.⁷⁵

⁷² The OEI was involved in the Argentine "middle school" reform, implemented in the province of Buenos Aires until 1971. This program spent 5,120,000 US\$, on "educational materials," see - *OEI, balance de actividades 1964-68*, located at Biblioteca del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, Buenos Aires, OEI/SG/IMF.15 (February 17, 1969).

⁷³ "Incorporación de la Argentina en la OEI," *Plana*, no. 110 (October-November 1966).

⁷⁴ Financially, Argentina was to benefit little from its collaboration with OEI, see - Carta de Rodolfo Barón Castro a Cesar I. Urién, July 3, 1968, AMREC, Embajada en Madrid II, caja 37.

⁷⁵ *II Seminario Iberoamericano de enseñanzas técnicas*, OEI/II SIET/18, Buenos Aires, September 14, 1967, 2; also - "Segundo seminario iberoamericano de enseñanzas técnicas," *Consudec*, no. 101 (October 2, 1967): 3-10.

Astigueta's reform relied on the groundwork of several prominent Catholic pedagogues, identified with the elite association Superior Council of Catholic Education (CONSUDEC).⁷⁶ Featuring figures such as the abovementioned Mayochi and Van Gelderen, the reform commission also included Catholic educators such as Luis Jorge Zanotti, Gustavo Cirigliano, and the Opus Dei's own Marcos Ronchino. In the writings of these men, Argentina's universities appeared not as a place of critical thought but as an apparatus designed to educate technicians for the sake of rapid economic growth. Ronchino even suggested a "human resources policy" whereby each student "fulfills his social role according to development plans."⁷⁷ For him, "democratization" merely meant that the youth could choose freely how to serve the economy best.⁷⁸ Backing the University Law, the foregoing men consequently advised ridding Argentine from academic autonomy, thereby cleansing the campuses of those who allegedly "use the academic prestige for the benefit of ideologies."⁷⁹

Astigueta's think-tank ultimately appeared in a special *Cuadernos del Sur* issue, dedicated to the reform.⁸⁰ Víctor García Hoz, then the director of CSIC's Institute of Pedagogy, was given the honor of presenting an introductory message. Contemporary education, he maintained, "does not satisfy the needs of contemporary times" given that technology "accelerates the process of change," he said. Expectedly, his pedagogical overview soon developed into a spiritualist

⁷⁶ "If this Argentine Revolution is not able to banish secularism from the schools and will not facilitate the reunion of the Argentine people with their more authentic tradition, it will have betrayed its reason for being," declared *Consudec* columnist Benicio C. A. Villarreal, see - *Consudec*, no. 83 (January 1967).

⁷⁷ Marcos Ronchino, "La democratización de la enseñanza," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 34 (May 1967): 367.

⁷⁸ While proposing the familiar Opus Dei formulas of educational "democratization," he also advised strict "moral and religious upbringing," see - Marcos Ronchino, "La educación de los hijos," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 30-31, (January 1967): 76.

⁷⁹ Mariano L. Menéndez, "La nueva ley universitaria," *Cuadernos del Sur* no. 35 (June 1967): 422; also - Mariano L. Menéndez, "Universidad: política y autonomía," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 29 (December 1966): 30-31.

⁸⁰ Chilean Catholic thinkers such as Claudio Orrego Vicuña and Eduardo Infante Rengifo also appeared in this volume, see - Claudio Orrego Vicuña, "Educación y desarrollo político," 146-52; Eduardo Infante Rengifo, "Escuela y familia," 59-62.

exhortation. One must “stimulate the spiritual development of man so that he does not become a mere means of production or a numerical unit,” he explained. For him, this meant to “fulfill the [divine] call to perfect and dominate the world, and the divine command to work.”⁸¹ These typical Opus Dei formulas resonated in *Cuadernos del Sur* in the next years. For example, in 1969 the Opus Dei’s female intellectual Delia Brusa stated that “when education emphasizes development [...] stoical men, even great technicians, are created.” On the other hand, a pedagogical emphasis on sheer “intelligence,” could result in “theoretical intelligences, unable to cope with the practical sides of life,” and thus, a “caricature of man,” she warned.⁸² Noticeably, Brusa reduced the Opus Dei’s theology to a slogan: education should create efficient technicians, not abstract thinkers.

Ultimately, despite this intensive intellectual work, Astigueta’s reforms failed to achieve most of their goals, for various reasons. To begin with, in a mostly secular society, the regime’s effort to change Law 1420 by means of persuasion rather than coercion was delusional. The Argentine mainstream media, unions, and even some of Onganía’s own ministers were taken aback by these clear Catholic and spiritualist undertones, deeming them “confessionalism.”⁸³ For another, the crisis in the Argentine universities did not end in August 1966 and was clearly a reason for the regime’s reluctance to further agitate the student body with polemical legislation. Thus, by 1970, teacher strikes, and the overall sense of crisis in the education system brought the reform to its end.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Víctor García Hoz, “La problemática perspectiva de la educación actual,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 42-43. (January-February 1968): 5-11.

⁸² Delia Brusa, “Los hijos,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 57 (April 1969): 287

⁸³ In particular, it was journals such as *Inédito* that derided Astigueta’s reform and questioned his motivations see- “Para quién trabaja el señor Astigueta?” *Inédito*, no. 41 (April 17, 1968).

⁸⁴ For further analysis of the reform’s failure see - Laura Rodríguez, “La reforma educativa del gobierno de Juan Carlos Onganía, Adhesiones y resistencias,” in Valeria Galván and Florencia Osuna (eds.), *Política y cultura durante el “Onganiato”: nuevas perspectivas para la investigación de la presidencia de Juan Carlos Onganía (1966-1970)* (Rosario: Prohistoria, 2014), 157-76.

A change of mentalities aside, the more Onganía opened his economy to foreign investment the more he sought to visibly instigate a new sense of Argentine leadership in the South American hemisphere by evoking Hispanic spirituality. It was therefore that he handpicked some of the Ateneo's most conspicuous "hispanistas" to lead his Foreign Ministry. With Costa Méndez as Foreign Minister, and with Mazzinghi, Enrique Peltzer,⁸⁵ and Máximo Etchecopar (Director of Cultural Affairs) at his side, the ministry now put the ICH concepts to practice. Or as Costa Méndez put it, Argentina was to become "the bridge" between Europe and the unified "Hispanic sphere."⁸⁶ Again, the Argentine Revolution defined "Argentina's continental mission" in spiritual terminologies.⁸⁷ While dining with Bolivian dictator Alfredo Ovando, Onganía even spoke amenably about Spain's "highest spiritual heritage" as the basis of "fraternity between the continent's nations."⁸⁸

Publicly, Onganía treated the USA with respect. Even Costa Méndez, who had been antagonistic to the Washington-led Organization of the American States (OAS) in the past,⁸⁹ presented a more pragmatic attitude towards Linden Johnson's administration as a Foreign Minister, thereby inciting a fissure inside the Ateneo between him and Amadeo.⁹⁰ True, at times it seemed that Onganía built on Mario Amadeo's 1950s rhetoric of "regionalism" when warning that "new groups of minor states can be seen emerging around one or the other superpowers. These

⁸⁵ He was the Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry Policy team, see - Jorge Pérez Rocco, "Facturas se pagan a preconciarios," *Inédito*, no. 35 (January 10, 1968):19; Interview with Enrique Pelzer, March 15, 2016.

⁸⁶ "Discurso pronunciado por el doctor Nicanor Costa Méndez, el 9 de Mayo, ante la asociación cristiana de dirigentes de empresa," in *Cinco discursos y una revolución*, 1968.

⁸⁷ "Discurso pronunciado por el secretario de estado de gobierno, Dr. Mario F. Díaz Colodrero, en el recinto de la cámara de diputados de la nación", March 6, 1967, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 103.

⁸⁸ "Discurso pronunciado por el señor presidente de la nación teniente general Juan Carlos Onganía en la comida realizada en la residencia de Olivos," December 15, 1966. AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 102.

⁸⁹ One occasion was the Punta del Este conference in 1962, in which the communist regime of Fidel Castro was expelled from the OEA, see - *ABC Madrid* (June 17, 1966).

⁹⁰ Amadeo accused Costa Méndez of a "generational rebellion" and of turning Argentina into a "South Africa in this part of the world," see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, March 31, 1969, AGUN documento 15/35/279.

nations seem to want to amalgamate with the nearest one to them [...] emulating them [...] and thus abandoning their own national character.” However, immediately thereafter, Onganía tellingly reassured that “luckily, Latin America is supported by Anglo Saxonian America in a pledge to establish a world of elementary norms of coexistence for a great society.”⁹¹

The same cannot be said about the United Kingdom. From the outset, Onganía displayed a stark antagonism towards this foreign power, by elevating the Falkland Islands dispute to the top of Argentina’s diplomatic priorities. He did so among other things by tying together the Argentine and Spanish disputes with the United Kingdom.⁹² “There is no issue that is important for our country than claiming back the territory of the Republic,” Costa Méndez announced.⁹³ The September 1966 Operativo Cóndor - a peculiar incident wherein eighteen nacionalistas kidnapped an Argentine Airlines airplane to the Falkland Islands - was a further indication of the mounting anticipations Onganía spurred among nacionalistas to recover Argentina’s territories.

No sooner had Onganía instituted his regime than he began presenting concrete schemes for a Latin American political “unification” to his fellow statesmen. Speaking in various Latin American forums he demanded “new juridical bases” for Latin American cooperation.⁹⁴ Most of all, Onganía and Costa Méndez spoke of integrating the Plata Basin states, in what they thought could be an “organic and realistic multinational project of physical integration.”⁹⁵ Their seemingly earnest relationship with the Brazilian dictatorship, and even friendlier ties with Peru, were to be

⁹¹ “Discurso del presidente de la nacion Argentina al declarar inaugurada la tercera conferencia interamericana extraordinaria de cancilleres,” February 15, 1967, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 103.

⁹² His speeches at the UN assembly in 1966 and 1967 were dedicated almost entirely to this issue, see - *Discurso del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de la Republica Argentina, Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez, en el 22 periodo de las Naciones Unidas, September 27, 1967*; also at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YEGjEljSKxk>

⁹³ “Está vigorizada por la convicción de sus pueblos, por la decisión de sus Gobiernos y por intereses económicos cada vez más fuertes,” declara en Nueva York Costa Méndez,” *ABC Sevilla* (October 8, 1967).

⁹⁴ “Palabras de aliento de Onganía a la reunión de cancilleres de la OEA,” *ABC Madrid* (February 17, 1967).

⁹⁵ “Discurso pronunciado por el doctor Nicanor Costa Méndez, el 9 de Mayo, ante la asociación cristiana de dirigentes de empresa,” in *Cinco discursos y una revolución*, 14.

the basis of this amalgamation. This integration, explained Grondona at the time, did not necessarily mean full economic integration, but merely an ideological “approximation.”⁹⁶ The main obstacle for this diplomacy was evidently Chile, whose Christian Democratic government had previously declared Onganía a *persona non grata*.⁹⁷ Onganía’s correspondence with Eduardo Frei is noteworthy in that respect. While the Argentine and Chilean leaders clearly shared an anti-communist sentiment, they differed substantially on their idea of Latin America’s integration and democratic culture. To put it mildly, Frei’s Revolution in Freedom did not coincide with Onganía’s authoritarian “revolution.” As a result, Chile opposed Argentina’s efforts to institutionalize the Inter-American Defense Board, defiance that further exacerbated the territorial dispute between the neighboring Southern Cone nations.⁹⁸ In August 1966, Onganía contacted Frei with the intention of solving the Beagle Straits dispute - a letter which Frei answered immediately suggesting the countries turn to the mediation of an international court.⁹⁹ Consequently, the Argentine Revolution’s one diplomatic achievement was the Onganía-Frei meeting in 1970, leading to the 1971 agreement to turn to international arbitration.

In short, Onganía’s “Hispanic” foreign policy was marked by contradicting trends. On the one hand, he was astute enough a leader to ignore the anti-American provocations arising from

⁹⁶ At the time there was a constant rivalry between the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BID), which supported a more liberal vision of economic open borders, and the Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC), which supported a more protected approach to national development and commerce, see - Mariano Grondona, “América: Grupos y tendencias,” *Primera Plana*, no. 195 (September 20, 1966): 11.

⁹⁷ “En el extranjero, la Democracia Cristiana de Chile declaró a Onganía persona no grata,” *Primera Plana*, no. 150, (September 21, 1965).

⁹⁸ Onganía sought to change the operation of Latin America’s armies by institutionalizing the Inter-American Defense Board (JID) within the Organization of American States (OAS), a motion that would have given military dictatorships in the continent a bigger say in the institution, as well as a symbolic seal of approval – all the while without having to actually commit to establishing an international task force. For more on the Chilean, Colombian and Mexican objection to the Argentine “Natoization” of the OAS, see – Selser, *El Onganiato: La espada y el hisopo*, vol II, 105; Andrew Hurrell, “The Politics of South Atlantic Security: A Survey of Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization,” *International Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 2 (1983): 179–93

⁹⁹ This initial cordial relationship between the Argentine dictator and the Chilean president, were soon replaced by suspicion due to disagreements on issues of commerce, see - Eduardo Frei, *Cartas con Juan Carlos Onganía*, Fundación Eduardo Frei, Proyecto Digitalización Archivo Historico, Documento 1654, CD ROM 9.

Azul y Blanco and fully collaborated with the USA's financial sectors. Seeking to distance himself from any "fascist" labeling also meant that Onganía's Argentina saw official visits of respectable world leaders such as Japanese Crown Prince Akihito.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, his somewhat exaggerated intransigent diplomacy towards the United Kingdom and Chile meant Argentina's two future territory-related crises, the Falkland Island War and the Beagle Straights conflict, were set in motion during this period.

To conclude, overall Onganía's "social phase" comprised of several parallel ideological projects that aimed to prepare the Argentine population at large, and the youth in particular, for their new role in Argentina's emerging post-ideological society. The "mentalities change" Onganía and his ideologues sought to propel comprised of a prominent return to a "spiritual" and "Hispanic" style of living, along with a commitment to equip the population with tools that would allow it contribute to bolster the country's technological modernization. Only jointly, they thought, could these processes make "non-ideological" and "unified" a nation of otherwise hopelessly politically-mobilized (and Peronist) citizens.

The dialogue between the Argentine Revolution and Franco's Spain

As I believe is by now clear, Franco's Spain and Onganía's dictatorship were not only similar but, to a large degree, ideologically interrelated. As we have seen earlier, Onganía exalted Franco's economic and social policies and granted positions of power to intellectuals who adhered to similar ideologies. And yet, given Onganía's letter to Franco of October 1966, one should ask: how intimate was the link between the two regimes in reality? To answer this question, we must first

¹⁰⁰ For video footage of this visit see –
http://www.difilm-argentina.com/detalle_film_archivo.php?id=27087&show=62&sel=0&page=61 ;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M78LHJXvVk0>

consider that there were ad hoc economic motivations for Argentina seeking Franco's amity. Pursuing and Argentine economic miracle, Krieger Vasena's team explored new markets for Argentina's agricultural products, as well as new sources of machinery and technologies. That the British government closed its market to Argentine beef in 1967, made Argentina efforts to link with countries such as Spain, Italy, and France even more urgent.¹⁰¹ Indeed, Spain came to Onganía's assistance, in what became to be known as the Onganía-Franco "meat treaties" of 1967. César Ignacio Uríen, the Argentine ambassador in Madrid, told the Spanish press that Spain's commitment to buy Argentine products meant that the Mother Nation was now "teaching the world that it evaluates the high quality of our meats."¹⁰²

Beyond this economic interchange, there was a ceremonial aspect to the Franco-Onganía relationship that should be underscored here. For instance, the two dictatorships exhibited conspicuous efforts to acknowledge one another through honors. Early in 1967, Franco honored Onganía and Costa Méndez with the Spanish Navy Medals of Honor, an occasion that brought Onganía to sheer pathos. "You all know by now," he said, "how great my love for Spain is [...] Iberia, a magnificent melting pot of races, upon fertilizing the arrogant American continent, has inherited us its glory, the spiritual temple of its greatness."¹⁰³ In return, Onganía honored three Spanish ministers: Adolfo Díaz-Ambrona Moreno (1967), Vicente Mortes Alfonso (1970), and, tellingly, Laureano López Rodó (1970).¹⁰⁴ No German, French, Brazilian, British, Mexican, or USA officials received any such honors from Onganía.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, apart from the OEI the two

¹⁰¹ More on this crisis, see - Roberto Roth, *Los años de Onganía: relato de un testigo* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones La Campana, 1981), 235-40.

¹⁰² "El ministro argentino de economía esperado hoy en Madrid," *ABC Sevilla* (November 12, 1967).

¹⁰³ "Palabras del presidente de la Nación, Juan Carlos Onganía, al recibir la medalla de oro de la marina de España," February 5, 1967, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 103.

¹⁰⁴ Decreto 7999/1967 *BOE (Argentina)*, no. 21306 (November 3, 1967); Decreto 1319/1970, *BOE (Argentina)*, no. 21964 (July 6, 1970).

¹⁰⁵ Italy received one, Chile two, and Peru, six.

dictatorships soon signed several other cooperation treaties, such as the one between Argentina's National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICT) and Franco's CSIC.¹⁰⁶ Onganía had little to gain materially from this cooperation. Arguably, this treaty was thus yet another "ideological adherence" of some sort. Furthermore, Argentina did not merely join the OEI but aspired to lead it. As it happened, it was Juan Carlos Goyeneche who was particularly keen to become Secretary General of the organization,¹⁰⁷ demanding for this purpose the assistance of Carrero Blanco, his "very close friend."¹⁰⁸ As in the case of UNESCO, where during the 1960s the nationalists had a presence in the shape of Atilio Dell'Oro Maini,¹⁰⁹ by joining the OEI Amadeo and Goyeneche aspired to direct Latin America's educational apparatus.

Gradually, Onganía's Argentina began attracting the attention of Franco's intellectuals. Following López Rodó and García Hoz,¹¹⁰ in 1967 Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, too, visited Argentina. In a series of conferences, the Francoist theorist presented *El crepúsculo de las ideologías* to a sympathetic audience, before moving on to Chile as I will further detail in chapter 5. He was merely one of many "visiting professors" who arrived in the Buenos Aires ICH that year, and who included Carlos Robles Piquer and Ismael Sánchez Bella.¹¹¹ Another visitor from

¹⁰⁶ In fact, Onganía signed the three following treaties with Franco's Spain: Acuerdo de Colaboración entre la Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica y la Junta de Energía Atómica de España (1966); Convenio entre el Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas y el Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (1968) convenio de cooperación cultural (1971) see - *Ministerio de asuntos exteriores y culto, memorias periodo 28.9.1966-22.3.1971*, available at AMAEC.

¹⁰⁷ Amadeo wrote to Sánchez Bella, asking to replace Baron Castro with Goyeneche, see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 22, 1970, AGUN, documento 15/35/291.

¹⁰⁸ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, November 19, 1970, AGUN, documento 15/35/298

¹⁰⁹ Dell'Oro Maini was the president of UNESCO's Executive Council for several years, see - Atilio Dell'Oro Maini, "El ex ministro de educación argentino, Atilio Dell'Oro Maini, preside el Consejo Ejecutivo de la UNESCO, (1968), in - <http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/29743>

¹¹⁰ The latter visited Buenos Aires in 1966 and 1967, invited by the Merced Foundation and CONSUDEC, see - Laura Graciela Rodríguez, "Los católicos desarrollistas en Argentina. Educación y planeamiento en los años de 1960," *Diálogos*, vol. 17, no.1 (January-April 2013): 159.

¹¹¹ *Desarrollo: publicación del Congreso para el Desarrollo Científico, Cultural y Económico de Iberoamérica*, no. 1 (September 1968): 60; Carta de Ismael Sánchez Bella a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, August 18, 1966, AGUN, documento 15/86/95.

Spain, although not a Spaniard himself, was Fredrick D. Wilhelmsen. A reactionary thinker, UNAV faculty member, and Opus Dei ally, in September 1967 he gave a series of lectures in Buenos Aires and drew the suspicion of the liberal media. The “opusdeísta Wilhelmsen” they alleged, “spoke at the Ateneo de la República, in parishes, and Catholic universities. [...] the new forerunners of communitarianism, cursillismo, corporativism - or all the names behind which clericalism and extreme rightwing fascism are hidden.”¹¹² Yet not only right-wing figures visited the Ateneo. Even Franco’s successor, Prince Juan Carlos dined there,¹¹³ indicating again that this was a distinguished institution and not a merely fanatical hub. Taken together, let us grant the following: The Argentine public sphere saw a presence of Francoist thinkers propagating what seemed as an array of technocratic-authoritarian ideologies.

The Argentine ICH was the site of several other Argentine-Spanish collaborations. On May 6, 1968, Buenos Aires hosted the ICH’s Congress for Scientific, Cultural, and Economic Development of Latin America. “Organized conjointly” by the ICH of Madrid and Buenos Aires, it was directed by Gregorio Marañón, and the President of the Argentine ICH Alberto Obligado, and attended by Onganía, Borda, and Costa Méndez. The opening declaration emphasized that the ICH is “willing to comply with the demands of [Latin America’s] respective nations, and jettison its ‘Spanish’ tinge [...] - a burden of the ideology that dominated their first half of our century.”¹¹⁴ These words are revealing in that they clarify how the Spaniards apologetically replaced Hispanidad with allegedly ideologically neutral cooperation.¹¹⁵ No less informative were the declarations made at the end of this session on Education and Economic Development in Latin

¹¹² “La banca del señor Palanca o la palanca del señor Labanca,” *Inédito*, no 28 (September 27, 1967): 3.

¹¹³ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, November 19, 1970, AGUN, documento 15/35/298.

¹¹⁴ *Desarrollo*, no. 1, 5-6.

¹¹⁵ Alberto Obligado, even complimented the Buenos Aires ICH asserting that its system “has created a broad base of social linkage that is not directly related to the Spanish community, or to a specific ideological or denominational type,” see - *ibid.* 37.

America. “The national educational effort must be closely linked to the needs of the economic and social development of our countries,” said the ICH declaration, and concluded that primary and secondary education “should create new consumption habits for the population.”¹¹⁶ Rather than Hispanidad, the ICH conference was thus a showcase of neoliberal formulations, which nonetheless attested to the technocratic-authoritarian theories that bonded the two regimes in 1968.

Simultaneously, Onganía’s ministers traveled to Spain to closely study the Spanish model. As noted earlier, Ateneo members such as Díaz Coloderero, Astigueta, and Mazzighi were frequent guests of the ICH in Madrid, later to be joined by Basilio Serrano (as the Ateneo’s new Secretary General)¹¹⁷ and Guillermo Borda.¹¹⁸ Three visits, however, should perhaps be underscored here as indicative of the Argentine fascination with Francoism. The first was Krieger Vasena’s visit in November 1967. A part of his European tour, in an attempt to gather foreign credit,¹¹⁹ the Argentine Minister of the Economy met not only with Franco but with the entire technocratic team including López Rodo, Gregorio López Bravo (Minister of Industry, and an Opus Dei member), and Manuel Fraga. Speaking to the local press, Krieger Vasena stated that “like Spain,” Argentina had been overcome by “a false policy of autarkic posturing” that had made it “lose traditional ties, such as the ones we had with Spain.”¹²⁰ With Krieger Vasena came a team of experts, aiming to explore “the functioning of Spain’s system of administrative decentralization,

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 28.

¹¹⁷ “He is a man of remarkable dynamism and (rare thing among us) capable of doing things,” said Amadeo to Alfredo Sánchez Bella, see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 22, 1970, AGUN documento 15/35/291.

¹¹⁸ Who after being sacked in 1969, he arrived in Madrid as “consultant to the OEI”, see - November 3, 1969, AMREC, Embajada en Madrid II, caja 81.

¹¹⁹ According to the news agencies and Spanish governmental correspondences, Spain granted Argentina a credit of “up to twenty million dollars of the Spanish banks” after only receiving ten million from the French banks, see - FNFF, Document 20159: November 14-15 1967, “Telegramas del Embajador en Buenos Aires, Alfaro: La prensa argentina da un gran relieve; also- “El ministro argentino de economía esperado hoy en Madrid,” *ABC Sevilla* (November 12, 1967).

¹²⁰ “Las exportaciones españolas gozarán en Argentina de mayores facilidades que hasta ahora,” *La vanguardia*, (November 14, 1967).

which is already applied as an initial experience in the Argentine province of Córdoba.” Among these guests was Minister of Social Security, Alfredo Manuel Cousido,¹²¹ and the head of Argentina’s Social Security Technical Council, Guillermo Bravo. “The Spanish social security system can serve as a basis for the application of some management methods related to risk coverage in Argentina,” stated Cousido.¹²² As we will see shortly, these declarations are telling given the work his ministry implemented in Córdoba, Argentina.

Next, came the official visit of Argentina’s Minister of Tourism and Press, Dr. Federico Frischmacht, who, in February 1968, spent an entire week in Spain. Hosted by Manuel Fraga, and meeting Franco in person - indeed, after receiving Spain’s Grand Cross of Civic Merit - the Argentine minister visited the touristic area of Costa del Sol, where he studied the Spanish “development” first hand.¹²³ “I must admit that I feel overwhelmed by the weight of trying to emulate the deeds developed by the Spanish Ministry of Information and Tourism,” he later wrote. The encounter with Spain’s chief expert in matters of “free press,” brought Frischmacht to other more expressive conclusions:

Effective social communication depends on two conditions: effective means of communication, and a common language that allows mutual understanding [...] i.e. that words have the same meaning for everyone. [...] the one concept necessary to guide the politics of governments and private activity is Christianity [...] I beg God to continue enlightening our respective leaders, General Franco, and Lieutenant General Onganía, who have done so much to lead our peoples together in the path of our historic destiny.¹²⁴

The “freedoms” of Franco’s Spain - as the liberty to express one “common language” of Christianity and authority - unmistakably impressed Frischmacht.

¹²¹ He also received the Spanish Grand Cross, see - Decreto 1861/1969. de 18 de Julio. por el que se concede la Gran Cruz de la Orden del Mérito Civil, *BOE (España)*, no. 220 (September 13, 1969): 14542.

¹²² “El ministro argentino de economía esperado hoy en Madrid,” *ABC Sevilla* (November 12, 1967).

¹²³ Carta del embajador Urién a Costa Méndez, Madrid, February 27, 1968, AMAEC, Embajada en Madrid II, caja 42.

¹²⁴ AGA, caja 42/08973,4.

Lastly, Nicanor Costa Méndez visited Spain in April 1969. The Argentine Foreign Minister met Franco and discussed, according to a Spanish intelligence report, the “identity of views of Spain and Argentina in relation to the national problems of Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands,” which, more specifically, meant “the need for the respective governments to continue to lend each other mutual and unyielding diplomatic support until they have obtained the justice that is due to them.” Thereafter, the two signed a Spanish-Argentine dual-nationality treaty.¹²⁵ On this occasion, Costa Méndez was, to put it simply, the most eloquent orator of Hispanidad in the room. “I hope we will outline the enterprises that the future of Hispanidad demands from Argentina and Spain,” he announced upon arrival.¹²⁶ “It is up to us [Spain and Argentina] to divulge the Hispanic truth,” he declared upon meeting with Franco.¹²⁷ Noticeably, for him, this encounter symbolized a moment of profound affinity.

A no less important ideological dialogue between the two regimes’ intellectual apparatuses took place in private. The correspondence between Amadeo and Sánchez Bella is a case in point, as it had become much more ideologically detailed in the late-1960s. The two men were juxtaposing their ideological projects constantly,¹²⁸ deliberating on how to bring their respective regime models to their final state of perfection. As always, the Francoist ideologue was trying to persuade his Argentine counterpart to walk in Spain’s path. Reflecting the Francoist political changes of the 1960s, Sánchez Bella too believed that Spain’s 1966 referendum had confirmed the regime’s popularity. A “pluralist, democratic, and representative democracy” should function

¹²⁵ “Visita oficial del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de la República Argentina, Doctor Nicanor Costa Méndez,” nota informativa no. 13, April 15, 1969, AGA, caja 42/08973/4.

¹²⁶ “El ministro argentino de asuntos exteriores celebró ayer una extensa entrevista con su colega señor Castiella,” *La Vanguardia* (April 13, 1969).

¹²⁷ “‘La verdad hispana ha que ser divulgada por nosotros’ dijo el canciller argentino,” *ABC Madrid* (April 15, 1969).

¹²⁸ “You have a government like that of Spain with a coalition with a predominance of [...] what the socialists deem ‘falangists’” stated Sánchez Bella, albeit with capitalist economic conduct - “realist, rather than liberal,” Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Mario Amadeo, October 31, 1967, AGUN documento 15/35/270.

without political parties, he told Amadeo, but based “on natural institutions, in order to make a ‘politics of things,’ pragmatic rather than ideological, closer to concrete problems than any abstract utopias.” By now, Sánchez Bella clearly mastered the Francoist technocratic jargon. “It is important that the Ateneo does not break or dissolve once in power,” he continued advising, so that it could propel a “new mentality, more appropriate than the present one to the technological society in which we live.”¹²⁹ As for Spain, he believed Franco would be succeeded by an authoritarian “presidentialist” monarchy, wherein the president is “appointed by a parliament, after being suggested by the Council of the Kingdom.” In short, he assured, “Franco will be succeeded by Francoism, as de Gaulle will be succeeded by Gaullismo.”¹³⁰

Amadeo, for his part, reverberated similar formulas. For the ICH’s 7th Congress of the Hispano-Luso-America of International Law in Buenos Aires, he invited a list of Francoist ideologues - Luis García Arias, Pepe Yanguas, Alfonso Valdecasas, and the above-mentioned Legaz y Lacambra - to discuss precisely these ideas. “We worked hard for fifteen days [...] analyzing extensively Franco’s recent transcendental act of succession. [...] the belief that a regime lasts the life-span of its leader, is no longer sustainable,” Amadeo told Sánchez Bella. Then, turning to Onganía’s imminent “political phase” he stressed that of all the model available - “extreme nacionalismo, philo-marxism, or anachronistic liberalism” only Frondizi and Onganía had ever fashioned a regime model with any “viability.”¹³¹ In short, throughout their dialogue Amadeo and Sánchez Bella bolstered each other’s belief in the sustainability of a technocratic-authoritarian future in both Spain and Argentina.

¹²⁹ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Mario Amadeo, February 22, 1967, AGUN, documento 15/35/268.

¹³⁰ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Mario Amadeo, July 16, 1968, AGUN, documento 15/35/273.

¹³¹ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, August 24, 1969, AGUN, caja 15/35/282.

Taken as a whole, these activities illustrate that by the late 1960s, Onganía and Franco's dictatorships were associated economically, diplomatically, and important of all, ideologically. Onganía's ministers and intellectuals, let it be said, traveled to many other countries and spoke to a myriad of leaders. Still, that Onganía's ministers met with Franco and his technocrats in person, and in some cases, even uttered declarations that exhibited an eagerness to build on what they had seen in Spain, leaves little doubt that technocratic Spain was a key source of inspiration for the Argentines. On the other hand, the correspondence between Sánchez Bella and Amadeo also confirms that the technocratic-authoritarian project was a vibrant transatlantic dialogue, wherein the Argentine and Spanish post-fascist thinkers constantly sought to define their alternative system of "representation" to one another. Indeed, it was Onganía's inability to give concrete content to this theory that would signify the end of his regime, as I will inspect now.

1969-70: the pending "political phase" and Onganía's downfall

As the Argentine Revolution entered its fourth year there seemed to be no question that the "political phase" was nowhere in sight. Already in 1968, the public debate on the regime's mission shifted slowly from the economic realm to the political and "ideological" one. It was at this point that Onganía and his ministers began revealing what the "political phase" entailed in actuality. Like in Spain, Argentina was to become an "organic" democracy with corporatist-sounding forms of social "representation." Much of this theorization appeared, once again, in *Cuadernos del Sur*. For Edmundo Carbone, the journal's editor, by 1968 ideologies were already a thing of the past in Argentina. While Illia's "administrative chaos" fully justified the "movement of June 28, 1966," he said, now, in 1968, Argentina lived in a period of "partisan asepsis," where "old divisions have been overcome." What was Argentina's political future in his opinion? "It is the duty of the present

generations,” Carbone answered, to design a “new country” based on the operation of “autonomous councils and commissions, with representatives of the different sectors of the society extracted from their freely constituted groupings.”¹³² Identically, a young Opus Dei publicist named Roberto Bosca advised “ridding democracy of disgraceful parliamentarism,” thus replacing it with an “organic entity” capable of “alleviating the errors [...] of liberalism, neoliberalism, and statism.”¹³³ The final destination of the Argentine Revolution, for Bosca, was a system of representation identical to that of the Francoist model, based on the family and the municipality; a “Democratic Corporative System” which is “neither fascist nor medieval” and supported by a “change of mentality through education.”¹³⁴

Unlike the Opus Dei, Onganía was neither keen to elucidate his “political phase,” nor to legally frame a system of corporative representation the way Franco did in 1966. But did he ever allude to a return of the previous parliamentary democracy to Argentina? Markedly, he did not. In fact, even fifteen years after the event, Onganía could not bring himself to say that retrieving parliamentary democracy was ever on his mind. As far as Costa Méndez recalled, Onganía’s “political phase” was a confused mixture of unfathomable phrases. “I never understood them [...] I think the nearest thing to his vision was Franco’s Spain,” he said in the 1980s.¹³⁵ Sure enough, his regime did set in motion several projects that seemingly intended to foster “participation.” The Ministry of Social Welfare, for instance, promoted the Secretary of State and the Promotion of Community Assistance (SEPAC) designed to institute new forms of “social participation.” But overall, these initiatives remained mostly a propaganda device.¹³⁶ Ultimately, the two official

¹³² Edmundo J. Carbone, “Una política maniquea,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 52 (November 1968): 999.

¹³³ Roberto Bosca, “Un problema explosivo: la representación política,” *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 61-92 (August-September 1969): 680.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 682-83.

¹³⁵ Nicanor Costa Méndez oral history with Robert A. Potash, 42.

¹³⁶ Gabriela D. Gomes, “El Onganiato y los sectores populares: funcionarios, ideas y políticas de la Secretaría de Estado de Promoción y Asistencia a la Comunidad (1966-1970),” *Anuario del Centro de Estudios Históricos*, año

bodies Onganía considered truly necessary “councils” were his civic councils: The National Security Council (CONASE) and The National Council of Development (CONADE). “Through laws 16,964 and 16,970, the two interrelated systems [...] of inorganic participation of individuals and groups enabled the gradual improvement of information, intelligence, and thereby the capacity for decision making,” he wrote.¹³⁷

In the Spring of 1968, Onganía’s rhetorical vagueness eventually led to a crisis, as Borda and Díaz Colodrero had both been quoted raising the possibility of “replacing” Argentina’s electoral system with another better arrangement.¹³⁸ Additionally, Onganía’s inaction was an invitation to the local levels of the regime to take the initiative. In one local “pilot” project, Carlos Caballero, the nacionalista governor of Córdoba, announced in August 1968 the creation of an Advising Council (or “consejo comunitario”). This is “a preamble for a proper fascist-like corporative chamber,” observed *Inédito* in contempt. In the opinion of this liberal biweekly, Córdoba had by now become a symbol of “fascist” ideology. “It is no coincidence that from this province the main causes now arise to be alarmed by fascist corporatism,” it stated.¹³⁹ Mariano Grondona was of a different opinion. He said that despite being seemingly “corporatist,” there is no contradiction between this project and democracy, assuming Caballero’s initiative is a temporary rather than

11, no. 11 (2011): 279-302; see also - Gabriela Gomes, “Refundar la sociedad: el comunitarismo como política de estado en el gobierno de Onganía,” in Galván and Osuna, *Política y cultura durante el “Onganiato”*, 105-118.

¹³⁷ Juan Carlos Onganía oral history with Robert A. Potash, 17-18; for more details on CONASE, CONADE, their composition and function, see - Aníbal Jáuregui, “El CONADE: organización y resultados (1961-1971),” *Anuario IEHS* (2014): 29-30; Aníbal Jáuregui, “La planificación en la Argentina: el CONADE y el PND (1960-1966),” *Anuario del Centro de Estudios Históricos*, vol. 13, no. 13 (2013): 243.

¹³⁸ “Expuso el doctor Borda la idea política del gobierno,” *La Nación* (April 25, 1968); “Declaraciones en Jujuy del Dr. Díaz Colodrero,” *La Nación* (May 19, 1968).

¹³⁹ “Próximas novedades” and “Los cursillos de cristiandad solo para gente influyente,” *Inédito*, no. 49 (August 7, 1968): 5-10.

permanent solution.¹⁴⁰ In any event, not coincidentally it was in the ideologically polarized city of Córdoba that the movement that would bring down the regime began.¹⁴¹

At any rate, in late 1968 Argentina witnessed a persistent public debate over the perplexing terminology of “participationism,” “communitarianism”, and “councilism,” drawing much confusion, if not ridicule.¹⁴² In a parallel vein, the more the regime moved towards cooperation with American and European financial corporations, the more the nacionalistas in *Azul y Blanco* attacked the regime’s loss of identity. It was at this period that Sánchez Sorondo, with the Vatican’s recent *Populorum Progressio* in mind, led his own socially-oriented turn to the Left, advocating a revolution against what he saw as the growing inequality between the rich and poor nations.¹⁴³ For him, Krieger Vasena’s economic model was “submissive” to the western financial order.¹⁴⁴ While not precisely allying with Peronism, Sánchez Sorondo also did his best to rehabilitate Perón in the public sphere. Peronism, he said, “was not a solution, but there is no solution without Peronism.”¹⁴⁵ As Onganía was reluctant to restrain the press, the latter’s criticism eventually enveloped not only the regime’s policies but the ideological groups serving it. This began already February 1967, as an elaborate report on the Opus Dei’s role in Onganía’s regime appeared in the Buenos Aires weekly *Análisis*.¹⁴⁶ By far the most damaging publication to date, the report depicted the Opus Dei’s relationship with the Ateneo, as well as with many other of its allies - including Mayochi’s

¹⁴⁰ “Cuestiones políticas,” *Primera Plana*, no. 294 (August 13, 1968).

¹⁴¹ In his letter of resignation, and in later interviews, Onganía denied any corporatist ideology behind these bodies, and added that “the Governor, was a Cordovan from a dignified traditional family [...] The Advisory Council was far from any suspicion of being a political corporatism” but was identified as such “because of the backgrounds of the people who promoted it.” For more on Caballero see - James P. Brennan, *Córdoba rebelde: el Cordobazo, el clasismo y la movilización social* (La Plata: De la Campana, 2008), 88-101.

¹⁴² See for example - “Gobierno: La ilusión del consejalismo,” *Primera Plana*, no. 295 (August 20, 1968); “Participacionismo: ¿una mala palabra?” *7 Días*, no. 66 (August 12, 1968): 19.

¹⁴³ Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, “¿Hacia una nueva cristiandad?” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 55 (October 2, 1967); for more on this turn see Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 211-212.

¹⁴⁴ “Onganía,” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 51 (September 4, 1967).

¹⁴⁵ “Peronismo,” *Azul y Blanco*, no. 60 (May 14, 1968).

¹⁴⁶ A publication that made its way to Spain, to Manuel Fraga, see - AGA, caja 42/09060

newspaper *El Pueblo* and Alberto Floria, allegedly the Opus Dei's *La Nacion* "contact man" - and discussed Escrivá's "penetration" tactics.¹⁴⁷ By 1969, pamphlets of all kinds were circulating in Argentina alleging that the Opus Dei is behind the move towards the "communitarian" model and that "the future state will be based on bodies similar to those existing in Spain and Portugal."¹⁴⁸ Later, in 1969, *Primera Plana* joined *Inédito* in revealing the Cursillos de la Cristiandad's control over the city of Tucumán.¹⁴⁹ An utterly negative account, it indicated that *Primera Plana* had by then turned against the regime. Joining those who spoke, *sotto voce*, of the inexistence of a political plan, in January 1969 Arturo Frondizi broke his silence and publicly questioned Onganía's objectives.¹⁵⁰ In short, by Spring 1969 the legitimacy of Onganía's regime, and the spiritual agencies directing it, were openly put into question in the public sphere.

Ultimately, it was a combination of tax raises, anti-union policies, continuous student unrest, and Peronist activism, along with the inaction of several disenchanted Azul generals,¹⁵¹ that ignited Argentina's 1969 student uprisings. Many explanations have been given in historiography for the events of May 29, 1969, in the city of Córdoba.¹⁵² There is a consensus among historians that the uprising was, initially at least, of a haphazard nature - an outcome of an alliance between students and the city's unions Fiat Materfer and Fiat Concord. Opting to protest despite the banning of political marches, the demonstrators took over the city for hours, later to be overrun by the police

¹⁴⁷ "El Opus Dei, aquí y ahora," *Análisis*, no. 308, February 6, 1967; also in AGA, caja 42/09060

¹⁴⁸ "Similitud de organismos," December 4, 1969, AGA, caja 42/08972.

¹⁴⁹ "Tucumán: reino del cursillismo," *Primera Plana*, no. 319 (February 4, 1969).

¹⁵⁰ The regime, he said, presented an "economic policy that is the absolute denial of the original aspirations that determined the overthrow of the previous government," in "Entrevista a Arturo Frondizi," *Extra*, no. 42 (January 1969), also at http://www.bernardoneustadt.org/contenido_127.htm

¹⁵¹ As Onganía's minister Dardo Pérez Guilhou put it, "my opinion is that Lanusse was, by then, personally against Onganía, if not against Onganía's regime as a whole," Dardo Pérez Guilhou oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1984.

¹⁵² For other analyses of these events, see - Emilio Ariel Crenzel, *El Tucumanazo* (Tucumán: Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, 1997); Liliana de Riz, *La política en suspenso, 1966-1976* (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2000), 67-80; for earlier texts, published in Argentina while Onganía was still in power, see - Juan Carlos Agulla, *Diagnostico social de una crisis: Córdoba, mayo de 1969* (Córdoba: Editel, 1969); Francisco J. Delich, *Crisis y protesta social Córdoba, mayo 1969* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones signos, 1970).

causing several fatalities. In fact, Córdoba was only the more salient case among several other uprisings, in Rosario (“el Rosariazo”), Tucuman (“el Tucumanzo”) and Corrientes, indicating that this was, indeed, a grassroot uprising of a national scale.

The events of May 1969 established that Onganía was neither a popular dictator nor capable of sustaining his regime without violence. In a deeper sense, they showed that three years of ideological interpellation of the Argentine middle-class had been an unmitigated failure. The ambiguous language of “political reform,” which in essence meant waiting for Peronism to disappear only thereafter to practice an “organic democracy,” led Argentines of all ages to the conclusion that the Argentine Revolution could only be ousted through active rebellion. Onganía’s ministers perceived the events differently. For Díaz Colodrero, for instance, even in the 1980s it was still oblivious that “Marxist activists” were behind the uprising and that Governor Caballero was merely the “pretext” for subversive activity.¹⁵³ Krieger Vasena, was of a different opinion and admitted that he had thought the events were an outcome of unnecessary nacionalista ideology. Onganía, for his part, blamed both “Castro-inspired communists” and his own Commander in Chief, Lanusse, for undermining him.¹⁵⁴ On the other side of the Atlantic Franco’s agents were interpreting the events their own way. Stating that the “effervescence” had been carried out by youngsters “lacking a political orientation,” their report explained the uprising by underscoring Onganía’s austerity measures as well as by pointing out fact that “everyone here enjoys freedom of the press, absolute and total.”¹⁵⁵ In brief, the Spaniards stated what was, for them, obvious: by not oppressing Argentina’s free press, Onganía doomed his regime to a slow death.

¹⁵³ Mario Díaz Colodrero oral history with Robert A. Potash, 24.

¹⁵⁴ Juan Carlos Onganía oral history with Robert A. Potash, 6.

¹⁵⁵ “La subversión argentina,” AGA, caja 42/08972.

The ensuing *Cuadernos del Sur* editorial could not have sounded more disappointed from the course of events. Arguing for the singularity of Onganía's regime, it maintained that the Argentine Revolution had "created a supra-constitutional order, placing above the Magna Carta the Act of the Argentine Revolution." While reiterating the notion that the regime relied on a "tacit consensus of the population," the journal did admit, however, several recent "economic mistakes" (the increase of seven pesos in the tax levied on petrol) and demanded from Onganía to reveal his political plan. "There is one issue on which we all agree: we cannot go back to the system concluded on June 28, 1966. The traditional political parties [...] are unable to carry out the colossal task that the country needs," said the editorial.¹⁵⁶ In other words, the Opus Dei's chief intellectual platform in Latin America articulated what was by then self-evident: it never believed in parliamentary democracy in Argentina.

In June 1969, Onganía sacked his entire cabinet, the dynamic Krieger Vasena included, replacing the Ateneo members with a less coherent assembly of ministers. Arguably, Onganía had identified by then that this authoritarian milieu was not earning him popularity. On August 5, 1969, Onganía also acted against the press by closing *Primera Plana* - an action that illustrated even further the profoundness of the Argentine Revolution's crisis. As replacements for the Ateneo ministers Onganía appointed intellectuals of similar ideological hues. For instance, as Education Minister, he assigned Dardo Pérez Guilhou, a jurist who had earned his PhD in the University of Seville and was a founding member of the ICH in the province of Cuyo.¹⁵⁷ Unlike Astigueta, Pérez Guilhou saw himself less as a nacionalista and more as a moderating factor.¹⁵⁸ With Minister of

¹⁵⁶ "Balance de tres años," *Cuadernos del Sur*, no. 60 (July 1969): 531-33.

¹⁵⁷ "XX aniversario del Instituto Cuyano de Cultural Hispánica," *Cuyo Hispánico*, no. 7 (May 1971).

¹⁵⁸ Astigueta, he said, was a "reactionary" and "useless," see - Pérez Guilhou oral history with Robert A. Potash, 27; nonetheless, Astigueta's group was a type of nacionalismo that was not fascist, he stated: "They are conversing with a glass of whiskey; they are fascists, but they are not in their actions," see - *ibid*, 38.

the Economy José María Dagnino Pastore on board, Onganía also moved towards a more protectionist economic strategy, publicly demonstrating that he was responsive to the surge of civic unrest. Yet strikingly, he insisted to sustain his solemn connection with Spain, by sending Pérez Guilhou to meet Franco and study the new Spanish Education reform. Indeed, Pérez Guilhou traveled to Spain in January 1970 and met with Franco and Luis Villar Palasí, after which he declared that the latter's White Book (discussed in chapter 6) may be the basis for educational reforms "in other countries in the Spanish-speaking community."¹⁵⁹ In other words, the Argentine Revolution perhaps altered the course of its economic policies somewhat, but when it came to its ideological inspirations little has changed.

