As Long as She Marries Joseph – Folha de S. Paulo, January 27, 1979

 

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

 

From what I hear around me from time to time and read in the newspapers, the habit of conceptualizing democracy in two different ways is becoming widespread. Not in terms of its substance, of course. The vast majority of Brazilians agree that democracy consists of the people’s sovereignty exercised at all levels of the State through representative government. It also entails affirming and protecting all individual freedoms so long as they do not offend “public order and morality” (the classic formula). In short, it is the democracy of the insurgents of American Independence, of the French revolutionaries of 1789, or of our constituents of 1891. All of it is conceived from the perspective of state secularism and updated with broader or narrower social laws according to each person’s taste.

I note in passing that, especially with regard to state secularism and, therefore, to the secular way of conceiving popular sovereignty, as well as to the often exaggerated scope with which social reforms are conceived under this view of democracy, this concept is at odds with what would be a Christian-inspired democracy according to the traditional teaching of the popes (cf. Pius XII, Christmas Radio Message of 1944, Discorsi e Radiomessaggi vol. VI, 238-240). Incidentally, I do not confuse Christian-inspired democracy with “Christian democracy.”

However, I am not delving into the Church’s traditional teachings on democracy, which are of interest to those studying the subject’s doctrinal aspects. I also refrain from considering democracy itself in theoretical terms and will limit myself to examining the inevitably exaggerated journalistic dimensions of public opinion’s attitudes toward democracy as it is currently conceived.

This latter subject contains more than one bone of contention, and I’ve picked one to address today. It concerns the attitude with which, according to democratic principles, democrats defend democracy against its opponents. I give it preference because of its particular relevance at this stage of the country’s liberalization process.

* * *

1. As I said, I sometimes hear and read that in a true democracy, with its inseparable popular sovereignty and individual freedoms, notably freedom of opinion, every individual must be guaranteed the right to diverge from certain courses of action. However, divergence would not be lawful with regard to a threefold agenda of basic human freedoms considered fundamental: freedom of conscience, thought, and religion. I copy these words almost verbatim from an author whose talent and competence deserve praise, but whom I do not mention because in our country doctrinal disagreements easily degenerate into insipid personal retaliations, which have never attracted me in my long life as a Catholic polemicist.

It seems to me that this understanding of democracy leads to a clear conclusion: the people are not sovereign. By definition, sovereign power is supreme. If someone claims the authority to tell the so-called sovereign people that there is a “fundamental agenda” they may not alter, then sovereignty no longer resides with the people at all. It passes instead to whoever sets those untouchable limits.

This intangible “agenda” undermines the very concept of popular sovereignty. In other words, it undermines the core of secular democracy—and, in its own way, of Christian-inspired democracy.

2. Incidentally, I do not understand how the triple freedom of conscience, thought, and religion can be held up as an intangible taboo, making it impossible to discuss or reject without, from another point of view, falling into an insoluble contradiction. The thesis that this triple freedom is democracy’s “fundamental guideline” is an opinion. If every opinion is open to discussion and rejection, then the triple freedom guideline must also be open to discussion and rejection. Instead of talking about a guideline, why not speak frankly of dogma, since the latter is an intangible teaching according to which the thoughts of men must be guided? So, we conclude that the triple guideline’s intangibility not only denies popular sovereignty, as we saw in the previous item, but also freedom of opinion, thereby emptying democracy itself.

3. I understand that one can argue, in favor of this democratic incongruity, that democracy must be defended against its adversaries. But this defense must consist of free, courteous, and clear discussion and effective persuasion, so that the sovereign people remain unwaveringly faithful to democratic principles. Otherwise, the defense will take the form of repressing dissenters, and in that case, the defense of democracy becomes undemocratic, and democrats extinguish democracy in the very act of preserving it. For if a law forbids the people from being anything other than favorable to the triple “agenda,” then democracy is no longer upheld by the sovereign discernment and sovereign will of the sovereign people, but by the will and force of a few.

