A Bitter Reflection for Accommodating Optimists – Folha de S. Paulo, November 20, 1968

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

During my visit to Rome in 1962, I sensed a mood of open optimism among influential and high-ranking circles about events beyond the Iron Curtain. The main reasons for this optimism were the start of the “softening” of the communist regime taking hold in Russia and Wladislaw Gomulka’s actions in Poland, which were seen as original, astute, and patriotic.

In my previous article, I discussed the key features of Russia’s communist “softening” (political disintegration of the bloc of nations under Russian control, decentralization of large administrative structures within Russia, “restoration” of capitalism and property, etc.), which was widely promoted by Soviet propaganda. I also outlined the significant—if not monstrous—benefits that communists have gained from this on the international stage.

This week’s telegraphic news prompts me to comment on Władysław Gomulka. To understand this communist leader’s actions, one must consider the assimilation problem that Poland, his homeland, posed to the Soviets after the war.

As is well known, Poland is profoundly religious and fiercely protective of its independence. These traits made the outbreak of constant religious and nationalist guerrilla warfare likely if the Soviet occupation continued. While this would not have caused the Russians to withdraw their troops, such guerrilla warfare would have seriously traumatized Europe and the world, sharpening global discontent against the Kremlin just as Stalin’s successors were starting their large propaganda campaign for their “softening” plan. How could they prove to the world that this “softening” was genuine while still oppressing a bloodied but resilient Poland? The Kremlin was therefore forced to choose a third way, which meant neither losing Poland nor crushing it.

As if by magic, a “patriot” emerged from the ranks of the Polish Communist Party and was elected head of state, running on this somewhat explicit argument:

1. I am Polish and seek my country’s independence. Therefore, I invite Poles of all backgrounds to support me;

2. Of course, I am a communist and support a communist system for my country.

3. If the Catholic majority supports me, I promise to secure freedom of worship and independence from the Kremlin, as much as the Soviets allow.

4. If the Catholic majority elects an anticommunist president, the Russians, who would barely tolerate the little freedom and autonomy that I advocate, will inevitably invade the country, unleash religious persecution, and crush Poland under an iron dictatorship.

What should they do? Elect Gomulka? To what extent can they rely on his consistency, strength, selflessness, and sincere enthusiasm to keep his promises once he takes office?

Being optimistic feels really good. It helps prevent insomnia and headaches, at least until that distant moment when someone realizes they are at the bottom of the abyss. Optimism has won…

Gomulka was elected, and a wave of praise spread across Europe in his favor. In Rome, I heard enthusiastic applause from this chorus. How proud Poland was to have produced a man so undeniably genuine in his patriotic passion, such as Gomulka!

Reassured by Gomulka, Poland did not rebel. The communist regime established itself peacefully. However, its initially friendly relations with the Church worsened day by day. Gomulka gradually moved closer to the Kremlin and ended up, under Soviet control, as compliant as his counterparts in Hungary and East Germany. He recently aligned with the Russians to crush Czechoslovakia. He also gave an enthusiastic pro-Soviet speech shortly after being re-elected secretary of the Polish Communist Party (a position higher than that of head of state). Overall, Gomulka’s actions perfectly served the Kremlin’s interests without engaging in unheroic guerrilla warfare, aligning Poland with Moscow’s wishes.

Gomulka’s actions have disastrous effects on the global political scene. NATO has just warned the Soviet Union that serious international consequences could occur if it attacks Austria, Yugoslavia, or another European nation supported by its satellites. In other words, NATO fears that, emboldened by the crushing of Czechoslovakia, Russia, Poland, and other Warsaw Pact countries are forming a plan that could lead to world war. Essentially, at the helm of Poland, Gomulka is acting as a factor of war, not peace.

Therefore, in this case, as in many others, superficial optimism and a desire for misleading compromises have caused war instead of peace.

*   *   *

These considerations are important and go beyond Central Europe. As I write this, the news suggests that South Vietnam is gradually and inevitably being pushed toward accepting negotiations, where, it seems reasonable to believe, the Vietcong’s strategy will succeed.

Meanwhile, North Korean communists are starting a guerrilla war to take over South Korea.

If this emerging guerrilla war in Korea takes hold, it is to be feared that the Korean peninsula will become another tragic and scorched Vietnam. This happens at a time when heroic Vietnam seems to be forced to make significant sacrifices to communists for the sake of “peace” in that region of Asia. One must also fear that the communists will soon use the military resources freed up by Vietnam’s capitulation on another front.

So, why surrender? Are there still people who don’t realize that surrendering doesn’t bring peace but prolongs war?