It took the Armed Forces several months to fully grasp the meanings of the 1969 events. In May 1970, the Azul high command sent Onganía a bold memorandum, wherein it attributed the uprising to "the absence of concrete ideas about the culmination of the revolutionary process and its exit."¹⁶⁰ That is to say, the Armed Forces had concluded that by barely provided the economic "miracle" it had promised, deploying unpopular authoritarian ideologues, and never presenting the public with a coherent political horizon, the Argentine Revolution had, in essence, reached the limit of its effectiveness. The abduction and murder of General Pedro Aramburu on May 29, 1970, was yet another grim sign of the uselessness of Onganía's regime in the face of left-wing mobilization turning to violence. It was then that the Armed Forces finally decided to force Onganía into action, demanding he presented the public with a concrete political plan. When Onganía finally returned to his generals with his "political theory," on June 5, 1970, it was an evasive mixture of technocratic-authoritarian jargon that ignored entirely the essential question of separation of powers and the principle of a party system. Led by General Lanusse, on June 8, 1970,

¹⁵⁹ "Llega el ministro argentino de cultura y educación," *ABC Madrid* (January 27, 1970).

¹⁶⁰ Juan Carlos Onganía oral history with Robert A. Potash, 25.

the Azul generals ousted Onganía. The Argentine Revolution was now entering its last and humiliating phase of reckoning.¹⁶¹

Lanusse's dilemma, and the end of Argentina's post-ideological experiment

The events of June 1970 were a humiliating moment for Onganía and the Azules alike, and the biggest setback to Argentina's technocratic-authoritarian process to date. The Argentine Revolution did not end with Onganía, though. Under Lanusse, it took three more years for the Azules to finally abandon their pipe-dream to set the controls on a future democratic process to their liking. Not willing to become Argentina's *de facto* President, Lanusse appointed the inexperienced General Roberto Levingston for the job. Doubtfully a nacionlista as the press portrayed him, this somewhat enigmatic figure vouched to bring Argentina back to more Frondizist economic protectionism. But his statements were mostly empty words. The economic strategies of his Minister of Economy, Carlos Moyano Llerena, were identical to those of his disciple Krieger Vasena and included a failed fourteen percent devaluation attempt at the end of 1970.¹⁶²

In truth, very little has changed in the regime's state ideology following Onganía definitive retirement. For one thing, the Education and Interior ministries were strictly in the hands of traditionalist and Catholic figures. For another thing, the Argentine Revolution did not abandon the effort to produce its own Development Plan. Once published, Argentina's 1970-1974 Development Plan even purported to be the materialization of the "Argentina Revolution Act" and Onganía's 1966 Development and Planning Directive. Indisputably, it thereafter declared the

¹⁶¹ Retrospectively, Lanusse described this period in harsh words: "It did not seem as amazing to me then as it is now that mixture of nationalism, semi-feudal traditionalism, fascism, industrialism, appeals to the duty of the Armed Forces, justifying violence", see - Alejandro A Lanusse, *Confesiones de un General* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1994), 258; for more on the struggle between the generals, see - Riz, *La política en suspenso*, 108-126.

¹⁶² For more on the differences between the economic policies of Onganía and Levingston, see - Rubén M. Perina, *Onganía, Levingston, Lanusse: los militares en la política Argentina* (Buenos Aires, República Argentina: Editorial de Belgrano, 1983), 121-31.

overcoming of “the anachronistic political, social, and economic structures that, opposing the realization of a modern and powerful country,” and spoke optimistically of nation “integrated spiritually, economically and physically.”¹⁶³

That being said, 1970 saw the withdrawal of several of the far-right ideological groups of the 1960s, for multiple reasons. Disheartened with the results of the Argentine Revolution, *Cuadernos del Sur* was the first to close down. Banned by the government in 1969, *Azul y Blanco* followed suit. The Ateneo de la República, for its part, reduced its activities and ceased to be the central intellectual platform of the previous years. To make matters worse for these affiliations, the Argentine press continued attacking the ideological groups that had backed and sustained Onganía. Hit hardest was the Opus Dei itself. Following recent defamatory publications in Spain, which will be debated fully in chapter 6, left-wing intellectuals such as Gregorio Selser and Jorge Pérez Rocco disparaged the Opus Dei by highlighting its involvement in recent financial scandals (MATESA in Spain and ADELA in Argentina). These writers also stated that the Opus Dei, with its “Rialp y Pomaire editorials, publications such as *Cuadernos del Sur*” had sought a “conquest of power,”¹⁶⁴ and further highlighted the work of intellectuals such as “Professor Ronchino,” who they accused of printing militaristic educational books in Madrid.¹⁶⁵ In 1971, *Confirmado* and Timerman’s new newspaper *La Opinión* joined this trend.¹⁶⁶ While shedding little light on the political operation of the Opus Dei in Argentina, these publications were nonetheless important as they indicated that

¹⁶³ *Plan de desarrollo de la Republica Argentina, 1970-1974* (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría del Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo), 6-7.

¹⁶⁴ Jorge Pérez Rocco, “Opus Dei: ¿Santa mafia o masonería tecnócrata?” *Inédito*, no. 80 (October 1970); “Opus Dei: ¿Santa mafia o masonería tecnócrata?” no. 81 (November 1970): 22-26; Gregorio Selser, “Adela: un pulpo con nombre de mujer,” *Inédito*, no. 74 (April 1970): 19-21.

¹⁶⁵ Editorial Magisterio Rio de la Plata, Graficos Torroba, and Melsa, were the three publishing houses mentioned, see - Jorge Pérez Rocco, “Opus Dei: ¿Santa mafia o masonería tecnócrata?” *Inédito*, no. 82 (December 1970): 28.

¹⁶⁶ “Opus Dei, el poder invisible,” *Confirmado* (November 26, 1969), 76; “Los secretos del Opus Dei,” *Confirmado* (January 21, 1971): 54-57; Silvia Rundi, “La trayectoria del Opus Dei, I-IV,” *La Opinión* (December 14-17, 1971).

now, that Onganía was gone, his supporting ideological apparatus was helplessly harassed by the mainstream press, accused of connections to Franco's Spain and of financial collusion.¹⁶⁷

On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the Spaniards observed the downfall of their intimate ideological counterpart with alarm. In June 1970, the Spanish ambassador informed his superiors that Levingston was “distancing himself from Hispanismo, half disavowing [Onganía's] message addressed to Spain, the only one of its kind.”¹⁶⁸ As a part of the effort to ensure that the economic and ideological ties between the countries remained intact, on February 28, 1971 Laureano López Rodó arrived in Buenos Aires for another short visit, and met with Levingston and with Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs, the nacionalista Luis María de Pablo Pardo.¹⁶⁹

While this visit left little to no imprint on the relationship between the countries, it did yield an unusual interview of López Rodó with Bernardo Neustadt on national television. By now, those in the Argentine media who had supported Onganía in 1966 were not pleased with the way the “revolutionary process” was going. One of them was Bernardo Neustadt, who even followed López Rodó to Madrid for his report. It is worthwhile examining this interview for several reasons. Published in a special edition on Neustadt's new journal *Extra*, it is illuminating primarily since Neustadt's adoration for López Rodó clearly did not diminish with the years; and second, because the Argentine publicist was now “angrily” deconstructing the Argentine technocratic-authoritarian ideology for his audience. Unlike the Spanish “development plans,” which are marked by “authenticity” he said, the Argentine equivalent was “made up of easy slogans, ideological formulations that are neither effective nor practiced, [...] and of men - ruling classes - who have

¹⁶⁷ “El Opus Dei sobre la educación argentina,” *Inédito*, no. 82 (December 1970): 28.

¹⁶⁸ Carta de José María Alfaro a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, June 17, 1970, AGUN documento 15/35/33.

¹⁶⁹ “The President told me,” López Rodó recalled, that Frondizi had advised him to emulate the Peruvian revolution's protectionist model, but that he was skeptic whether Peru, with its “six million Indians,” could serve Argentina; after all, “Argentines are European,” Levingston remarked, see - López Rodó, *Memorias*, vol. III, 168.

decided with every effort to delay progress.”¹⁷⁰ In short, this interview touched on the very core of the technocratic-authoritarian model and its botched Argentine implementation.

Neustadt asked López Rodó several hard questions. “Do you believe that ideologies have died?” he inquired for instance. “I do not believe in the end of the ideologies, although one must ask what we meant by ideologies,” answered the Spaniard and explained:

In politics, there are no dogmas, but there are ideals. I do not understand politics as pure management; I do not think that politics can be done without moving the support of the people towards a great national project that constitutes its destiny. It is the ideals that move people [...] I understand the freedom that is a fundamental value of man. I want freedom.¹⁷¹

“But you do not believe in parliaments institutions,” Neustadt further pressed. “I believe in a legislative chamber,” was López Rodó’s predictable answer. “Parliamentarism,” he added defiantly, “is a degeneration of democracy” since its fundamental activity is the “diversion to overthrow governments.”¹⁷² Alternatively, López Rodó advised the following model:

I believe in popular grassroots politics, with broad participation, which, at the same time, ensures continuity. [...] And continuity can only be achieved with institutions that relate to the needs of each nation. But I do not believe in a universal formula [...] The importation of formulas from other countries has always given us very bad results.

Next, López Rodó lampooned Levingston’s “outdated” Economic nationalism by alleging that GDP hikes cannot possibly “cause detriment to the countries integrated into a supranational area.” Briefly put, on Argentine national television, López Rodó appeared both as a staunch advocate of the global neoliberal economy, and a believer in an idiosyncratic Hispanic regime model. By renegotiating the very term democracy, and eluding constantly to “organic” participation, López Rodó was thus, in 1971, still Franco’s quintessential technocratic-authoritarian theorist.

¹⁷⁰ Bernardo Neustadt, “Mi conversación mayor,” *Extra*, no. 76 (November 1971): 1.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, 2

¹⁷² *Ibid*, 11.

The nine months of Levingston's tenure saw the Argentine Revolution gradually losing the ideological component that had held Onganía regime effectively together for four years.¹⁷³ "The cabinet is excessively heterogeneous and the distribution of powers between the President and his three Commanders in Chief complicates to the maximum the governmental task," reported Amadeo to Sánchez Bella in 1971. In contrast, the conduct of the Peronists," he said surprisingly, "has matured and they are spiritually very independent from [Perón in] Madrid."¹⁷⁴ Two months later Amadeo wrote again. "Levingston," he said, "lacked prestige and authority," and therefore, "there is a great emptiness of power and an almost total absence of authentic political thought." By now, Amadeo revealed that he had been in touch with "leading Peronist figures" and was "optimistic about the prospects of reaching solid and stable understandings with them."¹⁷⁵

By mid-1972 little had remained from Onganía's ideological apparatus. Amadeo, by then, was persuaded that a mature, Catholic, and anti-Marxist version of Peronism was better than any Azule-led regime. In his wishful thinking, he believed that Perón "does not really want to return and that he is no longer capable of assuming the heaviest burden [...] of the Presidency." Moreover, Amadeo lost all hope in further military intervention in politics. If such a thing were to happen, he predicted, "it would be a reactionary and ultraconservative attempt that would not last long and would only serve to 'radicalize' the process."¹⁷⁶ Hence, for him and his few remaining followers, only by supporting Perón's electoral "Front," and "fighting alongside the popular sectors" could one fight effectively against the emerging "Marxist enemy." Even Héctor Cámpora,

¹⁷³ For more on the gradual deterioration of the regime during the "Levingston interlude," see - Perina, *Onganía, Levingston, Lanusse: los militares en la política Argentina*, 204-11; Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina*, 289-359.

¹⁷⁴ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, August 17, 1970, AGUN documento 15/35/296.

¹⁷⁵ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, November 19, 1970, AGUN, documento 15/35/298.

¹⁷⁶ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, June 5, 1972, AGUN, documento 15/35/309.

the head of Perón's political Front (FREJULI), turned out, in Amadeo's opinion, to be a "decent fellow," his orientation being purely "Christian and anti-Marxist."¹⁷⁷

Once the more qualified General Alejandro Agustín Lanusse finally replaced Levingston, in July 1971, he and his staff had neither a plan for a spiritual makeover of the Argentine population, nor did they think they could bring about a profound change of attitudes of the Argentine polity towards Peronism. Perhaps one of the more reluctant presidents in Argentine History, if to judge from his memories at least,¹⁷⁸ from the moment Lanusse came into office what preoccupied him the most was retrospectively defending the image Argentine Military's deeds since 1962, trying to persuade the Argentine public that the upcoming democratic opening was to be carried out thanks to the Army's intervention rather than despite it. Thus, he declared his strategy of Grand National Agreement ("gran acuerdo nacional") which in essence meant establishing a consensus on the democratic rules of the game, thereby aiming to establish a protected democracy to avoid Perón from returning to power. In an act of desperation, Lanusse even contemplated changing the Argentine Constitution, as the only measure possible for gaining the foregoing objective.¹⁷⁹

But more fundamentally, Lanusse was now confronting the unintended consequence of the very resistance to his dictatorship, namely the rise of Argentina's so-called revolutionary "urban guerrilla." In particular, the dramatic upsurge of deadly operations from the hands of The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and Peronist movement Montoneros, tarnished whatever had been left of the Argentine Revolution's respectability, and complicated even further the democratic transitional process.¹⁸⁰ As a result, Lanusse's tenure was marked by mounting oppression, as first

¹⁷⁷ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, May 8, 1973, AGUN documento 15/35/313.

¹⁷⁸ Alejandro A. Lanusse interview with Robert A. Potash, December 15, 1983, Robert A. Potash Papers, Special Collections, University Archives UMass Amherst.

¹⁷⁹ More on Lanusse's initiatives see - Rubén M. Perina, *Onganía, Levingston, Lanusse: los militares en la política argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1983), 212-14.

¹⁸⁰ More on these movements see - Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón: Argentina's Montoneros* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

reports of torture, and later the reinstalling of capital punishment shocked the mainstream press.¹⁸¹ In short, Lanusse, who was not unfamiliar to nacionalista theory and who had been a frequent Cursillos de la Cristiandad participant himself,¹⁸² refrained from ever trying to instigate his own ideological movement. Likewise, by this time he had little interest in the services of the nacionalistas, the Ateneo de la República, or other intellectual groups of that ideological hue, as he sought to retrieve Argentina peacefully to a parliamentary system, with the Armed Forces saving as much of their dignity as possible. Alas, Argentina's 1973 democratic transition was to be anything but peaceful and dignified, as I will explore in chapter 6.

Conclusions

The Argentine Revolution of 1966-1970 was one of the first glaring examples of an effort to establish a Hispanic technocratic-authoritarian regime in Latin America. With the newly born Brazilian dictatorship at his side - though hardly a source of ideological inspiration - Juan Carlos Onganía turned to technocratic Spain, as well as to the post-fascist milieus operating in Argentina since the 1950s, for ideological guidance. By offering their service to him at the right moment, and by constantly explicating and theorizing his regime in the public sphere throughout the 1960s, the latter decided the ideological character of the Argentine Revolution. Assuredly, through a process of trial and error, Onganía and his ideologues pursued, at times clumsily, their own updated model of a post-ideological state. Still, Argentina's technocratic-authoritarian experiment was never haphazard or improvised, but the outcome of a genealogy of ideological production that led back to the 1930s and the rise of European fascism. It is important to note that it would take Argentine

¹⁸¹ See for instance Natalio Botana, Rafael Braun and Carlos A. Floria's editorials in *Criterio*, in *El régimen militar (1966-1973)* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones La Bastilla, 1973).

¹⁸² Dardo Pérez Guilhou oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1984, 25.

scholars and publicist several decades to begin reflecting on Onganía's Francoist inspirations, at which point some went as far as naming him the "Argentine Franco."¹⁸³ One possible explanation for this is that despite Onganía's dialogue with Spain, he and his followers never avowedly acknowledged Francoism was their model. Even so, as this chapter has now clarified, Onganía's eagerness to opt for the services of ICH, Opus Dei, and Cursillos de la Cristinadad affiliates, meant that Francoism and the Argentine Revolution were linked through networks of theorists, administrators, and educators. Moreover, the regimes displayed a public collaboration that was in no way secret.

Overall, however, the story of Onganía's failed technocratic experiment was that of Onganía's own interpretation - or better, misinterpretation - of the Francoist regime, under the enduring pressures to undo twenty years of Peronist mobilization. By believing his dictatorship could seamlessly implement a handful of "techniques" employed at the time in Spain, Onganía grossly overlooked the crucial importance of the memory of the Spanish Civil War and Franco's ongoing state-led terror. In turn, his regime ultimately spurred a severe backlash, in the shape of civil uprising, and soon thereafter, in urban guerrilla. As a result, by 1971 little had remained of Argentina's 1960s technocratic-authoritarian state-ideology. Nevertheless, the post-fascist ideologies of the 1960s did not entirely disappear in the 1970s, and would continue to play a role in the Argentine economic and political spheres. The sixth and last chapter of my analysis will touch on the lines of continuation between Argentina's authoritarian projects of the 1960s and the Argentine military dictatorship of the late-1970s.

¹⁸³ The term "the Argentine Franco" has been quite commonly used in the Argentine media in the last decade to describe Onganía, but was far from being common in the 1970s, see - "A 40 años del Golpe contra Illia: el espejismo de Onganía," *La Nación* (June 25, 2006); see also special issue on Onganía, *Todo es Historia*, no. 230 (July 1986).

Chapter 5: The Chilean Road to Technocratic-Authoritarianism, 1964-1977

On September 4, 1964, Eduardo Frei Montalva won a landslide victory in the Chilean General Elections. Under his leadership, Chile's Christian Democrats, who had once been the admirers of José Antonio Primo de Rivera's Falange, were, thirty years later, to implement what they dubbed a "Revolution in Liberty." In essence, it meant that by mobilizing Chile's working-classes within this *sui generis* political movement, Frei aimed to carry out an unprecedented redistribution of the country's wealth. A paramount turning point in modern Chilean history, it was also a moment of immense distress for the conservative political elites who had been ruling the country firmly since the 1930s.¹ Above all, it was the socially-conscious spirituality of the Christian Democrats - based on the writing of Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson - that made their "revolution" anathema in the eyes of the traditionalist Chileans. As a result, from this moment on Chile saw an ideological radicalization of its far-right polity, and the emergence of new technocratic-authoritarian groups. In 1970, in the wake of Salvador Allende's tenure and the so-called "Chilean Road to Socialism," these groups proposed replacing Chile's democracy with a definitive authoritarian state model. In turn, once General Augusto Pinochet overthrew Allende, in September 1973, his regime was to build on this decade-long ideological production.

That Franco's dictatorship was a source of inspiration for Pinochet and his ideologues is no secret. In fact, unlike in the case of Onganía's regime, it was an inseparable part the regime's

¹ Chile's acute social inequalities and polarization date back to the end of the 19th century. Brian Loveman's seminal work on land distribution in Chile has linked Chile's authoritarian turn with these social contexts, see - Brian Loveman, *Struggle in the Countryside; Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

public history.² Indeed, historians have already highlighted Pinochet inclinations towards “Hispanic” spirituality and his evocation of the memory of the Spanish Civil War when legitimizing his regime.³ This chapter builds on this literature but also seeks to broaden this narrative by pointing to the unexpected aspects of both the Francoist and Chilean ideological projects. While perhaps using Francoism as a reference, the Chilean intellectuals I examine cultivated their own highly original version of technocratic-authoritarianism. They did so amid a period when the Francoist dictatorship itself was undergoing deep crisis, and once again, within the framework of a stern competition against a neo-fascist countermovement. This chapter thus follows a structure similar to the ones preceding it. First it explores Chile’s post-fascist associations in the late-1960s and the presence of Franco’s technocrats in Chile during that period; next, the I elucidate the role these intellectual apparatuses played in the campaigns against Allende; thereafter, the chapter debates how these groups served the dictatorship in its first year of existence, and touches on Pinochet’s dialogue with Franco’s regime; and lastly, it examines the early Pinochet years as the embodiment of a third technocratic-authoritarian regime model.

Chile’s 1960s post-fascist authoritarianism: from the Francoist presence in Chile to the advent of the “gremialista” movement

Over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, Chile did not witness the rise of any influential neo-fascist movement alike the Argentine nacionalistas. Being in power for decades, Chile’s

² This fact was debated in public in the late-1970s, see - Miguel Rojas-Mix, “El hispanismo: Ideología de la dictadura en Hispanoamérica,” *Araucaria de Chile*, no. 2 (1978): 47; see also - Rodrigo Frey García, “Pinochet tuvo en Francisco Franco un modelo muy mediocre a seguir,” *La Tercera* (July 7, 2003).

³ Isabel Jara Hinojosa, *De Franco a Pinochet: el proyecto cultural franquista en Chile 1936-1980*; Isabel Jara Hinojosa, “La ideología franquista en la legitimación de la dictadura militar chilena,” *Revista Complutense de Historia de América*, no. 34 (2008): 233–53; Kirsten Weld, “The Spanish Civil War and the Construction of a Reactionary Historical Consciousness in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile,” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, no. 98:1 (2018): 77-115.

conservative elites ostensibly had no immediate incentive to support a revolutionary movement of the Right.⁴ True, the authoritarian theorists discussed in chapter 1 remained active throughout this period. While Oswaldo Lira edited the journal *Aesthesis* Eyzaguirre coordinated *Finis Terrae* - both belonging to the Catholic University of Chile and hosting ICH theorists such as Esteban Scarpa, Ricardo Krebs, and Hugo Montes. Yet Lira was hardly an influential ideologue in the 1960s. His most salient work at that period was his 1965 *Ortega en su espíritu* - a book that set out to repudiate the theories of the late Spanish philosopher. In the face of the miracle of creation, Lira thought he himself offered “answers,” whereas Ortega proposed the “virus of logic.”⁵ Similarly, Eyzaguirre quietly receded from public life. The only noteworthy aspect regarding his journal *Finis Terrae* is that from 1964 its entire editorial board was comprised of the exact same Chileans collaborating in *Cuadernos del Sur*: José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, Carlos Vial Correa, Juan de Dios Vial Correa, Raúl Urzua, and Raul Tomassini. That is to say, it was here that the Opus Dei’s penetration into the Catholic University of Chile took place. Expectedly, *Finis Terrae* thus touched on issues of public morality and spirituality in everyday life.⁶ While one cannot be evangelical “on an empty stomach,” it stated, economic development nonetheless must serve to “Christianize society” and lead to “spiritual salvation.”⁷ Overall, however, Lira and Eyzaguirre neither left a substantial imprint on Chile’s right-wing thought during this period, nor did they serve as a link to Franco’s Spain as they had done previous decades.

Consequently, by the mid-1960s a young and dynamic generation of Chilean thinkers replaced the authoritarian thinkers of the 1950s. This process went in tandem not only with

⁴ For further overviews on this period see - Correa Sutil, *Con las riendas del poder*; José Fernando García (ed.), *El discurso de la derecha chilena* (Santiago de Chile: CERC: 1992).

⁵ Oswaldo Lira, *Ortega en su espíritu* (Santiago: Editorial de la Universidad Católica, 1965), 102.

⁶ “Universidad y profesión,” *Finis Terrae*, no. 45 (September-October 1964): 3-4; “Iglesia y divorcio,” *Finis Terrae* no. 44 (July-August, 1964): 5-7.

⁷ “Subdesarrollo espiritual,” *Finis Terrae* no. 49 (May-June 1965): 2-5.

Eduardo Frei's rise to power but with the ever-growing presence of Francoist technocratic-authoritarian thought in Chile. As mentioned before, the Spanish embassy and ICH were cooperating in this period in an effort to coordinate political movements aligned with the Francoist worldview. Led by Roque Esteban Scarpa, Hernán Godoy Urzúa, and Arturo Fontaine, by the mid-1960s, Santiago's ICH branch was indeed one of the most energetic far-right circles in Chile's public sphere, and the most loyal to Franco in Latin America. An anecdote to support this claim was a letter sent by Chile's ICH director Raul Bazán to Alfredo Sánchez Bella in 1966 demanding a concrete ideological "action" from Madrid; to which Sánchez Bella responded that to achieve spiritual development "the institute in Madrid should stay behind curtains, promoting action, suggesting it, in some cases if necessary, financing it, but without appearing as its leader, because once it appears as such, 80 or 90 percent of its effect would be lost."⁸ Sánchez Bella's suggestions notwithstanding, Chile's ICH hardly operated "behind curtains." In fact, its members were noticeable public intellectuals - and this includes Sara Phillipi Izquierdo and Gisela Silva Encina, the heads of the ICH women's section - and hardly concealed their linkage to Spain. In his campaign against global family planning, ICH member Jorge Iván Hübner (discussed in chapter 1) even openly met with Franco in Madrid.⁹ Noteworthy in this respect is Sergio Fernández Larraín. Born in 1909, and trained as a historian, he was one of few who could rightfully consider themselves Franco's intimate friend.¹⁰ As Chile's Ambassador in Madrid in the early 1960s, Fernández Larraín witnessed the emergence of technocratic Spain first hand and was clearly

⁸ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a José María Alavares Romero, June 17, 1966, AGUN, documento 15/35/174.

⁹ Speaking at the Ateneo de Madrid he stressed that "there is no need to worry about population explosion," because of the "law of natural self-regulation," see - Jorge Iván Hübner, "El falso catastrofismo," *El Mercurio* (March 3, 1967); see also - "Visita del jefe del estado una comisión del arma de artillería," *ABC Madrid* (October 22, 1964); "Hübner Gallo en el Ateneo," *ABC Madrid* (October 26, 1966).

¹⁰ He also bragged of "hunting partridges with Franco in Toledo" and sending four of his daughters "to be educated at Castillo de la Mota, under the guidance of Pilar Primo de Rivera," see - "Sergio Fernández Larraín: Dios, patria y familia, versus comunismo," *Qué Pasa* no. 236 (October 30, 1975).

impressed with what he saw.¹¹ By the mid-1970s, he boasted that his life's pride was his "permanent campaign against communism and ardent defense of the eternal values of Spain."¹²

The presence of Francoist thought in Chile's conservative media was, by then, also noticeable. Apart from *El Mercurio*,¹³ *Estanquero*, and *El Diario Ilustrado*, other outlets, for instance, the publishing house Zig-Zag, now came under the aura of Spain's ideological production. The chief publishing house for Chile's conservative thinkers, in the 1960s, Zig-Zag held exclusive rights over the Francoist CSIC and IEP publications.¹⁴ Moreover, as in Argentina, Chile saw the arrival of prominent Francoist ideologues in the mid-1960s. Following Sánchez Bella's regular visits, Pérez Embid too arrived in Santiago de Chile. Reflecting on his journey, he stated the following anti-ideological authoritarian assertions. "I believe that in our time Western liberties can only be guaranteed by an authority with social effectiveness [...] this requires a formula that overcomes the political dialectic of the last century: oligarchies, elections, demagoguery, barracks," he wrote.¹⁵

Likewise, López Rodó arrived in Santiago before meeting with Onganía. Convening with Frei and his economic cabinet, the soft-spoken Opus Dei technocrat made several statements to

¹¹ "After some months in this country" Fernández wrote an "objective impression" of Franco's regime. This was a country of a "freedom of spoken expression," and the "front-line of anti-communist struggle," he stated, see - Confidencial, 154/9 26 de marzo de 1960, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1960, caja 5655.

¹² "Sergio Fernández Larraín: Dios, patria y familia, versus comunismo", 22-25; Indeed, he was one of the stauncher anti-communistic thinkers in 1960s Chile. His book *El comunismo sigue en marcha* from 1963 exclaimed that communism is appropriating Chile's intellectual world, directed from Moscow and aided by waves of Cuban "tourism," see - Sergio Fernández Larraín, *El comunismo sigue en marcha* (Santiago de Chile: Del Pregon), 9-20.

¹³ *El Mercurio* was the more important agent to be supportive of the Spanish dictatorship. Its literary critic Hernán Díaz Arrieta ("Alone") was another voice promoting Hispanic spirituality frequently.

¹⁴ *Libro de actas del patronato y asambleas del Instituto Chileno de Cultura Hispánica*, 21; Additionally, this was Eyzaguirre's main publishing house, and also gave a platform to Guillermo Blanco, Hugo Montes, and in later years to Ibáñez Langlois and Joaquín Lavín; see - José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, *El mundo pecador de Graham Greene* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1967); José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, *Eterno es el día* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1968).

¹⁵ "La realidad americana," *Mundo Hispánico*, no. 202 (January 1965): 71-73.

which the Chile's conservative media responded favorably. *El Mercurio*, for example, retold the Spaniard's propaganda in its entirety:

The central purpose of the Development Plan is to make Spain raise its standard of living, develop its culture, and provide greater well-being to its inhabitants, within three conditions: maximum speed, economic stability, and exaltation of the dignity and freedom of man. [...] López Rodó highlighted the assistance that Spain could provide Chile to establish vocational training centers, training courses for women, and artisan courses.¹⁶

El Diario Ilustrado further quoted him for saying that "Spain is not a miracle since these do not exist in the economy, but, fundamentally, the fruit of a collective effort of a nation determined to reach a better destination within [proper] standards of the justice."¹⁷ In a word: Spain's economic liftoff was, by now, openly debated upon Chile's conservative platforms.

The most prominent visit of all was that of Gonzalo Fernández de las Mora. Being the Director of Cultural Cooperation at Spain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and hailed by *El Mercurio* as an agent of "scientific rigor and pure rational effort," in 1967 he gave a series of lectures in Chile.¹⁸ Spain's philosophies, he opined then, had thus far suffered from "improvisation, contradiction, [and] 'machismo,'" whereas what Latin America needs is the opposite: "science, invention, rigor, method, pragmatism, efficiency." Given the contemporary global economic moment, he insisted, ideologies have become redundant in the West, thus "taking refuge in the most underdeveloped areas of the world." Next, he made an example of the Spanish case:

Forty years ago, it was a country of scarce development and today it is only a short distance from the developed nations. In that period, it has gone from 200 dollars per capita to 700. I remember that, in my childhood, in a town in Pontevedra, sugar was bought in pharmacies and was a luxury item. Currently, people commute on motorcycles and have televisions. Spain has experienced, in a very short time, the industrial revolution, the economic democratization, and the change of mentalities that in Great Britain took a century. We are

¹⁶ "El plan de desarrollo español da primacía a la empresa privada: declaraciones exclusivas para El Mercurio del Ministro español Laureano López Rodó," *El Mercurio* (August 14, 1966).

¹⁷ *El Diario Ilustrado* (August 12, 1966); see also - "Reseña de la rueda de prensa celebrada en la embajada de España," August 11, 1966, AGUN, box 005/480.

¹⁸ "El desarrollo económico deja atrasa las ideologías: Entrevista al profesor español Fernández de la Mora," *El Mercurio* (September 29, 1967).

a nation of 30 million habitants whose only “ideology” is economic development, that is, no longer an ideology proper, but a rational and realistic impulse.¹⁹

These words were technocratic-authoritarianism in its purest form. A teleological narrative, it spoke of an invisible agent “developing” a nation, bringing it from poverty to consumption in astounding speed, and consequently, liberating it from the “ideologies” plaguing it through a deterministic “change of mentalities.” The masses, Fernández de las Mora clarified, were completely out of the equation as historical agents: “there is no development without social reform, but this cannot be done either by paying attention to the street or from the street,” he warned his hosts.²⁰ That these words challenged Eduardo Frei’s democratic mobilization was fairly clear.

By the mid-1960s the direct influence of Francoist technocratic thought could be seen in the work and activism of a new generation of Chilean youngsters. Nothing exemplifies this better than the early texts of Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz. Unquestionably Pinochet’s most prominent ideologue in the 1970s, his intellectual trajectory echoed Francoism’s ideological shift between 1957 and 1976. Guzmán began his career sounding much like a “revolutionary” Falangist, only later to reemerge as Chile’s quintessential technocratic-authoritarian thinker, and last, as a theorist of “protected” democracies. Thus, his ideology, I argue, was not “marked by a remarkable conceptual unity and harmony,” as some historians have argued, but saliently changed throughout the years.²¹

A student of Lira and Eyzaguirre at the elitist Catholic school Colegio de los Sagrados Corazones, Guzmán was sent to Spain in 1962. Barely sixteen years old, he wrote his mother the following words:

I am already in Spain. I am already bursting with hispanism and Francoism [...]. I am an arch-Francoist because I have felt that the Generalissimo is the Savior of Spain, and have

¹⁹ “El crepúsculo de las ideologías: conferencia de Fernández de la Mora,” *El Mercurio* (October 1, 1967).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Renato Cristi, *El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán: autoridad y libertad* (Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones, 2000), 7.

noticed his illustrious personality, how happy people are with him, how well he works, and what economic progress he created. And let it be known that in Spain today there is absolute freedom, [...] oriented towards the Common Good and not to satisfy the absurd principle of the French Revolution - “Liberte” that ends up in debauchery. [...] The Valley of the Fallen, the greatest work of the twentieth century. Mama: a country that builds a monument like this, is the greatest country in the world.²²

Many have already cited these words as the definitive proof of Guzmán’s admiration of Franco.²³

That might be the case. Conversely, one should refrain from reducing his future work to this moment of exuberance. What we can definitely learn from this letter is how Franco’s indoctrination dazed the youngsters visiting Spain in the 1960s. One can also clearly notice here how the “economic miracle” had become an integral part of the Francoist teleological narrative regarding Spain’s universal mission against the French Revolution. Similarly, a text Guzmán wrote in his school’s journal, tellingly titled “Viva Franco, Arriba España,” implies that his visit to Spain equipped him with updated corporatist ideological outlines. “National-syndicalism,” he preached, “stands for a corporate organization of society, based not on political parties, but on the Family, the Municipality, and the Unions - intermediary bodies with authentic natural right, situated between society and the State.”²⁴ Indeed, some of these formulas would resonate in Guzmán’s texts at least until 1980.

But Guzmán was neither a Falangist nor a neo-fascist. Unlike Tacuara, and like Beccar Varela’s *Cruzada* affiliation, he quickly identified the reactionary Catholic ideological ground at the heart of the Francoist hierarchic order. In 1962, it was also clear to him that José Antonio Primo de Rivera was not the main ideological point of reference for Chile’s future political project. While

²² “Carta de Jaime Guzmán a Carmen Errazuriz, 10 de marzo de 1962,” in Rosario Guzmán, *Mi hermano Jaime*, (Santiago: Editorial VER, 1991), 79-80.

²³ See for instance - José Manuel Castro, *Jaime Guzmán: ideas y política 1946-1973*, 37; Weld, “The Spanish Civil War and the Construction of a Reactionary Historical Consciousness in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile”, 94.

²⁴ “Viva Franco, Arriba España!” *La Revista Escolar: Colegio de los Sagrados Corazones*, no. 436 (I trimester, 1962): 17

an acolyte of Eyzaguirre and Lira, he was neither a “corporatist” as his teachers, nor did he speak of Hispanidad much. Rather, in his effort to define a novel post-fascist horizon he too was attracted to the message of Corrêa de Oliveira. Thus, by the mid-1960s, Guzmán voiced a hybrid of intellectual influences that ultimately yielded a unique Chilean version of technocratic-authoritarianism. While clearly, albeit not admittedly, inspired by Fernández de la Mora and Sánchez Agesta, he was to propose his own path for a “post-ideological” society.

Guzmán eventually became a prominent figure in the recently-opened Chilean Tradición, Familia y Propiedad branch, notorious for its journal *Fiducia*. Corrêa de Oliveira’s conception of the enemy appeared here unapologetically: Marxists are “the enemies of God,” he told his Chilean audience.²⁵ Still a teenager, Guzmán added to this line of argumentation. The Détente, he wrote then, was an unacceptable reality. “Communism is still atheist and materialist, and therefore, a monstrous enemy of God and his church,” he maintained.²⁶ Defining private property as “natural law,”²⁷ he also fiercely attacked Frei’s reading of the Church’s gospel,²⁸ and, in turn, the Christian Democrats’ upcoming 1965 Land Reform.²⁹ By then, Guzmán reached one other important conclusion: whether it was fascism, or “communitarianism,” there was no liable revolutionary “third position” to be sought.³⁰

²⁵ “La verdadera paz exige la lucha de los seguidores de Cristo contra sus enemigos,” *Fiducia*, no. 14 (December-January, 1964): 54.

²⁶ “Relaciones diplomáticas con los países comunistas,” *Fiducia*, no. 13 (November 1964): 9.

²⁷ “El derecho de propiedad y el proyecto de reforma constitucional,” *Fiducia*, no. 13 (November 1964): 12.

²⁸ “El diálogo, la socialización y la paz utilizados como slogans de la Revolución,” *Fiducia*, no. 17 (May-June 1965).

²⁹ Or what *Fiducia* labelled Frei’s “economic and political dictatorship,” see - “Declaraciones frente a la reforma constitucional y la reforma agraria: en defensa del derecho de propiedad privada,” *Fiducia*, no. 15 (February-March 1965); Guzmán also justified the Brazilian dictatorship, labeling it an “uprising that avoided an imminent communist aggression,” see - “Respondiendo a FEUC sobre el alzamiento en Brasil, 1964, Archivo Federación Jaime Guzmán; also in - Castro, *Jaime Guzmán: Ideas y política*, 80.

³⁰ “Behind the slogan ‘neither capitalism nor communism’ [...] hides socialism,” he said, see - “El capitalismo y los católicos de tercera posición,” *Fiducia*, no. 20 (October 1965).

Guzmán's first actual political activism was the establishment of the Movimiento Gremial de la Universidad Católica de Chile, better known as "gremialistas." There was very little "unionism" in the gremialista program, as the Spanish word might suggest. The "gilds" to which *gremial* alludes were rather the pre-modern "intermediary groups" that had allegedly operated in the times of the Spanish Empire. The legends surrounding the gremialistas and their supposed influence on Pinochet's dictatorship have shaped the ways in which historians have depicted the prominence of the group also in the 1960s - a tendency we should at least be aware of at this point of the analysis.³¹ The gremialistas were merely a student organization devoid of a publishing apparatus. Consequently, they were noticeable perhaps in the social circles of the Catholic University. Yet even by the end of the decade Guzmán and his colleagues were still relatively anonymous figures in Chile's public sphere, known mostly of battling the Christian Democrats' higher educational reform, and, like the Opus Dei, proposing their own version of Catholic science by harmonizing "the natural with the supernatural."³²

At any rate, during this period Guzmán and the gremialistas explored both the economic and spiritual aspects of collective action. On the one hand, Guzmán theorized private property not merely as a key for market-oriented economic development but as society's essential ethical ground. Thus, Frei's Land Reform, Guzmán thought, was a "violation of a basic principle of

³¹ For more historical analyses on this period see - Belén Moncada Durruti, *Jaime Guzmán: una democracia contrarevolucionaria: el político de 1964 a 1980* (Santiago de Chile: RIL Editores), 200; Cristián Gazmuri, *Quién era Jaime Guzmán?* (Santiago de Chile: Ril editores, 2013), 33-61; Cristi, *El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán*, 69-74; Castro, *Jaime Guzmán: ideas y política*, 101-135.

³² "The Gremialistas resolutely defend the Catholic character of our University [...] the Revelation does not harm the autonomy of each science. [...] all science - properly conducted - must be in accordance with the revelation's principles; otherwise, it will be pseudo-science, unless it is intended to deny the harmony of the natural with the supernatural", see - "A la escuela de derecho: declaración de principios del movimiento gremial," in Castro, *Jaime Guzmán: ideas y política*, 208-216; see also - Jaime Guzmán, *Teoría sobre la Universidad* (Santiago de Chile: Universidad Católica, 1970).

natural law,” and the beginning of a “socialist and totalitarian” turn.³³ On the other hand, Guzmán was also a spiritual technocrat. “It is not enough to be technical professionals,” he touted, as “life has no worth if it is not utilized in the service of a larger cause.” Quoting José Antonio Primo de Rivera, he even suggested merging capitalist development with a “spiritual cause.”³⁴ José Antonio’s references aside, Guzmán and his followers presented a platform considerably dissimilar to that of the Falange’s forefather. Indeed, in their founding documents the gremialistas developed their technocratic-authoritarian language, as they now advocated the societal “de-politicization” and distinguished between “social” and “political” types of power. Markedly, the ideology they promoted was an anti-statist type of authoritarianism, wherein the regime, after purging society from its “enemies,” invites “intermediary” civic agencies to work in autonomy.³⁵

Graduating from the Catholic University of Chile, Guzmán continued to delineate this future “liberal” dictatorship. In 1969, he spoke of three types of states: the “liberal/ individualist,” the “socialist/statist,” and the Catholic “subsidiary state.” Given that “Socialism is the son of Liberalism,” and in a search for rapid economic efficiency, one must opt, he believed, for the third model, as it is the only one conscious “of the transcendent purpose of man.” In a typical post-fascist turn, Guzmán expounded next that by “subsidiary state” he meant that the state apparatus “is secondary not only with respect to man as such, but also regarding the family, the municipalities, and the unions - the only possibility of forming a truly organic society.”³⁶ Guzmán

³³ Jaime Guzmán, “El derecho de propiedad y el proyecto de reforma constitucional,” *Fiducia*, no. 13, (November 1964): 9; see also - Jaime Guzmán, *Escritos personales* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1992), 153.

³⁴ As Castro has pointed out, the sentence “la vida no vale la pena si no es para quemarla al servicio de una empresa grande” is a direct quotation from Primo de Rivera’s speech on February 25 1934 in Carpio de Tajo; see - Castro, *Jaime Guzmán: ideas y política*, 105; also - “Discurso a nombre de alumnos nuevos Facultad de Derecho, ceremonia de inauguración del año académico de 1969, la Facultad de Derecho,” Fundación Jaime Guzmán; José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *Textos de doctrina política* (Madrid: Sección Femenina de la FET, 1971), 176.

³⁵ “Discurso a nombre de alumnos nuevos Facultad de Derecho, ceremonia de inauguración del año académico de 1969, la Facultad de Derecho,” located at Fundación Jaime Guzmán.

³⁶ Jaime Guzmán, “El miedo, síntoma de la realidad político-social chilena,” *Portada*, no. 2 (1969): 5-7, 14.

failed to clarify whether he still believed in the separation of powers, for instance. In a sense, he did not need to: the model he was depicting was Franco's Spain in 1969.

While the gremialistas set the initial contours for Chile's post-ideological regime, the Opus Dei became ever more noticeable in Chile's public sphere. Following the *Cuadernos del Sur* project, with the aid of *Zig-Zag* and *El Mercurio* in the late 1960s, the Opus Dei intellectuals discussed in chapter 3 became ever noticeable in Chile's media. María Teresa Alamos became, for example, a prominent writer in *El Mercurio*. Another affiliate of the Opus Dei publicist network was Gonzalo Vial Correa.³⁷ Born in 1930, in the 1960s this young historian, himself a disciple of Eyzaguirre and a keen interpreter of Hispanic spirituality, began making a name for himself for his media savviness. As we will see shortly, he too would be a crucial actor in the early 1970s campaigns against Salvador Allende. Above all, Ibáñez Langlois himself now became a public intellectual, primarily as *El Mercurio*'s literary critique and publishing under the pseudonym Ignacio Valette. Thus, for more than two decades it was an Opus Dei priest who mediated the modern literary world to Chile's conservative readers. This did not mean that Ibáñez necessarily criticized secular literary work; it did signify however the frequent appearance of ultra-conservative writers in his work.³⁸ Ibáñez Langlois also became known for his poetry. In particular, it was his 1971 *Poemas dogmáticos* that attracted public critique. Apart from its alleged

³⁷ The brother of the aforementioned Opus Dei supernumeraries Elena Vial Correa and Juan de Dios Vial Correa, his wife was María Luisa Vial, an Opus Dei supernumerary and founder of the Colegios de la Fundación Barnechea, see - Mönckeberg, *El imperio del Opus Dei en Chile*, 215.

³⁸ For instance, he praised the work of his friend Armando Roa, who Ibáñez Langlois said was "educated in the manner of those Renaissance doctors and sages, capable of [...] combining rigorous modern study with the ancient ideal of humanities." Roa was a psychiatrist known for blending psychiatry with Catholic spiritualism and was married to an Opus Dei supernumerary, see - Ignacio Valente, "Armando Roa: Psiquiatría y destino," *El Mercurio* (October 24, 1971).

misogyny,³⁹ the book ridiculed the Christian Democrats and derided birth control.⁴⁰ Yet the most important role Ibáñez Langlois played in those years was his public “debate” with Marxist thought. More accurately, in his books *Marxismo y cristianismo*⁴¹ and *El Marxismo: visión crítica*, as well as in numerous other articles, Ibáñez Langlois set out to refute Marxism and the Liberation Theology with it. He did so by stressing that Marx’s theory is “a secularized and atheist version of the Judeo-Christian hope, of mysticism, of theology, and of the Catholic apocalypse,” and by certifying that only the Christian faith “can do justice to Marxism.” Of course, he did not merely point to the semblance between Marxism and the Christian theology; he insinuated that the former is the ontological truth while the latter is a perilous imitation.⁴²

Through Zig-Zag the Opus Dei was granted access to the prestigious women’s magazine *Eva*. Published also in Argentina and Peru, between 1967 and until the mid-1970s this platform was thereby to become strikingly similar to the aforementioned magazine *Telva*. With María Elena Aguirre and Carmen Echeverría as editors (both discussed in chapter 3), the Opus Dei’s toolkit of spiritual indoctrination was paramount here. Whether it was campaigning against divorce,⁴³ or ridiculing the 1960s youth culture,⁴⁴ warning against drugs,⁴⁵ or scolding birth control⁴⁶ - *Eva* was

³⁹ “No tengo nada contra ti, mujer. Me pareces sagrada y misteriosa y más próxima al cielo que a la tierra. y que amarte es más dulce que la miel. No tengo nada contra ti, si no es que un día se te caerán los dientes, que no eres Dios, que engordas, que te mueres,” José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, *Poemas dogmáticos* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1971), 64.

⁴⁰ See for example - “Diálogo demócrata cristiano con la luna”, 121; “Karl Marx se encerró una noche a leer las Sagradas Escrituras”, 102; “La madre de un hijo, esa mujer,” 59, all three in Ibáñez Langlois, *Poemas dogmáticos*.

⁴¹ Some of his writings were published in Spain, in Jesus Urteaga’s *Mundo Cristiano* booklet series, see - José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, *Marxismo y cristianismo* (Madrid: Mundo Cristiano, 1974).

⁴² “El demonio es una verdad incómoda,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 153 (March. 29, 1974):18-19; “El marxismo ateísmo en forma de religión,” *El Mercurio* (April 7, 1974); “Utopía del tercer milenio,” *Ercilla*, no. 2346 (July 16, 1980); “Teología de la liberación traiciona la causa de pobre,” *La Tercera* (July 30, 1985).

⁴³ “Hasta que la muerte nos separa?” *Eva*, no. 1278 (October 24, 1969): 96-97; “La fidelidad,” *Eva*, no. 1239, (January 24, 1969): 76-79; María Elena Aguirre, “A propósito de Fidelidad,” *Eva*, no. 1243 (February 21, 1969): 18.