Let us suppose that a law imposed by yesterday’s legislature prohibits today’s people from changing their minds. Or that a law imposed by today’s legislature prohibits them from changing their minds tomorrow. In either case, the law is enforced by penalties. Either of these “democratic” laws would punish the free exercise of popular sovereignty.

4. Now, then, what is political “openness” in a “guided” democracy? It is merely a change of “guidelines,” not a suppression of all guidelines. Until recently, it was a crime to fight against the principle and institution of private property. Now, this would no longer be a crime. It would become a crime to attack the triple guideline.

Under the strict logic of secular democratism, this does not free popular sovereignty from its ties or make it effective; it merely shifts their location. Yesterday, it tied the “left arm” to the penalties of the law; today, it would tie the “right arm.”

Frankly, this is not democratization.

Telling people they are free to go wherever they want, as long as it is within the triple agenda, is reminiscent of a joke. It was the case of a father who, boasting of being liberal, said: “My daughter can marry whoever she wants, as long as she marries Joseph.”

5. In a democracy, the people are king. But what is the remedy when a king is fickle? Is it to erect a super-king above him? And who, then, will restrain this super-king—yet another, even more “super,” sovereign? If the proposed remedy is a law that limits popular sovereignty, then I repeat: in certain cases, democracy must be left defenseless, on pain of suicide.

But there is a way to defend democracy without committing suicide. Frankly, I see no other way. It is to baptize it. I say “baptize” because it is important to remember that everything I have just said refers specifically to secular democracy.

A genuinely Christian-inspired democracy recognizes the people’s right to legislate freely, provided that it does not transgress the teachings and precepts of the infinitely wise and good God, the true Sovereign, King, and Father of all men. Under these precepts, nothing leads to ruin.

Under strict Catholic doctrine, the authority of God alone can circumscribe the sovereignty of temporal power, whatever its form, whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic. Otherwise, the people remain subject to the sovereign’s volatility, whether the sovereign is a king, an aristocrat, or a commoner.

To abstract God and confine sovereignty to “guidelines” devised by mere men—however intelligent, cultured, or experienced they may be—is ultimately to transfer sovereignty to them, even when those guidelines formally coincide with God’s law.

And who is not fickle except God, the greatest and most perfect? These men?

* * *

Naturally, a question remains. Under the current circumstances, it is quite certain that state secularism will not be abolished, at least in the medium term, if we are optimistic. What then should be done until then? Should we tell the country, with Olympian calm, to fend for itself and give up on everything? Of course not.

First of all, let us not paint too bleak a picture. As long as the current situation lasts, it is not true that public opinion (or even published opinion, which can be quite different) is so fickle on this matter. In other words, persuasive anticommunist education retains a strong margin of effectiveness.

Throughout my public life, I have devoted myself to a persuasive, nonviolent anticommunist action. Its effectiveness is evident in the continuous fury it arouses among the vast cohort of communists, socialists, fellow travelers, useful innocents, etc. This fury is also expressed in a tireless, widespread buzz of slander and in media campaigns of pharaonic proportions. No one has such rage against what is irrelevant, nor does one mobilize such means of action against something innocuous.

Therefore, I would contradict myself and declare my public action useless if I thought everything were irretrievably lost, even though anticommunists retain their legal right to argue. So let us use this faculty widely, boldly, and without prejudice to the respect and cordiality that high-level doctrinal discussion requires. That way, a viable path will remain open to the patriotism of those, like me, who are unwaveringly concerned about the communist danger.

There is more. They say that God is Brazilian. At the very moment I write, the Puebla conference shines like a rising light in the eyes of many good Brazilians. If it confirms the hopes it awakens here and there, it may diminish the dangerous communist infiltration on one of the fronts where it has been most effective: the Catholic environment. It will also help contain the distorted presentation of religion currently used to justify atheism and collectivism. How can we fail to see that the Catholic-inspired anticommunist controversy, within the bounds of legality and peace, will then gain new and precious advantages?

But at this point, another topic arises that I may devote another article to. But after Puebla.

You will then see why.