⁴⁴ “Eva opina: la juventud y sus dioses,” *Eva*, no. 1227 (November 7, 1968): 9-11.

⁴⁵ “Viaje a la incertidumbre,” *Eva*, no. 1267 (August 8, 1969): 54-64.

⁴⁶ “La píldora de la discordia,” *Eva*, no. 1250 (April, 11, 1969): 30-35; “¿Qué es lo que cambia con la píldora?” *Eva*, no. 1383 (November 26, 1971): 30-33.

the showcase of the Opus Dei's vision of middle-class womanhood.⁴⁷ It even published a series of articles by the name of "Eva's Sex education encyclopedia" where it stressed that only within wedlock can one "take sexuality to a higher level, that which is really human."⁴⁸

In the case of Chile, the Opus Dei's peculiar logic of feminism appeared in an even fuller form. The 20th century has presented women with two immoral positions, Aguirre alleged: Hitler's "Church, Kitchen, Children" ideal, and the 1960s progressive movement, which demanded from women "to be like men." Both resulted, she said, in appalling consequences. "Women have their own nature," she argued and gave the ensuing pseudo-scientific analysis to support her claims:

Women suffer from emotional instability, due to the vulnerability of their glandular and neuro-sympathetic system. Therefore, they aspire to balance and harmony. Men, on the other hand, are made for adventure. They are not content with stable situations, are revolutionary, and dissatisfied. Women, as general elections have shown, are much more conservative. [...] women are less gifted for abstract speculation but have a much richer sentimental life than man. [...] when a woman begets a child, she becomes the happy slave of that child [...] A woman subordinates her work and intellectual activity to her home, her husband, her children. She will never be able to focus on her career fully [...] Her role in future society is vital for its development, as she fulfills the plea made by all men, old people, and children, to humanize, to transform and to fill them with love.⁴⁹

Despite not admitting it, Aguirre's stance was not entirely dissimilar from the Nazi chauvinism, as she too implied that women are mainly functional as housewives. To suggest otherwise was to go against their biologic "nature." Strikingly, women empowerment, for the Opus Dei, thus meant tailoring a "scientific" theory around the difference between the genders. In evaluating the "complexes" of womanhood, *Eva* frequently evoked other "psychological" features, for instance by accusing women of having a "Diana complex."⁵⁰ Men, also received their share of schooling,

⁴⁷ Promoting the "cursos de empleadas del hogar," see - "Otra mujer en su casa," *Eva*, no. 1235 (December 26, 1968): 55-57, see also - "Sí, soy burguesa," *Eva*, no. 1270 (August 29, 1969): 22-27.

⁴⁸ "Educación sexual," *Eva* (April, 17, 1970), 31.

⁴⁹ "1968, la mujer busca su destino," *Eva*, no. 1234 (December 20, 1968): 55-57.

⁵⁰ "Es usted una mujer acomplexada?" *Eva* no. 1223 (September 19, 1968): 26-32; "Soy sentimental?" *Eva*, no. 1269 (August 22, 1969): 16; "1969: doce meses para ser feliz," *Eva*, no. 1235 (December 27, 1968): 56-62.

as *Eva* presented them with an anti-revolutionary ideal type, who is “not immoral,” does not “even smoke,” believes to “hold the truth,” does “not like hippies,” and who is a leader “without looking for it.”⁵¹ Even homosexuality was admitted into the discussion at this point - more often than not lesbianism - only to be deemed an “evil spreading in giant steps.”⁵² Arguably, for the Opus Dei homosexuality was not a cultural issue but a psychiatric one, and thus not worthwhile explaining.

The relationship between Chile’s different post-fascist affiliations was intimate, but not always harmonious. In 1966, a dispute between TFP and Opus Dei even became apparent. It began when Ibáñez Langlois disapproved of the TFP’s cherry-picking of episcopal texts for what he thought was a fundamentalist approach. Being the Opus Dei’s spiritual leader in Chile, he believed the TFP discourse might harm the urbane spiritual movement he and his followers disseminated in the Southern Cone. Jesus Christ, he said, should not be brought into what essentially was a political “quarrel.”⁵³ And yet, this dispute between the companions for the road did not last long. As we will see shortly, by the early 1970s Guzmán and the Opus Dei would cooperate harmoniously. The point not to be missed is that, in the late-1960s, these post-fascist ideological networks were all mobilizing to produce a militant countermovement against the mobilization of Chile’s left-wing parties. Overall, when it comes to penetration into the public sphere, the gremialistas and the Opus Dei were to demonstrate more ideological sophistication and political cunning than the TFP.

⁵¹ “Por qué soy líder,” *Eva*, no. 1236 (January 3, 1969): 84-96; the “anti-hippie” approach came to its acme in 1970, when *Eva*’s special report from the island of Ibiza, where is stressed that the hippies were a dying species, see - Ignacio Vicuña L., “Honorosa Hippilancia?” *Eva*, no. 1296 (February 27, 1970); see also - “Londres: furibunda rebelión anti-hippie,” *Eva*, no. 1300 (March 27, 1970): 24- 27.

⁵² Gloria Urgelles, “Lesbianismo: un mal solo para discretas,” *Eva*, no. 1380 (November 5, 1971): 33.

⁵³ “Respuesta al R. P. José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois,” *Fiducia*, no. 22 (February-March 1966): 9-11; see also - “Fiducia y los pecados del mundo,” *Portada*, no. 7 (1969): 27.

The struggle against Salvador Allende and the Popular Unity, 1970-1973

After nearly twenty years in Chilean politics, Salvador Allende won the September 1970 elections with only 36.6 percent of the general vote. In broad strokes, his political alliance, the Popular Unity, aimed to restructure Chilean politics through mobilization of the working classes, at all levels of society. Thereafter, the so-called “Chilean Road to Socialism” was to comprise of a unique combination of governmental and private economies. By nationalizing Chile’s mining industries and other private enterprises, Allende aimed to establish areas of “social property” (*área de propiedad social*) operating side by side with a restricted private economy.⁵⁴ For the Chilean far-right polity the Christian Democrats had been a misguided, yet respectable, opponent.⁵⁵ Allende and his program, on the other hand, were, for them, an illegitimate phenomenon. The process of delegitimizing Allende publicly, to the point of deeming him an external enemy worth eradication, was an intricate process however. As we will see shortly, this defamation campaign depended on peculiar narratives of victimhood and words games, using much Francoist mythology along with crafty improvisations.

For the Chilean Right the 1970 elections and the turbulent years that followed them were a period of restructuring. The electoral failure of Jorge Alessandri (or “alessandrismo”) was not accidental: the seventy-four-year-old leader of the National Party alliance had fairly little to offer the Chilean society in terms of novel economic and social plans. He too was, the argument went, a “man without ideology.” Vial Correa even promoted this as his talent: “For Alessandrismo [...]

⁵⁴ For several lucid analyses of Allende’s program of nationalization, see - Harmer, *Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*, 107-49; Angela Vergara, *Copper Workers, International Business, and Domestic Politics in Cold War Chile* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 155-78; Víctor Farías, *La izquierda chilena (1969-1973): documentos para el estudio de su línea estratégica* (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2000); Claudio Llanos, “El gobierno de Allende y la UP frente al ‘Poder Popular’ 1970-1972: Las bases radicalizadas y su dinámica,” *História Unisinos*, vol. 16, no. 1 (March 27, 2012): 28–42.

⁵⁵ Indeed, the language of the Chilean Right became particularly acrimonious Frei began implementing his Land Reform in 1967, also known as Laws 16.640 and 16.625.

authority stands for the end of the ideologies, the end of doctrinal theorists disconnected from real life,” he opined.⁵⁶ These types of technocratic superlatives apparently had but limited value in the poles. Thus, from 1970 a young generation of intellectuals was to take over the far-right’s ideological identity, while the figures of the 1950s - Jorge Prat and Alessandri for instance - were relegated to a secondary role in Chile’s right-wing politics.⁵⁷

From 1970 onward, the gremialistas propagated their alternative regime model openly. In the same vein, Guzmán led the effort to conceptualize “Marxism” in and of itself as a revolutionary threat. A social theory in essence, Marxism, for Guzmán, had become a historical agent. “Nothing is better for Marxism than the generous idealism of certain democrats,” he said in 1971.⁵⁸ In turn, he attacked the alleged naiveté of the Chilean liberals who never thought that the day would come when one “will use democracy to configure a totalitarian state that violates the essential freedoms of citizens.”⁵⁹ Juxtaposing the Armed Forces with Marxism, he also argued that the former was “professional” and “not at the service of any ideology,” whereas the latter did not believe in the “character or professional of anything.”⁶⁰ In Guzmán’s opinion, holding Marxist views meant, by definition, perceiving the state as a device for a communistic takeover.

Alongside the gremialistas, new platforms now appeared that conveyed even more coherent alternative visions of economic and social development. One of them was Vial Correa’s new journal *Portada*. While publicly promoting a *coup d’état* was somewhat risky, one could still suggest that Allende has ceased to serve the common good, and thus, was illegitimate. *Portada*

⁵⁶ Gonzalo Vial Correa, “Alessandri y alessandrismo,” *Portada*, no. 10 (1970): 2.

⁵⁷ Prat, to whom Vial Correa served as a personal secretary, died in 1971, while Alessandri would return to serve Pinochet’s regime in the late-1970s. For more on the Alessandri decline, see - Patricia Arancibia, Alvaro Góngora, and Gonzalo Vial, *Jorge Alessandri 1896-1986. Una biografía* (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1996).

⁵⁸ “Dos grandes equívocos e un momento decisivo,” *Portada*, no. 342 (December 17, 1971): 4.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 3.

⁶⁰ Jaime Guzmán, “Dos Grande equívocos en el momento decisivo,” *PEC*, no. 432 (December 17, 1971).

did precisely that. Featuring a mix of far-right ideologues,⁶¹ even before the 1970 elections, the journal proposed an alternative authoritarian order, which will not be “identified with any party, re-establish authority, and crush the threatening anarchism,” and in so doing, “reestablish social peace,” and “national unity.”⁶² *Portada* also invited Guzmán to explicate the hazards of “fundamentalist statism,” and promote his idea of “state subsidiary,” as the model best-suited to the Chilean metaphysical condition.⁶³ In turn, *Portada* was one of the most callous attackers of Allende, deeming him a “Marxist-Leninist,”⁶⁴ and a “Soviet penetration of Chile.”⁶⁵ Towards the end of 1971, Vial Correa was also convinced Allende was on the brink of eradicating free speech in Chile, by threatening to nationalize of the “most powerful Chilean publishing house Zig-Zag” and threatening to put *El Mercurio* under the “supervision of Workers’ United Center (CUT).”⁶⁶ These were generally exaggerations. They are indicative, however, of the prominence Vial Correa attributed to these publications as the frontrunners of Chile’s anti-Marxist “resistance.”⁶⁷

By March 1972, once Allende began realizing his nationalization policies, *Portada* declared itself a “nationalist” platform with a “doctrine of national reality”⁶⁸ and vowed to protect Chile as the “heir of the Greco-Roman world, Christianity, and Spain.” It now featured Arturo Fontaine (presented in chapter 1) who defined Chile’s “nationalist ideals” using deterministic ecological theories. “The true nationalist is not a developmentalist,” he suggested, and added, in the spirit of

⁶¹ The journal openly supported the Opus Dei, see - Fernando Orrego, “El Opus Dei y la política,” *Portada*, no. 9 (1970): 30.

⁶² “Crisis de autoridad,” *Portada*, no. 5, May 1969, 17.

⁶³ “El miedo. Síntoma de la realidad político-social chilena,” *Portada*, no. 2 (1969): 14.

⁶⁴ “El fenómeno gremialista,” *Portada*, no. 22 (June 1971); Richard Cox, “La situación chilena ante la doctrina marxista,” *Portada*, no. 30 (April 1972): 9-13.

⁶⁵ “Dos años de penetración soviética en Chile,” *Portada*, no. 39 (May 1973).

⁶⁶ “365 días de vía chilena,” *Portada*, no. 25 (November 1971): 5.

⁶⁷ For further debates on Allende’s struggle with the right-wing media, and *El Mercurio*’s cooperation with the CIA, see - Harmer, *Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*, 59, 154; for a more biased narrative, see also - René Silva Espejo, *El Mercurio y su lucha con el marxismo* (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1975).

⁶⁸ Editorial, *Portada*, no. 29 (March 1971).

Hispanidad, that “Chilean nationalism postulates that Chile is not born in Chacabuco or Maipu but with Don Perdo de Valdivia.”⁶⁹ By now *Portada* propagated “realism” and “state subsidiary” as its own ideological stance.⁷⁰ And as Allende’s regime entered a dramatic phase of economic crisis in 1973, *Portada* freely debated the prospects of civil war as if in 1936 Spain.⁷¹ To further evoke this parallel it presented Álvaro d’Ors’s *Arbor* article “Silent leges inter arma” (in times of war, the law falls silent), a text condoning civil war. As I have mentioned, Álvaro d’Ors was known for his anti-pacifist approach (page 120). In this text, he advocated a “state of exception” in which “the validity of the laws is suspended, [...] making way for a martial law of security.”⁷² Evidently, in this case, Carl Schmitt’s theory arrived in Chile through the particular Francoist lens of an Opus Dei theorist. In short, in a matter of months, *Portada* exhibited a mounting radicalization, promoting a blend of bellicosity, Hispanidad, and technocratic-authoritarian schemes of an “intermediary” state-model.

More fundamental for the delegitimization of Salvador Allende was Vial Correa a new journal *Qué Pasa*. Launched in 1971, unlike *Portada* it aimed to be the somewhat more sophisticated voice of the “opposition.”⁷³ With himself serving as editor, and with Diego Ibáñez Langlois (supernumerary) on the editing board, the journal had a clear Opus Dei imprint.⁷⁴ Like his brother, Ibáñez Langlois studies in Navarra, was an ICH fellow, and returned to Chile a specialist in matters of education and youth morality.⁷⁵ Other contributors from *Cuadernos del Sur*

⁶⁹ “Ideas nacionalistas chilenas,” *Portada*, no. 29 (March 1971): 12.

⁷⁰ “El destino de Chile y Portada,” *Portada*, no. 29 (March 1971): 3-6.

⁷¹ “En la Araucanía se atiza la guerra civil,” *Portada*, no. 18 (February 1971): 1-2.

⁷² Editorial. *Portada*, no. 41 (June 1973): 32-36.

⁷³ “La oposición: temperaturas distintas y armas a elegir,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 36 (October 32, 1971): 1; “El futuro de la oposición,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 54 (April 27, 1972): 5.

⁷⁴ More on this, see - Mönckeberg, *El imperio del Opus Dei en Chile*, 264.

⁷⁵ He also wrote spiritual poetry, see - Diego Ibáñez Langlois, *Las manos afligidas* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones del Joven Laurel, 1959); Diego Ibáñez Langlois, *Sentido común y educación en la familia* (Santiago de Chile: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1989).

- Sergio Contardo Egaña, Hermógenes Pérez del Arce, Arturo Fontaine, and Lilian Calm - also joined *Qué Pasa* as collaborators,⁷⁶ along with Jaime Guzmán. Despite its alleged moderation, *Qué Pasa* openly praised Franco's "dictablanda," and his "resisting" of the western blockade in 1945.⁷⁷ And as other Opus Dei publications, its editors enjoyed debating the alleged "mystique" surrounding the journal's very nature. "What are we?" pondered one editorial in 1973, and replied: "For some *Qué Pasa* is a 'mummy,' for others, Christian Democratic; for some, we belong to Opus Dei, for others, we represent international and national fascism. This eagerness to categorize us is a fine example of what we want to combat: the Chileans' unhealthy need to divide themselves into irreconcilable factions."⁷⁸ These pluralist statements notwithstanding, *Qué Pasa* displayed a consistent ideological line, as it fundamentally sought to retrieve Chile to its "traditional values," purge it from "false calls for social revolution,"⁷⁹ and, as Armando Roa said, along the way, "liquidate the menace of professional pornographers."⁸⁰ More important, *Qué Pasa* propagated Guzmán's gremialismo, now fully developed into a post-fascist model of authoritarian rule and civic "participation." Or as he himself wrote in *Qué Pasa* in 1972:

I think that the Chilean Gremialismo is the antithesis of fascism. We must not forget that fascism is a totalitarian and statist doctrine. The phrase "everything within the State and nothing outside it" belongs to Mussolini, [...]. On the other hand, I see Gremialismo as a modern manifestation of a nascent social democracy in which authentic participation can be achieved. Perhaps its "doctrinal backbone" can be sought in the old philosophical principle of subsidiarity, the key to every libertarian regime, by which the State should not directly coordinate civic activities that can be carried out by intermediate or grassroots organizations.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Asked in a *Qué Pasa* interview what he thought of those who label him an "Opus Dei and a Nazi," he replied that he was "not an Opus Dei member, and am not planning to become one, nor am I a Nazi or a fascist," see- "Arturo Fontaine, un acero preciso," *Qué Pasa*, no. 73 (September 7, 1972): 18.

⁷⁷ "Un tercio de siglo de 'dictablanda,'" *Qué Pasa*, no. 76 (September 28, 1972): 22-24.

⁷⁸ "¿Que somos?" *Qué Pasa*, no. 100 (March 15, 1973): 5.

⁷⁹ "Nuevas idolatrías," *Qué Pasa*, no. 8 (June 8, 1971): 3.

⁸⁰ "Que hacer frente a la pornografía?" *Qué Pasa* no. 28 (October 28, 1971): 14.

⁸¹ "Jaime Guzmán y el desafío gremial," *Qué Pasa*, no. 80 (October 26, 1972): 38.

In brief, not only was Guzmán's model post-fascist and anti-statist, but it belonged, in his own opinion at least, within the perimeters of libertarian theory.

Parallel to Guzmán's theories of the state, Chile saw the emergence of its own neo-fascist brand of "nacionalismo" in this period. Of course, the term "nationalist" was hardly new in Chilean right-wing politics. Among those who labeled themselves "nacionalistas" in the 1960s were anyone from hispanistas such as Arturo Fontaine, Mario Gongora, and Jorge Iván Hübner, to Jorge Prat, the leader of the party Nacional Action. Nevertheless, Chile's 1970s nacionalistas betrayed more obvious neo-fascist undertones. A case in point was Juan Antonio Widow's journal *Tizona*. Appearing in 1972, this platform not only attacked Allende but featured several neo-fascist Spanish ideologues such as Francisco Elías de Tejada,⁸² Agustín de Foxa, and Blas Piñar.⁸³ As I will detail fully in chapter 6, the neo-fascist networks between Spain and the Southern Cone were forming in this very period.

Ultimately, however, it was Pablo Rodríguez Grez's movement Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad that was to define Chile's emerging "nationalismo." Demarcating Rodríguez Grez's movement ideologically is a fairly intricate endeavor if only because he distinctively denied being either neo-fascist,⁸⁴ or traditionalist.⁸⁵ At a minimum, Patria y Libertad was an anti-communistic and anti-liberal association, "of the spirit" and against "materialisms."⁸⁶ Arguably, Rodríguez Grez

⁸² "La rebelión y sus fines"; "El derecho de la rebelión"; "La resistencia al tirano: cartas desde Sevilla," in *Tizona*, no. 44 (June 1973): 4-8.

⁸³ "El peso de la purpura"; "Hipócritas"; "Como cayo Portugal," in *Tizona*, no. 53 (April 1974); Blas Piñar also hosted Widow on his journal *Fuerza Nueva*, see - Juan Antonio Widow, "El comunismo y los católicos," *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 17 (May 6, 1967): 26.

⁸⁴ "If historically there have been totalitarian nationalisms (fascism, Nazism) no link can attributed us to them," he said, see - *Manifiesto nacionalista: frente nacionalista Patria y Libertad*, 9.

⁸⁵ "Chilean nationalism cannot be confused with traditional positions or 'politickers'; it is a new vanguard that aspires to reform our expired institutions," in *Patria y Libertad*, no. 1 (1971).

⁸⁶ "El problema de la juventud," *Patria y Libertad*, no. 4 (1971).

also echoed the Falange's formulas when propagating an "integrated company of workers,"⁸⁷ and a non-parliamentary organic "functional democracy."⁸⁸ Still, the importance of *Patria y Libertad* stemmed not from its ideological sophistication but from its violent presence in the public sphere. The first to identify this were non-other than Guzmán and the gremialistas who collaborated intimately with *Patria y Libertad*, indicating that the ideological differences between the movements were not profound, at least as start.⁸⁹ By and large, if *Patria y Libertad* ever used Falangist symbolism it was in the context of its allusions to the Spanish Civil War. Demanding the Armed Forces' intervention in politics, they constantly referred to José Antonio Primo de Rivera, for instance by publishing his infamous text "A Letter to the Spanish Military" of May 1936,⁹⁰ or by having "José Antonio" writing directly to the readers of their journal *Patria y Libertad*.⁹¹

With the advent of Allende's nationalizations, and within the context of the emerging economic setbacks caused by the USA's embargo on Chile in 1971, these far-right groups took to the streets. On December 1, 1971, the most memorable campaign against the Popular Union began with the "march of the empty pots" (*La marcha de las cacerolas y canastas vacías*). Scheduled to coincide with Fidel Castro's visit to Chile, this was the most significant achievements of the anti-Allende "opposition" to date. Organized by a coalition of right-wing feminine organizations, the

⁸⁷ "Una economía social de mercado," *Patria y libertad*, no. 25 (October 1972): 10; see also - Pablo Rodríguez Grez, *Entre la democracia y la tiranía* (Santiago de Chile: 1972), 110-21.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 92.

⁸⁹ While Guzmán apparently belonged to *Patria y Libertad*'s "political council," it is questionable whether he actively influenced the direction of the movement, see - Manuel Fuentes Wendling, *Memorias secretas de Patria y Libertad: y algunas confesiones sobre la guerra fría en Chile* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Grijalbo, 1999), 126; for more on the relationship between the two movements see - Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárata, *Nacionales y Gremialistas: el "parto" de la nueva derecha política chilena, 1964-1973* (Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones, 2008); for more on *Patria y Libertad* see - José Díaz Nieva, *Patria y Libertad: el nacionalismo frente a la Unidad Popular* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2015); José Díaz Nieva, *Breve historia del neofascismo y de la derecha radical* (Santiago de Chile: Akhilleus Ediciones, 2017).

⁹⁰ "Carta a los militares de España," *Patria y Libertad*, no. 28 (November 1972): 9.

⁹¹ José Antonio, "Se ve un camino más fácil," *Patria y Libertad*, no. 33 (December 7, 1972), 2; José Antonio, "Una lucha que nos engrandecerá," *Patria y Libertad*, no. 31 (November 22, 1972): 2; José Antonio, "El drama de la inteligencia en el socialismo," *Patria y Libertad*, no. 35 (December 21, 1972): 2.

march was the brainchild of Nina Donoso, head of the National Feminine Unity (UNAFE), Maria Morandé, and Carmen Saenz, an Opus Dei affiliate. Patria y Libertad's paramilitaries, for their part, safeguarded the march.⁹²

That the protests of Santiago de Chile's respectable housewives presented an utter humiliation to the men in charge of Chile's economy is undeniable. This gendered message added a distinctive vitality to the overall narrative of self-victimization that circulated within the conservative elites in this period, and that encouraged their members to feel "under attack" by external ideological forces. The political myth of communist brutes attacking the defenseless "cacerolas" at the time of the march was born not on the streets of Santiago but in the pages of *El Mercurio*⁹³ and *Qué Pasa*, the latter stating that "tens of thousands of women willing to face unjust violence" encountered MIR activists who attacked them "with stones, sticks, and even potatoes covered in shaving knives."⁹⁴ The "political symbol of the cacerola" was the telling headline *Qué Pasa* used merely a week after the event, indicating further how this media outlets was crucial for fashioning the narratives surrounding these events.⁹⁵ Not surprisingly, Pinochet was to make ample use of this ready-made tale. It is safe to say that in 1974, as several of its organizers published their accounts, the march even became the regime's foundational political myth. "The march of December 1, 1971 marked the beginning of the slow end of the Allende Government," declared then Teresa Donoso in pride.⁹⁶ By this she meant to say that this event was a watershed moment in the process of Allende's de-legitimation; as housewives, the argument went, Chile's women

⁹² Margaret Power, *Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende, 1964-1973*. (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 153.

⁹³ "Las mujeres protestamos!!" *El Mercurio* (December 5, 1971).

⁹⁴ "Poder y violencia al límite," *Qué Pasa*, no. 34 (December 9, 1971): 7-8.

⁹⁵ "Como nació el símbolo de la cacerola," *Qué Pasa*, no. 33 (December 2, 1971): 8.

⁹⁶ Teresa Donoso Loero, *La epopeya de las ollas vacías* (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1974).

were not merely the victims of Allende's economic policies but rejected his masculine "materialism" as such, thereby leading to his demise.⁹⁷

By the beginning of 1973, the intellectuals presented in the pages above began to actually plot a *coup d'état* against Allende. Headed by *El Mercurio* editor and *Qué Pasa* founder Hernán Cubillos, one of these "committees" assembled weekly in the offices of the Lord Cochrane Publishing House and included Arturo Fontaine, the abovementioned ICH director Raúl Bazán, Roberto Kelly - later the designer of Pinochet's development plans - and Jaime Guzmán.⁹⁸ Another forum of a similar nature saw Sergio Silva Bascuñán working to formulate an alternative regime for Chile - a collaboration that included Christian Democrats and traditionalists and that drew the attention of the left-wing media.⁹⁹ Present at the scene were Enrique Campos Menéndez, Sergio Fernández Larraín, Arturo Fontaine, Jaime Guzmán, José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, Julio Philippi, and Gonzalo Vial Correa - all of whom were to become the dictatorship's future key ideologues. As in the case of Onganía, these figures awaited a military leader to eradicate the parliamentary order and then offered themselves to him as his most loyal and skillful civic administrators. Unlike the Argentine Revolution, however, there was no concrete collaborated military-civic groundwork in the early months of 1973.

⁹⁷ "It was their spiritual power that debunked - by surprise - the failed weapons of materialism," see *ibid*, 71, for other similar narratives see - María Correa Morandé, *La guerra de las mujeres* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universidad Técnica del Estado, 1974).

⁹⁸ According to the testimony of Orlando Sáenz, Jaime Guzmán participated in a "gremialista opposition command" with the "purpose to produce a destabilization of the government with a view to a coup d'état" see - Patricia Arancibia, *Conversando con Roberto Kelly* (Santiago de Chile: Biblioteca Americana, 2005), 128-29.

⁹⁹ Carta de Sergio Silva Bascuñán a Jaime Guzmán, February 10, 1972, Fundación Jaime Guzmán; see also - "¡Conclave golpista!" *Puro Chile* (March 5, 1972); "Gobierno: 'Reunion de Chinigue es sediciosa,'" *El Siglo*, (March 7, 1972).

The Pinochet dictatorship and its late dialogue with the subsiding Francoist regime

On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military acted upon the vocal demands of the Chilean conservative elites and overthrew Allende. Led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, the Military Junta's contingency plans were strictly military and "counter-insurgency" oriented.¹⁰⁰ As the men partaking in the events testified in later years, few knew on the day of the uprising what future the Armed Forces envisioned for Chile. That is to say, the regime was initially defined in negations: it sought to purge Chile from "Marxism" and retrieve it "to its people," it claimed. What is more, unlike Argentina, where the military had been an inseparable part of politics since 1930, in Chile the military seldom intervened in politics during the previous decades. Hence, in 1973 it was up to Pinochet and his men to design a novel ideology of the state and the Armed Forces' agency within it.¹⁰¹

Pinochet and his generals studied the lessons of the Argentine Revolution, Francoism, and the Brazilian dictatorship. Their regime was to be, in Carl Schmitt's terms, a proper "state of exception" understood as the outdoing of the rule of law in "self-defense" against a foe who had transgressed all legal boundaries within a "global civil war."¹⁰² Indeed, Pinochet instantly defined his struggle in terms of "civil war," and his regime - a movement of "national liberation." Or in his own words, Chile "had been driven to an objective situation of civil war through the destruction

¹⁰⁰ According to one account, only from mid-July 1973, did the Armed Forces begin preparing the coup at the War Academy, with little to no presence of civic elements, see - James R. Whelan, *Desde las cenizas: vida, muerte y transfiguración de la democracia en Chile, 1833-1988* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1993), 450.

¹⁰¹ Historians Thomas Davis and Brian Loveman have already laid the initial foundations for the debate over the "anti-politics" legacies of Latin America's militaries, a history wherein the case of Chile looms large, see -Thomas Davies and Brian Loveman, *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978).

¹⁰² For more on Schmitt's influence on Pinochet's dictatorship, and on Jaime Guzmán in particular, see - Renato Cristi, "La síntesis conservadora de los años 1970," in Renato Cristi and Carlos Ruiz, *El pensamiento conservador en Chile* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1992), 123-54; Renato Cristi, *El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán: autoridad y libertad* (Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones, 2000), 56-57; Renato Cristi, "The metaphysics of constituent power: Schmitt and the genesis of Chile's 1980 Constitution," *Cardozo Law Review*, no. 21 (May 2000), 1749-75.

of the fundamental bases its coexistence and national sentiment.”¹⁰³ Yet with the exception of a handful of armed clashes in September 1973, there was no civil war in Chile; there were barely any significant instances of urban combat after October 1973 either.¹⁰⁴ This did not prevent the Junta from evoking the language of civil war in the ensuing years, with clear Francoist overtones.¹⁰⁵ “That this civil war has not materially exploded with all its [worst] possible consequences, was thanks to Divine Providence, which, with its mysterious hand, gave the Armed Forces the fluidity to carry out its pacifying action quickly and opportunely,” stated Pinochet.¹⁰⁶ In other words, even for him, this had been a civil war *in potential* rather than in reality. Nevertheless, like Franco, he believed himself to have saved Chile from this war through “divine” guidance, and therefore accountable for his actions only “before God and history.”¹⁰⁷

The regime was most deadly to its ideological opponents in its first weeks.¹⁰⁸ And unlike Argentina’s dictatorship of the 1960s, Pinochet quickly purged the Chilean press from any left-wing tendencies.¹⁰⁹ The remaining news outlets, and more specifically the ideological groups detailed in the pages above, unanimously legitimized the new regime by presenting it as the preventer of anarchy and civil war. *El Mercurio*, expectedly, was the first to praise Pinochet and even invited Osvaldo Lira to deride the antecedent parliamentary system. Criticizing the Church

¹⁰³ *A seis meses de la liberación nacional: mensaje al país del presidente de la junta de gobierno General Don Augusto Pinochet Ugarte pronunciado al día 11 de marzo 1974* (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1974), 33

¹⁰⁴ According to the military’s own figures, by the end of 1973, eighty-seven fatalities have been counted in the Armed Force. The Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación has later doubted this number arguing that many of them were in fact victims of the Armed Forces purging, see - Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, II,

¹⁰⁵ See for instance - *La junta de gobierno frente a la juridicidad de los derechos humanos: discurso pronunciado por el General Leigh, el 29 de abril de 1974, en la universidad católica de Chile* (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1974).

¹⁰⁶ *A seis meses de la liberación nacional*, 33.

¹⁰⁷ *Actas oficiales de la comisión constituyente*, Sesión 68, 23.

¹⁰⁸ In its first year, the dictatorship killed 1823 Chilean citizens, see - *Informe sobre calificación de victimas de derechos humanos y de violencia política* (Santiago de Chile: Corporación Nacional de Reperación y reconciliación, 1996), Table 20.

¹⁰⁹ A partial list of these newspapers included *El Siglo*, *La Nación*, *Puro Chile*, *Ultima Hora*, *El Rebelde*, *Chile Hoy*, *Clarín*, *De Frente*, *Ramona*, *Punto Final*, *La Quinta Rueda*, and *Paloma*.

for not going against Allende in the first place, he maintained that “one cannot equate the violence of the one who illegitimately attacks you with the violence of he who defends himself with the appropriate means.” Pinochet, he further argued, enjoyed the legitimacy of “origin and exercise,” since, “as St. Paul says, whoever resists authority, resists God.”¹¹⁰

Other ICH intellectuals immediately joined Lira in the ideological whitewashing of the regime in its first year of terror. Using the pseudonym “Veritas,” Hübner Gallo, for instance, became the regime’s spokesman in *ABC*.¹¹¹ *Qué Pasa* was another center stage of a sophisticated legitimization of the dictatorship. A week after the coup, it published the following text:

The Popular Unity has fallen in a Wagnerian finale [...] In this period Chile has dissolved into economic and political demagoguery, laziness, and the preaching and practice of violence. [...] Only the imminence of a bloody Civil War forced [the Military] to take the supreme decision to their hands. [...] It is impossible to go back to yesterday. The outcome of September 11 must be a foundational act of institutionality and - even more so - a new conception of Chile. Thus [the regime] should banish forever politicization, divisionism, and sectarianism. [...] Now, the traditional values of the country must be preserved.¹¹²

Besides alluding to a post-ideological society, *Qué Pasa* presented its readers with a full version of what would become the myth of Allende’s plan of “self-coup” (auto-golpe), only then to clear itself from any possible guilt for the violent events: “there were no civil participants in the planning of the coup,” argued its editors.¹¹³ Two weeks later the journal held an exclusive interview with Pinochet who stated that “at the moment there is a team of law professors working on a new constitution.”¹¹⁴ The interviewer asked him “for names.” Pinochet did not respond, although it is well documented that *Qué Pasa*’s own Jaime Guzmán was the leading “specialist” in these early

¹¹⁰ “El R.P. Osvaldo Lira declaró: ‘el Gobierno tiene legitimidad de origen y de ejercicio,’ *El Mercurio* (September 23, 1973).

¹¹¹ Confidencial, 364/111, March 3, 1974, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1974, caja 71; also - “Se hace público un manual de origen soviético para el sojuzgamiento psicológico,” *ABC Madrid* (April 7, 1974).

¹¹² “11 de septiembre,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 126 (November 20, 1973, edición especial).

¹¹³ “El viejo gobierno: 24 horas finales,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 126 (November 20, 1973, edición especial).

¹¹⁴ “El General Pinochet recibe a Qué Pasa,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 127 (September 27, 1973): 7.

conventions. As other conservative platforms, *Eva* was no different in instantly praising the “restoration of peace” and protection of women’s rights.¹¹⁵ The journal even published a list of left-wing politicians and their whereabouts, perhaps to indicate that they are unharmed.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, by portraying the “Pinochet home” as a zone of harmonious collaboration between Pinochet and his wife Lucía, *Eva* established him as an agent of civility.¹¹⁷

Thereafter, more derogatory historical narratives of the Allende years ensued. In 1974, Zig-Zag published Hernán Millas and Emilio Filippi’s *Anatomía de un fracaso*,¹¹⁸ followed by *Chile 70-73: crónica da una experiencia*.¹¹⁹ Teresa Donoso Loero, for her part, published *Breve historia de la unidad popular*.¹²⁰ These books presented Pinochet’s heroic narrative as the indisputable historical truth. Another case in point was Florencia Varas and José Manuel Vergara 1974 *Operación Chile*. Printed in Barcelona at the Opus Dei’s Pomaire editorial, this book was even “balanced” enough to anger Pinochet’s ambassador in Madrid.¹²¹ Last, and important of them all, was Gonzalo Vial Correa’s own creation, *The White Book of the Change of Government in Chile*. Published merely a month after September 11, this text aimed to establish that Allende had let murderous “foreign extremists” rule Chile and that he had drafted a plan (the infamous “plan Z”) for the assassination of his political opponents.¹²² In short, in a matter of months, the intellectual

¹¹⁵ The regime even recognized *Eva* for its “courageous attitude it showed during the three years of Marxist government,” see - “A propósito de restauración,” *Eva* (December 5, 1973): 4.

¹¹⁶ At least in one case, that of Luis Espinoza Villalobos, the victim was to be shot to death a week later, see - “De la política a cualquiera cosa,” *Eva* (II half of November 1973), 80-85.

¹¹⁷ “En la familia Pinochet, el mando esta compartido,” *Eva*, no. 1484 (September 2, 1974): 86-87.

¹¹⁸ Hernán Millás and Emilio Filippi, *Anatomía de un fracaso: la experiencia socialista chilena* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1974).

¹¹⁹ Hernán Millás and Emilio Filippi, *Chile 70-73: crónica da una experiencia* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1974).

¹²⁰ Teresa Donoso Loero, *Breve historia de la Unidad Popular: documento de El Mercurio* (Santiago de Chile: El Mercurio, 1974).

¹²¹ Apparently, it showed empathy to Allende and his family, see - Confidencial, 161/46, Informe sobre libro editado en España Operación Chile, January 31, 1974, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales 1974, caja 71.

¹²² *The White Book of the Change of Government in Chile* (Santiago de Chile: Secretariat-General of the Government, 1973), 71.

apparatus discussed thus far in this chapter took it upon itself to both vilify Allende and legitimize the new dictatorship.

In turn, between 1973 and 1975 Chile witnessed a return to Hispanidad rhetoric. Undoubtedly, Pinochet's regime revitalized and gave new meaning to the intellectual movements of the 1950s, retrospectively. Once the regime published its founding texts, they betrayed a clear Hispanic sentiment. An outcome of a "nationalist-gremialista collaboration,"¹²³ the *Declaration of Principles of the Honorable Governing Junta*, pledged, for example, to protect Chile's "Christian and Hispanic" tradition. Yet tempting as it is to align with Pinochet's opposition in exile and contend that his regime was a materialization of Hispanidad ideology from day one,¹²⁴ one must also underscore that the "Hispanic" component in this declaration was rather secondary to the assortment of authoritarian-technocratic formulas appearing in it. Strikingly, the declaration emphasized "subsidiarity" and pledged to a truly "libertarian" society.¹²⁵ It even advocated "morality over the letter of the law," and "shrewdness over ideology."¹²⁶ In brief, unlike in Franco's Spain, Pinochet's Catholic and Hispanic mythological element was initially implied rather than celebrated.

Only once the regime began to form its own ideological apparatus, did some of its public intellectuals begin presenting Hispanidad as the new ethical core of the new state. The director of Pinochet's Cultural Department, author Enrique Campos Menéndez, in particular, evoked the Hispanic mythology, as his following manifesto indicates:

No one can deny [...] that we are who we are because of that day when the Spanish arrived, and with their deeds granted unity and life to our country by conjoining the multiple races

¹²³ Gonzalo Vial Correa, *Pinochet: la biografía* (Santiago de Chile: Aguilar, 2002), 368.

¹²⁴ Rojas-Mix, "El hispanismo: ideología de la dictadura en Hispanoamérica", 47.

¹²⁵ *Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government* (English version), 30; *Declaraciones de principios del gobierno de Chile* (Spanish original), 12.

¹²⁶ *Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government*, 33.

that inhabited its territory, thus leading to a third reality that, without being Spanish, is constitutively Hispanic. As indicated by the Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile, it was the Christian conception of man and society “that gave form to the western civilization of which we form part, and it is their progressive loss or disfigurement that has caused, to a large extent, the moral breakdown that today endangers that same civilization.” That conception was the fundamental legacy of Spain.¹²⁷

Next, Sergio Fernández Larraín joined Campos Menéndez in editing *España y sus siglos de oro*, a book which further clarified that by 1974 Hispanidad was not a coincidental reference in the regime’s declarations but a conspicuous element in its system of justification.¹²⁸ Another telling example of this type of ideological production was the 1974 book *Pensamiento nacionalista*, which featured Menéndez Campos, Arturo Fontaine, and Osvaldo Lira theorizing Chile’s idiosyncratic Hispanic spirituality. In this book appeared the following telling depiction of Allende’s era:

A successful Spanish essayist has spoken of ‘the twilight of ideologies.’ He was completely right. [...] doctrines and programmatic labels had lost their meaning and served only as shreds of hopes and failed experiences. This is how Chile came to allow an adventurous and corrupt minority to overtake the Government disguised in the sheepskin of a false democracy.¹²⁹

Unmistakably, for Pinochet’s thinkers, Fernández de la Mora’s theories were a central point of reference when explaining the futility of Allende’s experiment.

Beyond the legacies of the Spanish Civil War, and the “end of ideologies,” Franco’s Spain inspired Pinochet in several other ways. While being well informed with the USA’s National Security Doctrine by 1973, the Chilean Army’s theoretical toolkit included Francoist military publications. This was the case of *La función del ejercito*. Published by the Spanish law specialist Hermann Oehling Ruiz, and originally a dissertation directed by Luis Sánchez Agesta and Ismael

¹²⁷ *Departamento Cultural de la Secretaría General de Gobierno* (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1974), 39.

¹²⁸ The writing of the book involved Franco’s Spain sending Campos Menéndez documents from the 15th century, see - *España y sus siglos de oro, octubre de 1974* (Santiago de Chile: Secretaría General de Gobierno, 1974), 9-10.

¹²⁹ *Pensamiento Nacionalista* (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1974), 8-10.

Sánchez Bella, this book theorized the global role of militaries, depicting them as the “last hierarchical group of society capable of saving it from dissolution.”¹³⁰ Significantly, it portrayed the military as an “apolitical” body that depends neither on civic rule nor on a constitutional order and that defends the body of the nation both “externally” and “internally” - thus solving rather than stimulating its inherent “civil wars.”¹³¹

Pinochet also contacted Franco. September 11, 1973, was a chaotic day, in which Salvador Allende found his death, and where countless military operations took place. It is therefore surprising that on the following day Pinochet found time to write a letter to none other than Spain’s aging dictator. “My great and good friend,” it opened, and then read: “Having deemed it necessary to relocate Mr. Oscar Agüero Corvalan, Chile’s Ambassador in Spain, we have agreed to end the mission that had been entrusted to him at your excellence’s side. Please accept my sincere vows for the welfare of your excellence and for the greatness of Spain. Your loyal and good friend, Augusto Pinochet, the Moneda Palace.”¹³² Pinochet’s letter said fairly little and was, in a way, unneeded. Its significance stemmed from its timing and flattering tone. Pinochet merely illustrated to Franco that he was Chile’s *de facto* leader, sitting at the Moneda Palace - Chile’s emblem of executive power.

How did the Spaniards react to Pinochet’s signs of fraternity? As we have seen in the previous chapter, in the 1960s technocratic Spain had changed its attitude towards the Latin American Left. On the background of thriving economic cooperation with Chile, Franco was cautious not to label Allende either communist or Marxist. Given his familiarity with Chilean

¹³⁰ Herman Oehling, *La función política del Ejército: memorial del Ejército de Chile, edición especial y restringida*. (Santiago de Chile: Estado Mayor General del Ejército, 1977), 18.

¹³¹ Ibid, 93-95.

¹³² “Septiembre 12, carta del presidente de Chile, Augusto Pinochet,” FNFF, documento 21953.

politics, Fernández de la Mora - in 1970, Franco's Minister of Public Works - even represent Franco personally at Allende's inauguration.¹³³ Despite the ideological differences between the regimes, Fernández de la Mora recalled later, it was Franco himself who wanted to make a point: given the tradition that "a minister of the Government attends all transmissions of command in the sister republics of Spanish America" the presence of Fernández de la Mora was to dispel any "doubts about our conception of the [Chilean] State."¹³⁴ In the next two years, a bilateral trade agreement between Spain and Chile further enhanced Franco's bond with Allende, who, pressured by the USA's embargo, had motivations of his own to invite Spanish companies such as Pegaso to manufacture heavy vehicles in Chile.¹³⁵

Besides economic motives, what could have drawn Franco to treat Allende affably? Trying to answer this mystery, Pinochet's men proposed several hypotheses of their own. Mariano Fontecilla, a high-ranking diplomat at the embassy in Madrid, had the following theory:

Spain was interested in showing Europe, which until today does not treat it with much confidence, that it has ceased to be a country full of dated dogmas and that it is progressively opening up to the contemporary moment. Hence its relations with Cuba, its opening to Eastern Europe, and also [...] its friendly and generous attitude towards the Government of President Allende. [...] The Spaniards [...] vowed to help providing our country either through credits, scholarships, and sustained a pro-Chilean position [...] at the Paris Club.¹³⁶

Seen this way, eager to normalize the dictatorship internationally and integrate into the European Community, Franco both collaborated with communist regimes and avoided appearing to back right-wing dictators. Be that as it may, it is worthwhile noting that the relationship between Franco

¹³³ See for instance - Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, "La hispanidad tecnocrática: Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora en Iberoamérica," in Cañellas Mas, *La tecnocracia hispánica*, 105-34.

¹³⁴ Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, *Rio arriba* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1995), 232.

¹³⁵ By inviting Pegaso to produce trucks in Chile, Allende sought to assuage the damaged caused by the exit of Ford from the country in 1971. This was just one of several treaties between Spain and Chile in this period. In March 1971, Spain's Foreign Minister Gregorio López Bravo visited Allende and signed a treaty on "touristic cooperation" see - "Convenio de cooperación en la esfera turística entre Chile y España," March 26, 1971, AGA, caja 42/08982.

¹³⁶ Confidencial, 1319/177, September 20, 1973, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales 1973, caja 64.

and Allende was a theme that, between 1970 and 1973, was discussed incessantly and *positively* in the Spanish media, which, for its part, reported on Allende's adherence to Hispanidad, and his pledge to "learn from Spain's development."¹³⁷ Subsequently, the September 1973 *coup d'état* was greeted in Spain with initial hesitation, rather than immediate rejoicing.

The Chilean historian Isabel Jara Hinojosa has suggested that Pinochet sought Franco's friendship for the sake of "external legitimization."¹³⁸ This, I argue, is only one part of the story. As in the case of Onganía, Pinochet's dialogue with Spain should be read primarily as a regime trying to define itself to its own immediate followers. Before advancing further, let us first address this alleged collaboration. True enough, the Spanish dictatorship did aid Pinochet in several ways. For one thing, Chile's new ambassador in Spain, the retired General Francisco Goigoitia, had a key role in deploying the Spanish media for Pinochet's purposes. With Carrero Blanco supporting the new regime, by the end of November 1973, the ambassador reported to his superiors that his operation in Madrid had yielded "good results" as that he had "silenced numerous attacks," in the Spanish press.¹³⁹ For Pinochet, Franco's Spain was thus one of the only sympathetic platforms for propagating his dictatorship in Europe and Latin America. This also explains the visit of a large-scale delegation of Chilean jurists to Madrid, in December 1973. Led by the ICH member, and President of Chile's Bar Association, the Christian Democrat Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, it sought,

¹³⁷ "Chile busca en España apoyo financiero, para los proyectos del gobierno," *Pueblo* (May 20, 1971); "Dice a los periodistas el presidente del Banco de Chile: Nos interesa la experiencia tecnológica de España," *Informaciones* (May 20, 1971); "Abrazo Hispano-Chileno: el ministro chileno de Asuntos Exteriores Clodomiro Almeida, hizo anoche una breve escala en el aeropuerto de Barajas donde fue saludado por su colega señor López Bravo," *Pueblo* (June 15, 1971); "El convenio Pegaso-Corfo: 'Nueva y moderna dimensión de la Hispanidad, de la que surge la cooperación e integración industrial', dijo el presidente Allende en el acto de la firma," *Puebo* (October 13, 1972); "España concede a Chile créditos por valor de 1.600 millones de pesetas," *Ya* (December 7, 1972); "España se ha renovado sin perder su personalidad: declaraciones del almirante Montero Cornejo, comandante jefe de la armada Chilena," *ABC Madrid* (June 29, 1972); For more on the Franco-Allende relationship, see - María José Henríquez Uzal, *¡Viva la verdadera amistad!: Franco y Allende, 1970-1973* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 2014).

¹³⁸ Jara Hinojosa, "La ideología franquista en la legitimación de la dictadura militar chilena", 233-53.

¹³⁹ Oficio confidencial no. 1764/212 del embajador chileno Francisco Goigoitia al Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, November 27, 1973, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1973, caja 63.

in the ambassador's own words, to "explained with great precision and brilliance the reasons for the military uprising [...] emphasizing the illegitimacy for which the previous government had fallen."¹⁴⁰

Beyond positive coverage in the Spanish media, Pinochet also implored Franco for material help. The Spaniards were obliged to conform, sending Chile an aircraft with "twenty tons of diverse equipment" - a somewhat symbolic delivery of military aid that took off from Spain at the presence of Chile's Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Fernández Valderrama. Simultaneously, Goigoitía reported of other help offers, one of which saw the director of the Madrid ICH, Alfonso de Borbón (Duke of Cádiz), promising to "help rebuild the Moneda Palace." For Goigoití, these were undeniable signs that Franco's regime "understands the problems Chile has been facing and would make every effort, within its powers, to solve them."¹⁴¹

This depiction notwithstanding, Franco's Spain did not align with Pinochet in unison. In 1974, within the context of a society in search of its own democratization, reformist groups in Spanish society, for instance, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez's journal *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* and Juan Fernández Figueroa's *Índice*, attacked Pinochet. In return, Spain's new neo-fascist platforms, *El Alcázar* and *Nueva Fuerza*, reacted by stating that it is "disgusting to see how some Spanish pens drool to the service [...] of international Marxism."¹⁴² Goigoitía personally contacted *Nueva Fuerza*'s editor Manuel Ballesteros to thank him for these words,¹⁴³ stating later that this journal "is a right-wing movement, very similar to Chile's Patria y Libertad."¹⁴⁴ Similarly, Álvaro d'Ors

¹⁴⁰ Confidencial 1690/207, December 10, 1973, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1973, caja 65.

¹⁴¹ Confidencial 1479/193, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1973, caja 64.

¹⁴² "Da asco!" *Fuerza Nueva* (November 3, 1973).

¹⁴³ Confidencial, 1593/527, November 16, 1973, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1973, caja 65.

¹⁴⁴ Confidencial, 90/22, January 15, 1974, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1974, caja 71.

appeared in *Fuerza Nueva* claiming that the Chilean dictatorship is a classic example “a firm principle of Public Law.” After all, “who can overcome such revolutionary violence, if it is not the legitimate violence of the Armed Forces?” he pondered. Accordingly, said d’Ors, those Spaniards who now show “aversion to the Chilean Army” are, in truth, symptomatic of a “resentment of the defeated by the Spanish victory of 1939.”¹⁴⁵ That this Opus Dei intellectual linked Pinochet and the Spanish Civil War further impressed the Chilean Ambassador.¹⁴⁶ *ABC*, for its part, as a Francoist’s mainstream daily, eventually aligned Pinochet,¹⁴⁷ and sent its prominent journalist Luis Calvo to conduct one of the first full-length interviews with the Chilean dictator.

In 1974, as reports of Pinochet’s atrocities began surfacing internationally, the Spanish left-wing opposition daringly confronted the Chilean dictatorship. On September 11, 1974, some two-hundred Spanish journalists signed a declaration stating that “on the anniversary of the fascist military coup that took the life of President Salvador Allende, along with thousands of Chilean democrats, [...] we the journalists from Madrid hereby express our strongest repulsion of the current situation in Chile.”¹⁴⁸ Depictions of torture by electric shock even appeared in the Spanish press,¹⁴⁹ as well as tirades against Chile’s neoliberal turn.¹⁵⁰ In fact, ironically Franco’s Spain had become, by then, a center stage for Chilean exiles to disclose Pinochet’s brutalities. At times utilizing their Spanish-Chilean double citizenship, they were a source of irritation for the Chilean

¹⁴⁵ Álvaro d’Ors, “Tres breves reflexiones sobre la crisis chilena,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 372 (February 23, 1974): 6-7.

¹⁴⁶ Confidencial 363/11, March 12, 1974, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1974, caja 71.

¹⁴⁷ It gave the stage to *El Mercurio*’s journalist Alfredo Silva Carvallo, who accused Allende of starting the violent hostilities, see - Alfredo Silva Carvallo, “Chile no fue una segunda Cuba,” *ABC Madrid* (October 20, 1973).

¹⁴⁸ Reservado, 1378/5, September 17 1974, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1974, caja 70.

¹⁴⁹ Jaime José Fernández Palou, “Chileno y torturado,” *Cambio 16* (October 4, 1974).

¹⁵⁰ The Spanish Socialist (PSOE) Joaquín Leguina, was one of the first to publish a critique against Pinochet’s economic policies, see - Joaquín Leguina, “Los Chicago Boys,” *Cambio 16* (May 13, 1974); See also – Confidencial, 800/72, Artículo sobre Chile publicado en Cambio 16 y respuesta de esta embajada, May 22, 1974, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1974, caja 71.

Embassy. One example was Ignacio Gayango's book *Chile: largo camino al golpe*.¹⁵¹ Another was Hernán Antonio Valdés's testimony *Tejas Verde: diario de un campo de concentración en Chile*. Published in Barcelona in 1974, the two publications indicated that the Spanish public sphere was by now losing fear of the Francoist regime.

Despite all this, in 1974 and 1975 Pinochet's generals and intellectuals arrived in Spain to establish a dialogue with the regime and to request further assistance. For instance, Spain saw the visits of Chile's Head of Police (Carabineros), Hernan Isla Rios, who came to "study the Spanish Guardia Civil,"¹⁵² and Education Minister Arturo Troncoso, who visited Spain and the OEI in October 1975.¹⁵³ Declarations regarding wanting to "learn from the Francoist system" were a recurrent theme in the ambassador's reports.¹⁵⁴ The most important official visit, however, was that of Navy Admiral José Toribio Merino, one of the three leaders of Chile's Military Junta.¹⁵⁵ In January 1975, he traveled to Spain to disentangle what had now become a dispute over the aforementioned Pegaso deal, but also to sign an economic and cultural agreement with the Spanish government,¹⁵⁶ and ask Franco to support Chile in the upcoming UN resolutions of 1975.¹⁵⁷ As Chile found itself under mounting international isolation, an even more conspicuous need for a "accelerated approximation" to Spain became apparent. In the ambassador's precise words, the

¹⁵¹ Ignacio Gayango, *Chile: el largo camino al golpe* (Barcelona: Editorial Dirosa, 1974); see also - Estrictamente confidencial, 1129/92, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1974, caja 70.

¹⁵² Confidencial, 981/81, visita a Madrid de oficial relacionado público de carabineros de Chile, July 1, 1974, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, caja 70.

¹⁵³ Reservado, no. 14/3, January 2, 1976, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1976, caja 1.

¹⁵⁴ Reservado, no. 1458/179, Informe sobre viaje a España del secretario nacional de los Gremios de Chile, November 19, 1976, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1976, caja 1.

¹⁵⁵ Ascanio Cavallo, *La historia oculta del régimen militar* (Santiago de Chile: La Epoca, 1988), 94.

¹⁵⁶ Allegedly, it was the USA and Ford Company that pressed Pinochet to decline the deal, which he initially did, later to return to the negotiating table with Spain in 1975, see - José Manuel Azcona Pastor, *Emigración y relaciones bilaterales España-Chile. 1810-2015* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2016), 190; see also - "La junta militar chilena cancela el acuerdo con Pegaso: la decisión está motivada por presiones de las grandes compañías norteamericanas," *Ya* (May 22, 1974).

¹⁵⁷ "Éxito diplomático fue gira de Merino," *Qué Pasa*, no. 197 (January 30, 1975): 10-11.

visit “served mainly to create a new image of Chile. [...] I estimate that the Spanish foreign policy towards us, in the next year and future [...] will open friendly doors in Western Europe.”¹⁵⁸ Allegedly, although this cannot be entirely confirmed, Merino carried home a personal letter from Franco to Pinochet.¹⁵⁹ Along with the 1975 Spanish-Chilean treaty of Cultural Cooperation, these were the last official expressions of solidarity between these dictators who believed themselves to be the authors of two definite chapters in one mutual teleological narrative.

Several of the intellectuals debated in this chapter also arrived in Spain at this point, mostly as Pinochet’s representatives. Roque Esteban Scarpa, now Director of Libraries, Archives and Museums, visited Franco then,¹⁶⁰ and so did Rodríguez Grez. The latter’s declaration to the Spanish press that “the military junta declares itself far from all the traditional political parties” and that it cannot rely solely on the “use of repression,” might have seemed surprising to some. Rodríguez Grez even spoke of the need for a “national consensus” to allow the dictatorship to govern.¹⁶¹ Yet his seemingly moderate tone merely reflected an understanding that Pinochet needed to propagate a “political” plan if he wished to win international respectability. Another paradigmatic anecdote, in this regard, was the November 1975 tour of Chile’s Women Secretariat director Carmen Grez in Spain. Accompanied by the organization’s political adviser, the aforementioned Gisela Silva Encina, the two were Pilar Primo de Rivera personal guests. “The Falange’s Women’s Section and Chile’s Women’s Secretariat” reported Goigoitía, agreed on “establishing contacts and sharing experiences that could be used in the plans of the National

¹⁵⁸ Secreto, no. 7, December 18, 1975, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1975, caja 76.

¹⁵⁹ Oficio secreto no. 7, Consideraciones generales sobre probable evolución de las relaciones entre España y Chile, December 18, 1975, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1975, caja 76.

¹⁶⁰ “Cientos de excolegiales llegan de toda América,” *El Alcázar* (January 11, 1974).

¹⁶¹ 5304 urgente, November 28, 1973, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1973, caja 64.

Secretary of Women in Chile.”¹⁶² Given that Franco was on his deathbed at that time, Spain’s dailies did not even report this visit. Still, the encounter was important, as we will see shortly, as the similarities between the Spanish and Chilean women organizations were to be conspicuous.

When Franco died on November 20, 1975, the Chilean regime declared three days of mourning.¹⁶³ Of the wave of eulogies that followed, Fernández Larraín’s words at the ICH conference hall were particularly telling. In what seemed as a comprehensive narrative of his friend’s life, he spoke of a leader who by the Grace of God, had led “the most authentic of all crusades,” and whose political testament was not democratization but “perfecting the existing system.”¹⁶⁴ Pinochet’s own well-documented trip to Franco’s funeral was yet another act of ideological loyalty. Days before the beginning of Spain’s democratic transition, Pinochet was greeted warmly by Prince Juan Carlos, and even more enthusiastically by the heads of the Spanish Army and mobs of saluting neo-fascists.¹⁶⁵ Later he attended Franco’s burial and crowning proclamation of the King. In truth, he was one of the only world leaders at the funeral, and the only dictator at the King’s coronation.¹⁶⁶ The shady secrets surrounding the visit apart, Pinochet fully seized this last opportunity to be identified with Franco and his legacies.¹⁶⁷ If there were any

¹⁶² Reservado, 1944/170, Informe sobre la visita a España de la Sra. Carmen Grez, secretaria nacional de la mujer, December 12 1975, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1975, caja 76.

¹⁶³ “Duelo oficial en Chile por tres días,” *El Mercurio* (November 21, 1975).

¹⁶⁴ *Francisco Franco! Presente!, Conferencia pronunciada en la Sede del Instituto Chileno de cultura Hispánica por D. Sergio Fernández Larraín, ex-Embajador de Chile en España, el 18 de diciembre de 1975, con motivo del solemne homenaje rendido al Jefe del Estado Español* (Santiago de Chile: Instituto Chileno de Cultura Hispánica), 45, 55.

¹⁶⁵ A scene that has recently been portrayed fully by historian Kirsten Weld, see - Weld, “The Spanish Civil War and the Construction of a Reactionary Historical Consciousness in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile”, 106.

¹⁶⁶ Prince Juan Carlos I was not eager to be identified with the Chilean General, and even rejected the Chilean Ambassador’s invitation to visit Chile, arguing that “his international tours are regulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ultimately by General Franco,” see - Secreto, no. 3, Visita príncipe de España a Chile, July 2, 1975, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1975, caja 76.

¹⁶⁷ According to one well-known account by Michael Townley, it was there and then that Pinochet conspired with Italian neo-fascist Stefano Della Chiaie the assassination of Chilean Christian Democratic Bernardo Leighton - a failed attempt that took place in Rome that year, see - FBI, Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), January 21, 1982 - <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc02.pdf>

doubts regarding the parallels between the two, *Qué Pasa* was there to underline them once more for the Chilean audience:

Franco's figure and work are of exceptional importance for Chile today. [...] The death of the Spanish Head of State, as our President has reminded us during his visit to the Mother Nation, has demonstrated that it was possible to defeat Soviet communism [...] not just once, but twice: the first, on the battlefields; the second, in the offensive of isolation and economic boycott [...] That offensive, so similar to the one suffered by Chile today, was defeated by Franco's Spain.¹⁶⁸

As for Spanish figures visiting Pinochet's Chile: this was not a frequent sight. Particularly after Carrero Blanco's death and the beginning of Spain political opening (discussed in chapter 6) for a Spanish figure to appear in Chile was to convey an image of far-right leanings. This was precisely the case of Fernández de la Mora, who, in 1975, arrived in Chile triumphantly. In his statements to the press, he justified Pinochet's regime, saying that "Détente only exists at the diplomatic level, but nothing has diminished the ideological aggressiveness of Marxism." He also compared Franco and Pinochet stating that "the Spanish situation in 1939 is similar to today's Chilean." But more important, he unveiled an unapologizing anti-democratic stance. Upon several interviews, the technocratic theorist held that Franco's "corporatist formula is a more organic representation and therefore more democratic than the party system."¹⁶⁹ Deeming democracy "closer to taboo and superstition than to science and reason," Fernández de la Mora finally stressed that to "rationalize" political life meant to "replace ideologies with rigorous ideas."¹⁷⁰

One other prominent Spanish visitor in Pinochet's Chile was Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer. This visit, in July 1974, had been planned before the *coup d'état*, and was, in *Qué Pasa*'s words, "private and family-oriented." The importance of this event was the content of Escrivá's public

¹⁶⁸ "Franco: sus lecciones para Chile," *Qué Pasa* no. 240 (November 27, 1975): 5.

¹⁶⁹ "Situación Española en 1939 era similar a chilena de hoy," *El Mercurio* (August 12, 1975).

¹⁷⁰ "Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora: un apasionado de la razón," *Qué Pasa*, no. 226 (August 21, 1975): 16-19.

“gatherings.” Asked about the thing concerning him the most at the time, Escrivá pointed to the progressive Catholic movements of the 1970s, stating that the Church is “a Mother with many disloyal children” and that it is “very upset.” Somewhat more expectedly, Escrivá also attacked family planning: “do not put obstacles on life [...] blessings from God onwards! That the earth is small? lies!” he exclaimed.¹⁷¹ Cleverly, Escrivá avoided mentioning Pinochet’s regime. By suggesting, however, that the Liberation Theology was treasonous, his words were illustrative of the continuous far-right message the Opus Dei propagated in the 1970s.

Ultimately the official Spanish-Chilean dialogue was short lived. As we will see in the next chapter, with the death of Franco and the onset of the Spanish democratic reform, the two regimes disconnected politically and symbolically. Whether in the Chilean press or within Pinochet’s inner circles, nobody quite expected the Spanish transition. The ambassador in Madrid even believed that King Juan Carlos would be able to “use Franco’s powerful mystique,” and thus continue Francoism without Franco.¹⁷² Strikingly, Goigoitia refused to even consider that democratization was feasible in Spain. “The conception of democracy, as Europe sees it, is very confusing for the average Spaniard. [...] [who] does not know how to implement it [...] because he was educated for de-politicization,” he wrote his superiors in 1976. In his opinion, the Spaniards thus fully trusted Franco’s Organic Laws and were to opt, voluntarily, for the regime’s continuation.¹⁷³ As events were to prove, they did not.

¹⁷¹ “Del autor de Camino a los chilenos,” *Qué Pasa* no. 168 (July 12, 1974): 13.

¹⁷² Reservado 1832/162, November 21 1975, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1975, caja 76.

¹⁷³ Reservado, 9/2, situación política española”, January 2, 1976, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1976, caja 1.

Chile's technocratic-authoritarian model, 1974-1977

Between 1974 and 1977 Chile saw the establishment of its own technocratic-authoritarian state-ideology. Generally speaking, like Onganía, Pinochet operated two teams of specialists. On the one hand, during this period Chile became a laboratory for a neoliberal experiment, under the guidance of a distinctive group of economists known as the “Chicago Boys.”¹⁷⁴ And yet, the endeavors of this team cannot be understood disconnected from the regime’s parallel ideological project. Here, once again, the post-fascist gremialistas and ICH ideologues, rather than the neo-fascist Patria y Libertad affiliates, were given access to power thereby deciding the ideological character of the regime. As one gremialista testified later, they and the Chicago Boys shared “some similarities” and worked together “without friction,” but were not the same.¹⁷⁵ As the economists toiled to propel Chile’s economic growth, Pinochet’s ideological team was to design Chile’s future post-ideological system of representation and theorize the country’s unique “change of mentalities.”¹⁷⁶ As we saw, the regime’s “declaration of principles” was a typical technocratic-authoritarian manifesto, as it spoke of a society “more technical and less ideological” wherein “the word of specialists prevails over slogans.”¹⁷⁷ Jaime Guzmán’s influence on this text was no doubt decisive given the fact that it pledged the “de-politicization of all intermediate societies,” along with the “regionalization of the country.” These labels were now to be reiterated time and again in

¹⁷⁴ See for example - Juan Gabriel Valdés, *Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Patricio Silva, “Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* vol. 23, no. 2 (May 1991), 385-410; Patricio Silva, *In the Name of Reason*.

¹⁷⁵ Sergio Fernández Fernández, *Mi lucha por la democracia* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial los Andes, 1994), 136.

¹⁷⁶ For some noteworthy accounts of Pinochet’s dictatorship early years see - Pamela Constable, *A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991); Mark Ensalaco, *Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Mary Helen Spooner, *Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: The New Press, 2013).

¹⁷⁷ *Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government*, 38.

Pinochet's speeches as he pledged to the "effectiveness and fundamental realism of the new economic policy."¹⁷⁸

After one year of so-called "civil war," which in actuality meant the slaying of nearly two-thousand Chilean citizens without trial, Pinochet decided that his regime was ready for its civic phase. With the publishing of the text *Bases de la institucionalidad*, in June 1974, the regime was now to allegedly probe new forms of "participation." Only twenty-eight years old in September 1973, Guzmán played a key role in this process. Given his unique talent to narrate the regime's story in post-ideological terminologies,¹⁷⁹ and aptitude in devising a comprehensive *sui generis* Chilean authoritarian state model, Guzmán was, by then, the regime's chief ideologue. As Pinochet's speech-writer,¹⁸⁰ he worked within the dictatorship's official organs but was even more prominent as Chile's semi-official public intellectual in the Chilean press.¹⁸¹ Apart from Guzmán's work at *Qué Pasa*, he appeared regularly on television panels and published countless columns in Chile's dailies *Ercilla*, *El Mercurio*, *La Tercera*, *La Segunda*, and later, in the influential journals *Realidad* and *Cosas*. As an autonomous public figure, he would ultimately define what he believed was Chile's emerging system of non-ideological participation, for instance via Chile's own "State Council."¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ *A seis meses de la liberación nacional*, 19.

¹⁷⁹ Particularly memorable was his interview to a documentary of the Swiss television about the first years of the Dictatorship, from 1976 (directors: André Gazut and Claude Smadja). In perfect French, Guzmán said that "returning to a parliamentary system in Chile is impossible" and that "the communists see us as enemies and that gives us much pride. We are the enemies of the communists," see - <https://vimeo.com/40748738>.

¹⁸⁰ The manuscripts of some of these speeches are available at the Jaime Guzman Foundation.

¹⁸¹ In a letter to his mother, he wrote: "I collaborate in a commission destined to write a new Constitution, and also in the organization of propaganda and of youth, in the General Secretariat of Government," see - Santiago, 15 de octubre de 1973, located at Fundación Jaime Guzmán.

¹⁸² "Habla el abogado Jaime Guzmán: 'actas constitucionales darán vida a una nueva democracia en Chile,'" *La Tercera* (September 13, 1976).

The return to any political participation, Guzmán agreed, depended on swift economic progress. Chile was not the only neoliberal “experiment” in Latin America; after all, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and many other countries in the hemisphere underwent overtly similar processes. Chile was, however, the first regime to present its social metamorphosis by using unequivocal “neoliberal” jargon. These economic reforms developed gradually. Under Minister of Economy Fernando Léniz, the country first underwent a relatively modest stabilization program, the outcome of which was hardly satisfying. Following an economic recession in 1975, Pinochet thus replaced Léniz with Sergio de Castro. Chile’s exemplary “Chicago Boy,” de Castro was Milton Friedman’s own apprentice and the product of the intellectual collaboration between the Catholic University of Chile and the University of Chicago since the 1950s. In turn, one by one the most celebrated neoliberal theorist of that era, Friedrich Hayek,¹⁸³ Michael Novak,¹⁸⁴ and, of course, Milton Friedman himself, visited the Andean dictatorship, expressing their delight over the implementation of their theories.¹⁸⁵ Strikingly, by May 1975, the very term “Chicago Boys” and “neoliberalism” were already catchphrases in Chile’s public sphere.¹⁸⁶ Friedman even went as far as addressing the Chilean public directly from *Qué Pasa*, stating that he believed in “maintaining peace, protecting the individual from coercion by his fellow citizens, and providing a stable currency.”¹⁸⁷ For him, too, Chile’s return to parliamentary democracy could wait.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸³ Guzmán hosted Hayek during his visit to Chile in 1975, see - Bruce Caldwell and Leonidas Montes, “Friedrich Hayek and his visits to Chile,” *The Review of Austrian Economics*, 28: 3, (2015). 261-309.

¹⁸⁴ “Crisis in Chile,” *Crisis Magazine* (June 1, 1983); at <http://www.crisismagazine.com/1983/crisis-in-chile>.

¹⁸⁵ Friedman wrote in later years that his Chilean students “were among the best foreign student” he ever taught and that he was delighted to have had “good influence on them and on Chile,” see - Letter from Milton Friedman to Hernán Cubillos, June 2, 1992, Hernán Cubillos Sallato Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1.

¹⁸⁶ “Los Chicago Boys: De Castro enfrenta la críticas,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 214 (May 29, 1975), 1, 10-12.

¹⁸⁷ Milton Friedman, “Medidas graves para una grave enfermedad,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 206 (April 3, 1975): 52.

¹⁸⁸ In his letters Friedman even seemed to justify the regime’s human rights violations saying that they were “far less extreme than [...] the political repression that would have followed [had Allende stayed in power],” see - Letter from Milton Friedman to Louise Smith Pencavel, August 6, 1981, Hernán Cubillos Sallato Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 5.

Sergio de Castro lead an entirely new economic policy. Based his founding text *El Ladrillo* (The Brick) he set out to stimulate Foreign Direct Investment, cut public expenditure, and curb inflation. Once again, the state was to “realize an effective decentralization” of its economy, “de-politicize” its workforce, and “decentralize” the education system.¹⁸⁹ Despite the common assertion in the literature of Chile being the first country in which a “thorough program of neoliberal restructuring was initiated,” there was nothing particularly original about its so-called “creative destruction.”¹⁹⁰ Anti-inflation measures, privatization, and slashing of government expenditure - which meant ending traditional distributive pension system, for instance - had all been tried, by now, in Spain, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. The main difference between Sergio de Castro’s “Boys”, Krieger Vasena’s “tecnicos,” and Spain’s Opus Dei “technocrats,” was the aura of allure that each of these groups constructed around itself, typically via their affiliated media groups. In truth, the similarities between these projects are striking. Take for instance Chile’s Office of National Planning (ODEPLAN): A center of the Chicago Boys and gremialista operation, this body was to implement Chile’s “regionalization,” through “decentralization” and the formation of “poles of development” - all echoing the French, Spanish, and Argentine development plans of the 1960s.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ “*El Ladrillo*”: *Bases de la política económica del gobierno militar chileno* (Santiago de Chile: Centro de Estudios Públicos, 1992), 52-54; for more on the Chilean capitalist turn and its ramifications, see - Manuel Gárate Chateau, *La Revolución capitalista de Chile: (1973-2003)* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Alberto Hurtado, 2012).

¹⁹⁰ Marcus Taylor, *From Pinochet to the 'Third Way': Neoliberalism and Social Transformation in Chile* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006), 1.

¹⁹¹ For years ODEPLAN was under the direction of the Gremialista Miguel Kast. Its “regionalization” plans were already designed in the 1960s and returned to become the center of Pinochet’s policies, see - El Federico Arenas, “El Chile de las regiones: una historia inconclusa,” *Estudios Geográficos*, vol. LXX, no. 266 (January-June, 2009): 11-39; see also - Verónica Valdivia, *La alcaldización de la política: los municipios en la dictadura pinochetista* (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2012).

Pinochet did not wait for economic growth alone to change the mentalities of the Chilean citizens, however. Akin to Franco's and Onganía's methods, he was to rely on a combination of civic societies and a unique state-controlled apparatus to indoctrinate the population. Perhaps not a one-party system as in the case of Franco's Movimiento, the latter was indeed very tangible in the Chilean society. Known as the General Secretariat of the Government (Ministry from 1976), it operated the Women, Youth, Unions, and Culture sub-secretariats. As mentioned already, it was through these bodies that the dictatorship's initial Hispanidad message emerged. In a parallel vein, Pinochet endeavored to enact an immediate constitutional change. Merely two weeks after the coup, his Constitutional Commission opened its sessions towards what would become Chile's 1980 Constitution. Having that said, until 1977, the sluggish crafting of Chile's fundamental "constitutional acts" meant the commission was, at least during these three first years, in no hurry to define Chile's political future.

All the same, with his catch-phrase "Family, Woman, and Youth" - as the three pillars of society and center stages of the creation of a new mentality - Pinochet mobilized Chile's conservative polity towards a novel civilizing process. Hence, discussing the Chilean "new mentality" did not happen in secret meetings but publicly, on the pages of the enthusiastic conservative media.¹⁹² Needless to say, for them, this was not to be an ideological but a "realist" national project. The ideologies of the enlightenment, Pinochet told the Chilean youth in 1974, were "demagogic utopia."¹⁹³ His plans to "change the mentality of Chileans," on the other hand, did not amount to "the absurd pretense of making a new Chilean, as postulated by Marxism." All he wanted, he said, was to "stimulate the virtues that are in the national spirit [...] a realistic and

¹⁹² "Coronel Orlando Jerez: hacía un chileno con nueva mentalidad," *Qué Pasa*, no. 202 (March 6, 1975): 18-19

¹⁹³ *El General Pinochet se reúne con la juventud: textos de los discursos pronunciados en el primer aniversario de la Secretaría Nacional de la Juventud* (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral), 8.

not utopian goal.”¹⁹⁴ Nevertheless, Pinochet admitted that his state was not ethically “neutral” but rather an “instrument at the service of a Homeland that has permanent spiritual values.”¹⁹⁵ In other words, the dictatorship was a promoter of a spiritual truth, understood as antithetical to any materialist ideology.

Women, as we saw, were for the Chilean far-right the paramount symbol of self-victimization and anti-Marxist defiance. Building on the 1971 women movement, Pinochet further attributing Allende’s downfall to them. During the “courageous struggle waged by our women against the Marxist regime,” he said, “each home was a bastion of rebellion, designing a thousand forms of repudiation.”¹⁹⁶ Yet Pinochet theorized the role of women in paradoxical ways. Given their better “sense of reality” women were more suitable than men as teachers, he thought. The regime also believed in women’s economic value at the workplace, but like the Opus Dei, also suggested women be “compatible to men.” Or as Pinochet’s said in 1974, “equality of rights and opportunities” cannot be confused with complete “identification,” alien to the “physical and moral reality of the human being.” By demanding of women to give up their “authentic personality” and unique mission in society, one risks violating their “natural rights,” Pinochet opined.¹⁹⁷

The Women’s National Secretariat was an ideological apparatus that mobilized Chilean women mainly in the form of voluntary operation (“voluntariado”). Adding to the preexisting Mothers Centers (CEMA-Chile), which had been taken over by Lucía Hiriart de Pinochet personally, and as a part of the so-called “communal social development,” it was yet another

¹⁹⁴ “El general Pinochet y el futuro de Chile,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 193 (January 2, 1975): 55-58.

¹⁹⁵ *El General Pinochet se reúne con la juventud*, 8.

¹⁹⁶ *Mensaje a la mujer chilena: texto del discurso pronunciado por el presidente de la Junta de Gobierno, General Augusto Pinochet, en el acto organizado por la Secretaria Nacional de la mujer, April 24, 1974* (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1974), 6-7.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 9-10.

expression of the State's renunciation from its welfare function.¹⁹⁸ With its publications and lavish events, and indeed in plain resemblance to Pilar Primo de Rivera's Feminine Section, the Women's Secretariat main significance was as propaganda apparatus; it was here that the Chilean women's "gratitude" to Pinochet could be channeled throughout the years. Additionally, with the ICH's Gisela Silva Encina on board, the Women's Secretariat explored other of aspects Hispanidad, for instance in the following statement emphasizing the mythological bases for the Chilean womanhood. "The Chilean, our race, was forged in the Arauco War.¹⁹⁹ For three centuries, to maintain civilized life in this land, our men had to fight in the south and our women were left behind to lead civil life, family, homes, and cities. [...] We were executors and directors, in this joint destiny," it read.²⁰⁰ Accordingly, Silva Encina contended that in contemporary times women ought to equally organize society behind men, by making their homes "a cell where the Chilean economic order is born."²⁰¹ As importantly, and similar to the Opus Dei's theories of the 1960s, women were presented here as having a fundamental anti-ideological function. Or as Carla Scassi, the first director of the Secretariat, said in 1974, the appalling "distortion" that ideologies bring with them generate a "deep repulsion" in women, thereby making them the most suitable agents of "unity, service, and pacification."²⁰² That is to say, the Secretariat suggested that given their natural inclination to rational thought, Chile's women were to have a central role in the de-politicization, and therefore, the unification of the Chilean society.

¹⁹⁸ This apparatus also was at the heart of recent revelations regarding Pinochet's fraud, see - "La Justicia arrinconada a la viuda de Pinochet," *El País* (December 10, 2016); "Pinochet's widow under investigation on suspicion of swindling millions," *The Guardian* (August 19, 2016).

¹⁹⁹ The 16th century battles of the Spanish conqueror against the Mapuche tribes of Southern Chile.

²⁰⁰ *Si a Chile* (Santiago: Secretaria Nacional de la Mujer, 1975), 5.

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, 9-13.

²⁰² "Y ahora qué?: responde Carla Scassi de Lehmann, presidenta de la Secretaria de la Mujer," *Eva* (I quincena de Enero, 1975): 80.

Yet the regime clearly limited women's liberties. When it came to equality at the workplace, Pinochet's 1974 Work Code infamously banned certain production jobs from women - for instance, night shifts in certain production lines - ultimately spurring a certain amount of discomfort in the press.²⁰³ For the Women's Secretariat spokeswomen, however, these restrictions were insignificant. In Carla Scassi's view, women may work in many professions but would benefit more if they find an "artisan" activity in their homes. "We think that artistry is an excellent vehicle for women to enter the field of productive activity," she said, "in a way that enriches the spirit."²⁰⁴ Eventually, the Secretariat developed its own section for "household education" (educación para hogar), whereas its journal *Amiga* promoted women's housework as "real labor"²⁰⁵ subsequently issuing patronizing tips for house cleaning.²⁰⁶

More broadly, during these first years, Chile's public sphere saw the appearance of the notion that a novel and more authentic form of Chilean feminism was in the making. María Elena Aguirre and Rosario Guzmán - the sister of Jaime and a *Qué Pasa* and *El Mercurio* columnist - led this trend. In their opinion columns, they argued that women might possess social agency using their "sexual presences," but even more so as respectable housewives.²⁰⁷ Women should aspire to higher education, they said, but not to replace men in positions of leadership; they should be able to choose whether or not to marry but can have no right for abortion.²⁰⁸ Some of these propositions, one might pose, were not entirely dissimilar from debates over matrimony and abortion in the mid-1970s Western Europe. The difference was the omnipresent narrative of self-victimization at the

²⁰³ See for example - "Trabajos prohibidos a las mujeres," *Eva*, no. 1974 (April 24, 1974): 5.

²⁰⁴ "Y ahora qué?", 80.

²⁰⁵ "Su trabajo es trabajo," *Amiga*, no. 5 (June 1976, 33-34).

²⁰⁶ See for instance - "Vital para toda la familia: normas básicas para una dueña de casa," *Amiga*, no. 10 (November 1976): 39-40.

²⁰⁷ "Profesión: simple dueña de casa," *Qué Pasa*, no. 1490 (December 4, 1974): 8-13.

²⁰⁸ Or in Aguirre's words, "one has to be very little a woman, not to have an instinct to save the life of a child," see - "Nuestras feministas," *Qué Pasa*, no. 208, (April 17, 1975): 34-35.

basis of these concepts of womanhood, whereby western “feminism” sought to “change all traditions” and thus did not signify liberation but a fraudulent “liberationism.”²⁰⁹ This narrative quite often involved juxtaposing Chilean “maternalism” with the western pornographic “sexual exaltation.” Consequently, well into the 1980s, the regime proclaimed proudly its demarcation of gender differences. “We affirm that men and women are physically, psychically, and spiritually different from each other. The ideological [...] attempts to desegregate the two sexes, minimizing or ignoring their manifest differences, constitute, therefore, an error against nature,” stated the Women Secretariat in 1982.²¹⁰

The National Youth Secretariat presented similar methods of ideological interpellation. For Pinochet, Chile’s youth was to be purified from its external ideological transgressions and thereafter set an example to the world as the docile and obedient server of progress. “The Chilean youth,” he said, bears a “cheerful libertarian message,” to those who “have not been able to share our fate, and who live under oppressive regimes.”²¹¹ Analogous to Chile’s women, the youngsters also were to have a key role in the “integration” of the nation.²¹² As head of the Youth Secretariat, Pinochet appointed the gremialista Cristián Valdés Zegers, a board member of the ICH and another of *Qué Pasa*’s founders.²¹³ Pledging to make the youth the “vanguard of Chile’s spiritual rebirth,”²¹⁴ under his guidance, the Secretariat became increasingly conspicuous in Chilean public life, organizing a host of activities from summer camps to university preparatory courses.²¹⁵ Working in cooperation with the Secretariat was the gremialistas’ own National Unity Youth

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 32.

²¹⁰ *Valores patrios y valores familiares* (Santiago de Chile: Secretaria de la mujer, 1982), 22, 42; see also - “La participación de la mujer,” *Amiga*, no. 17 (June 1977): 3.

²¹¹ *El General Pinochet se reúne con la juventud*, 29.

²¹² Ibid, 8.

²¹³ *El Instituto Chileno de Cultura Hispánica, Memoria de actividades 1967*, 1.

²¹⁴ “Vanguardia de un nuevo renacer,” *Juventud*, no. 12 (April 1976).

²¹⁵ “Cristián Valdés Zegers: la juventud, principios valores y estilo,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 202 (March 6, 1975): 36-39.

Front, yet another voluntary organization designed to exhibit the operation of Chile's "intermediary" societies. The head of this body, Javier Leturia, stated that he and his followers "denounce the suicidal weakness of the so-called great contemporary democracies," and swore to consolidate Chile's new society upon the "Christian, Hispanic, and republican tradition."²¹⁶ The Secretariat's journals *Juventud*, *Revista Araucania*, and *Diario Loco*, promoted strict norms of behavior and "responsible" labor as a source of "juvenile mystique" and a cure for young "restlessness."²¹⁷ Other publications, the Opus Dei's journal *La Pandilla* for instance, added other traditionalist and militaristic themes to this corpus of texts.²¹⁸ Even so, given its voluntary nature, the Youth Secretariat was ultimately a limited source of grassroots mobilization. Its importance emanated from its symbolic presence in the public sphere, as a confirmation of the youth's genuine identification with the regime and its "intermediary" societies.

The paradoxical voluntary image of Pinochet's non-ideological society could be best seen in Jaime Guzmán's own public persona. Despite rarely holding any official role in government, between 1973 and 1977 he himself embodied the regime's alleged grassroot "intermediary" essence. His unofficial position derived from the gremialistas' very self-branding, as agents of truth who transcend politics and thus guarantee society's perfection. An example of this logic was Guzmán's declarations from 1976. "It just so just happens that we are never interested in that [power], because, now and in the past, we have presented an ideal far beyond political power. We

²¹⁶ "Proclama de la juventud," *Secretaria Nacional de la Juventud: Boletín Informativo*, no. 6 (August 1, 1975).

²¹⁷ "La juventud trabaja por Chile," *Juventud*, no. 5 (August 16, 1977): 16-17; "Sorprendente: un loco escribe a un diario loco," *Diario Loco: diario quincenal de la juventud*, no. 1 (1980), 1; "La mística juvenil nace del trabajo responsable," *Revista Araucania*, no. 1 (1982); According to Mönckeberg's analysis, the Opus Dei was influential within the Women and Youth Secretariates, see - Mönckeberg, *El imperio del Opus Dei en Chile*, 210.

²¹⁸ For more on this journal see - Francisco Soto, *Fascismo y Opus Dei en Chile: estudios de literatura e ideología* (Barcelona: Avance, 1976), 157-260; a parcial list of battle stories appearing in this journal includeds "La conquista"; "cuando mueren los héroes," (no. 1, April 23, 1974) "El jugar de nuestra Señora"; "El combate de Cero Cavilan" (no. 2, May 7, 1974) "El combate naval de Iquique" (no. 3, May 17, 1974) "La toma del mora" (no. 4, June 4, 1974), "Combate de la concepción" (no. 6, July 2, 1974).

are fighting for something that we believe is the very source of a free society: the defense of the autonomy of the Intermediate Bodies, one that does not postulate a simply blind or dogmatic path but one founded on a doctrine of man and society,” he said about the gremialistas.²¹⁹ As an ideological agent, Guzmán thus held a position similar to that of the Opus Dei in Spain, and the Ateneo de la República in Argentina. Rather than an abstract constitution, or state-sponsored corporatist chamber, it was up to spiritual elite vanguards, he thought, to be the tacit agent guiding a “pacified” authoritarian society towards perfection.

Similar illuminations also appeared in José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois’s presentations at the time. Now lecturing to the regime officials on the nature of Marxism,²²⁰ in 1976 the Opus Dei’s spiritual leader in Chile stated, plain and simple, that “the critical demolition of Marxism” can only be undertaken “by Christians,” as Marxism is “a religious phenomenon, exactly reversed to Christianity.” However, when asked whether he thought Marxism is being effectively expunged in Chile, Ibáñez Langlois offered an Opus Dei answer *by the book*: “I do not want to be against anything, in principle. I want to be pro. But [Marxism] is intrinsically perverse [...] there is something terrible in its basis, it is superhuman, diabolical. But my task stays in the intellectual order. [...] priests are not called to make judgments of a political nature.”²²¹ Evidently, the Opus Dei’s spiritual leader thought it made perfect sense to refute and demonize the “ideologies” of the Left upon every platform, even at the service of a dictatorship in the midst of a merciless purge, only thereafter to brand himself and his followers as non-political actors.

²¹⁹ “Jaime Guzmán habla del frente juvenil,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 281 (September 9, 1976): 9; for a detailed account on the operation of the gremialistas during these years, see – Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime*, 225-70.

²²⁰ This series of eight lectures before the Military authorities, even made it to an edited volume, see – José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, *Marxismo: religión al revés, síntesis de las ocho conferencias desarrolladas por el sacerdote José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois ante las autoridades de Gobierno* (Santiago de Chile: División de Comunicación Social, 1982).

²²¹ “P. José Miguel Ibáñez, vocación: Opus Dei,” *Qué Pasa*, no. 286 (October 14, 1976): 22.

Conclusions

A decade of ideological radicalization among Chile's conservative elites ultimately brought about an idiosyncratic authoritarian-technocratic regime. The post-fascist intellectual projects of the late-1960s perhaps facilitated the emergence of the dictatorship, but more importantly, served it retrospectively once Pinochet sought to fashion his own coherent state ideology. The regime thus constantly proclaimed being both "anti-ideological" and "rational," this, despite constantly evoking notions of the Catholic and Hispanic Sacred. Like Onganía before him, prior to allowing any "political phase," Pinochet attempted to guarantee a fundamental alteration of the minds and souls of his citizens, by means of terror but also through the mobilization of Chile's conservative sectors combined with a distinctive state-led indoctrination. Unlike Franco's Spain, and like Onganía's Argentina, Pinochet did not even bother founding formal corporatist institutions, and instead was fully committed to a neoliberal economic project supported by advisory groups. In fact, the only meaningful "intermediary" entity to be found in this regime were the post-fascist networks such as the ICH, Opus Dei, and the gremialistas, all of which offered themselves to Pinochet as the holders of a definite knowledge thus deciding the regime's theory of the state, gender ideology, and overall "spiritual" rhetoric. Thus, once more, these agencies ultimately were far more significant for the design of the regime's state-ideology than Chile's neo-fascist affiliations - a process that I will touch on further in the last chapter.

Pinochet's regime was indebted to Francoism, from its assertion of being the second chapter of the Spanish Civil War, to the gremialistas' use of the Francoist corporatist jargon of "intermediary" societies, to the actual assistance it received from Spain between September 1973 and November 1975. Being a dictatorship far deadlier than the Argentine Revolution, meant the designers of the Chilean dictatorship clearly had an ampler understanding of the Francoist political

myths. Unlike Onganía, they did not believe a post-ideological society could emerge devoid of a purifying civil war against the Left's "totalitarian" components in society. Therefore, one can easily align with historian Kirsten Weld who has stressed recently that Pinochet sought to "transcend and succeed" Francoism, although neither he nor his ideologues ever quite said that.²²² Another way to put it is that Pinochet and his intellectuals aimed to produce a third chapter of what was, but now, an acknowledged authoritarian state model; a version that was calibrated to address the political and economic contexts of the 1970s, as well as the Chileans supposed unique mentality. As we will see in the next chapter, Fernández de la Mora's repeated appearances in Chile during the late-1970s and early 1980s, meant that with the disappearance of the Francoist regime, even he identified Pinochet's Chile as the last bastion of the regime model he had toiled his entirely life to conceive. To Fernández de la Mora's chagrin, however, Pinochet's identification with Francoism also meant that with Franco's death and Spain's democratization, the Chilean dictatorship too began seeking a path back to parliamentarism, thereby bringing its technocratic-authoritarian experiment to its conclusion.

²²² Weld, "The Spanish Civil War and the Construction of a Reactionary Historical Consciousness in Augusto Pinochet's Chile", 81.

Chapter 6: The Demise of the Technocratic-Authoritarian State Model

Throughout the 1970s, the prestige of the technocratic-authoritarian state model diminished in Argentina, Spain, and Chile. This happened due to a conjuncture of several historical conditions, such as economic crisis, large-scale popular mobilization against these so-called “soft” dictatorships, and international pressure for democratization - processes that put into question both the legitimacy and effectiveness of technocratic-authoritarianism. Yet a democratic transition was neither imminent nor inevitable in any of the three countries. In reality, the democratic reforms of the 1970s and 1980s were preceded by the surge of powerful neo-fascist resistance, stemming directly from the impediments and ultimate failure of the technocratic state model. The purpose of this last chapter is therefore not to analyze to the fullest the regimes that replaced the technocratic-authoritarian experiments - the scope of this dissertation would not allow us that - but to illustrate how the intellectual networks and ideologies that I discussed in the previous five chapters changed throughout different historical contexts. In general, I argue that the technocratic-authoritarian model continued to inform the regimes that replaced it. The chapter opens with the crisis of the Francoist regime in the 1970s; continues to explore the rise of the interlinked Spanish-Argentine neo-fascist wave of the 1970s; discusses the Argentine Dictatorship of 1976-1983 and its handling of the 1960s formulas; and concludes with debating the legacies of technocratic-authoritarianism during the Spanish and Chilean democratic transitions in the late-1970s and early 1980s.

“Francoism without Franco”: the design of Spain’s authoritarian future

During the second half of the 1960s, the Francoist dictatorship, despite its seeming economic achievements, began exhibiting signs of acute political crisis. As students and workers steadily

lost fear of the dictatorship, Spain saw a mounting wave of unrest from the street. More important, Francoism faced the emergence of its own urban guerilla: the Basque national liberation movement Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). A “terror” group according to the regime’s own definition - although it attacked mostly military personnel - it proved to be a crucial factor in deciding the regime’s fate. In truth, however, it was the opposition from within the dictatorship’s own political sphere that propelled Franco’s technocrats to change strategies in the 1960s, ultimately leading to Spain’s peculiar monarchic restoration. To begin with, throughout the 1960s, the moderate Falange politicians, namely José Solís, the General Secretary of the Movimiento, and Manuel Fraga, the Minister of Tourism and Information, resisted Carrero Blanco’s increasing authority by suggesting an alternative political project comprising of further political “openings.”¹ Despite rejecting parliamentary politics in principle, Fraga believed Spain was a “body in a process of configuration” that deserved effective forms of representation within its existing corporatist apparatus.² His Press Law of 1966 was thus a step in the direction of allowing a pluralist society to thrive within the regime’s ideological body.

The first act of avowed opposition to Franco in the 1960s came not from the Falange, however, but from Spain’s Christian Democrats and moderate monarchists. On June 5, 1962, the Munich Congress of Europeanists, declared the establishment of “genuinely representative and democratic institutions” in Spain.³ Here, those who had been the regime’s supporters in the past - most famously Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez - propositioned a monarchy significantly different to that put forward by Carrero Blanco and the Opus Dei. Following this congress, angrily, Franco

¹ Spain should strive towards a society “less rigid and more social just” stressed Fraga in 1961, see - Manuel Fraga Iribarne, *Promoción social y educación* (Madrid: Ateneo, 1961), 61.

² “La doctrina de José Antonio ante los problemas de hoy,” Manuel Fraga Iribarne, *Organización de la convivencia*. (Madrid: Ediciones S.A, 1961), 53 ,93.

³ This initiative was led by Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, Joaquín Satrustegui, and José María Gil Robles, see - Julio Crespo McLennan, *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 65-69.

appointed General Agustín Muñoz Grandes as his first Vice-president of Government. Still, for Franco the damage had been done: for many respectable monarchists, a transition toward a constitutional monarchy had become the preferred political “continuation” to Francoism.⁴

More external pressures began coming into play at this point, beginning with Spain’s rebuffed application to join the European Community, and continuing with the opening of the Second Vatican Council.⁵ Sensing an imminent political shift, even some Opus Dei intellectuals then began reconsidering their ideological stance. This was the case of the Rafael Calvo Serer. Following his interactions with West European intellectuals, in the 1960s he who had once been Franco’s fiercest reactionary intellectual began to display increasing democratic leanings. In his 1964 book *Las nuevas democracias*, for instance, he promoted a Monarchy as a symbol of authority that, given its “appeal to the army,” can prevent exaggerated “desires for executive power.”⁶ While not explicitly proposing democracy, he nevertheless urged the future monarch to heed the “will of his citizens” and adapt to the new historical “realities.”⁷

By the mid-1960s, Calvo Serer and Antonio Fontán began insinuating that they too believed a democratic opening was pertinent in Spain. This happened upon the daily *Madrid* - a case that is worth examining briefly since the Opus Dei technocrats used it later to dispel any critique of the Opus Dei’s political agenda.⁸ In 1968, during the days of the Parisian May uprising, Calvo Serer

⁴ Once the moderate monarchist José María Anson hinted this position publicly, the regime responded by collecting the June 23, 1966 edition of *ABC*, indicating just how limited the freedom granted by the 1966 Press Law really was, see - José María Anson, “Usted primero,” *ABC Madrid* (June 23, 1966).

⁵ Some historians have already interpreted Spain’s aspiration for economic integration with Europe as the sole reason for this new age of reforms. Despite not applying again until July 1977, these moderation measures did grant Spain with a preferential Agreement with the European Community in 1970, see - Charles Powell, *The Long Road to Europe: Spain and the European Community, 1957-1986* (Working paper: Elcano Royal Institute, 2015).

⁶ Rafael Calvo Serer, *Las nuevas democracias* (Madrid: Rialp, 1964), 173-74.

⁷ “Modifications that show it is situated at the height of time”; “The height of time” (altura de los tiempos) is one of Ortega y Gasset’s tropes from *Rebellion of the Masses* that refers to society’s own self-perception and feeling of ripeness for a specific political system.

⁸ “I can assure you,” said López Rodó to Neustadt in 1971, “that some of the people who are most distant from me politically belong, precisely, to Opus Dei. [...] Like Rafael Calvo, whose qualities and good faith I recognize, but whose political ideas I do not share at all,” in Neustadt, “Mi conversación mayor”, 15.

published a diatribe against Charles de Gaulle, declaring the incompatibility of authoritarianism with “the structures of industrial society and with the democratic mentality of our time.”⁹ The text said scarce little of the future Calvo Serer envisioned for Spain. This did not prevent Fraga from closing *Madrid* for months.¹⁰ Consequently, the incident has led conservative Spanish historians to question the Opus Dei’s loyalty to Franco, since “there was an important Opus group whose members professed anti-Francoism.”¹¹ This is clearly an overstatement. Calvo Serer and Fontán were not “anti-Francoist,” and showed no remorse for serving this regime for decades. In 1968, Calvo Serer merely suggested Francoism should progress towards a parliamentary democracy that would allow “socialism without Marxism.”¹² He did, however, fall from favor with Carrero Blanco. “I feel obliged to serve my country in the new situation that the Press Law had created,” he even wrote the Admiral in defiance,¹³ and later, wrote to Franco pledging him not to let Carrero Blanco make the Bourbon Prince “his prisoner.”¹⁴ Even so, Calvo Serer’s letters to Carrero Blanco, Franco, and López Rodó, clearly indicate that he wanted to reform Francoism from within, presenting himself as the authentic interpreter of the “July 1936 spirit.”¹⁵

Ultimately, *Madrid* was the premature preamble of Spain’s future “pacted transition.” Nothing exemplified this more than Fontán’s statement that *Madrid* advocates “an evolution of the country without rupture [...] towards a progressive economic, social, and political

⁹ “No al general De Gaulle,” *Madrid* (May 30, 1968); See also Rafael Calvo Serer, “La diversidad política es necesaria,” *Madrid* (April 4, 1968).

¹⁰ Writing to Franco, Calvo Serer begged him to order Manuel Fraga to lift the ban on the newspaper saying it is “animated by principles and values and objective importance beyond discussion for those with a Christian concept of life,” see - Carta de Rafael Calvo Serer al Generalísimo Francisco Franco, June 17, 1968, AGUN, documento 001/051/131.

¹¹ Ricardo de la Cierva, *El Opus Dei: controversia y camino* (Madrid: Arc Editores, 1997), 16.

¹² Rafael Calvo Serer, *España ante la libertad, la democracia, y el progreso* (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, 1968), 10.

¹³ Carta de Rafael Calvo Serer a Luis Carrero Blanco, November 19, 1967, AGUN documento 001/ 051/110.

¹⁴ Carta de Rafael Calvo Serer to Francisco Franco Bahamonde, July 17, 1969, AGUN documento 001/051/326.

¹⁵ Or as he said to Villar Palasi, “to say that the restoration of liberties is impossible since the Spanish people are not prepared, is tantamount to making the worst criticism of the work of the rulers of these years of peace,” see - Carta de Rafael Calvo Serer a José Luis Villar Palasi, June 24, 1968, AGUN, documento 001/051/136.

democratization.”¹⁶ How could a parliamentary democracy emerge from dictatorship without rupture? Fontán would not answer that question. Still, this modest defiance sent shock waves within the regime and even impressed Dionisio Ridruejo, now the emblem of Franco’s democratic opposition. In a letter to the *Madrid* editors, he sarcastically noted that he was not surprised the Opus Dei had produced both “sincere democrats” and “argumentative fundamentalists.” He would have been willing to consider the Opus Dei as a pluralist entity, he added, had Calvo Serer not pretended that these positions “are one and the same.”¹⁷

Calvo Serer’s mischiefs were the least of Franco’s problems in these years. Amidst a period of constant student riots and ETA attacks, in January 1969 a state of emergency was declared in Spain for the first time in decades. Worse yet, Pope Paul VI turned decidedly against the Spanish dictatorship. Alfredo Sánchez Bella, then the ambassador in Rome, wrote López Rodó that the Pope had not only broken with Francoism “but with the entire conception of Spain,” and that the regime had no alternative but to “give an impression of greater openness,” while at the same time letting the “absolutely faithful” Francoists “tighten the knots better.”¹⁸ Carrero Blanco and López Rodó needed no persuasion. Having passed the Organic Laws in 1967, they turned to administer what was essentially a silent *coup d’état*, which meant the elimination of alternative power centers in the regime and the design of an authoritarian monarchy to their liking. Carrero Blanco’s proximity to Franco meant that on September 21, 1967, Franco appointed him as Vice-president of Government instead of Muñoz Grande. Alfredo Sánchez Bella, now plotting inside Carrero Blanco’s circle, advised the Admiral on their group’s next political move:

If we act now, if we carry out what we have said, if the leader in life [Franco] [...] designates his successor himself, if we establish a crowned presidentialist state - which is what our era demands and what the national and international public opinion is willing to accept - the

¹⁶ Antonio Fontán, “La reaparición de Madrid,” *Madrid* (September 30, 1968).

¹⁷ Carta de Dionisio Ridruejo a José M. Miner Otamendi, February 7, 1967, AGUN, documento 001/051/092.

¹⁸ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Laureano López Rodó, June 25, 1969, AGUN, documento 15/68/365.

action of the enemy could cause inconvenience but will not substantially affect the historical evolution of Spain.¹⁹

The so-called “prince operation” was hence simple in theory. Building on the outlines of the 1947 Law of Succession, Franco was to designate the Bourbon Prince, Juan Carlos, as a powerless symbol at the heart of an authoritarian state, firmly in the hands of a “President.”²⁰ But there were complications ahead. For one thing, there were other contenders to the Spanish Crown. Some, for instance Sánchez Bella, advised crowning Otto von Habsburg, Austria-Hungary’s last Crown Prince, as Spain’s monarch.²¹ Likewise, the Carlist traditionalists, Javier de Borbón-Parma and his son Prince Carlos Hugo, still demanded the throne for themselves. As a result, in 1968 Carrero Blanco banished both father and son from Spain. Then there was the problem of Juan Carlos’s own ideological orientation. The operation to reinstate Francoism under a Bourbon monarchy was based on the belief that the Prince could be educated to be an authoritarian ruler himself. Following a two-year military service, in 1960 Juan Carlos thus began his studies in Spain. His education was the mission of a special committee that comprised of a salient group of Opus Dei’s ideologues: Federico Suárez Verdeguer, López Amo, López Rodó, and Pérez Embid.²² That the Prince publicly expressed his admiration to López Rodó was subsequently a matter of deep concern within the Falange inner circles.²³

¹⁹ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Luis Carrero Blanco, March 12, 1969, AGUN documento 15/44/57.

²⁰ This was based on the well-known Franco-Don Juan agreements of Estoril (Portugal) from 1957, wherein the Bourbon King agreed to abdicate the throne. For two detailed narratives on Don Juan’s relationship with Franco throughout the 1940s and 1950s see - Charles T. Powell, *Juan Carlos of Spain: Self-Made Monarch*. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Paul Preston, *Juan Carlos: A People’s King* (London: Harper Collins, 2004).

²¹ Cañellas Mas, *Alfredo Sánchez Bella*, 214-16; see also - Ramón Pérez-Maura, *Del imperio a la unión europea: la huella de Otto de Habsburgo en el siglo XX* (Madrid: Rialp, 1997).

²² Javeir Tusell, *Juan Carlos I: La restauración de la Monarquía* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995), 302; Preston, *Juan Carlos: A People’s King*, 135-36; see also - César de la Lama, *Juan Carlos I: Las ideas y los hechos de un reinado* (Astorga, León: CSED, 2012).

²³ “During the meal, the Prince made some enthusiastic compliments about Laureano López Rodó.[...] an excited enthusiasm really out of the ordinary,” see - “Gregorio Marañón Moya, Informe para el señor ministro de asuntos exteriores,” February 10, 1964, AGUN, documento 148/037/003.

While heading towards its authoritarian institutionalization, Francoism saw further performances of seeming liberation, for instance with the laws of religious liberty of 1967.²⁴ Villar Palasí's education reform of 1969-70 was another case in point. The law, and the study that preceded it (the "White Book"),²⁵ were primarily a propaganda device aimed at the UNESCO educational bodies as evidence of Spain's moderation.²⁶ Underpinning the law were narratives of modernization portraying Franco as he who had transformed a nation of "illiterates" into a technological power.²⁷ The White Book spoke of Spain's "political evolution" and even stated that Spain's entire "value system" was now subject to a "broad process of revision." Expectedly, however, the law openly adhered to "Christian concept of life" and the "Principles of the Movimiento."²⁸ Ultimately, Villar Palasí's efforts to "democratize the education" merely meant expanding the state's expenditure on education slightly closer to Western European levels.²⁹

The tensions between the Falange and the Opus Dei technocrats surfaced fully with the "MATESA Affair," in July 1969. A colossal scandal of public money embezzlement involving several Opus Dei institutions, it soon became an instrument in Fraga's hands at the exact time of the succession process.³⁰ Carrero Blanco, irritated by the Falange's utilization of the scandal, posed

²⁴ Known as "Ley 44:1967 de Libertad Religiosa," see - *BOE (España)* no. 156, (July 1, 1967): 9191-94.

²⁵ The book was officially titled *La educación en España: bases para una política educativa* and was presented to the Education Commission of the Spanish Cortes and on February 12, 1969.

²⁶ The law was the brainchild of CSIC's pedagogues Díez-Hochleitner and Joaquín Tena Artigas. In later years this reform would be presented as a key for the democratization of the Spanish population, see - "La reforma educativa española y la educación permanente," *Experiencias e Inovaciones en Educación*, no. 31 (Paris: Unesco, 1977).

²⁷ "Ley 14/1970, de 4 de agosto, General de Educación y Financiamiento de la Reforma Educativa."

²⁸ *Revista Española de Pedagogía*, vol. 27, no. 105 (January-March, 1969): 93.

²⁹ More on Franco's education system, see - Cazorla Sánchez, *Fear and Progress*, 93; Albert Carreras, *Historia económica de la España contemporánea, 1789-2009* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2010); Manuel de Puelles Benítez, "Evolución de la educación en España durante el franquismo," in *Corrientes e instituciones educativas contemporáneas* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2011), 267-88.

³⁰ MATESA was a textile-machinery corporation that received an estimated 140 million US\$ in export credits from the government - exports that in the words of the *New York Times* "in large part turned out to be imaginary." Some of the stolen money allegedly made its way to the University of Navarra and the Opus Dei's University of Piura in Peru, see - Richard Eder, "Cabinet in Madrid Periled by Scandal" *The New York Times* (July 16, 1970); Juan Martínez Alíer, "España verano 1970: el miedo empieza a desaparecer," *Cuadernos Ruedo Ibérico*, no. 25 (June-July 1970): 9.

an ultimatum: “It is either me or Fraga!”³¹ In response, Franco sacked Fraga and Solís. Following the official nomination of Juan Carlos as Franco’s successor, in October 1969, Carrero Blanco then formed his own so-called “mono-color” government, comprising of his intimate collaborators: Sánchez Bella (Minister of Information and Tourism), Fernández de la Mora (Minister of Public Works), the Opus Dei supernumerary Gregorio López Bravo (Foreign Minister), and López Rodó, as the Development Plan’s director. That is to say, paradoxically, following the MATESA scandal the technocrats tightened their control over the state.³²

But unlike the early 1960s, the period of 1970-73 was characterized by neither social peace nor economic miracles. Despite its ongoing growth, the Spanish economy showed the first symptoms of stagnation and in 1973, fell into full economic crisis due to the 1973 Oil Crisis.³³ With the Burgos Trials (beginning December 1970), which sentenced several ETA members to death, and Sánchez Bella closing of *Madrid*, the regime also fell back to its repressive propensities. True, Franco’s Spain then decided to perform yet another spectacle of democratic elections.³⁴ Arguably an “escape valve” for political pressures, the 1970s elections for the Cortes third rank (of “family representatives”) was nonetheless followed by the placing of other mechanisms of control - for instance, the elevation of the Kingdom Council to the regime’s highest advisory body.

³¹ Federico Silva Muñoz, *Memorias políticas* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1993), 263.

³² For more on Carrero’s 1969 government and increasingly authoritarian policies, see - Juan Ma de Peñaranda. *Los servicios secretos de Carrero Blanco: los orígenes Del CNI* (Barcelona: Espasa, 2015).

³³ Andreu Mayayo, *Economía franquista y corrupción* (Barcelona: Flor del Viento Ediciones, 2010), 169-79.

³⁴ There are those who argue that this new public sphere had a tremendous effect on the Spanish democratic culture, see - Pamela Beth Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960-78* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and those who reject this thesis, see - Omar G. Encarnación, *The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Brazil* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Omar G. Encarnación, *Democracy without Justice in Spain: The Politics of Forgetting* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

Under the technocrats' influence, this body was designed to propose presidential candidates for the Cortes to choose from.³⁵

On a strictly ideological level, seemingly little had changed in Spain's technocratic-authoritarian model in these years. This could be easily seen in Franco's end-of-the-decade speech, where he spoke of Spain's increase of its per-capita "Renta," warned against "abstract ideologies," and proclaimed to be "perfecting" the organic democracy as an "open and flexible order."³⁶ Nevertheless, in the 1970s the Francoist rhetoric did become more "political." Even the technocrats began to speak differently by then. In 1971, López Rodó stated that he "believed he is a politician" - a declaration that caused many in the Spanish press to raise an eyebrow.³⁷ Not by coincidence, it was then that the Falange took the Opus Dei to court, for violating the ban on political associations. The allegations read as follows:

The exclusive political ends of Opus Dei, are now revealed clearly in the rapid and successive acquisition of the most important newspapers of the country. [...] The countless incorporations of the journalists of the University of Navarra in the media, and a vast presence of their future candidates as members of the Cortes [...] indicates that the Opus Dei not only participates in national politics but also aspires to do so exclusively.³⁸

This was just the beginning of a challenging period for the Opus Dei. Following the MATESA scandal, the early 1970s saw the appearance of detailed reports regarding its alleged operations.³⁹ In 1974, the publication of Eva Jardiel Poncela's book *¿Por qué no es usted del Opus*

³⁵ Cazorla Sánchez, *Fear and Progress*, 55; see also - Cañellas Mas, *Laureano López Rodó: biografía política de un ministro de Franco*, 224, 281.

³⁶ "Mensaje de navidad 1969," AGUN, Archivo López Rodó, caja 119.

³⁷ Negrin, "Un Político," *Pueblo* (September 28, 1971); "Todo un político," *Nuevo Diario* (September 29, 1971).

³⁸ Alberto Royuela Fernández, "Al juzgado de instrucción," July 30, 1971, AGUN, caja 001.021.

³⁹ In particular, the Paris-based publishing house Ruedo Iberico was responsible for the defamations of the Opus Dei with texts that quickly informed copious reports in the Latin American press, as we have seen in chapter four, see for instance - "Significación religiosa, económica y política del Opus Dei," *Horizonte español*, vol. 1 (1966): 225-252; Ynfante, *La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei*; Artigues, *El Opus Dei en España*.

Dei? even reduced the game of guessing whether one belonged to Opus Dei to a mere caricature.⁴⁰ More striking, the technocratic ideology, in and of itself, now came under criticism. The texts of Juan Vallet de Goytisolo and Josep Meliá - both respectable Catalanian intellectuals - were good examples of this type of deconstruction. Both took issue with the contraposition between “ideology” and “technocracy.”⁴¹ The so-called development plans, Vallet de Goytisolo said, assume what people want and how to satisfy their needs, and are thus profoundly ideological. Moreover, organizing society by specialists towards perfection is where “technocracy and socialism coincide,” he said, and further warned that Spain’s development involved destruction, pollution, and social inequality.⁴² Last, with the appointment of Vicente Enrique y Tarancón as Archbishop of Madrid in 1971, The Catholic Church turned firmly not only against Franco but against the Opus Dei. “Relations between the Holy See and the Government became increasingly tense,” Tarancón testified, as López Bravo and López Rodó “quite unbelievably” sought to defend Spain’s Church “from the Pope and the Spanish episcopal hierarchy.”⁴³

Its outward political opening notwithstanding, Spain’s future lay firmly in at the hands of Admiral Carrero Blanco. “The principles of our Movement are permanent and unalterable, born of an exact conception of the truth of man,” he stated in March 1973. While denying being an “inmovilista” (“resisting change”) and underlining Spain’s “political dynamism,” he stated that

⁴⁰ The book presented a series of interviews with public figures in which they all explained why they had decided not to join the Opus Dei throughout the years, see - Eva Jardiel Poncela, *¿Por qué no es usted del Opus Dei?* (Madrid: Valera, 1974).

⁴¹ Juan Vallet de Goytisolo, *Ideología ‘praxis’ y mito de la tecnocracia* (Madrid: Montecorvo, 1971), 63-64; Josep Meliá, *Carta abierta a los tecnócratas* (Madrid: Ediciones 99 SA, 1973).

⁴² Vallet de Goytisolo, *Ideología ‘praxis’ y mito de la tecnocracia*, 92; Another critique of the technocratic development came from political scientist Manuel García-Pelayo’s who asked: “An optimal path, begs the question: for what? For whom? In the name of which values?” in Manuel García-Pelayo, *Burocracia y tecnocracia y otros escritos* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1974), 94.

⁴³ Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, *Confeciones* (Madrid: PPC, 1996), 276.

“we experience material abundance in our times but within our own national reality.”⁴⁴ By this he meant that despite legends about the causal link between economic growth and democratization, the Spanish subject had shown to be capable of living under only one system - Francoism - and would therefore continue to do so for eternity. With the further deterioration of Franco’s health, in June 1973, the Kingdom Council appointed Carrero Blanco as Spain’s first President of Government. In his inaugural speech, on July 20, 1973, the Admiral reiterated that the Spaniards will partake in the state’s “tasks,” but never decide the identity of its executive authority, lawmaker, or judge.⁴⁵

Neo-fascism: the return of the revolutionary alternative from the Right in Spain and Argentina

When Carrero Blanco stated that he was no “inmovilista” he was not speaking in abstractions but of a concrete group. Even more than the left-wing opposition, it was Spain’s emerging neo-fascist mobilization that undermined the technocratic-authoritarian model in this period. Famously nicknamed the “Bunker” after the zealots surrounding Hitler’s in his last days, this movement’s rhetoric betrayed a nostalgia for the fascist revolutions abandoned in the 1950s, and more specifically, to José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s nationalist-syndicalist political myths.⁴⁶ Strikingly, this sentiment surfaced simultaneously in Spain, Argentina, and Chile, thus developing into a tangible collaboration in the mid-1970s, perhaps the last neo-fascist international network of the

⁴⁴ Italics in the original text, see - “En el consejo nacional del Movimiento,” March 1, 1973, in - Luis Carrero Blanco, *Discursos y escritos, 1943-1973* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos), 290-96.

⁴⁵ “Designación del Presidente del Gobierno, Discurso en el Pleno de las Cortes españolas, celebrado el día 20 de julio de 1973,” in *ibid*, 332; for more on this phase in Carrero’s political career, see - Tusell, *Carrero: la eminencia gris del régimen de Franco*; Fernando Vizcaíno Casas, *1973, el año en que volaron a Carrero Blanco* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1993).

⁴⁶ That the journal *Fuerza Nueva* praised actual Nazis such as Otto Skorzeny made this connection even more obvious, see - Jesus Palacios, “Otto Skorzeny: se regreso a la patria,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 450 (August 23, 1975): 13-15.

Cold War. Despite their yearning for the 1930s, the 1970s neo-fascists were symptomatic of their own era. Rather than merely anti-communist, they spoke primarily in “anti-subversive” terms and were fixated on public morality, youth sexuality, women’s mobilization, homosexuality, and other 1960s alleged transgressions they knotted together to one imagined ubiquitous “enemy.” More often than not, their rhetoric showed a return to Anti-Semitism - a proclivity the post-fascist technocrats have long since abandoned. What is more, the neo-fascist movement echoed clear Third World penchants (“third worldism”) as it attacked the American-led economy of “trusts.” Thus, unlike the Opus Dei, the neo-fascists did not seek protective “bridges” with the Western Bloc but sought to purge their spiritual domain from its “excess.”

The Falange never ceased being a salient part of Francoism’s ideological landscape. Being the symbolic core of the Movimiento, it also upheld its youth, student, and women’s organizations. Examined more closely, however, by 1960 Francoism barely produced novel militant neo-fascist affiliations. This began changing in the early 1960s. A good example for this is Luis González Vicén and José Antonio Girón’s intellectual group Círculos Doctrinales José Antonio. Established in 1960, it aimed to redeem the ideology of the Falange’s late leader. The second case in point was the interlinked Acción Católica Ecuánica (ACE) and the youth movement Joven Europa. Acknowledged by the state in 1962, ACE was a part of a transnational neo-fascist network, which included Vanni Teodorani in Italy, Leon de Poncins in France, and Franz Von Papen in Germany. Joven Europa, too was an international European network that purported to unify the European neo-fascist forces. The two movements also linked with the Southern Cone. While Sergio Fernández Larraín was intimately linked to the ACE, Joven Europa associated with Tacuara,⁴⁷ and

⁴⁷ Pedro de Prat y Soutzo, “Confidencial: informe resumen acerca de las actividades internacionales de Acción Cristiana Ecuánica,” October 22, 1962, AGA, caja 42/09013.

more importantly, with Juan Perón, then residing in Madrid. In 1962, Perón addressed Joven Europa with the following words:

Social justice, economic independence, and political sovereignty, [...] constitute a third ideological position, far removed from the extremism of Moscow and Washington, and make up the synthesis of our Justicialista doctrine and the basis of our mystique [...] We are morally united with all the movements that, like Joven Europa, fight for common objectives and ideals [...] I wish and hope that our movements will unite in the future, [...] also because the Argentines descended from Europe we have never stopped being Europeans in our thoughts and in our behavior.⁴⁸

Not only does this text confirm that Perón collaborated with neo-fascist elements while in Madrid,⁴⁹ it also indicates that European neo-fascists felt Peronism was part of *their* movement - a notion that was to be confirmed in the early 1970s as we will see shortly. Yet despite this link, ACE and Joven Europa barely left a mark on Spanish politics at the time.

The same cannot be said of Blas Piñar. The ominous leader of the “Bunker” for decades, this Falangist, who had replaced Sánchez Bella as head of ICH in 1959, was one of the first to be dismayed by the technocrats’ submission to the western economic order.⁵⁰ Unlike the reformist Falange ministers, Piñar presented a clerico-fascist ideology that combined José Antonio’s mythology, Hispanidad, and staunch anti-Americanism.⁵¹ On the one hand, his so-called “Joseantonian reaffirmation” meant a yearning for an anti-Bourgeoisie “syndicate, vertical, and nationalized” society.⁵² On the other hand, he alleged that the Falange and traditionalism “do not

⁴⁸ “El General Perón y Joven Europa,” *Acción Católica Ecuménica (boletín)*, no. 6 (June 15, 1962): 1-2.

⁴⁹ Especially infamous was Perón’s connections with Tacuara member Joe Baxter, who revealed that Perón asked him to assassinate Augusto Vandor, see - Alejandra Dandan and Silvina Heguy, *Joe Baxter: del nazismo a la extrema izquierda: la historia secreta de un guerrillero* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Norma, 2006), 178-79.

⁵⁰ For more on the origins of Piñar’s movement see - John Gilmour, “The extreme right in Spain: Blas Piñar and the spirit of the nationalist uprising,” in Paul Hainsworth (ed.), *The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 206-231.

⁵¹ He mocked the Latin American “snobbery of fashion and dances” and rebuked its “surrender to the melody of the soul and flees from the noisy din of jazz”, see - Blas Piñar, *Combate por España* (Madrid: Fuerza Nueva, 1975), 72.

⁵² “Ni marxistas ni burguesas: Falangistas!” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 233 (June 26, 1971): 24.

oppose diametrically,”⁵³ and set out to Christianize José Antonio’s spirituality,⁵⁴ among other things, by stressing his own “providentialist sense of History.”⁵⁵ Last, it was his fascist symbolism - which included incessant public fascist salutes - that made Piñar a quintessential neo-fascist.⁵⁶

In January 1962, Piñar published an opinion column in *ABC* that was to become the definitive text of disillusionment from technocratic Spain. “Hipócritas” was one of the most staggeringly anti-American texts to be written in Franco’s Spain. Months before the Cuban missile crisis, it scolded the USA for its pragmatic dealing with the USSR, its violations of human rights, and imperial aspirations:

They had no scruples casting the first atomic bomb on the defenseless people of Hiroshima. [...] deep down, they search for a formula of coexistence that would allow them to live in peace [with communism] thus letting millions continue to moan as slaves [...] they pretend to be anti-colonialists and demand the self-determination of the under-developed nations, while binding them to the yoke of total economic dependency.⁵⁷

As the Chilean ambassador and Piñar’s friend Sergio Fernández Larraín observed, the USA’s irritation with Piñar’s allegations led Franco to sack him from the ICH.⁵⁸ Obviously, Piñar’s words exposed the unspoken truth of technocratic-authoritarianism: it depended on the American economic order for its very autonomous existence in the midst of the western domain.

⁵³ “Blas Piñar, en el eje de una idea,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 200 (November, 1970).

⁵⁴ Fray Antonio de Lugo, “José Antonio: ¿un místico? Su testamento rebosa autenticidad cristiana,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 382 (May 4, 1974), 24-27.

⁵⁵ This was Point no. 1 in his “minimal program,” see - Blas Piñar, *Hacia la III república?* (Madrid: Fuerza Nueva, 1979), 146; His collaboration with Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira to attack Allende was another sign of his clerico-fascist leanings, see - “Toda la verdad sobre las elecciones en Chile,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 194 (September 26, 1970): 5-6.

⁵⁶ Piñar did not like others naming him “neo-fascist,” although he humoristic embraced the “Bunker”; in his words - “we the people of the Bunker, every day we love the word more. While Hitler committed suicide, we who have a Christian and providential historical sentiment have not,” in “Blas Piñar en Guadalajara: Amigos del Bunker,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 478 (March 6, 1976); see also - “‘Bunker’ por la gracia de Dios,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 446 (July 26, 1975): 3; Even the Falange’s newspapers *Arriba* and *Pueblo* label *Fuerza Nueva* a neo-fascist party, see - M. Ballestros, “Fascistas y neofascistas,” *Fuerza Nueva* no. 204 (December 5, 1970): 5.

⁵⁷ “Hipócritas,” *ABC Madrid* (January 19, 1962).

⁵⁸ Confidencial 55/7, January 29, 1962, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1962, caja 6.

In 1966, Piñar established the journal and affiliation *Fuerza Nueva*. There are those who have claimed that by then he was “not a Falangist,”⁵⁹ but that would be to miss the point. *Fuerza Nueva* wanted to salvage the Falange’s road-not-taken of revolutionary national syndicalism. Subsequently, it scorned Spain’s opening of the global economy, its turn to consumerism, and social inequalities, but no less important, its reduction of politics to questions of science and specialists.⁶⁰ Put differently, the neo-fascists wanted back their irrational and virile “pending revolution.” Or as a *Fuerza Nueva* editorial stated:

We do not like this Cold Spain [...] where the aroma of a steak is confused with the sweet rhetoric of flexible ideologies of circumstances. [...] technocratic Spain, the one that tries to educate us in alloys of the spirit, the one that is more attentive to the consumer society than the consummation of society [...] this Indirect Spain, in short, we do not like, we do not like it! [...] We like the Direct Spain, which attests to the strong Celtiberian courage, which is willing to die for the sake of an ideal.⁶¹

Fuerza Nueva even questioned the Opus Dei loyalty to Franco,⁶² but was wary of doing the same to the Opus Dei’s patron, Carrero Blanco.⁶³

Piñar and his followers presented several discursive novelties in the Francoist landscape. Similar to the Argentine nacionalistas at the time, they represented a gradual motion from anti-communistic to “anti-subversive” rhetoric. For them, “subversion” encapsulated any phenomena that defied the hierarchies of the Christian Civilization as they understood it, be it European socialists, ETA - a movement that had little to do with communism - and Hippies.⁶⁴ In a parallel

⁵⁹ González Cuevas, *Historia de las derechas españolas*, 414.

⁶⁰ *¡Basta y adelante!: Discurso pronunciado por Blas Piñar el día 25 de enero de 1968, con motivo de la entrega de los premios nacionales del semanario Fuerza Nueva* (Madrid: Fuerza Nueva, 1968).

⁶¹ Ricardo Horcajada, “España Directa y España tecnócrata,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 228 (May 22, 1971): 26.

⁶² It did so for instance by publishing an article from the Venezuela newspaper *La Religión* questioning the Opus Dei’s loyalty to Francoism, see - “¿El Opus Dei es franquista?” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 218 (March 13, 1971): 14.

⁶³ “Carrero Blanco,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 311 (December 23, 1972): 5.

⁶⁴ “Los enemigos del régimen: los separatistas vascos,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 18. (May 13, 1967): 12; “Los enemigos del régimen: los socialistas,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 17 (May 6, 1967): 10-13; Carlos Jiménez. “Hippies: sus valores cardenales son negativa al orden social, negativa a trabajar y negativa a lavarse,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 55 (January 27, 1968): 14-18.

vein, Piñar thought he led the “third world” against the Cold War empires. This meant he admired Fidel Castro’s initial “desire for justice,”⁶⁵ only then to name Allende a “Trojan horse.”⁶⁶ More significant, *Fuerza Nueva* defied the 1960s peace movement and demanded the return to a state of civil war. “As protesters in England chant ‘better red than dead,’ we want to propose our, quite different, version: ‘better dead than red,’” Piñar stated sardonically.⁶⁷ Calling for the physical extermination of an internal enemy was nothing new for the Argentine nacionalistas but quite a novelty in Franco’s society where communism had allegedly been vanquished in 1939.⁶⁸ In other words, for Piñar, Franco’s “aseptic, comfortable, bourgeois peace” was deceitful.⁶⁹ Last, *Fuerza Nueva* demanded to renew Spain’s ideological role in Latin America. By resuming the call for a “Hispanic community of nations,” Piñar simply appropriated Franco’s Hispanidad message.⁷⁰ In short, led by *Fuerza Nueva*, and later including groups such as Círculo Español de Amigos de Europa (CEDADE), Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey, and the newspapers *El Alcázar* and *El Imparcial*, Spain’s “Bunker” was one of the more formidable neo-fascist movements in Europe.⁷¹

⁶⁵ Confidencial, 197 /28, discurso pronunciado en el Instituto de Cultura Hispánica por su Director, don Blas Piñar, en el homenaje que esa entidad rindió al Archiduque Otto de Habsburgo, April 28, 1961, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1961, caja 1.; In another case, at the 7th legislative session of the Spanish Cortes he declared that “there cannot be revolution without cause, and that of Cuba must invite the West for meditation,” see – Confidencial 286/39, June 12, 1961, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1961, caja 1.

⁶⁶ “El comunista Allende y sus acólitos,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 232 (June 19, 1971): 26; “En el Chile de Salvador Allende, una cura marxista de Gerona,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 376 (March 23, 1974): 23-27.

⁶⁷ Piñar, *Combate por España*, 134.

⁶⁸ Piñar spoke of the “oblivion” of the Civil War, and warned of the new “openness, dialogue, conviviality and Europeanism” which allowed he said “the ironic destruction of our country,” see – “Después del indulto,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 213-215 (February 7, 1971 -February 20, 1971).

⁶⁹ And when it was Carrero Blanco’s turn to die from the hands of the enemy, Piñar called for the ignition of another civil war, invoking the memory of the murder of Calvo Sotelo in 1936, see – “El enemigo está dentro,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 365 (January 5, 1974): 5.

⁷⁰ “Una tarea de nuestro tiempo: Comunidad hispánica de naciones,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 208 (January 2, 1971): 34-37; “Blas Piñar, en el eje de una idea,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 200 (November 7, 1970): 14-16.

⁷¹ For more on the “Bunker” and the Spanish neo-fascism see – Preston, *The Politics of Revenge*; José. L. Rodríguez Jiménez, “The Spanish NeoNazis. Evolution, Organizations, and International Connections (1966–1994),” *Historia 16*, no. 240 (April 1996): 12–24; Xavier Casals, *Neonazis en España: de las audiciones wagnerianas a los skinheads (1966-1995)* (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1995).

The parallels between the Argentine and Spanish neo-fascist movements were manifest, as the colossal failure of Onganía's technocratic-authoritarian regime triggered a salient neo-fascist backlash in Argentina as well. With *Azul y Blanco* closing in 1971, the Argentine public sphere saw the resurgence of other far-right cliques. A partial list would include Fernando de Estrada's journal *Premisa*, Edgard Saa's Agrupación Nacionalista Argentina, Walter Beveraggi Allende's Confederación Nacionalista Argentina, and Sánchez Sorondo's Movimiento de la Revolución Nacional.⁷² Other groups pertaining to José Antonio's ideology were Antonio Mille's Movimiento Nacional Sindicalista, with its journal *Leña*, Oscar Calzada López's Falange Restauradora Nacionalista, and later, Carlos Flores Allende's Falange y Fe. The main leader of this nacionalista revival was, however, Jordán Bruno Genta. While Argentina's urban guerilla revitalized his "anti-subversive" theories of the 1960s (discussed in chapter 3), his 1970 book *Seguridad y Desarrollo* was as much a manifesto against subversion as it was a tirade against technocratic capitalism. "There is no doubt that money is the new 'divinity,' not only of secular Jews but also for gentrified or proletarian Christians," he wrote.⁷³ In Genta's opinion, rather than a "new mentality," Onganía had led Argentina to a society plagued by "inessential" citizens, where one could be a "materialist, positivist, technocrat, existentialist, psychoanalyst, [...] a 'hippie.'"⁷⁴ Like Piñar, Genta linked these types to a global "subversive war." For him, the rebellion of the hippies and workers stemmed from the same "satanic inspiration" and the "fiercest resentment against unity, form, and order."⁷⁵ His Manichean perception of history, anti-materialist pursuit, and pledge to militarily "organize,

⁷² Other less important names were Ruben Calderon Bouchet's Ateneo de Cuyo, Héctor H. Hernandez's Movimiento Unificado Nacionalista Argentino (MUNA), and Father Meinvielle's last movement Patria Grande, see – "El nacionalismo argentino: un futuro sin Falanges," *Carta Política*, no. 16, (II semana de Febrero, 1975): 19-21.

⁷³ Jordán B Genta, *Seguridad y desarrollo: reflexiones sobre el terror en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Cultura Argentina, 1970), 15.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 25.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 70.

nationalize, and hierarchize social life” made Genta the key nacionalista ideologue of the early 1970s. His assassination in October 1974, by ERP militants, further fueled the myth around him.⁷⁶

By the late 1960s, the Spanish Bunker and Argentine neo-fascists were already collaborating. This began with the friendship between Blas Piñar and Alberto Boixados - a hispanista from the University of Córdoba who was a fierce critique of the technocratic 1960s in general and of the Opus Dei in particular -⁷⁷ but became even more substantial with the partnership between the Bunker leader and the nacionalista Ricardo Curutchet. In July 1973 the latter launched the journal *Cabildo*, which after the deaths of Meinvielle, in August 1973, and Genta, in 1974, became the new epicenter of nacionalista ideology. Apart from publishing texts ranging from Julio Meinvielle and Julio Irazusta to more respectable figures such as Catholic philosopher Bernadino Montejano, the journal was the mouthpiece of Curutchet’s own Movimiento Nacionalista de Restauración (MNR).⁷⁸ Curutchet quickly found points of reference in the Spanish “Bunker.” For instance, he published Ernesto Giménez Caballero’s article “Ante el 18 de Julio.” Originally published in *El Alcázar*, the Falange ideologue demanded here an “involution,” understood as a return to the zeitgeist of the days before the Spanish Civil War.⁷⁹ Moreover, Curutchet exhibited a deep admiration to the legacy of José Antonio, of whom he said the following words:

No nacionalista will be able to forget his teachings [...] The conception of the Homeland as “unity of destiny in the universal,” the opposition to the fallacious rationalist “program,” by the “instinct” - a total intuition, clear in the soul, of the Homeland and the History - and

⁷⁶ In the nacionalista journals he appeared as “the ‘martyr’ [...] the love that was crucified,” see- “Jordán Bruno Genta,” *Restauración*, no. 4 (October 1975): 35.

⁷⁷ See for instance - “Hispanoamerica unida al destino de España: declaraciones del profesor argentino Alberto Boixados,” *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 48 (December 9, 1967): 32-33; Alberto Boixados, *España entre Europa e Hispanoamerica* (Buenos Aires: Areté, 1973), 117-136.

⁷⁸ Initially, the movement was named La Liga de Restauración Nacionalista, see - “Proclamación pública de la Liga de Restauración Nacionalista,” *Restauración* no. 17, (February 1976): 22; see also - “Principios doctrinales del Movimiento Nacional de Restauración,” Informe confidencial no. 0317, Archivo Nacional do Brasil, MIC_GNC_AAA_82023839_d0001de0001.

⁷⁹ Ernesto Giménez Caballero, “Ante el 18 de Julio,” *Cabildo*, no. 15 (July 15, 1974): 24.

opposition to capitalism and to communism [...] his synthesis of tradition and revolution. [...] José Antonio's Spain [...] he has given us an imperial gift.⁸⁰

In *Cabildo*, and later in his journal *El Fortín*, Curutchet further vilified the technocratic project of the 1960s. "There is no authentic aristocracy, or true 'ruling class'" in Argentina, was his point of departure.⁸¹ And like *Fuerza Nueva*, he blamed the technocrats for both the 1960s "moral decay" and the rise of the subversion.⁸² In 1975, Marcos Gigena Ibarguren's nacionalista journal *Restauración* joined *Cabildo* in attacking not only the "useless revolution of 1966,"⁸³ but also the publicists who supported it: Grondona and Neustadt.⁸⁴ Here a clear demarcation between "golpismo" and "crusade" became apparent.⁸⁵ Whereas the former meant a lame authoritarian rule, the latter, like in Franco's "crusade," meant the annihilation of the enemy and the nation's rebirth.⁸⁶ Accordingly, the "subversion" appeared in these texts as an abject being, meriting death by non-constitutional means.⁸⁷ Indeed, upon hearing of Franco's death in 1975, the neo-fascists exhibited renewed interest in the legacies of the late Spanish dictator and his "crusade":

The death of Generalissimo Franco is a tragedy not so much for Spain but for the Christian West [...] The political experience indicates the importance and the necessity of the Conductor; when the system fails, or where the technique deforms reality or the ideology denies it, the Conductor knows how to impose order, correct deformations, and reconstruct human beings. The Conductor personalizes the politics that, from the French Revolution, tend to become abstract and mystical. [...] The Civil War was the Crusade - religious, mystic, transcendent, luminous, sharp, imbued with love and metaphysics.⁸⁸

⁸⁰ "Destino y legado de José Antonio," *Cabildo*, no. 7 (November 1, 1973): 16.

⁸¹ Fray Alberto, "Aristocracia y Oligarquía," *Cabildo*, no. 9 (January 3, 1974): 14.

⁸² Ruben Calderón Bouchet, "Hombre y Mujer o el Significado Sociopolítico del unisex," *Cabildo* no. 3 (July 5, 1973): 33; "Una guerra decisiva," *El Fortín*, no. 1 (March 20, 1974): 10.

⁸³ "Las revoluciones inútiles," *Restauración*, no. 4 (October 1975): 19.

⁸⁴ "Neustadt: un ejemplo de la continuidad del régimen," *Restauración*, no. 3 (September 1975): 7.

⁸⁵ "Entre el golpismo y la cruzada," *Restauración*, no. 2 (July 1975): 18.

⁸⁶ "El Nacionalismo o el Imperativo Poético," *Restauración*, no. 1 (June 1975): 20.

⁸⁷ "The Argentine soldiers died for the Nation, not for the Constitution," he said, see - "¿Por qué se lucha contra la guerrilla?" *El Fortín*, no. 1 (March 20, 1974): 11.

⁸⁸ Víctor Eduardo Ordoñez, "Francisco Franco: Caudillo de España por la gracia de Dios," *Restauración*, no. 6 (December 1975): 31.

These lines attest to the neo-fascists' interest in the military leader, not only as a designer of a purifying civil war but as the only form of rationality in a world plagued by illusory ideologies.

This tribute is noteworthy also because the nacionalistas rarely revered Franco in such words in the 1960s. That is not to say that they had given up on Spain altogether. For Juan Carlos Goyeneche, it was Muñoz Grandes who was, for a while, the new hope for the regime's return to its revolutionary essence. Goyeneche approached the vice-president in 1964, presenting him with his ideas of "pending revolution," and demanding to unite Latin America's neo-fascists. "There is a Jewish International, a Freemason International, a Marxist International, and an International of Money - where is ours?" he demanded to know.⁸⁹ Thereafter, in 1971 Goyeneche approached Carrero Blanco with similar pleas.⁹⁰ Still, only with the advent of the nexus between Piñar and the nacionalistas did a truly Spanish-Argentine neo-fascist amity occur, based on the contempt of the "technocratic" era and an unabashed reading of Franco's "Crusade" as exemplary for contemporary Latin America.⁹¹

While this happened, Argentina was to undergo what was, in essence, Latin America's first prominent, and somewhat forgotten, transition to democracy of the 1970s. Rather than bringing solidarity and civic cooperation to the country, however, this transition brought about the rise to power of yet another neo-fascist faction: the so-called "Peronist Right." Juan Perón has been absent from this analysis thus far, at least since he abandoned his Hispanidad rhetoric in the 1950s. There is a simple reason for this: Peronism was the alternative post-fascist ideology, if not the antithesis,

⁸⁹ Carta de Juan Carlos Goyeneche a Agustín Muñoz Grande, June 2, 1964, AGUN, documento 36/04/01.

⁹⁰ "I think," he said, "that after the moment we live here the occasion is timely," see - Carta de Juan Carlos Goyeneche a Luis Carrero Blanco, January 11, 1971, AGUN, documento 15/11/432.

⁹¹ As Piñar said in the honor of Boxiados, our countries need "not a change in technique, but in the mentality of men," in Alberto Boxiados, *Cartas de viaje: acerca de la realidad iberoamericana*, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Aret, 1968), 9.

of the technocratic-authoritarian state that is the center of this dissertation.⁹² While it would be impossible, in this study, to provide a comprehensive mapping of Peronist ideology in the 1960s, it is important to note that Argentina's technocratic-authoritarian ideology dissolved also due to Peronism reviving its own authoritarian, Catholic, and Hispanic message.⁹³

The history of Juan Perón's return to Argentina in 1973 is an intricate one that still calls for more historical research. Following the November 1970 "The Hour of the People" agreement between the Peronists and the Radical Party that paved the way for the democratic return, and under the leadership of Héctor José Cámpora, Peronism remerged in Argentine politics as an adaptable and trustworthy actor. This fact was made clear on November 17, 1972, as Perón returned to Argentina from Spain (the "operative return") and swiftly struck deals with Argentina's key political parties and labor unions. This achievement undercut Lanusse's own "Grand National Agreement" initiative, thereby opening the way for Cámpora's March 1973 electoral victory, Perón's return to Argentina, and own reelection in September 1973. His pragmatism notwithstanding, by catering both to the nacionalistas and the revolutionary Left - thus stimulating the Peronist Left's urban guerrilla activity in the early 1970s - Perón was far from ideological moderation. More worrisome, being in Madrid for twelve years, it was the political habitus at his residence in Madrid (Puerta De Hierro) that decided the neo-fascist character and stark murderousness of his third tenure.

⁹² Perón himself even famously ridiculed the Opus Dei, calling it the "catholization of the dollar" see - Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Conversaciones con Juan Domingo Perón* (Buenos Aires: Colihue-Hachette, 1978).

⁹³ For further analyses on this topic, see - Juan José Sebreli, *Los deseos imaginarios del Peronismo* (Buenos Aires: Legasa, 1983); Norberto Galasso, *Perón: exilio, resistencia, retorno y muerte, 1955-1974* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Colihue SRL, 2005); see also - Mariano Ben Plotkin, "Perón y el peronismo: un ensayo bibliográfico," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2015).

The Peronist “turn to the right” was the brainchild of Perón’s third wife Isabel Martínez de Perón, and personal secretary José López Rega⁹⁴ - the new interpreters of the “Peronist truths.”⁹⁵ Of course, Peronism had seen other right-wing figures before them. A case in point was Raúl Matera, who in the 1960s advocated his own brand of anti-communist authoritarianism, and rubbed shoulders with Sánchez Sorondo and Cardinal Caggiano.⁹⁶ But ultimately, the Peronist Right was born in Madrid, in López Rega’s journal *Las Bases*. Here Isabel spoke of a “Christian economy where matter and spirit could be in dialogue in equal conditions,”⁹⁷ and even evoked José Antonio’s “dignified concept” of political violence. In the face of a “murderous thief inside your house,” she said, one may act in self-defense. Violence is “systematically reprehensible, only when it is contrary to justice,” she further paraphrased the Falange leader.⁹⁸ Being the close friend of Franco’s sister, María del Pilar, meant Isabel was also well-connected with the Francoist establishment. On October 7, 1973, following Juan Perón’s electoral victory, María del Pilar even arrived in Buenos Aires for Perón’s inauguration as Isabel’s official guest.⁹⁹ Fittingly, as the elected vice-president, Isabel returned to Madrid and displayed further signs of Hispanic and spiritual tendencies. On June 25, 1974, in a speech at the Madrid ICH, she stated that “the

⁹⁴ López Rega joined Perón in Madrid in July 1965 and was his personal secretary since then. For more on this person, see - Marcelo Larraquy, *López Rega: el peronismo y la Triple A* (Buenos Aires: Punto de Lectura, 2007); Luis Vicens, *El Loperreguismo* (Buenos Aires: El Cid, 1983); Marcelo Larraquy, Katherine Cortés Guerrieri, Guido Bilbao, María José Grillo, and Daniel Guebel, *López Rega: la biografía* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2004).

⁹⁵ It was Isabel Perón who defined the “twenty Peronist truths” upon a series of editorials in *Las Bases* between 1971-1974.

⁹⁶ At times, Matera seemed to propose a post-ideological Christian society with Peronism merely controlling the technocratic-authoritarian apparatus, see - Raul Matera, “Mensaje a los argentinos: bases para una empresa nacional,” August 1964, The Perón Papers, The Hoover Institution Archives, box 6; Raul Matera, “Argentina: planta piloto de la revolución social Cristiana,” Buenos Aires, December 1966, The Perón Papers, The Hoover Institution Archives, box 9.

⁹⁷ “Dijo la vicepresidente de la nación en el foro internacional de la OIT,” Presidencia de la nación: Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión. Argentine Subject Collection, The Hoover Institution Archives, box 1.

⁹⁸ Isabel de Perón, “La verdad no. 11: el peronismo anhela la unidad nacional y no la lucha; desea heroes pero no mártires,” *Las Bases*, no. 14 (June 6, 1972): 9; see also - The Hoover Institution Archives, The Perón Papers, box 9.

⁹⁹ “Llegó la hermana del Generalísimo Franco Para Asistir a la asunción del mando por el Teniente General Perón,” October 7, 1973, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 110; see also - “Una gran amiga de los argentinos!: Doña Pilar Franco Bahamonde,” *Las Bases*, no. 15 (June 21, 1972): 66-68.

intellectual and spiritual seed Spain had planted [in Argentina] has germinated with strength and hierarchy.”¹⁰⁰ As to López Rega, his self-made image of mysticism (he was known as “El Brujo,” or the Sorcerer) was accompanied by a simplistic Manichean world-view presenting Perón’s adversaries as “enemies of the nation,”¹⁰¹ and more striking, with an obsession for generating an Argentine “new man.” Through inner inspection and “spiritual exercises,” he held, “the common man may get to know the new man who dwells within himself.”¹⁰²

Whether Juan Perón himself “turned to the right” in the early 1970s is not easy to answer based on his texts.¹⁰³ Some in the Argentine press thought he did, even before “The Hour of the People.”¹⁰⁴ Mario Amadeo definitely believed so and joined his political movement in 1972. Settling old grudges with Sánchez Sorondo, in 1972 they established the Movimiento de Acción Nacional (MAN) as a basis for the Ateneo members to join the Peronist electoral alliance (FREJULI).¹⁰⁵ In May 1973, as Argentina’s second elections of 1973 drew closer, Amadeo thought he could “participate actively in the definitive organization of the Movement.” In his fantasies, he saw Peronism purifying itself from its Marxist factions, thereby integrating the nation.¹⁰⁶ Just before Perón’s death, Amadeo stated that the Argentine masses exhibit “clear Christian and national inclinations” and are neither influenced by any “liberal ideology,” nor “seduced by the

¹⁰⁰ *María Estela Martínez de Perón, vicepresidente de la república argentina habla en el Instituto de cultura Hipsápnica, Madrid, julio el 25, 1974* (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, 1974), 11.

¹⁰¹ “Only traitors of the Fatherland would want to harm those who fight against the imperialism that threatens to enslave the Argentine Workers,” he declared, see - José López Rega, “La verdad desnuda,” Peronist movement files, The Perón Papers, The Hoover Institution Archives, box 9; López Rega was not a member of any official spiritual affiliation. He was, however, allegedly connected with Madrid’s circles of conspirators and famously befriended Licio Gelli of the Propaganda Due secret society, see - Vicens, *El Loperreguismo y justicialismo*, 20.

¹⁰² José López Rega, “Filosofía del hombre nuevo,” *Las Bases*, no. 6 (February 1, 1972): 32-33, see also - Peronist movement files, The Perón Papers, The Hoover Institution Archives, box 9; José López Rega. “Para la juventud: filosofía del hombre nuevo,” *Las Bases*, no. 10 (April 4, 1972): 30-35.

¹⁰³ According to Finchelstein, he did so, and even promoted anti-Semitic concepts such as the global Jewish-led “sinarquía,” see - Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War*, 114.

¹⁰⁴ Rodolfo Pandolfi, “Perón y su regreso a las fuentes,” *Redacción*, no. 5 (July 1973): 16.

¹⁰⁵ “El nacionalismo argentino: Un futuro sin Falanges,” *Carta Política*, no. 16 (II week of February 1975): 21.

¹⁰⁶ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, May 8, 1973, AGUN documento 15/35/313.

ideological left.”¹⁰⁷ In other words, the Ateneo’s ad hoc alignment with Peronism relied on the belief that by committing to the “Spanish-Creole tradition” this could become Argentina’s next post-ideological “Movement.”¹⁰⁸ Perón’s own declarations from that period disclose why Amadeo might have reached this conviction. While chiding Argentina’s alleged financial “oligarchies,” Perón nonetheless voiced fairly technocratic formulations in the early 1970s, for instance in the following statement from 1973:

This modern world has created new needs, so nations can no longer afford to do politics. Those times have passed. Now is the time for Integrated Democracies, where everyone struggles with a common goal, maintaining their individuality, doctrines, and ideologies, but still working for a common goal. [...] now it is necessary to create truly representative [...] superior councils.¹⁰⁹

By proposing alternative forms of non-political representation through councils, Perón’s jargon merely reflected the spirit of the time.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, the Ezeiza Massacre on June 20, 1973 - the day of Perón’s return to Argentina - and López Rega’s formation of the assassin squad Triple A (Argentine Anticomunist Alliance) immediately thereafter, indicated that Perón made the physical eradication of the Peronist Left his undertaking, thereby quickly moving away from the Argentine Revolution’s legalist approaches to authoritarian control. *Cabildo* was quick to explain the significance of these events: “Marxism believed it had the right to put its stamp on a party to which it was not invited. Now it will be expelled, with a great shedding of blood.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Mario Amadeo, *La opción argentina: conferencia pronunciada en el Círculo del Plata el 14 de marzo de 1974*, (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ateneo de la República, 1974), 6.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 21.

¹⁰⁹ “Discurso pronunciado por el Teniente General Juan Perón Ante los gobernadores provinciales,” August 2, 1973, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 110; see also - *Gobernar es persuadir: Mensaje del Teniente General Perón a los gobernadores de provincias, pronunciado el 2 de agosto de 1973*, 6.

¹¹⁰ For another example of Perón’s notions of technological acceleration and integrated democracies, see - *El camino de nuestra revolución: iscurso pronunciado por el Teniente General Perón en la Confederación General del Trabajo, Julio 30, 1973, Mensaje II*.

¹¹¹ “El país ante la hora de las definiciones,” *Cabildo*, no. 3 (July 5, 1973): 5.

It is difficult to speculate how Perón's presidency would have developed ideologically, as he himself made but few political resolutions before falling into illness, and ultimately dying on July 1, 1974. But sure enough, after his death, Peronism turned decidedly to the far-right side of the ideological spectrum. The twenty months of Isabel Perón's rule were a showcase of neo-fascist rhetoric and much Catholic spiritualism. For her and López Rega, the battle against the urban guerrilla was now a "God-given mission."¹¹² And preoccupied with spurring "the rebirth of a new man" Isabel further vowed to regenerate "traditional Christian values," as the "best patrimony of a real Argentineness."¹¹³ A new journal by the name *El Caudillo* represented this turn fully. The Triple A's mouthpiece and the creation of Tacuara member Felipe Romeo,¹¹⁴ it espoused a new hybrid of clerico-fascism and Peronist zealotry. Romeo identified the Nation's enemy as the Jewish-led "sinarquía," which for him, encompassed liberalism, communism, and the Argentine "oligarchy,"¹¹⁵ as well as psychoanalysis and the feminization of men. "Revolutions are not done with long hair but with virile attributes," he told the revolutionary Left.¹¹⁶ Against these enemies, he advocated a "civil war" and famously stated that a "good enemy is a dead one."¹¹⁷ But unlike Tacuara, strikingly *El Caudillo* did not wallow in the margins of society but represented the state apparatus, which concurrently was responsible for the assassination of hundreds of Argentines.¹¹⁸ López Rega's rule (or "Loperreguismo") could thus have well been the most grotesque neo-fascist

¹¹² "Enérgico discurso pronunciado la jefe del estado al inaugurar la reunión con los representantes de las fuerzas activas del país," October 8, 1974, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 111.

¹¹³ "Discurso pronunciado hoy por la presidente de la nación," February 20, 1975, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 111.

¹¹⁴ For a full account on the nexus between the two movements see - Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War*, 116-18.

¹¹⁵ "Guerra a la oligarquía," *El Caudillo*, no. 30 (June 7, 1974).

¹¹⁶ "Oime Barbudo!," *El Caudillo*, no. 2 (November 23, 1973).

¹¹⁷ Felipe Romeo, "Hay que dar la cara," *El Caudillo*, no. 43 (September 13, 1974); this statement has been frequently quoted in the Argentine press ever since, see - "Murió Felipe Romeo, vocero de la banda de ultraderecha Triple A," *Clarín* (May 5, 2009); "El órgano oficial de la Triple A y del Brujo," *Página 12* (January 7, 2007).

¹¹⁸ The Triple A excuted 685 people, see - Conadep, Informe Nunca Más, Capítulo II, Título Primero: Víctimas; <http://www.desaparecidos.org/arg/victimas/listas/aaa.html>

regime of the Cold War. Or as a Peronist left-wing journal said, this “fascist Catholicism,” which adored “Christ and Mussolini” was the “most mediocre expression of the Right.”¹¹⁹

In brief, by rejecting the elite-controlled technocratic society, the neo-fascists of the 1970s - be they Piñar, Curutchet, Rodríguez Grez, or Romeo - demanded a return to a civil war mentality, as well as to revolutionary, violent, and “corporatist” political action. As a result, despite initial high expectations, the period of Isabel Perón and López Rega’s tenure shattered Amadeo’s hope for a respectable authoritarian modernization under Peronism. In January 1976, he wrote Sánchez Bella of a regime “controlled by events” and of a country “falling apart.”¹²⁰ The downfall of Isabel Perón was a result of a combination of political violence and economic crisis, but not less significantly, from her inability to strike alliances with the nacionalistas, Catholic elites, and military.¹²¹ As in 1966, in 1976 the Argentine Military seized an opportunity to oust what had become one of the most politically disqualified, murderous, and unpopular regimes in Argentine history. Allegedly, following a brief period of exile in Spain, Romeo and other Triple A associates were to return to serve the last Argentine dictatorship in 1976.¹²² The remaining neo-fascist movement, for its part, was henceforth to expand further within the context of the collaboration between *Cabildo* and *Fuerza Nueva*.

The Argentine dictatorship of 1976-1983 and its links to the 1960s ideological projects

The Peronist terror regime ultimately came to its end with the rise of an even more murderous military dictatorship: the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional. An exceptionally idiosyncratic

¹¹⁹ “De la primavera camporista a el Caudillo’ - el giro a la derecha de la burguesía,” *Manifiesto* (January 1975).

¹²⁰ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, January 14, 1976, AGUN, documento 15/35/322.

¹²¹ For more on his topic, see - María Sáenz Quesada, *Isabel Perón: la Argentina en los años de María Estela Martínez* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Planeta, 2003); Julio C. González, *Isabel Perón: intimidades de un gobierno* (Buenos Aires: Editorial El Ateneo, 2007).

¹²² “Murió Felipe Romeo, vocero de la banda de ultraderecha Triple A,” *Clarín* (May 5, 2009).

regime, the Argentine Dictatorship of 1976-1983 (“the last dictatorship,” or simply the Proceso) and its ideology received countless interpretation throughout the years.¹²³ Based on its early texts, it is safe to say that the Proceso was indebted to the nacionalista “anti-subversive” theories of the 1960s. However, to say that the regime was simply neo-fascist would be to overlook the complexity of its “democratic” rhetoric, and initial popularity among the moderate Argentine middle-class. My analysis will add to the debate on the Proceso by stressing the peculiar relationship this dictatorship maintained with the legacies of Onganía and Franco.

The Proceso was a regime that justified itself in terms of destruction, targeting both the revolutionary urban guerrilla and the Peronist political structure. While Onganía envisioned a voluntarily post-ideological society of “changing mentalities,” General Jorge Rafael Videla, the Proceso’s leader between 1976 and 1981, sought to purge Argentina from its alleged “impurities,” and then, gradually restore a “representative, republican, and federal democracy.”¹²⁴ As such, the Proceso refrained from defining itself in theoretical terms. At times, Videla sounded like Onganía, when he vowed to eliminate all ideological “demagogy.” In other moments, he explained his regimes as follows:

The other day, in the cabinet meeting I said: let us imagine that we are in a theatre play, and there is a scene in which a group of actors worked, there was a fight, and now all the furniture is in disarray. The actors disappear for the moment and another set of actors enters the scene; finding everything messy they put things in their place. That is, broadly speaking, what happened on March 24, as [we discovered] a backdrop that was already is in shambles, due to the subversion.¹²⁵

¹²³ Some noteworthy examples would include - Marguerite Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Donald C. Hodges, *Argentina’s “Dirty War”: An Intellectual Biography* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014); Diana Taylor, *Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s “Dirty War”* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Alfredo Pucciarelli, (ed.), *Empresarios, tecnócratas y militares: la trama corporativa de la última dictadura* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 2004).

¹²⁴ “Declaraciones del Señor Presidente de la Nación en la sala de periodistas de la casa de gobierno”, April 12, 1976, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 112.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

It is telling that the metaphor Videla chose was that of a theatre. Unlike the neo-fascists, this murderous General seldom spoke against Marxism, “sinarquías,” or international “trusts.”¹²⁶ Often times, he even admitted that “subversion” was not the main justification for his regime, but rather the Peronist “misrule” and “national frustration” over Argentina’s economic misfortunes.¹²⁷ To the Argentine public, the Proceso hence presented itself as one of the least intellectual regimes in Argentine history, certainly next to Onganía’s ideological and spiritual projects.

Of course, this is not to say that there was no ideology behind the Proceso. Videla aspired to rectify Argentina’s “traditional values” and “authentic lifestyle.” Albeit rarely elaborating what these values entailed, he also vowed to purge Argentina from the values of the enemy, which he defined as “nihilist and “anti-national.”¹²⁸ It should be noted that despite being loyal to Christian values, the Proceso never once claimed to be either “popular” or the embodiment of the “Grace of God” - as we have seen, the more significant of Franco’s and Pinochet’s self-legitimations. Through mass-scale state-led terror and psychological warfare, the regime sought to silently operate against the alleged subversive enemy in “all social fields,”¹²⁹ and thereafter, vanish.

The dictatorship gladly allowed, however, neo-fascist platforms to thrive within its public sphere. With López Rega’s ban lifted, *Cabildo*, now with Blas Piñar as an official collaborator,

¹²⁶ Some of the internal texts of the regime did, of course, present a coherent anti-communist tone, but not in the same intensity and paranoia of the nacionalista texts, see - *Marxismo y subversión: ámbito educacional* (Buenos Aires: Estado Mayor General del Ejército, 1977); *Documentos básicos y bases políticas para de las fuerzas armadas para el proceso de reorganización nacional* (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nación, 1980).

¹²⁷ “Discurso pronunciado el día 30 de marzo de 1976, por el excelentísimo Señor Presidente de la nación, D. Jorge Rafael Videla al asumir la primera magistratura de la Republica Argentina,” *Mensajes presenciales: Proceso de Reorganización Nacional, tomo I* (Buenos Aires: 1976), 8,13; see also - “El presidente de la nación dirigió hoy un mensaje a todo el país conmemorarse el 166 aniversario de la Gesta de Mayo,” May 24, 1976, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 113.

¹²⁸ “Discurso del presidente de la nación ante directivos de diarios, radio y televisión del interior del país,” May 12, 1976, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 113.

¹²⁹ “El teniente general D. Jorge Rafael Videla pronuncio un discurso en la cena de la camaradería de las fuerzas armadas,” July 7, 1976, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 113.

returned to the center of public life.¹³⁰ Against the international outcry over human right violations in Argentina, *Cabildo* straightaway reissued Piñar's "Hipócritas."¹³¹ More Spanish-Argentine collaboration ensued as Ricardo Curutchet arrived in Madrid to speak at one of *Fuerza Nueva*'s spectacles of contempt to the Spanish transition: a ceremony at Madrid's Las Ventas Bullring commemorating the beginning of the Civil War.¹³² Following a tribute to Franco and José Antonio at the Valley of the Fallen, Curutchet's speech attacked the "international power of money,"¹³³ and praised José Antonio - "the greatest civil captain of our time."¹³⁴ Despite his fascist salutes, by now his ideas, it is important to note, were fairly different from Primo de Rivera's ideology, insofar as he emphasized Christian restoration, and market-oriented economic prosperity, rather than a nationalist-syndicalist utopia. Even so, this event, which hosted European neo-fascists such as French Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour and Italian Gregorio Almirante, should be considered a rare public display of what was intended to be the inception of a novel neo-fascist international (the "Eurodestra").¹³⁵

Less than a year later, Piñar led a *Fuerza Nueva* delegation to Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Paraguay, a trip of which his journal made the following statement:

The presence of *Fuerza Nueva* in the South American cone coincides with the rebirth of those lands of our ancestry. Another New Force - which has God, the Fatherland, and Justice, as a triple ideal - is emerging in places long subjected to subversive movements inspired by foreign powers. [...] The Armed Forces, in the patriotic tradition of the leaders who once

¹³⁰ "Fue levantada la prohibición sobre las revistas *Cabildo* y *Fortín*," June 17, 1976. AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 113.

¹³¹ Ricardo Curutchet, "Editorial," *Cabildo*, no. 3 (October 22, 1976): 3.

¹³² According to *El País*, some 20,000 people attended the event, see - "El fervor franquista llenó algo más de tres cuartas partes de la plaza de toros de Las Ventas," *El País* (July 18, 1976).

¹³³ "17 de Julio en Madrid Hacia la Restauración de la Cristiandad," *Cabildo*, no. 18 (August-September 1978).

¹³⁴ "El fervor franquista llenó algo más de tres cuartas partes de la plaza de toros de Las Ventas," *El País*, July 18, 1976.

¹³⁵ For more on this movement see - Stephan Braun, Alexander Geisler, and Martin Gerster, *Strategien der extremen Rechten: Hintergründe - Analysen - Antworten* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 483; see also - "Blas Piñar visita Italia al frente de una delegación de *Fuerza Nueva*," *El País* (April 14, 1978).

forged Spanish-American independence, assume the government of the young republics, plagued by international Marxism, and besieged by North American capitalism.¹³⁶

Indeed, in *Fuerza Nueva*'s worldview, this visit represented nothing less than a triumphant gathering of all the "new forces" now operating in Spain and the Southern Cone against the enemies of the Hispanic civilization. For Piñar, this trip was one of the highlights of his political career. The reception in his honor, at La Salle College in Buenos Aires, concluded with yet another spectacle that saw him and Curutchet leading the crowd into singing the Falange's hymn *Cara al Sol*.¹³⁷ The mainstream Argentine press, for its part, enthusiastically quoted Piñar's caveats against emulating the "tragic" Spanish transition.¹³⁸ Piñar, reported the Spanish press somewhat more laconically, held several other conventions with "like-minded" groups such as La Liga de Restauración Argentina and Falange y Fe.¹³⁹ Thereafter the Spanish delegation continued to Chile. Here Piñar convened with Pinochet, Pablo Rodríguez Grez, and Chile's Minister of Interior, Sergio Fernández, and as a whole, was given an even more formal welcome than in Argentina.¹⁴⁰ To *Fuerza Nueva*'s alarm, however, the "opposition" journal *Qué Pasa* interviewed Piñar with "words like bullets."¹⁴¹ It should come of no surprise that the Opus Dei-affiliated journal appeared in *Fuerza Nueva* as an antagonist.¹⁴² As we will see shortly, *Qué Pasa* did not take kindly to this neo-fascist alliance.

¹³⁶ "Especial American de Fuerza Nueva," *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 644 (May 12, 1979): 18-19.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹³⁸ "Blas Piñar hablo de la situación española," *La Nación* (April 29, 1979); "Para Blas Piñar el marxismo no es una avalancha faltamente victoriosa," *Convicción* (May 3, 1979): 6.

¹³⁹ "Blas Piñar en Buenos Aires: Filial Argentina de Fuerza Nueva," *ABC Madrid* (May 2, 1979); In Paraguay, the group attended the 12th convention of the "World Anti-communist League" hosted by Alfredo Stroessner ("XII Congreso de la Liga Mundial Anticomunista en Asunción").

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁴¹ After the intimate meeting, reported *Fuerza Nueva*, Blas Piñar exited the room with tears in his eyes, see - "Especial American de Fuerza Nueva", 25.

¹⁴² Apparently, the journal dared to ask him "why have the Spaniards forgotten Franco so quickly?" see - "España se juega su propia existencia," *Qué Pasa*, no. 421 (May 10, 1979): 52.

Contrariwise to these events, the Proceso gradually pursued the services of more moderate civic groups. It found them, in many cases, in the shape of Onganía's own spiritual and technocratic figures. Naturally, the affiliations discussed in Chapter 3 did not merely disappear from public life in the 1970s. The Opus Dei's and FFP intellectuals, for instance, were still publicly influential, and even continued to attack nacionalistas such as Genta for their "money-hating" ideology.¹⁴³ The Argentine ICH apparatus was also active in the late-1970s and underwent a small-scale radicalization. "Towards the Hispanic crusade!" was the title of its 1977 annual meeting.¹⁴⁴ Onganía's technocrats returned to play their most salient role in the regime's education system. The one significant continuation line between the 1966 and 1976 dictatorships was the Proceso's Education Minister Juan Rafael Llerena Amadeo (Onganía's deputy-minister of Education, discussed in chapter 4). Replacing Juan José Catalán - also an Onganía official and Cursillos de Cristiandad affiliate - the appointment of Llerena Amadeo meant that Argentina's education system was again affected by his spiritual pedagogy.

In no time, the Argentine education system saw the return of Onganía's educational think tank and the reestablishing of the collaboration with Spanish pedagogues Víctor García Hoz and Ricardo Díez-Hochleitner. In fact, García Hoz's theories of "personalized education," and expertise in issues of teenage drug-use and sexuality,¹⁴⁵ received their fullest consideration in the Proceso's education system. The personal guest of Llerena Amadeo, in July 1979 the Opus Dei pedagogue visited Argentina - an encounter that has already drawn the attention of Argentine historians of education.¹⁴⁶ Above all, this visit indicated how a Francoist pedagogue who had

¹⁴³ "Genta, un doctrinario de la dictadura," *Tradición Familia y Propiedad*, no. 17-18 (November-December 1973).

¹⁴⁴ "Hispanidad identifies us and defines us [...] Hispanidad is something essential to the Argentine being" said Ernesto Muñoz Moraleda, see - *Boletín informativo de los institutos argentinos de cultura hispánica*, no. 21 (July 31, 1977).

¹⁴⁵ Víctor García Hoz, *Familia, sexo, droga* (Madrid: Rialp, 1976).

¹⁴⁶ As some historians have noted, the presence and influence of García Hoz's pedagogy in Argentina was considerable, see for instance - Nelly Fillipa, *Educación personalizada y dictadura militar en Argentina. 1976-1983*.

gradually become marginalized in Spain remained esteemed in Latin America.¹⁴⁷ As for Llerena Amadeo, not much had changed in his rhetoric since writing in *Cuadernos del Sur*. Speaking at the UNESCO International Education Convention on July 6, 1979, he discussed the overpowering “technicisms” of modernity, and promised to protect the Argentine youth from “frivolity, extremism, and subversive crime.”¹⁴⁸ Faced with growing criticism over the resurgence of Catholic contents in the education system, he retorted that his methods were “not religious teaching in any way,” but merely the healthy vision of “man, family, society, and the state.”¹⁴⁹ In short, while at times expressing discomfort over the regime’s reduction of the education system to fighting “subversion,”¹⁵⁰ all in all, Llerena Amadeo and his intellectuals served the Proceso well, offering it a comprehensive educational model and international pedagogical networks.¹⁵¹

Similarly, the Argentine media still saw the presence of those who had promoted the post-ideological theories of the state in the 1960s and who now justified the Proceso by exerting similar opinions. Mariano Montemayor, for example, assisted the Proceso in his tabloid *Convicción* - a platform that served Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera personally and that presented itself as “a journal of the extreme center.”¹⁵² Another noteworthy example was Mariano Grondona’s journal

(San Juan: Universidad Nacional de San Juan, 1997); Laura Graciela Rodríguez, “La influencia católica en la educación,” *Estudios*, no. 25 (January-June 2011): 141-57.

¹⁴⁷ The Argentine Centro de Investigación y Acción Educativa (CINAE) publish six of García Hoz’ booklets, as well as the Spanish José Rodríguez Diéguez and Amparo Martínez Sánchez, both specialists in “Personalized education”: *La universidad*; *Una pauta para la evaluación de centros educativos*; *El Proyecto educativo*; *Predicación y la evaluación personalizada*; and *¿Qué es la educación personalizada?*; see also - Víctor García Hoz, *La universidad: su misión, su poder* (Buenos Aires: Docencia, 1980); García Hoz did not hold any important public position in Spain in the late 1970s, but did remain the director of CSIC’s Institute of Pedagogy until 1980.

¹⁴⁸ Juan Rafael Llerena Amadeo, *Educación para la paz: texto del mensaje del ministro de cultura y educación, Dr. Juan Rafael Llerena Amadeo, en la XXXVII reunión de la conferencia internacional de educación de la UNESCO, el 6 de julio de 1979*.

¹⁴⁹ *La Nación* (August 13, 1979).

¹⁵⁰ By 1981 Zanotti even sounded disenchanted by the educational politics of the regime, stating that “the education system is reduced to the perspective” of subversion, see - Luis Jorge Zanotti, “Los sistemas educativos y el desafío del siglo XXI,” *IIE: Revista del instituto de investigaciones educativas*, no.3 (September 1981): 15.

¹⁵¹ As Historian Federico Sor has lucidly clarified recently in his dissertation, see - Federico Sor, *The Pedagogy of Revolution and Counterrevolution in Cold War Argentina, 1966-1983*, Dissertation, NYU, 2016.

¹⁵² Claudio Uriarte, *Almirante Cero. Biografía no autorizada de Emilio Eduardo Massera* (Buenos Aires: Edición Editorial Planeta Argentina S.A, 1992), 213; see also - Marcelo Borrelli and Jorge Saborido, “La prensa del

Carta Política. Established in late 1974, and featuring Carlos Alberto Floria (the *Cuadernos del Sur* commentator, see page 156), Heriberto Kahn (*Confirmado*), and Nicanor Costa Méndez, it helped delegitimizing the Peronist Right.¹⁵³ Argentina, said Grondona, had regressed from being a dignified liberal, if authoritarian, state, to being a democratic terror regime.¹⁵⁴ Conversely, *Carta Política* attacked the nacionalistas and demanded a future “without Falanges.”¹⁵⁵ In March 1976, the journal avidly supported the Proceso by using the all-familiar language of rationalization. “The revolutionary vanity of the theorists [...] must be met with a policy of concretions, of facts,” they claimed.¹⁵⁶ Subsequently, *Carta Política* suggested the Proceso should complete the unfinished project of 1966, through “rationalization” and “interior peace.”¹⁵⁷ Tellingly, while Grondona agreed that the Proceso suffered from “lack of intellectual appeal,” and criticized its “dirty war,”¹⁵⁸ he nevertheless praised its “discrete, soft operation.”¹⁵⁹

As importantly, *Carta Política* constantly reflected on the meanings of the “Onganiato.” “Nobody has done in this country more than Onganía, and nobody has smeared more posters on the walls than Perón,” was Grondona’s basic stance. The first lesson to be learned from the Argentine Revolution, he thought, was the futility of development “phases.” The Proceso, Grondona held, must thus work towards the “political” phase from the start, thereby deconstructing “the heritage of populism.”¹⁶⁰ By avoiding “corporatist theories,” and pledging to a future

‘Proceso.’ El diario Convicción durante la dictadura militar argentina (1976-1983).” *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* (2008): 49; Daniel Muchnik, “El diario de Massera, el marino cruel que quiso ser presidente,” *Perfil*. (November 12, 2010).

¹⁵³ “Jose López Rega, ¿El hombre del año?” *Carta Política*, no. 13 (III week of December, 1974): 10.

¹⁵⁴ It might soon “crash into a wall,” said Grondona, see - “Del Peronismo al Lópezreguismo,” *Carta Política*, no. 24, (V week of May, 1975): 16.

¹⁵⁵ “El nacionalismo argentino: un futuro sin Falanges,” *Carta Política*, no. 16 (II week of February 1975): 14

¹⁵⁶ Nicanor Costa Méndez, “Americanos del sur, a los hechos,” *Carta Política*, no. 33 (July 1976): 73.

¹⁵⁷ “Subversión y racionalidad,” *Carta Política*, no. 31 (May 1976): 6.

¹⁵⁸ The enemy is fighting a dirty war, without “fronts” or “canons,” he admitted, but this did not mean that the military is excused from a “rational imperative” and the rule of law, see - Mariano Grondona, “Lo que brilla por su ausencia,” *Carta Política*, no. 33 (July 1976): 76.

¹⁵⁹ Mariano Grondona, “El golpe sobre la mesa,” *Carta Política*, no. 31 (May 1976): 78.

¹⁶⁰ “La idea-fuerza,” *Carta Política*, no. 32 (June 1976): 5.

democratic restoration, he further observed, the Proceso would gain the middle-classes' sympathy.¹⁶¹ In other words, Grondona did not suggest a "modernizing" phase but rather a return to parliamentarism, starting after society is purged from its non-democratic elements. Bernardo Neustadt's *Extra* was no different in depicting the Proceso as a simple "cleanup" period. "Videla is not Pinochet," he argued revealingly. "We all aspire for a distinct new democracy, with authority built-it,"¹⁶² he explained himself. In the meantime, amid a period of further neoliberal economic reforms,¹⁶³ these writers drew up the notion of a regime of specialists. The Proceso, Grondona stressed, might as well experiment in "architectural policy," by putting "economists into the management of things" and commit to "political gradualism" at the municipal level.¹⁶⁴ Indeed, the Argentine Revolution's ideological tropes were still noticeable in these publicists' texts.

As for the Ateneo de la República, ever since 1974 it slowly receded from political life. Embittered by the 1966 experience, Amadeo doubted the prospects of a successful military phase in Argentina.¹⁶⁵ Later, while perplexed by the Proceso's "methods of combat," he justified it overall; in this battle "it would be utopian to demand strict compliance with the Geneva conventions," he told Sánchez Bella. On this occasion, he also recommended that the Proceso established a "Movimiento" to civically support the Proceso, since "for failing to do so, Onganía had fallen."¹⁶⁶ Herein lay Amadeo's lessons from the Argentine Revolution: not having eradicated the enemy, and thereafter, not having created a mass-based movement, but choosing an elite-oriented setup instead. Eventually, however, both Amadeo and Costa Méndez did work for the

¹⁶¹ "Los 100 días de Videla," *Carta Política*, no. 33 (July 1976): 7.

¹⁶² Bernardo Neustadt, "La Situación," *Extra*, no. 138 (December 1976): 9.

¹⁶³ What Argentina Minister of the Economy, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, officially labeled Programa de Recuperación, Saneamiento y Expansión de la Economía Argentina.

¹⁶⁴ José Luis Rocas and Roque Martino (eds.), *La Argentina productiva: un camino hacia el progreso* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pro, 1977), 199-200.

¹⁶⁵ "In the light of the experience since 1966, I am quite skeptical about the results of a new military regime" he said, see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, January 14, 1976, AGUN, documento 15/35/322.

¹⁶⁶ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, August 24, 1976, AGUN, documento 15/35/324.

Proceso briefly, the latter serving as General Galteiri's Foreign Minister. During the first months of 1982, Costa Méndez took a part in the chain of events that led to the Falkland War, although he was hardly personally responsible for it. In a dictatorship that had become increasingly unpopular internationally, he thought his previous connections in Washington could mitigate the crisis with the United Kingdom.¹⁶⁷ Somewhat less salient, but no less noteworthy, was Amadeo's return to the public activity in 1980, attempting to promote an Argentine democratic "consensus," as I will examine shortly. On the whole, however, these 1960s ideologues had but a minor influence on Argentina's last dictatorship.

All things considered, the Proceso was hardly a technocratic-authoritarian regime as its leaders defined their mission in terms of purging Argentina's supposed subversive enemies and therefore did not bother formulating a definite "post-ideological" or corporatist alternative to democracy. Whilst sharing some of the Argentine Revolution's intellectual origins, the Proceso's spokesmen distinctively dismissed "corporatist" ideologies and ridiculed Pinochet, who they thought personified them. And yet, it is important to note that the regime's overall self-identity as an invisible "cleaner" cannot be understood detached from the lessons of the failed experiment of the 1960s. What is more, the technocratic theorists of the 1960s played an important role in the Proceso, rationalizing and legitimizing it upon their intellectual platforms. As a result, while assassinating and torturing its citizens in the thousands, this dictatorship, at least between 1977 and 1981, displayed a *mélange* of technocratic, neo-fascist, and liberal-democratic jargon.

¹⁶⁷ In interviews in later years, this serene *nacionalista* defended his deeds during his short and calamitous tenure, see - *The Falklands-Malvinas War: An interview with Nicanor Costa Méndez* by James S. Sutterlin, United Nations Oral History Project.

The Spanish transition: from a “protected democracy” to a transitional “consensus,” 1974-1982

The late-1970s witnessed the Southern European and Latin American authoritarian regimes undergoing a simultaneous historical process of democratization. Frequently named the “Democracies of the Third Wave,”¹⁶⁸ in some cases, these regime changes happened due to a dictatorship imploding under the weight of economic and social crisis, as in the case of 1974 Portugal and Greece. In other cases, transition originated from within the authoritarian regime, coordinated by its very initial designers. Spain’s transition was the first of such “reforms” and thus exemplary for many regimes that followed suit. The following section explores the dissolvment of Spain’s technocratic-authoritarian model, but also sheds light on the continuation of certain ideological traits from the antecedent political system to the democratic order.

Officially, Spain’s transition began on November 23, 1975, as King Juan Carlos I of Spain was sworn as the country’s sovereign, three days after Franco’s death. Yet to understand the transition one must go back to December 20, 1973, to an even more dramatic event: the killing of Luis Carrero Blanco by the ETA at the center of Madrid. Arguably, the death of the sixty-nine years old Admiral spared Spain from years of authoritarianism, as can be inferred from the speech Carrero prepared for his ministers on the day of his death, and which revealed an ever-paranoid autocrat. “Communism, despite its false manifestations of coexistence, remains the same communism of more than fifty years ago. [...] the subversive war, tries to weaken countries by morally annihilating the human element, by exploiting the human congenital weaknesses, people’s religious feelings, their patriotism,” it read.¹⁶⁹ López Rodó, who received the news of the

¹⁶⁸ The term was originally coined by the famous American political scientist Samuel Huntington, see - Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

¹⁶⁹ Laureano López Rodó, *Memorias*, vol. III, 516-18.

assassination while hosting his Argentine associate José López Rega, would be one of many to speculate on the CIA's involvement in the act.¹⁷⁰ In any event, no sooner had the Admiral been buried than the Falange ministers took over the regime, removing the Opus Dei-led government entirely. From serving as Spain's Foreign Minister, López Rodó was relegated to being Spain's ambassador in Austria. Amongst those rejoicing was Cardinal Tarancón. The Opus Dei's "satisfactory" removal from power, he said, resolved the "many ambiguities that in no way favored the Church."¹⁷¹ Hence, in a haphazard historical turn, in a matter of days, Francoism proceeded in an entirely different political and ideological trajectory.

On February 12, 1974, Carrero Blanco's successor, Carlos Arias Navarro, gave a speech at the Cortes that, in a way, precipitated the Spanish transition. A new legal process of "national consensus" would now lead Francoism to further civic participation, he stated.¹⁷² With the moderate Torcuato Fernández-Miranda as president of the Kingdom Council and Manuel Fraga as the *bona fide* reformist at his side, thus began the Falange's political "opening" (*apertura*).¹⁷³ Arias Navarro, a brutal figure during the Civil War but the moderate Mayor of Madrid in the 1960s, was henceforth to represent the "spirit of February 12," which, in actuality, meant a progression from a technocratic-authoritarian model to allowing a "political" culture to flourish at the lower echelons of society, while maintaining executive power strictly in the hands of the Francoist political elite. Spain's executions of several ETA and Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front (FRAP) members in September 1975, indicated just how paradoxical this "democracy" was to be. Nevertheless, with

¹⁷⁰ "It is surprising that the American Intelligence Services failed to detect an excavation that took place less than a hundred meters from the US Embassy, days before the arrival in Madrid of the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger," he said, in *ibid*, 523.

¹⁷¹ Tarancón, *Confeciones*, 696-97.

¹⁷² "En el futuro, el consenso nacional entorno al régimen habrá de expresarse en forma de participación," *La Vanguardia* (February 13, 1974).

¹⁷³ For more on this process see - Cristina Palomares, *The Quest for Survival after Franco: Moderate Francoism and the Slow Journey to the Polls, 1964-1977* (Portland, Or: Sussex Academic Press, 2004).

the demise of Carrero Blanco's alliance, Spain's ideological landscape was now decidedly split between the Bunker's "inmovilistas" and the Falange's moderate "aperturistas."¹⁷⁴

While stunned by Carrero Blanco's death, the Opus Dei apparatus still held firmly to its vision of the post-ideological society. With *Madrid* closed, in 1974 and 1975 there was virtually no Opus Dei publication promoting democratic reforms. Whereas Piñar spoke of national-syndicalism and Hispanidad, the Opus Dei hence presented its own more refined "inmovilismo." Álvaro d'Ors and the intellectual José Zafra Valverde led this trend, the latter's books further analyzing Spain's upcoming authoritarian monarchy.¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, López Rodó was still the most significant Opus Dei public intellectual in this period. In 1974, in an interview to the Opus Dei's journal *Actualidad Económica*, he said that the label "technocrat" did not apply to him, that the Falange was the "only political affiliation in his life," and that he was "hundred percent a politician." But he also claimed that his 1967 Organic Laws worked "like a clock" and that the Carrero Blanco's team of ministers was the last "legitimate" government in Francoist history.¹⁷⁶ That is to say, despite abandoning his "post-ideological" façade, he too was still conspicuously in the anti-democratic camp.¹⁷⁷

Thenceforth, 1975 brought more agonizing news to the Opus Dei. It began with the sudden death of Florentino Pérez Embid, at the age of fifty-six. "The regime of July 18 had hardly any other intellectual defense better than that of the writers Pérez Embid assembled," Fernández de la

¹⁷⁴ The repercussion of the 1975 military tribunals and executions were considerable, as the international press, the Pope, and even the Spanish press condemned the killings, see - Walter Schwarz, "Spain Erupts into Fury," *The Guardian*, (September 29, 1975); "Mañana, primer aniversario de las últimas penas de muerte ejecutadas en España," *El País* (September 26, 1976); "Las presiones internacionales no pudieron frenar los cinco fusilamientos del 27 de septiembre de 1975," *El País* (September 27, 1985).

¹⁷⁵ José Zafra Valverde, *Alma y cuerpo del movimiento nacional* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1975) 111-46; also - José Zafra Valverde, *Régimen político de España* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1973); Álvaro d'Ors, "Tres breves reflexiones sobre la crisis chilena," *Fuerza Nueva*, no. 372 (February 23, 1974).

¹⁷⁶ "Siempre he sido falangista: entrevista en Viena con López Rodó," *Actualidad Económica*, no. 867 (October 26, 1974): 31-34.

¹⁷⁷ He reiterated these positions in another interview in 1975, see - "Mesa política con Fraga, López Rodó, Blas Piñar, Tierno Galván," *Actualidad Económica*, no. 835 (March 16, 1974).

Mora eulogized his late friend. With José María Albareda deceased in 1966, and with Calvo Serer and Antonio Fontán joining the democratic opposition, little was now left from the “Generation of 48.” Then, on June 26, 1975, Escrivá de Balaguer suddenly died in Rome. Months of ensuing obituaries could not conceal the fact that Opus Dei was caught unprepared for the death of its seventy-three years old spiritual leader. In an emotional article from Chile, Ibáñez Langlois spoke of a holy man who “always abhorred personalist governments.”¹⁷⁸ Evidently, the Opus Dei intellectuals worldwide thus began preparing for the upcoming democratic future.

Francisco Franco died on November 20, 1975, predictably, after months of hospitalization. In *ABC*, Fernández de la Mora, then the director of Spain’s Diplomatic School, eulogized the dictator by stating that “there was nothing authoritarian” about him, and stressing that Franco had received a “impoverished country” and transformed it into “a middle-class society,” and a “robustly institutionalized monarchy.”¹⁷⁹ Cleverly, he did not state that Franco wanted his regime to be replaced by a democracy; still, he insinuated that Franco had in fact made it *possible*. The Opus Dei journals, on the other hand, moved from discussing Francoism as universal regime model to depicting it as a simple personalist regime. In *Telva*, for instance, Franco appeared as the person “who was everything in Spain for forty years.”¹⁸⁰ *Mundo Cristiano*, for its part, asserted that “all the architecture of the State rested on Franco personality,” and even alleged that Franco “said that the Francoism would end with his death.”¹⁸¹ Franco never said that.¹⁸²

What Franco allegedly *did* say was that he had left Spain “bound and tied” (atado y bien atado) for its authoritarian future. It was King Juan Carlos who chose not to implement Franco’s

¹⁷⁸ “Monseñor Escrivá de Balaguer,” *El Mercurio* (July 13, 1975).

¹⁷⁹ Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, “Franco,” *ABC Madrid* (November 21, 1975).

¹⁸⁰ “España: luto por Franco y esperanza en el Rey,” *Telva* (December 1975, Especial Navidad).

¹⁸¹ Gonzalo Lobo Méndez, “Una llamada a la responsabilidad social,” *Mundo Cristiano*, no. 155 (December 1975): 13.

¹⁸² At least not in his “last message” to the Spanish nation, see - “Ultimo mensaje de Franco,” *Actualidad Española*, no. 258 (December 1975): 7-8.

vision as planned. Due to political constraints, however, he selected Arias Navarro to lead his democratic reform.¹⁸³ When the latter failed to do so, Juan Carlos utilized the Kingdom Council and on July 3, 1976, appointed the relatively anonymous Adolfo Suárez as Spain's Prime Minister. Having to maneuver between Franco's loyalists who demanded "continuation," and the democratic opposition that demanded a clear political "rupture," Suárez prompted instead an ideological compromise, namely the so-called "pacted rupture." After skillfully persuading the Armed Forces to cooperate, Suárez led the Cortes to vote its own dismantling in November 1976. Spain's December 1976 Referendum granted a symbolic mark of approval to this Reform Law, and general elections were called for June 1977.¹⁸⁴ Spain's true moment of democratic "rupture," however, was not the referendum but rather the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in April 1977.¹⁸⁵ Like any Western European country, the monarchy decided to allow "Euro-communism" into its political system, thereby negating Francoism's *raison d'être*.

As the keystone of the "pacted rupture," a powerful, if deliberately vague, rhetoric of "consensus" appeared in the Spanish public sphere, understood as a commitment among all "democratic forces," from both Left and Right, to avoid political polarization for the sake of a motion towards a fully functional parliamentary democracy.¹⁸⁶ In October 1977, after winning the General Elections, Suárez enacted Spain's Amnesty Law and Moncloa Pacts. The former,

¹⁸³ The agency of the King during the Spanish transition was crucial and has become the topic of numerous historical analyses, see for instance - Javier Tusell, *Tiempo de incertidumbre: Carlos Arias Navarro entre el Franquismo y la transición (1973-1976)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003); Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (New York: Methuen, 1986); Preston, *Juan Carlos: A People's King*; Tusell, *Juan Carlos I: La Restauración de la Monarquía*.

¹⁸⁴ The law was officially called "Ley para la Reforma Política" (Ley 1/1977)

¹⁸⁵ Following the neo-fascist January 1977 Atocha murders, see - Javier Tusell, *La transición española a la democracia* (Madrid: Historia 16, 1997), 117.

¹⁸⁶ Juan Luis Cebrián, the founder and editor of *El País*, addressed this culture of fear arguing that this alleged consensus was the perfect opportunity for the Spanish Right to regroup and consolidate its forces "through the borrowed nickname of the Center," see - Juan Luis Cebrián, *La España que bosteza: apuntes para una historia crítica de la transición*, (Madrid: Taurus, 1980), 23-26.

pardoned political prisoners and granted complete impunity for crimes committed by the Armed Forces during the dictatorship;¹⁸⁷ the latter legalized the labor unions and set the terms for the cooperation between them and the government during the transition. Hence, from an ambiguous gambit, the “consensus” became a juridical reality. Spain’s 1978 Constitution even included a definite “principle of non-retroactivity,” which essentially meant the legal sealing of the Francoist past.¹⁸⁸ The “consensus” also championed a full institutional continuation of the state apparatus into the democratic order, allegedly to prevent any recalcitrance from undermining the transition.¹⁸⁹

Spain’s conservative press supported the reform by deploying new strategies of dealing with Franco’s legacies. A year after his death, *ABC* hailed Franco as the “Europeanizer of modern Spain” who brought into being a country of “middle classes, industry, and services,” and whose deeds enabled “a liberal future of civil participation.”¹⁹⁰ In an identical fashion, the daily *Ya* declared that Franco had made Spain a society “much better prepared for the new system of national coexistence that it deserves.” Franco’s name, the newspaper even insisted, is “too great for one to convert into a shallow political flag.”¹⁹¹ In other words, these platforms portrayed Franco in teleological terms, as the apolitical missing link that, perhaps unintentionally, enabled Spain’s future democracy.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ Or as article 2(e) declares, “Included in the amnesty are [...] the misconduct and crimes that might have been committed by the authorities, functionaries and agents of public order, with the motive of investigating and persecuting the [previous] acts indicated in this law.”

¹⁸⁸ Known also as Article 9.3, this ban on retroactive justice has not changed until this very day.

¹⁸⁹ In Vicent Navarro’s critique, this “incomplete transition” has led to a “democratic deficit,” in which the Spanish political panorama leans more to the Right than in any other country in Europe, see - Vicente Navarro, *Bienestar insuficiente, democracia incompleta* (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2002), 190-95; for further critical literature on this process see - Ferran Gallego Margaleff, *El mito de la transición: la crisis del Franquismo y los orígenes de la democracia (1973-1977)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2008); Emmanuel Rodríguez López, *Por qué fracasó la democracia en España: la transición y el Régimen Del '78* (Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2015).

¹⁹⁰ “Franco,” *ABC Madrid* (November 20, 1976).

¹⁹¹ “Primer aniversario,” *Ya* (November 20, 1976).

¹⁹² See for instance - Ricardo de la Cierva, “Franco, una etapa en la historia de España,” *Ya* (November 20, 1976).

Within this context, reconfiguring their political future was not a simple task for the technocratic-authoritarian ideologues of the 1960s. At first, they avowedly questioned a return to parliamentary democracy. Fernández de la Mora, for instance, promoted Franco's Organic Laws as an "autochthonous" model that was "more effective and more susceptible to perfective development," and therefore should not be replaced with recipes that "had led Spain to chaos."¹⁹³ His 1976 book *La partitocracia* further discredited universal ("inorganic") suffrage as an inefficient form of social organization. "The classical theory of democracy is an unsustainable fiction," he argued.¹⁹⁴ Mariano Navarro Rubio, for his part, advocated a "real democracy" to bypass the "clumsy compromises" of parliamentarism.¹⁹⁵ For him, the Francoist "authority of arbitration" presented the best system of perfection, based on "councils, academies, and specialized associations."¹⁹⁶ López Rodó followed suit with an even more cynical approach: the constitution of 1967 "is not even ten years old," and thus changing it would be a "symptom of political immaturity," he said.¹⁹⁷ Strikingly, all three perceived democracy not as a value in and of itself - as a culture of mutual respect and solidarity - but in terms of cold economic "efficiency."

With the 1977 elections a *fait accompli*, the technocrats did try to get elected, however. The lifting of Franco's censorship, and the emergence of the liberal newspaper *El País* in May 1976, made this effort ever more difficult.¹⁹⁸ Eventually, in a press conference on October 21 1976,

¹⁹³ Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, "Defensa de la constitución," *ABC Madrid* (December 6, 1975); see also Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, "La democracia real," *ABC Madrid* (January 21, 1976); for other Opus Dei figures attacking the reform see, Luis Valls Taberner, "El Rey no gobierna," *ABC Madrid* (December 16, 1975).

¹⁹⁴ Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, *La partitocracia* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1977).

¹⁹⁵ Mariano Navarro Rubio, "Democracia democrática de verdad," *ABC Madrid* (November 27, 1975).

¹⁹⁶ Mariano Navarro Rubio, "Postulados," *ABC Madrid* (January 6, 1976).

¹⁹⁷ Laureano López Rodó, "Enmiendas de la constitución," *ABC Madrid* (February 27, 1976).

¹⁹⁸ This period in 1976 is considered the height of Spain's cultural "raising of the lid" (*destape*), a phenomenon that scholars now criticize for being a "mass culture mega-enterprise financed by the same fat cats that had secured their fortunes through collaboration with the regime," in Crumbaugh, *Destination Dictatorship*, 112; more on the role of *El País* during the Spanish transition see - Luis Negró Acedo, *El diario El País y la cultura de las élites durante la transición* (Madrid: Tres Cantos, 2006).

Manuel Fraga, Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, Laureano López Rodó, and Federico Silva Muñoz, joined forces in forming the Popular Alliance (AP).¹⁹⁹ Their party purported to preserve the alleged achievements of Francoism, for instance by banning the communists from entering parliament. “We take responsibility for the past, we know we have made mistakes, but we dare to appear again,” Fraga stated apologetically.²⁰⁰ Justifying his recent anti-democratic views, Fernández de la Mora added that he “never said that organic democracy or inorganic democracy are bad in themselves,” but should be “valued according to results in specific circumstances.” A false statement, it still revealed a purely technocratic attitude: Fernández de la Mora would still not commit to democracy if it was not economically effective.

To attract conservative voters, AP opted for several other tactics. First, it portrayed Spain as a country currently ensnared in “moral decay,” “pornography,” and “permissiveness.”²⁰¹ Even more than their anti-communistic sentiment, the Opus Dei technocrats and moderate Falangists unified over the nostalgia for Francoism’s alleged protected society. Second, expectedly, the AP members presented themselves as the original visionaries of the constitutional monarchy, working within the limits of a “personalist” regime. “Now Franco is dead and that is it,” said Silva Muñoz.²⁰² When in 1977 López Rodó published his self-praising memoirs, even *ABC* observed that his work could have well been titled “the History of the pressures I put on General Franco to opt for monarchic restoration.”²⁰³ But the question still remains: even at this moment, did the technocrats ever give their blessing to a parliamentary democracy in Spain? Based on these texts, the answer cannot be affirmative.

¹⁹⁹ “Una rueda de prensa espectacular,” *ABC Madrid* (October 22, 1976).

²⁰⁰ “Esperamos serenos y optimistas el veredicto final del pueblo español,” *ABC Madrid* (October 22, 1976).

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² Federico Silva Muñoz, “¿Qué es eso del neofranquismo?” *ABC Sevilla* (June 8, 1977).

²⁰³ Turcuato Luca de Tena, “La larga marcha hacia la monarquía,” *ABC Madrid* (July 6, 1977).

The AP fared poorly in the 1977 general elections (8.3%), and even worse in the 1979 elections (6.1%). An opposition party for the next decade and a half, it would watch Adolfo Suárez and Felipe González, the young leader of the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (PSOE), lead the Spanish state through its new constitutional phase. It is not difficult to speculate on the reasons for the party's electoral failure. After all, ideologically AP had little to offer the new democracy.²⁰⁴ Its electoral fiasco emanated, I suggest, also from its inability to compete with the slogans of its main electoral opponent: Adolfo Suárez's own center-right party, the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD).²⁰⁵ A hastily assembled conglomerate of centric parties, UCD represented a break with Spain's Civil War legacies. Suárez, who had admittedly been an Opus Dei member but had left it eventually to become the Movimiento's General Secretary, was particularly adept in utilizing the conditions of the Spanish transition. On the one hand, by 1977 many in the Spanish press agreed to the stance that Franco was "was the dictatorship." Even Franco's fiercest opposition, for example, the monarchist Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, voiced this inclusive sense of victimhood by which "the historical responsibility for the events of that era lies on Franco personally."²⁰⁶ On the other hand, an economic crisis, and the ETA and far-right gangs terrorism, further spurred a collective anxiety from the return to ideological politics.²⁰⁷ Adolfo Suárez built on these fears

²⁰⁴ A point that was constantly raised in the liberal and conservative Press, see -Joaquín Calvo Sotelo, "La descalcificación del patriotismo," *ABC Madrid* (January 23, 1977); El Conde de los Andes, "Interpretaciones falseadas," *ABC Madrid* (September 10, 1977).

²⁰⁵ For more on this party and its politics see - Juan Francisco Fuentes, *Adolfo Suárez: biografía política* (Barcelona: Planeta, 2011); José García Abad, *Adolfo Suárez: una tragedia griega* (Madrid: Esfera de los Libros, 2005); Charles T. Powell, *Adolfo Suárez* (Barcelona: Ediciones B, 2004).

²⁰⁶ Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, *Testimonios y recuerdos* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1978), 10-11; In the words of Falangist Antonio Tovar, "a dictator and a handful of retired generals" had robbed Spain of its identity, see - Antonio Tovar, "José Antonio Primo de Rivera y el 18 de Julio," *El País* (July 23, 1980).

²⁰⁷ Several historians have recently begun depicting the Spanish transition as a period of extreme violence and collective sense of crisis, see - Sophie Baby, *Le mythe de la transition pacifique: violence et politique en Espagne, 1975- 1982* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2012); Mariano Sánchez Soler, *La transición sangrienta: una historia violenta del proceso democrático en España, 1975-1983* (Barcelona: Península, 2010); Andrea Davis, "Enforcing the Transition: The Demobilization of Collective Memory in Spain, 1979-1982," *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*, no. 6 (2015), 667-89; Omar G. Encarnación, *Spanish Politics: Democracy After Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).

effectively, as he both disengaged from Franco's image, whilst presenting himself as an agent who was to overcome Spain's ideological schisms. Before the 1977 general elections, the UCD promoted itself as a historical group that had belonged to neither of the belligerent "two Spains."²⁰⁸ Debating this so-called center, *La Vanguardia* columnists Ángel Gómez Escorial praised Suárez for neutralizing the "splintering germ that threw us into war forty-two years ago."²⁰⁹ Similarly, conservative intellectuals such as Carlos Seco Serrano and Ricardo de la Cierva portrayed the UCD as a distinctive social stratum. This "third Spain," they said in *ABC*, had nothing to do with the nation's "extremist minorities" responsible for the Civil War and currently represented by Suárez's "catastrophist" electoral rivals.²¹⁰ The UCD leaders quickly joined this narration, describing their party as "the last hope" against yet another civil war.²¹¹ Notably, these narratives echoed the 1960s technocratic ideology. In a society dreading the return of "ideological" politics, the UCD's image was merely a reincarnation of the soothing "end of ideologies" fantasy.²¹² This might explain why Suárez denied Opus Dei members such as López Bravo joining his party - the semblance between the two projects might have been too obvious.²¹³

²⁰⁸ Some historians have portrayed the struggle between 'Center' and 'Right' as a competition between two Francoist generation groups rather than two ideological movements, see - Juan Carlos Monedero, "Nocturno de la transición," in Emilio Silva (ed.), *La memoria de los olvidados: un debate sobre el silencio de la represión franquista* (León: Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica, 2004), 146-49.

²⁰⁹ Ángel Gómez Escorial, "De centro a centro," *La Vanguardia* (July 7, 1978).

²¹⁰ Carlos Seco Serrano, "Catastrofistas," *ABC Madrid* (January 6, 1978); Carlos Seco Serrano, "Ni 'bunker' ni Ariete," *ABC Madrid* (May 26, 1976); Carlos Seco Serrano, "Razon de ser de centro," *ABC Madrid* (March 3, 1978); *Ya* commentator José Jiménez Blanco also spoke of a "dialectics of minority extreme positions, which nonetheless succeeded imposing a Civil War on all of us," see - José Jiménez Blanco, "Pequeña historia del centro," *Ya* (June 8, 1977); see also - Santiago Araúz de Robles, "La utopía del centro (2)," *Ya* (January 11, 1977).

²¹¹ In the words of Fernando Álvarez de Miranda, the leader of the Christian-Democrats in the UCD, see - Fernando Álvarez de Miranda, *Al servicio de la democracia* (Madrid: S.N. 1979), 81; for other similar UCD narratives see - Francisco Fernández Ordoñez, *La España necesaria* (Madrid: Taurus, 1980); Joaquín Garrigues Walker, *Una política para España* (Madrid: Unión Editorial, 1976); José Luis Meilán Gil, *Escritos sobre la transición política española* (Madrid: Mayler, 1979).

²¹² As the Falange intellectual Tierno Galván later admitted, Suárez "had no political ideology," in Tusell, *La Transición*, 91.

²¹³ "Adolfo Suárez did not want López Bravo to overshadow him," said López Rodó, in López Rodó, *Memorias*, vol. IV, 316.

Following AP's electoral failure, Fernández de la Mora retired from politics and returned to his intellectual work with the establishment of the journal *Razón Española*. Here, he and other Opus Dei technocrats would criticize the Spanish transition throughout the 1980s.²¹⁴ López Rodó, on the other hand, was actively removed from the AP. Or as he himself testified "I was unexpectedly displaced because of one of those pirouettes that some politicians have accustomed us to."²¹⁵ Arguably, Fraga understood that the Opus Dei technocrat was not bringing his party any voters. As for Alfredo Sánchez Bella, for a while, he aligned with José Antonio Girón and the "Bunker." In 1978, Sánchez Bella still believed Spain's democratization "will produce unstable governments and unviable situations" similar to "the period 1931-1934."²¹⁶ But he did not run for office and contributed little to Spain's far-right politics hereafter. While Spain's constitutional commission of 1978 included several figures such as Manuel Fraga and Antonio Fontán, little remained of their 1960s ideological positions.²¹⁷ And as for Rafael Calvo Serer, the Opus Dei's one democrat of the 1970s did not pursue a political career but continued to be a public intellectual. In sum, the 1980s witnessed a stark diminishing in these intellectuals' public influence.

Under the King's reign, the new Spanish democracy reconfigured its role in Latin American politics. Nothing represented this more than changing the title and mission of the ICH. In August 1977, this institution was renamed the Institute for Ibero-American Cooperation (ICI) and was redesigned to espouse economic cooperation with Latin America.²¹⁸ What is more, apparatuses

²¹⁴ *Razón Española*'s editing board included the aforementioned Opus Dei ideologues Antonio Millán Puelles, Luis Suárez, and Juan José López Ibor. Alfredo Sánchez Bella and Laureano López Rodó also published there as commentators.

²¹⁵ López Rodó, *Memorias*, vol. IV, 443.

²¹⁶ Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a José Antonio Girón, April 30, 1974, AGUN, documento 15/59/64.

²¹⁷ Despite the tendency to criticize this text, reading Spain's constitution back to back with the Organic Laws of 1966 leaves little doubt that the 1978 committee consciously deconstructed the Francoist legal framework, what cannot be said of the 1980 Chilean constitutional process.

²¹⁸ The decree stated the need for an "urgent adaptation and modernization of the ICH," see - Real Decreto 2305/1977, de 27 de agosto 1977, *BOE (España)*, no. 213 (September 6, 1977).

such as the OEI closed down, with their director publicly admitting that the Spanish-Latin American bonds were mostly “a myth.”²¹⁹ More striking, in 1977 Spain abruptly cooled down its relationship with Latin America’s far-right dictatorships, and in particular with Pinochet. One symbolic moment of falling-out was the Spanish vote against Pinochet in the 1978 UN resolution against Chile’s human rights violations. Obviously, this was a disconcerting moment for Francoist and Chilean ideologues alike. While Fernández Larraín overtly resigned from the Chilean ICH,²²⁰ Sánchez Bella wrote Fontaine stating he felt “ashamed as a Spaniard” for this “intolerable imposition by the socialists.”²²¹ Fontaine’s response was no less telling: “we are the true supporters of liberty, unlike Felipe González, the Mitterrands, or the American ‘liberals,’” he wrote.²²²

Once the Spanish transition and constitutional reform were in place, Spain’s young democratic reformers turned to promote democracy in Latin America.²²³ King Juan Carlos’s 1978 visit to Argentina, and his “lecture in democracy” to one of Latin America’s most brutal dictatorships was, in this sense, a watershed moment in this new type of diplomacy.²²⁴ The Junta did not fail to grasp the importance of the event either. Videla’s earnest reception of the King of Spain was illustrative that the Proceso leader definitely sought to foster a moderate international image. This did not prevent *Cabildo*, however, from publicly insulting the democratic monarch:

A strange man, [...] Bourbon by blood and by spirit, in any other time in his family history he would have been repudiated as a fool or suicidal. [...] in Argentina, he signed several protocols, some of which, as we know, will never be fulfilled. [...] no text has been included

²¹⁹ “Renán Flores: ‘las tan ponderadas relaciones entre España y América son un mito,’” *El País* (April 8, 1981).

²²⁰ “With what ease have they forgotten the year in which the world ‘powers’ agreed to separate Spain from the United Nations! Thank God the Spanish rulers of that time were of another stature and of another morality. And alone, entirely alone, they faced universal incomprehension and hatred,” he stated, see - “Sergio Fernández L. Renunció al Instituto De Cultura Hispánica,” *El Mercurio* (December 28, 1978).

²²¹ “We are living in a dark, uncertain, and doubtful period of transition,” see - Carta de Alfredo Sánchez Bella a Arturo Fontaine, December 19, 1978, AGUN, documento 05/46/217.

²²² Carta de Arturo Fontaine a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, January 2, 1979, AGUN, documento 05/46/218.

²²³ During his first visit to Latin America in 1976, he spoke of Spain’s “universal mission from which it cannot withdraw,” see - “Discurso de don Juan Carlos I en Cartagena de Indias el 12 de octubre de 1976,” in *España en el Mundo. Discursos de S.M. el Rey. 1976-1979* (Madrid: Oficina de Información Diplomática, 1979).

²²⁴ He also successfully expatriated six Spaniards imprisoned by the Junta, see - “El rey hizo en Argentina una decidida defensa de los derechos humanos,” *ABC Sevilla* (December 1, 1978).

regarding the extradition of the Argentine terrorists based in Spain, where they provide technological support to the ETA assassins. [...] the stupid desire to adopt all changes, this foolish vocation to 'Europeanize,' means nothing less than to end the Caudillo's philosophy and policy of the regime inaugurated in 1939 by the greatest Spaniard of the twentieth century.²²⁵

Beyond depicting the Spanish transition as a betrayal of Franco's legacy, *Cabildo*'s fantasies of a link between the ERP and ETA are telling as they show how fixated the neo-fascists were with proving the international operations of their so-called "enemy." In the same breath, *Cabildo* deemed the Spanish reformers "traitors" and Blas Piñar - Spain's "the last hope."²²⁶

The history of Spain's efforts to propel Latin America's democratization during the 1980s is a topic too broad to discuss here.²²⁷ Still, we should perhaps touch on several key points in this history, to bring this analysis to its full closure. To begin with, in the 1980s, the Spanish "consensus" emerged as a semi-official transitional model for Latin America. The Spanish conservative media had much to do with this, as it demanded the exportation of Spain's "model" abroad, as can readily be seen in the following words of *ABC* columnist, Manuel Blanco Tobío:

Getting off the tiger, i.e. getting out of a dictatorship to practice democracy is extremely difficult [...] This is the case of the following countries [...]: Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Turkey. For these countries, there is a model of transition to look up to: The Spanish model. [...] Our transition, I am convinced, was a miracle. How do the Argentines, Chileans, Uruguayans, and Turks envision this miracle repeating itself?²²⁸

Indeed, particularly after the electoral victory of Felipe González (PSOE) in 1982, the ICI coordinated extensive conferences analyzing the Spanish transition, in Spain, Chile, and Argentina. Herein, Spain's Deputy-Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra (PSOE) declared that his government "undertakes the task to propel the creation of an Ibero-American community of

²²⁵ "De las vicisitudes de un rey demócrata," *Cabildo*, no. 21 (December 1978): 10-11.

²²⁶ "España: otra vez ante sí misma," *Cabildo*, no. 23 (March-April 1979): 27-28.

²²⁷ For further reading, see - "Getting off the Tiger: The Spanish Transition to Democracy in Latin America's Southern Cone", *Global Society*, (forthcoming, issue 33:3, July 2019).

²²⁸ Manuel Blanco Tobío, "Bajarse del tigre," *ABC Madrid* (July 11, 1983).

democratic nations.”²²⁹ Explaining the “consensus” to his interlocutors, Spain’s Foreign Minister Fernando Morán (PSOE) further defined a paradoxical mnemonic operation: “to forget without forgetting the thing you have forgotten,” or in other words, a transition “without denying the past but also with no grudges.”²³⁰ Thus, he barely reined in the impulse to assert that democracy is worth any price, including pardoning the perpetrator entirely.

In Argentina, the early 1980s, and in particular the period of Roberto Viola’s less murderous Second Junta, saw the early start of a discussion on Argentina’s own possible future democratic “consensus.” Eager to inform the Argentines of the Spanish model, within these circumstances, in 1981 Adolfo Suárez - who had recently resigned from being Spain’s Prime Minister - visited Buenos Aires, and advised the local political class to “appease the military class, that it would say farewell to power.”²³¹ In 1983, a series of conferences sponsored by the ICI at the University of Belgrano, Argentina, added to that line of argumentation. Aiming “to analyze the recent process of democratization produced in Spain,”²³² on this occasion the Spanish socialist José María Benegas asserted that “Franco was the only source of power of the Spanish dictatorship,” and that therefore the Left happily agreed to an “amnesty that would seal the past.”²³³

Regardless of these efforts, few in Argentina ever publicly expressed interest in applying Spain’s “consensus” in the Argentine context. Some, Mario Amadeo for example, did believe,

²²⁹ Rafael Fraguas, “El Gobierno español se compromete a impulsar la creación de una comunidad iberoamericana de naciones democráticas,” *El País* (April 28, 1983); See also - Alfonso Guerra, “Discurso del Sr. D. Alfonso Guerra, vicepresidente del gobierno de España,” *Iberoamérica encuentro en la democracia* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1983), 30.

²³⁰ Fernando Morán, “Palabras de Fernando Morán, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de España,” *Ibid*, 15.

²³¹ “Se murió la última excusa: ni Perón ni Balbín resucitarán,” *Creer*, no. 78 (September/October 1981): 2.

²³² According to the Spanish press these events produced a “notable repercussion” in Argentina, as the “amazed” locals pondered “how should we imitate the Spaniards?” see - Pedro Massa, “Argentina: gran eco de las conferencias sobre la transición española,” *ABC Madrid*, (June 29, 1983); Carlos Ares, “Amplio tratamiento en la Prensa argentina sobre la transición española,” *El País*, (June 25, 1983).

²³³ *La transición a la democracia en España, hoy: encuentro en la universidad de Belgrano con el auspicio del Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana de Madrid* (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1983), 17, 65.

however, in “relaxing the regime” towards its institutionalization as a protected parliamentary democracy. Having purged the Army’s “hotheads” in 1981, General Viola, he told Sánchez Bella, was the most capable figure to carry out an “institutional evolution.”²³⁴ In a series of meetings, Viola told Amadeo that the Armed Forces would stipulate not to be “subject to verdicts of responsibility, for the subversion or the repression that ensued.” Despite being empathetic to the “painful question of the disappeared,” Amadeo decided that there is no choice but to “turn the page and start anew,” i.e. he believed a collective amnesty prior to a democratic transition was feasible in Argentina too.²³⁵ This position was evident in a special UNESCO symposium on “Consensus and Peace,” in April 1980, where, representing Argentina, Amadeo insinuated that once nations achieve “sincere” and “authentic” consensus, they should expect the “generosity” of the international community.²³⁶ Later Amadeo informed Sánchez Bella that Argentina’s transition was to proceed in this path, given that “only a few” demand justice for Proceso’s “disappeared.”²³⁷ Indeed, following the fiasco of the Falkland War in 1983, the Proceso attempted to enforce its own Amnesty Law while launching its democratic transition.²³⁸ Much additional research is needed if we were to suggest that there was a connection between the Spanish transition and the Argentine Amnesty Law. Still, it is important to highlight that Amadeo’s efforts to articulate the Argentine democratic “consensus” are symptomatic of a generation of ideologues who replaced their post-ideological authoritarian pipe-dreams with a new vision of protected democratizations, collective amnesties, and forgetfulness.

²³⁴ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, February 7, 1980, AGUN, documento 15/35/335.

²³⁵ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 14, 1980, AGUN, documento 15/35/337.

²³⁶ *Consensus and peace, Oslo 1980* (Paris: UNESCO, Division of Human Rights and Peace), 134.

²³⁷ Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 14, 1980, AGUN, documento 15/35/337.

²³⁸ For more on the history of the formulation of Bignone’s Law 22,924, see - Carlos Santiago Nino, *Radical evil on trial* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 64-65.

The Chilean transition: Jaime Guzman's "protected democracy" and the Spanish technocrats' return to Chile

As it happened, Chile was the country where the concept of "protected democracy" was to reach its most sophisticated form. Beyond repeating the axiom "we shall never go back" (to the pre-1973 democracy),²³⁹ few in 1976 Chile knew how their regime's so-called "institutionalization" would unfold. The answer came in 1977, as Chile's technocratic-authoritarian project swiftly disappeared giving way to Pinochet's novel concept of the "authoritarian democracy." Several factors led to this change. Firstly, with President Jimmy Carter in the White House, and following the regime's scandalous assassination of Chilean socialist Orlando Letelier in Washington DC in 1976, Pinochet's relationship with the USA had been severely damaged.²⁴⁰ Secondly, with the first signs of economic success, the immediate threat of international embargo further contributed to Pinochet's urge to design a political reform. Last, one should not undervalue the influence the Spanish transition had in Chile. That Francoism had dissolved so instantly meant that Chile was both isolated politically, and on the verge of becoming an ideological anachronism.²⁴¹

This pressure ultimately set about a series of changes that would in a matter of three years determine the fate of the regime entirely. In his famous 1977 "Chacarillas speech" Pinochet presented the initial outlines for a "protected," "integrative," and "authoritarian" democracy.²⁴²

²³⁹ Meaning Chile would never go back to the parliamentary system of 1925-1973 see - "El once y la evolución política," *Qué Pasa*, no. 281 (September 9, 1976): 2; also "Juventud," *Secretaría Nacional de la Juventud: Boletín Informativo* (June 10, 1975).

²⁴⁰ For more on Pinochet and Operation Condor's "Phase III" of international assassinations, see - J. Patrice McSherry, *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 5; also see - John Dinges, *The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents* (New York: New Press, 2004).

²⁴¹ As Vial Correa said, Francoism was "convincing in 1973," but was abruptly "irreparably discredited in 1975 when in less than a year this political construct collapsed," in Vial Correa, *Pinochet: La biografía*, 365.

²⁴² Again, these speeches were allegedly written by Guzmán, see - Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime*, 357; Cristi, *El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán*, 12.

These declarations were followed by Chile's January 1978 referendum (or "consulta"), where the regime ratified its reform through means of "universal suffrage." With its control of the popular journal *Ercilla*, the Opus Dei was, in effect, supportive of this peculiar democratic reform. The same can be said of *Qué Pasa*, which promoted this modest evolution intensively.²⁴³ It did so, however, while voicing warnings against the Spanish transition, which had prompted economic and moral crisis, so it thought.²⁴⁴ In 1978, Pinochet's reform continued with the appointment of the following civilians to his government, all of whom were technocrats rather than nationalists: The gremialistas Sergio Fernández (Interior) and Miguel Kast (head of ODEPLAN), Hernán Cubillos (Foreign Minister), and *Qué Pasa*'s own Vial Correa (Education).²⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the dismantling of Pinochet's secret police (DINA), and dismissal of the extreme right-wing Manuel Contreras and Airforce General Gustavo Leigh,²⁴⁶ meant the regime's effective removal of its far-right components.²⁴⁷ Now that Pinochet established a governing civilian group "firm, determined, and effective as him," the transition was imminent, Vial Correa thought.²⁴⁸

The actual design of Chile's future democracy took place within Pinochet's Constitutional Commission. Headed by Enrique Ortúzar Escobar and Jaime Guzmán, by then it comprised of several other authoritarian specialists, such as Luz Bulnes Aldunate and Raúl Bertelsen Repetto - an Opus Dei jurist who had been Ismael Sánchez Bella's student in Navarra and who specialized in Francoist law.²⁴⁹ These figures were to make sure that "Chile would never go back," in

²⁴³ "Sí!" *Qué Pasa*, no. 349 (December 29, 1977): 1.

²⁴⁴ "España hacía la libertad de mercado," *Qué Pasa*, no. 435 (August 16, 1979): 19-20

²⁴⁵ They were also identified as technocrats in press by then, see - Pablo Huneeus, "La tecnocracia triunfal," *Ercilla* (March 21, 1979).

²⁴⁶ This was perhaps one of the most severe moment of conflict within the leading Junta, following an interview to *Corriere Delta Sera* on July 18 1978, in which he criticized Pinochet's leadership.

²⁴⁷ The regime could now move towards democracy "prudently but surely," asserted Sergio Fernández, see - Sergio Fernández, *Mi lucha por la democracia* (Santiago: Los Andes, 1994), 29.

²⁴⁸ Vial Correa, *Pinochet*, 338.

²⁴⁹ See - Raúl Bertelsen Repetto, *El Senado en España* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, 1974); Raúl Bertelsen Repetto, *Control de constitucionalidad de la ley* (Santiago: Ed. Jurídica de Chile, 1969).

Pinochet's words, to the 1925 Constitution and the 1973 "civil war." Speaking to the committee in 1977, Pinochet explained what "institutionalization" meant to him:

I am certain that the world observes with attention the new constitutional provisions that we are forging and that it will understand very soon that only with a new democracy, authoritarian, vigorous, and protected, based on the concept of unity, participation, and integration of all sectors of the country, we will be able to withstand the onslaught of the powerful enemy.²⁵⁰

Giving concrete meaning to these paradoxical formulations was, as of this moment, Jaime Guzmán's new life-mission.²⁵¹

Chile's Constitutional Commission, it is important to note, was well-acquainted with the Falange's parallel concepts of "apertura" and authoritarian representation. As mentioned previously, Silva Bascuñán and other commission members visited Spain in 1973 and met with several Falange jurists such Luis Legaz Lacambra (discussed in chapter 2). They even proposed him a "collaboration with the IEP in preparing the new constitution."²⁵² Yet Chile's commission raised the prospects of a return to parliamentarism before the Spanish transition ever began.²⁵³ It also reviewed various other constitutions, including that of West Germany and France, and never once mentioned the Spanish transition in its sessions after 1977.²⁵⁴ If the gremialistas designing Pinochet's reform learned anything from the Spanish precedent it was rather the importance of the spectacle of a referendum. The Madrid daily *El País* was quick to address this issue, stating that

²⁵⁰ *Actas oficiales de la comisión constituyente*, sesión 296 (June 9, 1977): 1151-53.

²⁵¹ As can be seen in his famous text "Protected Democracy and the 1980 Constitution," in Elizabeth Quay Hutchison, Thomas Miller Klubock, Nara B. Milanich, and Peter Winn (eds.), *The Chile Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 468-73.

²⁵² *Actas oficiales de la comisión constituyente*, sesión 20 (January 15, 1974) Anexo 2, 13-16.

²⁵³ Already in September 1973, Guzmán spoke of institutionalization and hypothetic democratic return, see - *Actas oficiales de la comisión constituyente*, session 2 (September 25, 1973); Jara Hinojosa, "La ideología franquista en la legitimación de la dictadura militar chilena", 246.

²⁵⁴ Even the visit of the Spanish Cristian Álvarez de Miranda, and his discussions with the commission over the Spanish model did not seem to influence the commission's discussions see - "Álvarez de Miranda: mi visita es en testimonio de solidaridad," *El Mercurio* (August 22, 1978).

Franco's performance of referendums inspired Pinochet to "realize the same manipulation."²⁵⁵ Apart from that, however, Pinochet's "authoritarian democracy" was to be an original undertaking. Unlike the Falange's aperturistas in 1974, the Chilean reformers understood that parliamentarism and universal suffrage ought to replace the so-called "organic" model of representation. The question was rather the ideological spectrum that was to be admitted into parliament. For Guzmán, there were no illusions that allowing "Marxists" partake in the democratic game was inconceivable in Chile. Thus, while he deemed corporatism "disposable,"²⁵⁶ he envisioned a democracy safeguarded by strict controlling mechanisms designed to negate the political representation of any ideologies pertaining to "statism."²⁵⁷

Unlike Guzmán, Rodríguez Grez still believed in national-syndical corporatist participation. This was the crux of what now became Chile's well-known feud between the "soft-liners" (Blandos) and "hard-liners" (Duros).²⁵⁸ The former affiliation included the gremialistas, Chile's economic elite, and the *Qué Pasa* network. The latter, comprised of Rodríguez Grez and his followers, nacionalistas such as Jorge Ivén Hübner, and even Pinochet's daughter Inés Lucía. These "Chilean Francoists," said Vial Correa, believed Pinochet should govern "until he died, thus allowing a transformation of the Chilean economy and society." The Chilean neo-fascists wanted more than that, however. Rodríguez Grez avidly advocated a "nationalist, anti-imperialist, and corporate state."²⁵⁹ From his columns in the daily *La Tercera*, he condemned the government's latest efforts to appease the international community and demanded a swift return to a "socially" oriented system based on national-syndicalism.²⁶⁰ In November 1979, he even invited Fernández

²⁵⁵ "Chile en el corazón," *El País* (January 6, 1978).

²⁵⁶ *Actas oficiales de la comisión constituyente*, sesión 360 (April 26, 1978).

²⁵⁷ See for instance the debate on the Contralor General, *Actas oficiales de la comisión constituyente*, sesión 329, (November 22, 1977).

²⁵⁸ For more on this ideological quarrel see - Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime*, 205, 237, 360.

²⁵⁹ Vial Correa, *Pinochet*, 365-67.

²⁶⁰ "Mano dura," *La Tercera* (May 28, 1979); see also -

de la Mora and French thinker Alain de Lacoste-Layremondie-éste to Chile to criticize the new Chilean constitution.²⁶¹

To the hard-liners' dismay, the constitutional process continued with an urgency, guided by Guzmán and Sergio Fernández. A son of Spanish parents, the latter was a vital addition to the reform process. The main promoter of Chile's 1978 "General Amnesty," Fernández convinced Pinochet to pardon all those sentenced in military tribunals, thereby establishing an equilibrium between the criminalities "of both sides."²⁶² As for Guzmán, he was far from being a wholehearted democrat; he even paraphrased Churchill by saying that "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others."²⁶³ As Fernández de la Mora before him, while promoting the reform, he tended to bring into play sheer instrumental conceptions. The new system was to be efficient, he said, or else it would be taken away:

If democracy is a form of government, it cannot be an end in itself, because no form of government can ever be. And as a means, its validity stands in direct relation to its effectiveness to promote a desired way of life. That is why democracy is only really legitimate as long as it serves freedom, security, progress, and justice while losing all validity if, due to an erroneous design or practical application, it ends up favoring the anti-values of totalitarianism, statism, terrorism, subversion, and demagoguery.²⁶⁴

Efficiency, for him, meant that corporatism, or any "elite or aristocratic formula," were also impracticable in Chile's contemporary reality.²⁶⁵ The only way forward, Guzmán therefore decided, was a democratic transition based on a "minimal basic consensus" over Chile's alleged

²⁶¹ In Vial's words, these debates aimed to "reduce, if not eliminate, the political weight of suffrage and parties," see - Vial Correa, *Pinochet*, 370.

²⁶² Fernández, *Mi lucha por la democracia*, 29-31.

²⁶³ "El Camino político," *Realidad*, no. 7 (December 1979).

²⁶⁴ Jaime Guzmán, "Libertad y democracia", in Gerald Wolfgang Goldberg, *Chile y Europa, doctrinas políticas: resultado del simposio celebrado los días 22 y 23 de mayo de 1980 en la Pontificia UC* (Santiago de Chile: Andres Bello, 1981), 83.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 85.

“essential values of social organization,” or in short, the indefinite exclusion of any Marxist or “statist” theories from politics.²⁶⁶

Hernán Cubillos was Pinochet’s answer to international isolation, as well as to the aggravating dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Islands. The editor of *El Mercurio*, and another of *Qué Pasa*’s founders,²⁶⁷ he embarked on a key European tour in September 1979 and was the first of Pinochet’s officials to visit democratic Spain and meet King Juan Carlos.²⁶⁸ Tellingly, in this instance, both sides flatly denied the possibility of any resemblance between their parallel, if not peculiar, democratic transitions.²⁶⁹ “The Spanish experience can neither be copied nor transferred,” Suárez assured his guest.²⁷⁰ Cubillos, for his part, spoke of a democracy based on “strong executive power” and “exclusion of totalitarian doctrines.”²⁷¹ His trip was merely one part of a broader effort to promote the 1980 Constitution nationally and internationally. In particular, it was Guzmán’s new journal *Realidad* that was to be the central channel for explaining the reform to the Chilean public. Along with Juan de Dios Vial, José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois²⁷² and even Mariano Grondona, here Guzmán fully developed his visions of Chile’s protected democracy. Going against socialism, but also against elite politics, *Realidad*’s first editorial asserted that “to configure a new democracy” means the “elimination of the paralyzing obstacles of socialist statism, [...] and of multiple monopolistic centers of power.” Speaking to the hard-liners, the editorial also denounced corporatism, as a system that “was valid in middle-ages monarchies” but

²⁶⁶ “El Camino político,” *Realidad*, no. 7 (December 1979).

²⁶⁷ “Hernán Cubillos: un diplomático por naturaleza,” *Qué Pasa* (May 4, 1978): 24-26; “Casillería en vías de apertura,” *Ercilla* (May 24, 1978).

²⁶⁸ “Una gira eminentemente política,” *Qué Pasa* (September 27, 1979): 6-7; “Positiva es considerada gira de Cubillos a España,” *La Tercera* (September 9, 1979); “Un viaje esclarecedor,” *Realidad*, no. 5 (October 1979): 3.

²⁶⁹ “Experiencia española no es trasmisible, ni copiable,” *La Tercera* (September 9, 1979); for more journalistic accounts of this visit, see - The Hoover Institution Archive, Hernán Cubillos Sallato papers, Box 10.

²⁷⁰ “Experiencia española no es transmisible ni copiable”.

²⁷¹ Guzmán was determined to go “against the Spanish precedent,” he even noted, see - “Poderes Fuertes al presidente y exclusión de doctrinas totalitarias,” *Madrid* (September 7, 1979).

²⁷² José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “Marxismo religión al revés,” *Realidad*, no. 27 (August 1981): 35-39.

that in modern times simply turns into a fascist “totalitarianism.”²⁷³ Regardless of these illuminations, also in this case democracy never appeared as a value in and of itself, but as means to guarantee “progress,”²⁷⁴ “free economy,” and “realism.”²⁷⁵

Now well within Chile’s own “economic miracle,” the constitutional referendum of September 11, 1980, became a triumphalist celebration of a regime that had chosen this so-called “democracy” over technocratic-authoritarianism.²⁷⁶ With 65.7% of Chileans ostensibly approving the reform,²⁷⁷ Chile’s own “minimal consensus” was now a juridical fact. Expectedly, the constitution declared the illegality any doctrines “of totalitarian character or based on class warfare.”²⁷⁸ Less expected was its declaration that “the state recognizes and protects the intermediate societies through which society is organized and guarantees them adequate autonomy to fulfill their own specific purposes (Article 1)” But this was an inconsequential residue of what had been, three years earlier, an entire concept of a post-ideological society. In short, the 1980 Constitution turned Chile into a lessened parliamentary democracy *de jure*, waiting to be applied *de facto* in an eight-year transitional phase.²⁷⁹

As it happened, the referendum also signaled the end of the gremialistas’ mandate. Having been invited and then humiliatingly denied access to the Philippines by dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1980 (a diplomatic incident known as the “Filipinazo”), Pinochet’s returned home to a fanatic

²⁷³ “Autoridad fuerte para la institucionalidad,” *Realidad*, no. 1 (June 1979).

²⁷⁴ Jaime Guzmán, “El sufragio universal y la nueva institucionalidad,” *Realidad* no. 1 (June 1979): 33-44; see also “Modernización y horizonte político,” *Realidad*, no. 8-9 (January-February 1980).

²⁷⁵ “El camino político,” *Realidad*, no. 7 (December 1979): 14; Jaime Guzmán, “El sentido de la transición,” *Realidad*, no. 28 (July 1982): 9-28.

²⁷⁶ See - Jaime Guzmán, “La definición constitucional,” *Realidad*, no. 3 (August 1980): 21.

²⁷⁷ According to one secret CIA report, “the government left no stone unturned to ensure a favorable outcome in the plebiscite,” thereby clearly manipulating the vote through intimidation and actual fraud, see - “Chile: How Authoritarian is Pinochet’s constitution?” May 17, 1988, at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000451593.pdf

²⁷⁸ Article 8, For more on this see - “Dos conceptos sobre el consenso,” *Realidad*, no. 4 (September 1980): 10.

²⁷⁹ For a comprehensive analysis of the Chilean constitutional process and the design of the infamous Article 8, see - Robert Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 223; see also - “Chile: How Authoritarian is Pinochet’s constitution?”

wave of support, which might have been helpful in producing popular backing for the 1980 referendum, but also undermined the hegemony of the soft-liners. With Vial Correa, Cubillos, and Fernández discharged, Pinochet moved the regime back towards oppression and violence at least until 1983.²⁸⁰ Even so, from 1981 the constitution was a fact. As in the case of Spain, democratic transition came from within the regime, using its own constitutional framework. Yet strikingly, Guzmán still contested any similitude between the “Spanish model” and Chile’s reform. Franco’s “mistake,” he said, was not accepting democracy as an inevitability, and claiming it for himself, though he was “objectively its father.”²⁸¹ Supporting Pinochet’s reelection for president in 1988, Guzmán therefore opined that since Pinochet was the original author of Chile’s democracy he could continue to be its leader - unlike the King of Spain, without ever needing to rely on subterfuge to do so.²⁸²

Pinochet’s eight-year “transition” also witnessed the Chicago Boys’ economic policies ending in deep economic and social crisis in 1982. As a result, a new chapter of social unrest opened in Chilean history, spurring further brutality but also, from 1983, bringing about a political “opening” with the lifting of censorship and new forms of elections in professional associations. In an effort to stymie the return of the democratic opposition to a position of power, Guzmán transformed the gremialistas into an official political party: The Independent Democratic Union (UDI). Here, despite ducking his own 1960s authoritarian-technocratic theories, Guzmán

²⁸⁰ Sergio Fernández claimed that the Filipinazo “helped the institutionalization”, see – Fernández, *Mi lucha por la democracia*, 130; for more on the “Filipinazo” and its effects, see - “Hernán Cubillos rompe su silencio,” *Qué Pasa*, (November 13, 1986): 32-33; see also - Augusto Varas, “The Crisis of Legitimacy of Military Rule in the 1980s”, in Paul W. Drake, Ivan Jaksic (eds.), *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).

²⁸¹ Jaime Guzmán, “El camino político,” *Realidad*, no. 7 (December 1979): 13-23.

²⁸² Jaime Guzmán, “Dos casos radicalmente diferentes,” *Ercilla* (December 17, 1986).

exemplified how limited his vision of democracy really was.²⁸³ Similarly, the Opus Dei's "soft-liners" theoreticians, Ibáñez Langlois, Bravo Lira, and Vial Correa, struggled earnestly to keep intact what they thought was a society on a path to material and spiritual perfection.²⁸⁴ They perhaps rejected the regime's human rights abuses but were also eager supporters of the UDI and Pinochet's "Yes" campaign of 1988.²⁸⁵ Joining them were new voices, for example the Opus Dei economist Joaquín Lavín, who was essential in constructing the political myth regarding Chile's so-called "silent revolution."²⁸⁶ Throughout the 1980s, Lavín stressed that Pinochet's regime had liberated the Chilean regions from Santiago's centralist grip via a successful "regionalization" and a system of "poles of development,"²⁸⁷ thus enabling Chile's democratic future. In short, the technocrats of the 1970s were still salient in the political climate of a country heading towards yet another "consensual" democratic transition, marked by structural continuation and devoid of transitional justice.

Tellingly, by this time the Spanish reformers lost hope of influencing Pinochet's regime, directing their diplomacy towards Chile's Christian Democrats instead. Adolfo Suárez, who had already hosted Chile's Christian Democrats at the UCD national convention of 1978, continued his intimate cooperation with Chile's centrist opposition throughout the 1980s.²⁸⁸ In 1984, the

²⁸³ The Independent Democratic Union used the Constitutional Tribunal to prevent any Marxist political movement to operate legally in Chile, see - Mark Ensalcado, *Chile under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 177-79.

²⁸⁴ "De conformidad a la constitución estamos en un periodo transitorio," *La Tercera* (November 7, 1982).

²⁸⁵ One example was the 1985 "El caso de los degollados" scandal, where Vial Correa took a firm stance against Pinochet's Carabineros, see - Gonzalo Vial Correa, "Como un cáncer," *Qué Pasa* (August 1, 1985): 14-16.

²⁸⁶ Joaquín Lavín, "Chile y su experiencia de planificación," *Qué Pasa*, no. 305 (February 24, 1977); "Cómo nacieron la extrema izquierda y la... extrema pobreza," *El Mercurio* (June 15, 1980); "Decibeles de una revolución," *Ercilla*, no. 2748 (March 30, 1988): 37-38; Joaquín Lavín Infante, *Chile, Revolución Silenciosa* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1987); see also Joaquín Lavín and Ernesto Tironi, "Competing Perspectives on Dictatorship as Revolution," in Hutchison, Klubock, Milanich, and Winn, *The Chile Reader*, 498-511.

²⁸⁷ "Gradually Santiago stopped being Chile," he said, and even compared the area of Copiapó to the Israeli Negev Desert development experiment (of which he, apparently, knew very little), see - Joaquín Lavín, *Revolución silenciosa* (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1987), 61-63.

²⁸⁸ He invited Eduardo Frie, Patricio Aylwin, Andres Zaldivar, and Juan Hamilton to attend the UCD convention in 1978, see - "Hay dos mil de DC trabajando en la política," *Qué Pasa* (October 18-25, 1978); In 1986 he visited

Christian Democratic leader Patricio Aylwin accepted the 1980 constitution “as a fact.” Promoting the formula of “democracy to the extent possible,”²⁸⁹ he indeed pointed to the Spanish transition as his main reference. “This so-called ‘pacted rupture’ allowed a peaceful and continuous transition from Francoist authoritarianism to democracy. Why should not our country follow such an example?” he pondered.²⁹⁰ In brief, the mid-1980s saw a new format of Spanish-Chilean dialogue, mostly upon the international Christian Democratic networks, over the meanings and possible design of “consensus politics.”²⁹¹

Meanwhile, politically ostracized, Franco’s technocrats fought over their own legacies. By 1985, Chile had therefore become a platform where they could unleash criticism towards their own transition, retrospectively.²⁹² In particular, Fernández de la Mora’s visit to Chile in September 1985 was an anecdote worthwhile examining here fully, if only for its ideological transparency. Invited by Gustavo Cuevas, the director of the University of Chile’s Political Science Institute, and meeting in private with Pinochet, the retired Spanish politician evidently was still considered in Chile an intellectual of the highest degree. This was no ordinary visit. Rather, ten years after Franco’s death, Fernández de la Mora arrived in Chile to publicly denounce the country’s upcoming democratization. As the Spanish ambassador Miguel Solano reported to his superiors,

Chile and promoted a collective amnesty, see - María A. Bulnes, “Suárez en Chile: ‘El perdón de los perseguidos, clave de la transición,’” *ABC Madrid* (December 13, 1986).

²⁸⁹ Patricio Navia, “Living in Actually Existing Democracies: Democracy to the Extent Possible in Chile,” *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 45, Special Issue (2010): 298-328.

²⁹⁰ “Una Salida Jurídico-política,” in Patricio Aylwin, *Un desafío colectivo* (Santiago de Chile: Planeta, 1988), 127.

²⁹¹ This dynamic is too broad a phenomenon to be explained fully here. According to literary critic Alberto Medina Spain “displayed the role of the guide for other young democracies” and thus the Chileans followed Spain’s path “literally constituting themselves as its mimesis,” see - Alberto Medina, *Exorcismos de la memoria: políticas y poéticas de la melancolía en la España de la transición* (Madrid: Ediciones Libertarias, 2001), 25; for more analyses of the Spanish transition and the ways it was rejected in Argentina and later evoked in Chile, see - Kressel, “Getting off the Tiger”; Encarnación Lemus López, *En Hamelin: la transición española más allá de la frontera* (Oviedo: Septem Ediciones, 2001); Luis Lorente Toledo, “España y el Cono Sur de América Latina. Transiciones y flujo democrático,” in Álvaro Soto Carmona (et al), *Historia de la transición y consolidación democrática en España (1975-1986)* (Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1995), 36-46.

²⁹² Manuel Fraga, “La España de hoy vista por Fraga: redescubrimiento y manipulación del carnaval,” *Realidad*, no. 46 (March 1983): 43-45.

in “series of workshops,” which saw the attendance of Chile’s “most prominent intellectuals and four ministers,” Fernández de la Mora advocated Franco’s “corporative” and “organic” democracy, based on the efficient work of economic and social “councils.”²⁹³ In lengthy interviews with the Chilean press, his technocratic formulas then reached new levels of crudeness. “Ideologies are no longer useful,” he said in *Ercilla*;²⁹⁴ “I evaluate regimes by results and not dogmatisms,” he told *La Segunda*.²⁹⁵ Amazingly, he even noted that Spain’s transition “was not the exigency of the masses but the decision of Spain’s political class.”²⁹⁶

Fernández de la Mora was no less firm when depicting the alleged “errors,” of Spain’s democratization. This message was particularly well-received by his friends in *La Tercera*, Jorge Iván Hübner for instance, who restated his work as the foremost analysis of the failures of parliamentarism.²⁹⁷ In 1987, López Rodó joined Fernández de la Mora in publicizing the latter’s book *Los errores del cambio* in *El Mercurio*.²⁹⁸ In this case, Fernández de la Mora argued that ever since 1975 the Spanish society had undergone downright moral decay. From the sudden rise of drug abuse to pornography and “trivialization of sex” - for him, nothing was in order in 1986 Spain. More pointedly, he argued that the entry of the masses into politics has brought Spain to a state of “infantilization.”²⁹⁹ This was the other side of the coin of the technocrats’ authoritarian paternalism, which had once demanded its citizens to “be a child,” and let spiritual guides and technicians rule them, voluntarily and without qualms.

²⁹³ “1147, visita a Chile del embajador Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora,” October 1, 1985, AGA, caja 82/07900.

²⁹⁴ “Las ideologías ya no sirven,” *Ercilla* (September 25, 1985).

²⁹⁵ “Fernández de la Mora: ‘El cambio en España se hizo marginando y persiguiendo a la derecha,’” *La Segunda* (September 27, 1985).

²⁹⁶ Tomas Mac Hale, “Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora: la transición española,” *El Mercurio* (September 29, 1985).

²⁹⁷ “El pensamiento de Fernández de la Mora,” *La Tercera* (December 4, 1986).

²⁹⁸ Laureano López Rodó, “La transición española,” *El Mercurio* (July 12, 1987).

²⁹⁹ Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, *Los errores del cambio* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1986), 20-21.

Conclusions

By the mid-1980s, the authoritarian technocrats had become a fairly marginal political and ideological actor, in Spain, Argentina, and Chile. The majority of right-wing politicians and intellectuals in these countries - even those who had once rebuked parliamentarism - were increasingly prone to the conclusion that the authoritarian models of the 1960s and 1970s reached the limits of their functionality. In other words, they agreed that while technocratic-authoritarian regimes were perhaps an ethically acceptable arrangement in the past, they were now, even before the end of the Cold War, neither sustainable nor respectable enough in the international arena, and therefore could be abandoned for the sake of a better democratic setup.³⁰⁰ Whether it was due to the pressure of the international community or the Vatican, the workers or the students, the idea that the Hispanic world could live under an “alternative” system of representation, “organic” and purged of abstract ideologies, was thus considered seriously by a tiny few. Fernández de la Mora’s 1985 appearance in Chile was, in this sense, a somewhat uncanny exception that attested to the rules of Latin America’s new democratic zeitgeist.

True, the Proceso and Pinochet’s regime willingly allowed neo-fascist groups to operate in their public spheres and propagate a return to a nationalist-syndicalist revolution, and even a new civil war. The young Spanish democracy, too, tolerated a host of right-wing actors voicing clear anti-democratic slogans, a process that continued at least until the failed *coup d’état* of February 23, 1981. But taken as a whole, the Proceso leaders, as well as Pinochet, accepted the finitude of

³⁰⁰ There are multiple examples of this genre of retroactive reflection. One example is Manuel Fraga’s 1980s texts, see for instance - Manuel Fraga Iribarne, *En busca del tiempo servido* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1987); another example are Jaime Guzmán’s historical analyses after 1988, see - “Fuerzas armadas en el futuro político,” in Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz, *Escritos personales* (Santiago de Chile: Fundación Jaime Guzmán, 1992), 191-92; for another debate on these types of narratives see - Craig L. Arceneaux, *Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone and Brazil* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

their regime in the early 1980s, and did not formally endorse any novel authoritarian theory of the state. Whereas Guzmán, López Rodó, Amadeo - and, of course, the Opus Dei at large - never quite believed in democracy as a superior ethical order, many of them did eventually accept parliamentarism as a done deal and grappled to formulate their own restrictive interpretation of it. In so doing, most of them could be found participating in the new electoral system, where they defended what they believed were the dictatorship's achievements of societal and spiritual perfection.

There were significant differences between the Argentine, Chilean, and Spanish cases of transitions to democracy, certainly when it comes to their concepts of transitional justice and types of truth-telling mechanisms commenced in each transition. A closer look reveals, however, one important similarity between the transitions, especially in case of the “pacted” transition Spain and Chile: The ideologues who had designed the technocratic-authoritarian state ideologies in the 1960s now all voiced similar narratives. The authoritarian phase of economic growth and modernization they had devised, they explained, enabled democracy to successfully take root, given the evolution of their nation from a state of “underdevelopment” towards a society of non-ideological consumerist “middle-classes.” In turn, one could argue that the so-called transitional “consensus” of the 1980s meant not only the resolve between all moderate political forces to avoid any persecution of the Armed Forces, but also the tacit agreement to accept the dictatorship's alleged functionality and respectability as the authentic birthplace of democracy.

Conclusion: On the Legacies of Technocratic-Authoritarianism in Spain, Argentina, and Chile

This study has scrutinized a unique post-fascist ideology and contextualized its appearance, apex, and decline within three historical settings. Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism first emerged in the 1950s as an ideology upon the international apparatuses of the ICH and Opus Dei. Next, in the 1960s, this ideology was translated into a state-ideology in Francisco Franco's Spain, and was further developed within the texts of Argentina's post-fascist nacionalistas and Chilean gremialistas. In turn, it informed the state-ideology of Juan Carlos Onganía's regime, and immediately thereafter, decided the character of Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship in its early days. And last, this ideology significantly diminished in popularity in the mid-1970s, to be supplanted by either a neo-fascist radicalization or "protected" democratic transitions, an entire decade before the Cold War ended. Having been the first laboratory of this post-fascist ideological makeover, technocratic Spain captivated the imagination of Argentine and Chilean far-right thinkers. By propagating the interlinked political myths of Spain's anti-Enlightenment "crusade" and post-ideological "economic miracle," the Francoist regime was both a state-model and a landscape wherein Latin American youngsters, intellectuals, and military men toured, writing back home in elation. In the 1960s, Francoism thus became the central point of reference for Latin America's conservative elites in their quest for a return to authoritarianism in the name of a modernizing leap forward.

But rather than replicating Francoism, Onganía, Pinochet, and the post-fascist technocratic-authoritarian ideologues they handpicked, chose to formulate updated interpretations of Franco's state model. By doing so, they all believed themselves to belong to an ilk of Hispanic "organic"

democracies - as a third regime model within the Cold War system. As such, they alleged to have successfully transcended the liberal-democratic era, thereby reaching a final mode of economic and social progress, all the while maintaining their sovereignty vis-à-vis the other Cold War blocs. While never an avowed utopian project, there is a clear genealogy between the messianic fascist project of the 1930s and the 1960s spiritual “technocratic” society. My findings outline that the two merely proposed different techniques for achieving the same fundamental objectives: a technically modernized consumer society, purged from 19th century ideologies, hierarchical, fundamentally patriarchal, and last but not least, wallowing in a state of a spiritual sublime.

This study thus aims to fill a certain gap in the historical writing on Latin America’s far-right ideology during the Cold War. Whereas historiography has scrutinized to the fullest neo-fascist revolutionary movements such as the nacionalistas, and even more so Latin America’s authoritarian Populisms, this dissertation points to a realm of post-fascist ideological production that has yet to be been aptly labeled. Lest this appears a game of taxonomies, let us underscore again that the designers of Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism proudly purported to replace what they believed were the imprudent “totalitarian” national revolutions of the 1930s with a non-statist theory of collective action. By so doing, and by actually being granted access to the center of the state apparatus, they were arguably more consequential than the Cold War neo-fascists. As I have shown, the latter exhibited fierce opposition to the technocrats throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, Piñar, Sánchez Sorondo, Curutchet, and Rodríguez Grez, challenged the technocrats’ ideology in a fairly similar fashion, consequently making the far-right ideological panorama in these countries a binary feud between neo-fascist and post-fascist authoritarianisms; between “revolution” and “restoration”; a statist “national-sindicalist” format of corporatism versus a neoliberal regime directed by “intermediary societies.” Yet, as this study also shows, the

two ideological schools clearly overlapped. For instance, they dovetailed in their endorsement of civil war and political violence as the legitimate means to rid society of its “materialist” enemies. In this sense, the movements differed only inasmuch as the neo-fascists perceived violence as the heart of their perpetual “revolution” and the very means to attain the spiritual sublime, whereas the technocrats saw it as a precondition for the formation of a post-ideological society and a spiritual project of yet another kind.

Indeed, the pages above clarify that despite bearing a thematic consistency with the western neoliberal technocratic jargon, Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism cannot be understood disconnected from its matching spiritual project. Paradoxically, for the thinkers I have analyzed, “rationalizing” the state economically went hand in hand with cultivating the community’s unifying “irrational” mystical core. When Pérez Embid spoke of “European in the means and Spanish in the ends,” he merely meant to say that he believed in the existence of a historical agent who could guide society peacefully towards a uniquely Hispanic modernity comprising of dual process of technological progress and spiritual perfection. By the same token, the confidence of these post-fascist intellectuals in the benevolent operation of civil society underneath an authoritarian peace-keeper betrayed a holistic fantasy that began with the harmonious Catholic household and ended with an antagonism-free elite-oriented method of collective action.

Examining the predominance of the technocratic ideologies of the 1960s invites a reappraisal of the dichotomy between communism and anti-communism in Latin America during the Cold War period. The fear of communism, I argue, was ubiquitous among the authoritarian technocrats but was also dissimilar from the zeitgeist of the 1930s. A sense of uncontrolled technological acceleration, the progressive turn within the Catholic Church, and rapid change in gender roles and sexual norms were no less crucial in mobilizing a generation of conservatives in

demand for an authoritarian project that was *not a nationalist revolution*. By evoking a pre-modern anti-nationalist Hispanic mythology, the technocrats' "anti-totalitarian" language thus mirrored both the traumatic legacies of fascist Europe and the preoccupations of the conservative subject during the 1960s. Beneath the canopy of authoritarian "social peace," the society Pérez Embid and the likes of him envisioned entailed a middle-class fantasy of material abundance rather than violence, followed by an apparition of a protective act of cultural intermediation. This could be best seen in the case of the Opus Dei feminism. Bringing a "European" technique into the "Hispanic" realm meant producing a "modern" womanhood that seemingly endorsed new economic and social undertakings, only thereafter to strip women of their political agency and reproductive rights in the name of protecting both their alleged inner nature and the Hispanic spiritual domain.

Apart from touching on the Cold War's right-wing theories of the state, this study contributes to the history of this era's ideologies of development and neoliberal reforms. Despite not being an economic history per se, it still exemplifies that technocratic-authoritarianism should be read through the prism of the international economic circumstances of the 1960s. Franco, Onganía, and Pinochet all believe in the feasibility of a distinctive economic "miracle," thus placing a neoliberal economic mechanism at the heart of their modernizing and civilizing process. Given the stark similarity between the Francoist, Argentine, and Chilean "development plans," administrative "rationalizations," "regionalization" initiatives, and even usage of "development poles," these dictatorships should therefore be perceived as three interlinked episodes in a systematic platform of authoritarian economic stimulation, a phenomenon that calls for further historical analysis.

Beyond these insights, as any historical research on the 20th century, this study has been written with the concern over current distortions of collective memory in mind. Unlike in the case of European fascism, the legacies of technocratic-authoritarianism have not been aptly challenged, let alone purged, in Spain, Argentina, or Chile.¹ In truth, the technocrats are still among us, as are their ideologies. Thinkers such as Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, Laureano López Rodó, Jaime Guzmán, and Joaquín Lavín have all energetically participated in parliamentary politics following their countries' democratic transitions.² Mariano Grondona, Bernardo Neustadt, and Mariano Montemayor - all of them respectable intellectuals in Argentina - have never publicly repented their endorsement of, and assistance to, either Onganía or the Proceso.³ Others, Roberto Bosca for example, who had still spoken against parliamentarism in 1981,⁴ later became advocates of democracy in the public sphere.⁵ As of yet, especially in regards to the Argentine Revolution, these figures have shown an inability to assume responsibility for Argentina's authoritarian turn. Decades later, figures such as Jorge Mazzinochi even doggedly justified their participation in the plot against Illia - whom he still labeled an "honest man, but an iniquitous mediocrity."⁶

¹ The literature on German memory has recently begun to challenge this alleged "denazification" of the German society, see for example - Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996).

² Some in the Spanish media have portrayed Fernández de la Mora, sarcastically, "as Einstein and Heidegger, the greatest thinker of all times," see - Francisco Umbral, "Seis personajes en busca de su autor," *El País* (October 13, 1976); Gonzalo Vial Correa even partook in drafting the Rettig Report uncovering Pinochet's human rights abuses.

³ Grondona never publicly refuted the allegations by which he had been the author of the Proceso's foundational text *Bases Políticas para la Reorganización Nacional*, see - Martín Sivak, *El Doctor: biografía no autorizada de Mariano Grondona* (Buenos Aires: Aguilar, 2005).

⁴ Horacio Verbitsky, *La mano izquierda de Dios. La última dictadura (1976-1983): historia política de la iglesia católica* (Buenos Aires: Penguin Random House Argentina, 2012).

⁵ See for instance - Roberto Bosca, "La iglesia católica y la democracia. Presupuestos históricos, teológicos y filosóficos," *Colección*, no. 20 (2009): 147-71; far-right groups have even accused Bosca of being committed to a "democratic auto de fe," in order to "redeem his past" as someone who cooperated with the Proceso, see - <http://info-caotica.blogspot.de/2014/11/una-replica-roberto-bosca.html>

⁶ Mazzinochi, *Ni memorias ni olvido*, 61.

In a parallel vein, the Opus Dei, Cursillos de la Cristiandad, and Tradición, Familia y Propiedad, are still immensely present in the Latin American public sphere.⁷ The Opus Dei, in particular, has maintained its influential position as an ultra-conservative pressure group in global politics, as many historians, sociologists, and journalists have pointed out in recent years.⁸ The beatification of Escrivá de Balaguer in May 1992, and Álvaro del Portillo in September 2014, are further indications of the Opus Dei's dominance within the Catholic world at large.⁹ This evolving interest in the Opus Dei has produced a rather distorted public image of its character and history, however. "Opus Dei is a deeply devout Catholic sect that has been a topic of recent controversy due to reports of extreme practices," are the opening lines of Dan Brown's novel *The Da Vinci Code*, perhaps the most famous reference in popular culture to what is, in truth, the Vatican's formal Prelature.¹⁰ Hereafter, the public debate over the Opus Dei ideologies and agency has been

⁷ The amount of publications on these societies is tremendous and included a myriad of conspiracy theories, see for instance: "El Opus Dei da la cara," *Clarín* (February 14, 1997); Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez y Hernán Brienza, "Los secretos del Opus," *Tres Puntos*, no. 144 (April 6, 2000): 28-37; Alejandra Dandan, "Tradición, Familia y Propiedad," *Página 12* (August 7, 2011); Barbie Latza Nadeau, "This Secret Catholic Exorcist Cult in Brazil Is Making a Deal with the Devil," *The Daily Beast* (June 18, 2017); "The secret doctrine of the Heralds: 'Correa encourages the death of the Pope,'" *La Stampa* (April 16, 2018). <http://www.lastampa.it/2017/06/14/vaticaninsider/eng/world-news/heralds-the-secret-doctrine-correa-encourages-the-death-of-the-pope-EBrYbUZMZvf4sBm0aIrLOI/pagina.html>.

⁸ See for example - Michael J. Walsh, *The Secret World of Opus Dei* (London: Grafton Books, 1989); Robert Hutchison, *Their Kingdom Come: Inside the Secret World of Opus Dei* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2014); Jesús Ynfante, *El santo fundador Del Opus Dei: biografía completa de Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2002); Jaime Escobar, *Opus Dei: génesis y expansión en el mundo* (Santiago de Chile: LOM ediciones, 1992); Mercedes Balech (ed.), *El Opus Dei y la restauración católica* (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2002); Corbière, *Opus Dei: el totalitarismo católico*.

⁹ With the advent of Pope Francis's papacy, in March 2013, the international press has speculated on the antagonistic relationship between the Jesuit Pope and the Opus Dei given the former's Peronist past, a claim that both sides have consistently denied, see - Paul Elie, "Francis, the Anti-Strongman," *The New York Times* (April 9, 2018); "Pope Francis Removes Opus Dei Bishop," *Catholic Herald* (September 25, 2014); "Pope Remembers Opus Dei Head as 'Paternal and Generous' Witness," *Catholic Herald* (December 13, 2016); Thomas G. Bohlin, "The Pope and Opus Dei," *The New York Times* (April 4, 2018); "Pope Francis Brings a New Energy Many Young People Can Identify With," August 30, 2018, is <https://opusdei.org/en-us/article/pope-francis-brings-a-new-energy-that-a-lot-of-young-people-can-identify-with/>.

¹⁰ Dan Brown, *The Da Vinci Code* (New York: Bantam, 2003), 1.

reduced to disputes over the veracity of its methods of self-torture and maltreatment of its members - a proclivity I hope my analysis will assuage.¹¹

The Opus Dei, too, has yet to come to terms with its participation in authoritarian experiments worldwide. This fact is evident in the Opus Dei's own scholarly system, which nowadays is a source of numerous historical analyses touching on its own intellectuals and politics.¹² At times, these studies are informative and important. By and large, however, they demonstrate a failure to criticize the organization's founders, or fully scrutinize the role the Opus Dei's intellectual apparatus played during the regimes of Franco, Onganía, and Pinochet. What is more, whereas Franco's legacy has been fairly successfully erased from the Spanish public sphere by now, authoritarian ideologues such as Álvaro d'Ors, Florentino Pérez Embid, and Ismael Sánchez Bella are still venerated in the Opus Dei's campuses, further exemplifying the difficulties this institution exhibits when dealing with its anti-democratic legacies.¹³ As importantly, over the years the technocrats have expressed no repentance over the economic, social, and even ecological consequences of their theories of development and population control. On the contrary: to this day many of them, Joaquín Lavín to name one, stress the unequivocal success of this alleged authoritarian development phase.

A problem arises when members of the scholarly community restate the technocrats' assessment of their own success in spurring economic development and social peace. Take for

¹¹ See for instance - "I use spiked chain, says senator in Opus Dei," *The Telegraph* (March 9, 2007); "Catholic Group Says of 'Da Vinci Code' Film: It's Just Fiction," *New York Times* (February 7, 2006).

¹² Antonio Cañellas Mas research on Alfredo Sánchez Bella and Laureano López Rodó are the more salient examples, see - Cañellas Mas, *La tecnocracia hispánica*; Cañellas Mas, *Alfredo Sánchez Bella: un embajador entre las Américas y Europa*; Cañellas Mas, *Laureano López Rodó: biografía política de un ministro de Franco*.

¹³ "Inaugurado un busto en la UN en recuerdo de Álvaro d'Ors, una gran persona crucial para el centro universitario," *Europapress* (April 25, 2013); "Presentan libro en homenaje a Álvaro d'Ors," *Udep hoy* (April 27, 2012), <http://udep.edu.pe/hoy/2012/presentan-libro-en-homenaje-a-alvaro-dors>; Ana Barrero, "Homenaje a Ismael Sánchez Bella, Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1992," *Anuario de historia del derecho español* (1993): 1303-11.

example the work of sociologist José Casanova on the Opus Dei from 1982. True, Casanova explored fully the Opus Dei's paradoxical Catholic scientific project and return to scholastic reasoning. However, by referring to Max Weber's thesis on the connection between the protestant ethics and the nature of capitalism, Casanova's work quite plainly suggested interpreting the Opus Dei's "inner-worldly asceticism" as a Catholic version of protestant ethics and therefore a catalyst for "economic modernization."¹⁴ Subsequently, Casanova argued that the Opus Dei technocrats had been "adequate carriers of the Spanish modernization process,"¹⁵ as they "rationalized the Francoist administration" and, in so doing, "served indirectly to prepare the state administration for the role it was called to play in a democratic system."¹⁶ Scholars have since then contested Casanova's standpoints, stating that the Opus Dei was "conspicuously absent from the ranks of democratizing reformers."¹⁷ This present study takes this critique one step forward. I argue that when Casanova praised López Rodó's so-called "ethics" he brazenly reiterated the technocrat's own self-branding as a spiritually-driven immaculate "directing elite." Likewise, my study has shown that for the Opus Dei, as the powerhouse of Franco's unique technocratic-authoritarian state-ideology, a return to parliamentary democracy went against the very essence of its post-ideological project and was therefore nonsensical.

¹⁴ José V. Casanova, "The Opus Dei Ethics and the Modernization of Spain" (Dissertation) The New School for Social Research, 1982.

¹⁵ José V. Casanova, "The Opus Dei ethic, the technocrats and the modernization of Spain," *Social Science Information* (1983): 27.

¹⁶ José V. Casanova, "Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain's Transition to Democracy", *Social Research*, vol. 50, no. 4, (1983): 963; elsewhere Casanova claimed that the technocrats had "promised that democracy would come automatically when Spain reached the 1000\$ per capita level, and thereafter "found themselves helpless to bring about democratization," see - José V. Casanova, "The Opus Dei Ethic, the Technocrats and the Modernization of Spain," *Information*, vol. 22, no. 1 (January 1, 1983): 41.

¹⁷ Frances Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: the Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 227-30; according to sociologist Joan Estruch the foregoing "Weberian thesis" was the Opus Dei's own self-made "stereotype"; see - Estruch, *Saints and Schemers*, 221.

A word is still in order about the actual consequences of technocratic-authoritarianism. Let us begin with stating the obvious: the three regimes at hand produce an impressive, if temporal, GDP hike in their economies, a fact they promptly used for their own self-legitimation. However, with hindsight, it is evident that the one crucial factor that enabled this impressive economic growth was the American and Western European agreement to direct investments to these dictatorships while turning a blind eye on their authoritarian practices. The so-called “economic miracles” in Spain, Argentina, and Chile - as well as in other Latin American dictatorships - were therefore not the outcome of some enigmatic “administrative rationalization” but of routine deregulation, a measure that had been put in place in other countries in the Western hemisphere without necessitating dictatorial rule.

Cruelty, brutality, and terror, where other prerequisites for these regimes seeming “economic miracles.” Having stripped the working class from its rights to either vote or strike, the technocratic dictatorship became attractive to foreign investment, allowing its leaders to cynically “thank” the workers for their willing sacrifice. Yet the notion of popular authoritarianism and participation through “intermediary societies” was a myth; a meager residue of the 1930s corporatist jargon, this notion was true only insofar as these dictatorships mobilized certain elite groups to consolidate power and gain absolute control over the public sphere. For the rest of the population, resistance was the only path forward and was met with varying degrees of violence, even during periods of democratic transitions. Being the least murderous of the three, the Argentine Revolution’s “soft dictatorship” was ultimately not only unpopular but, as historian Luis Alberto Romero has argued, opened “a Pandora box” of protest and violence, as the last symbols of solidarity between Argentina’s social groups were disjointed.¹⁸ Of course, one cannot attribute the rise of Argentina’s

¹⁸ Luis Alberto Romero, “A 40 años del golpe contra Illia: el espejismo de Onganía,” *La Nación* (June 25, 2006).

urban guerrilla to Onganía alone. It is, however, important to note that Francoism inspired Onganía and Pinochet differently. While Onganía believed he could institute a peaceful post-ideological regime mirroring technocratic Spain, Pinochet was more loyal to the entire legacies of Francoism - starting with its civil war and concluding with a neoliberal dictatorship of civic “participation.” Not by coincidence, Pinochet’s regime was more long lasting.

The social consequences of technocratic-authoritarianism in Spain, Argentina, and Chile is a topic that encompasses an array of studies. Ultimately, there is a consensus among historians that authoritarian neoliberal development came at an extremely high cost, benefitting mainly the elites who directed it. While the western Europeans enjoyed the emergence of a democratic welfare state (also known as the European Social Model) the Spaniards and their Latin American counterparts were coerced to live under governments that invested proportionally far little in their citizens’ welfare, thereby causing a soaring gap between the wealthy elites and the rest of the population.¹⁹ As historian Peter Winn pondered in the case of Chile, “have Chile’s workers paid the costs for their country’s economic success?”; are they “victims of Chile’s neoliberal ‘miracle’”? His answer was, overall, affirmative.²⁰ Beyond pointing to the detriment of neoliberalism, historians have also specified other unintended consequences of authoritarian development, such as mass immigration and human capital flight (“brain drain”). Additionally, Catalan sociologist Vicenç Navarro has held that low public expenditure, social polarization, high public debt, and chronic corruption

¹⁹ A partial list of this type of critique, especially in regards to Chile, would include: Vicente Navarro (ed.), *Neoliberalism, Globalization, and Inequalities: Consequences for Health and Quality of Life* (Amityville, N.Y: Baywood Pub, 2007); Cal Clark, *Challenging Neoliberalism: Globalization and the Economic Miracles in Chile and Taiwan* (Northampton, Ma.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016); Marcus Taylor, *From Pinochet to the 'Third Way': Neoliberalism and Social Transformation in Chile* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006); Larissa Adler de Lomnitz, *Chile's Middle Class: A Struggle for Survival in the Face of Neoliberalism* (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1991);, Patricio Silva, *In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in Chile* (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008).

²⁰ This exceptional edited volume is dedicated entirely to the harms of the Pinochet’s economic and social policies, see - Peter Winn (ed.), *Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 5.

caused by a faulty separation of powers, meant that Spain was still an underdeveloped society in the 1980s.²¹ Or as the Spanish historian Antonio Cazorla Sánchez summarized it: “Francoism’s damage to society has no equivalent in any post-war West European society. It could be said without exaggeration that only the most callous of dictators could have maintained for so long such absurd economic and social policies.”²²

Within this field of critique, the contribution this study makes is to address the technocrats’ peculiar understanding of democratic societies, and intimate transatlantic collaborations in an effort to undermine the democratization of the Hispanic world. Take the correspondence between Amadeo and Sánchez Bella: upon nearly two-hundred letters these kindred spirits pronounce their contempt for parliamentarism, which they perceived as a gateway for an imminent communistic infiltration. But beyond this, a sincere belief in the ethical superiority and functionality of the “organic democracy” arises in these exchanges of opinion; the notion that once liberated from ideological distractions, the population becomes both prosperous and “unified,” and can thus contribute its technical skills better through means of councils and intermediary societies. Was there any truth in these claims? This is a question that is quite difficult to answer, as it touches on the causality between social solidarity and economic performance. Some theorists, for instance, Brazilian philosopher Roberto Mangabeira Unger, have vehemently contested the notion that the political empowerment of the population hinders economic and technologic modernization. Historically, “technical innovation” and “individual emancipation” had always enhanced one another other, he has argued, since innovation relies heavily on participation, collaboration, and

²¹ Vicenç Navarro, *El subdesarrollo social de España: causas y consecuencias* (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 2006).

²² Cazorla Sánchez, *Fear and Progress*, 94.

circulation of knowledge between different parts of society.²³ Seen from this perspective, by letting an elitist minority control the state, thereby untangling the basic solidarity networks within society, technocratic-authoritarianism may have well damaged the very economic modernization that was its alleged reason for being.

There is also no evidence to sustain the argument that technocratic-authoritarianism had been a stepping stone for democratization and robust civil society. If anything, my findings indicate that this very narrative surfaced within the context of the technocrats' electoral campaigns during democratic transitions. The return to democracy in 1973 Argentina was anything but orderly. Moreover, it so happens that the technocrats bequeathed the newborn democracies with particularly troubled constitutional frameworks, tailored with an authoritarian imaginary in mind. In particular, Chile's 1980 constitution is nowadays considered a politically polarizing symbol, suggesting that rather than modernizing the state apparatus towards democratization, Pinochet's dictatorship had damaged Chile's democratic system for years to come.²⁴ This situation is not dissimilar from that of Spain. Surely, there are those who have stressed that Spain's elite-orchestrated democratic transition had initially produced a steadier democracy than, say, Brazil.²⁵ However, as the Catalanian independence movement and general political and economic crisis in Spain have recently shown us, there are still vast portions of the Spanish society that express discomfort with the monarchy Franco had perpetuated in the country.

²³ Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative* (New York: Verso, 1998); more on "organizing solidarity" and "making democracy profound" in Spain, see - Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *España y su futuro ¿Un país en transformación?* (Madrid: Sequitur, 2009).

²⁴ See for example - Javier Couso, "Trying Democracy in the Shadow of an Authoritarian Legality: Chile's Transition to Democracy and Pinochet's Constitution of 1980," *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, no. 29 (2012-2011): 393-415; Claudia Heiss and Patricio Navia, "You Win Some, You Lose Some: Constitutional Reforms in Chile's Transition to Democracy," *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol. 49, no. 3 (2007): 163-90.

²⁵ Political scientist Omar Encarnación, while being one of the fiercest critics of the Spanish transition, has also argued provocatively that the Spanish transition was particularly effective given the fact that it took place in a society with a weak civil society, see - Omar G. Encarnación, *The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Brazil* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 46-73.

A distorted memory of the technocratic era in Spain, Chile, and even Argentina, is therefore fairly common as it is politically consequential. This is particularly true in Spain - a country where the democratic transition had not even established a truth commission for the criminalities of the dictatorship, in what has become known as the “pact of oblivion.”²⁶ But even in the case of Argentina, one of the only Latin American democracies to have applied retrospective justice towards the crimes of its last dictatorship, the collective decision to overlook the crimes of the Peronist Right and the Argentine Revolution meant that these periods are especially sensitive to historical revision and memory falsification. In an effort to explain the gap between historical knowledge and collective memory, critics of the Spanish transition have argued that the deep Francoist state, which the transition had allegedly failed to dismantle, controlled the consciousness of the Spanish middle classes.²⁷ Further historical analysis is due to understand this phenomenon. What is beyond doubt is that during the 1980s, Spain, Chile, and Argentina witnessed a public sphere dominated to a large extent by the same right-wing apparatuses that had buttressed authoritarianism for decades, a fact that has made the benign treatment of these dictatorships in the public arena all the more likely.²⁸

“Oblivion” in and of itself is a slightly unsuitable way to describe the memory politics ever since the 1980s, either in Spain or in Chile and Argentina. Rather, the rise of far-right revisionism

²⁶ A process that had been debated intensively in recent years, see for instance - Joan Ramon Resina, *Disremembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to Democracy* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000); Paloma Aguilar Fernández, *Memoria y Olvido de La Guerra Civil Española* (Madrid: Alianza, 1996); Madeleine Davis, “Is Spain Recovering Its Memory? Breaking the Pacto Del Olvido,” *Human Rights Quarterly* vol. 27, no. 3 (August 1, 2005): 858–80.

²⁷ Juan Luis Cebrián, “The pre-constitutional experiment,” in José Luis Cagigao, John Crispin, and Enrique Pupo-Walker, *Spain, 1975-1980: The Conflicts and Achievements of Democracy* (Madrid: J. Porrúa Turanzas, 1982), 15.

²⁸ All three countries have allowed the activity of memory agents preserving their authoritarian legacies. While Spain saw the establishment of the Francisco Franco Foundation in Madrid, Chile saw the establishment of Jaime Guzmán and President Pinochet Foundations, and Argentina saw the creation of the Instituto Bibliográfico Antonio Zinny, as well as the reappearance of the Ateneo de la República; needless to say, the Opus Dei’s journals, and platforms such as the Chilean *Que Pasa* and *El Mercurio*, have all maintained their predominance in the public sphere until this very day.

in these countries has been challenging mainstream historiography by circulating the dictatorships' official narratives as legitimate alternative histories. Here too Spain seems to be setting a negative precedent. This began in the 1980s with the politicking of Fernando Vizcaíno Casas - the unofficial spokesman of the so-called "Sociological Francoism" (*franquismo sociológico*) - whose narratives betrayed an unabashed nostalgia for Franco's society. "Under Franco we lived better," was even his memorable maxim.²⁹ Later, it was the journalist Luiz Pío Moa's who made the rebranding of the dictatorship's narratives in their entirety his mission. For Moa, Francoism was perhaps "authoritarian" but a much lesser evil compared to the "totalitarian" alternative Spain had faced in 1936.³⁰ Similarly, Moa has stated that given that Franco liquidated totalitarianism from the Spanish society, and granted it "peace and prosperity,"³¹ the Spanish democracy "grew from within Francoism and not from anti-Francoism or from the Republic."³² Spanish historiography has fiercely contested Moa's opinions.³³ Arguably he does not even represent the Spanish moderate Right. Still, it is important to note that his positions are not unthinkable, and at a minimum are undeniably legitimate, in Spain's public sphere.

²⁹ Fernando Vizcaíno Casas, *Viva Franco! (con perdón)* (Madrid: Editorial Planeta, 1980); The public debate over the trope "Con Franco vivíamos mejor," and novelist Manuel Vázquez Montalbán's struggle against it ("contra Franco vivíamos mejor"), has appeared in the work of several scholars, see - Juan Egea, "El desencanto: La mirada del padre y las lecturas de la transición," *Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures*, vol. 58. no. 2 (2004); Teresa M. Vilarós, *El mono del desencanto: una crítica cultural de la transición española, 1973-1993* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1998); Jaume Guillamet, *Las sombras de la transición: El relato crítico de los corresponsales extranjeros (1975-1978)* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2017); Angel Díaz Arenas, *Quién es quién en la obra narrativa de Manuel Vázquez Montalbán* (Kassel: Edition Reichenberger, 1997).

³⁰ For Moa there is no doubt that the Popular Front had been influenced and manipulated by Stalin, see - Pío Moa, *Los crímenes de la guerra civil y otras polémicas* (Madrid: La esfera de los libros, 2004), 24; "I do not condemn Francoism because it saved Spain from revolution, from WWII, and from the new Civil War planned by the Maquis guerrilla," he stated elsewhere, see - Pío Moa, *Falacias de la izquierda, silencios de la derecha* (Madrid: Libros Libres, 2008), 210-11.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 212.

³² Pío Moa, *Contra la mentira* (Madrid: Libros libres, 2003), 226.

³³ Alberto Reig Tapia, *Anti-Moa: la subversión neofranquista de la historia de España* (Barcelona: Ediciones B, 2006).

The Argentine and Chilean right-wing polity is not devoid of authoritarian and technocratic remainders either. Its spokesmen's eagerness to debate the dictatorships' "pros and cons" reveals time and again a tendency to tacitly accept the technocratic-authoritarian narratives of modernization.³⁴ In effect, against the backdrop of the rise of Latin America's left-wing "pink tide," it is not uncommon to witness right-wing politicians contrasting the Left's "utopian" ideological projects with their own alleged "pragmatism" and "political realism."³⁵ Thus, the question regarding the Right's relationship with its authoritarian legacies is a vexed one. Assuredly, actual expressions of nostalgia for authoritarianism are an entirely marginal phenomenon.³⁶ Yet nostalgia does not necessarily signify hoping to return to life under a dictatorship but rather a fantasy of a simpler world of economic miracles and no ideological complexity. Therefore, we should think of nostalgia foremost as conservatives evoking the dictatorship's teleological narratives. Kept alive throughout the "consensus" transitions of the 1980s, they reappear encapsulated in the demand to be allowed to take pride in the dictatorship as the authentic embryo of civility, modernity, and democracy.

Analytical historiography, for its part, is torn between the commitment for a dialogue with all political orientations and the need not to allow far-right authoritarian "residues"³⁷ become

³⁴ This trend was particularly conspicuous in 2013 with the commemoration of forty years since Pinochet's rise to power, see for instance – Gideon Long, "Chile: los que todavía defienden a Pinochet," *BBC Mundo* (September 9, 2013).

³⁵ Sebastian Piñera's latest presidential campaign highlighted this dichotomy frequently, see for example – "Realismo político o volador de luces? UDI se divide ante la opción de que Longueira forme su propio partido," *Cambio 21*, (September 21, 2017); "Piñera, en Chile y América Latina: se consolida una profunda división ideológica en la región," *El País* (December 24, 2017); For more on the right-wing tactics in confronting the "pink tide," see – Barry Cannon, *The Right in Latin America: Elite Power, Hegemony, and the Struggle for the State* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016).

³⁶ The Chilean public sphere has seen several debates over the alleged nostalgia for Pinochet Chile, for instance in Patricio Guzmán's documentary, *Nostalgia for the Light*, at <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1556190/>; see also – Verónica Foxley, "Augusto Pinochet Molina: 'Mucha gente siente nostalgia por el gobierno Militar,'" *Cosas* (August 27, 2015); "Why Pinochet is the dictator who never dies," *New Statesman* (November 21, 2013).

³⁷ "Residual Francoism" is the way historian Sebastian Balfour has labeled these historians in the past, see – "The concept of historical revisionism: Spain since the 1930s," *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, vol. 21 no. 3, (2008), 179.

official national histories, all the while avoiding being labelled as “leftist” in the public arena. British historian Eric Hobsbawm famously said that “nations without a past are contradictions in terms,” and that we historians, like drug traffickers, “supply the essential raw material for the market.”³⁸ Building on these insights, I contend that nowadays historians have a much arduous responsibility than this. In the bipartisan enmity that is Latin American politics, it is up to us to demarcate the ethical boundaries for a scholarly and communal debate over authoritarianism and democracy, compromising neither the historical truth nor the capacity to communicate with conservative audiences. Thus, it is up to us to aid reconstructing national histories towards the restitution of national and international bonds of solidarity.

³⁸ “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today,” in Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson (eds.), *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 2000, 255).

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Appendix: Sources and Methods

For the most part, this study falls within the category of intellectual history. Nevertheless, throughout my research, I have sought to broaden the borderlines of this somewhat rigid subfield of historical analysis by drawing on a range of archival and literal sources, many of which are crucial to the research of transnational ideological networks. Therefore, a brief explanation is due on the types of original, and slightly less original, sources used for this study.

My analysis builds primarily on published ideological texts, most of which were originally devised to impact the public sphere. Roughly one hundred newspapers and more than two-hundred published monographs serve as the main underpinnings for my textual analysis. Moreover, the innovations in the field of digitization and search engines in recent years - for instance the case of the Spanish newspapers and journals *ABC*, *La Vanguardia*, and *El País*, *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, *Arbor*, and *Nuestro Tiempo* - have allowed me to gather corpuses of texts in great speed, but even more importantly, to reach statistical approximations regarding the popularity of certain trends in the public arena. What is more, this study puts special emphasis on inner-publications and pamphlets from the ICH congresses, which can be found in abundance at the AECID library in Madrid, as well as the UNAV library in Pamplona, and the Argentine National Library - at the Centro de Estudios Nacionales, in collections such as the “*Que*” newspaper boxes. In addition, this analysis illustrates the resistance to the technocratic ideology and the Opus Dei, by far-right groups as well as from the side of the Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean left-wing polity. A fairly good source for primary texts on Opus Dei from the left-wing spectrum of the public sphere can be located at the Emilio Corbière Opus Dei collection, archived at the CEDINCI institute in Buenos Aires. Additionally, the study highlights educational theory

and pedagogical representations. Argentina's Ministry of Education Archives and central library in Buenos Aires are, for example, a useful location to gather both digitized materials and rare pedagogical texts from the 1960s.

Another highly significant type of representations my work builds on are public speeches. Texts written for public discourses differ substantially, I believe, from those directed either to intellectual journals or to popular dailies, not only stylistically but, in many cases, in their actual content depending on the audience they address and spectacle they aim to stimulate. Interestingly, some of the most ideologically compressed texts in the 1960s and 1970s appear in the shape of speeches, some of which were later published as pamphlets and booklets. This is particularly true in the case of military leaders such as Franco, Carrero Blanco, Onganía, Lanusse, Pinochet, and Videla - all of whom rarely appeared in the press as published ideologues in their own right (Juan Perón was, in this sense, an exception to the rule). Collecting speeches, in the case of Argentina, has been made fairly easy in recent years with the opening of the personal archives at the abovementioned Centro de Estudios Nacionales, for instance at the Arturo Frondizi collection, and even more so, at the recently-opened collections of the Presidencia de la Nación (Secretaría de Presna y Difusión) located at Argentina's General Archive of the Nation (AGN). Save for the years 1974-1976, in the latter case, the Argentine Office of the Presidency has meticulously archived most every press release and speech made by Argentina's presidents and prominent ministers from 1956 until the early 1980s. This collection therefore provides historians of Argentina a unique tool to systematically survey the ideological and political trajectory of most any of the country's Cold War administrations.

But most importantly, in this dissertation, I have made a specific effort to bring to light and integrate correspondences between intellectuals, publicists, politicians, and military dictators, on

a national and transnational scale. If to paraphrase Erving Goffman's classic formulations on the human presentation in everyday life,¹ then whereas publications and speeches serve as the "frontstage" of intellectual production, correspondences are the key to understanding the ideological "backstage"; an arena wherein genuine motivations, intrigues, and self-doubt are expressed candidly in the shape of dialogue, far from the public eye. The newly opened archives at the University of Navarra, in Pamplona, Spain, have been crucial for this methodological approach. At the personal archives of Alfredo Sánchez Bella, Laureano López Rodó, Florentino Pérez Embid, Rafael Calvo Serer, and many other Francoist ideologues, I discovered countless personal correspondences. Going back and forth from the Spanish technocrats to their Latin American counterparts, it is the first time many of these letters appear in a historical analysis. Likewise, in the Hoover Institution Archive at Stanford University, the Juan Perón, Hernán Cubillos, and Sergio Fernández Fernández personal collections further enable historians of Argentina and Chile to study the ideological production of these figures fully. In addition, the Hoover Institution includes valuable collections for any historian researching Chile's neo-liberal turn, as it contains a special archive dedicated to the "Chicago boys" comprising of correspondences, speeches, and rare publications. Last, the Francisco Franco Foundation in Madrid (or alternatively, the Historical Memory Archive in Salamanca) contain Franco's invaluable personal archives - a source of many of the private correspondences not only of Franco but of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco and Alfredo Sánchez Bella.

As for official correspondences, bilateral protocols, and official governmental reports, for instance between Franco's Spain and the dictatorships of Onganía and Pinochet, these types of documents were also important to my analysis. While illuminating fairly little the inner worlds of

¹ Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Doubleday, 1959).

certain far-right intellectuals, they still are fairly useful informants on how each dictatorship grasped the other regimes' key assets and problems. As importantly, more often than not these sources disclose how regimes sought to shape the public opinion within their authoritarian counterparts. One particularly useful source for this type of knowledge were the Spanish Embassy collections at Argentina's Foreign Ministry Archive, and even more so the Spanish Embassy boxes at the Chilean Foreign Ministry Archives. In the case of the latter - and while the archives containing documents from the Chilean embassy in Argentina are indefinitely closed to the public - the boxes from Chile's embassy in Madrid are fully open for consultation, and have already yielded several noteworthy historical analyses. What is more, after several years of being frustratingly closed, the Spanish Foreign Ministry Archives are nowadays gradually opening at their new location in Spain's Central Archive of the Administration, at Alcalá de Henares (AGA). While containing scarce little documentation from Franco's Latin American embassies, this archive still holds much correspondence and documentation regarding the establishment and operation of the ICH. With the ICH's own archives still closed, this is the place where more discoveries regarding the transnational operation of Franco's ideological apparatus in the 1950s could be made. Interestingly, the fullest collection at the AGA is the Spanish Tourism and Information archive. Most likely the initiative of Manuel Fraga during his tenure as Minister of Tourism and Information, i.e. the outcome of political spying, the collection contains valuable information not only on the Opus Dei but also on the Argentine and Chilean intellectuals.

Last, this dissertation relies on interviews with several figures from this era, as well on the oral history collected throughout the years by other scholars such as Robert A. Potash and Maria Olivia Mönckeberg. The case of the former is particularly noteworthy, as his entire oral history project of the 1980s has become recently available at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

This appendix does not suffice to fully debate the methodological problems of oral sources. However, I do wish point out that being a historian of the Argentine military whose work is considered an obligatory read for those researching the 1960s, Prof. Potash has left much of his findings on the cutting room floor, so to speak. This is particularly true in the case of his oral history with intellectuals such as Mariano Grondona, Mario Díaz Colodrero, Carlos María Gelly y Obes, and Nicanor Costa Méndez, whose remarks on issues of ideology had served Potash's analysis little but are crucial for several of the argument laid down in my study. On the whole, however, the interviews I have conducted with Opus Dei and ICH figure have been effective to the extent that they illuminate the official narratives these men have developed ever since the 1960s. With the exception of Dr. Alberto Moncada, who has left the Opus Dei in the 1970s and has been a critic of the organization ever since, rarely did these speakers betray any secretive information regarding their operations in the 1970s, or any remorse for that matter. And yet, as the case of Ernesto García Alesanco also shows, even these official histories are at times utterly revealing, especially when discussing the spiritual "sanctity" these figures have aimed to reach ever since encountering Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer in the 1950s.