Berlinger, Amendola, and Co. – Folha de S. Paulo, November 21, 1971
by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira
Today, I find it interesting to discuss two news items about the Italian Communist Party that the São Paulo press reported without the emphasis they, in my opinion, deserve.
As is well known, due to its large voter base, the Italian CP is the most influential communist party in Western Europe. It thus maintains a discreet but undeniable leadership over its counterparts.
The internal structure of a communist party is fundamentally different from that of liberal-democratic parties. While the liberal tendency of the latter leads to an underestimation of party discipline and results in less effective governing bodies, the totalitarian nature of communist doctrine enforces strict discipline and concentrates power excessively within governing bodies.
For all these reasons, a meeting of the ICP’s Central Committee is a very serious matter and usually has a significant impact on the progress of communism in Italy, and sometimes, in specific cases, on the actions of the communist parties in free Europe.
It was at one such meeting that “comrade” Enrico Berlinger, who holds the important position of ICP undersecretary, made a proposal, which I summarize in a few points:
1) That the communist parties of Western Europe stress their independence from Moscow and Beijing.
2) That the ICP and its counterparts in free Europe adopt a form of neocommunism, which differs from classical communism in the following government program:
a) Genuine multipartyism;
b) Autonomy of labor unions relative to government agencies.
c) Survival of some leeway (undefined, it should be noted) for private enterprise activity within the national economy as a whole.
d) Individual rights, including freedom of religion, culture, art, and science.
The importance of this proposal from such a highly qualified individual at the top of Europe’s leading communist party is immense. If it is well received, communist doctrine will face the greatest “heresy” in its history, as neocommunism differs from traditional doctrine in significant ways.
Is this “heresy” real, or just a trick?
In other words, is Comrade Berlinger’s proposal an act of rebellion against the ICP’s Central Committee, or is it a trial balloon launched in agreement with the other committee members?
Usually, everyone present should have responded with outrage to the all-encompassing, controversial proposal. It should have shaken the party’s foundations and sparked protests throughout Italy. Beijing and Moscow should have “excommunicated” the “heretic.” In turn, various European Communist Parties should have publicly condemned Berlinger’s proposals. This would only make sense if Berlinger acted alone, without prior agreement with anyone.
However, the opposite has happened. The newspapers show no signs of revulsion or even surprise from any communist government, party, or group.
It therefore seems that everyone agreed in advance with what Berlinger was going to say. His suggestion thus indicates a course that the mentors of international communism truly want to see followed by the Communist Parties of free Europe.
Some readers might ask: What would the cause of communism gain from such a deceptive maneuver?
To answer this, we first need to examine the analogy between the plan proposed by Berlinger and the “revolution in freedom” that Allende has been declaring in Chile.
Allende has openly discussed the strategic reasons behind his decision to pursue a path of relative freedom in implementing the Chilean revolution. He recently acknowledged that he had “won the government, but not power” in Chile (cf. O Estado de S. Paulo, November 5, 1971). This clearly places on him the difficult task of using the government to gain power. In this process, he cannot rely on force, since force is a consequence of power, which he has not yet secured.
Thus, Allende is forced to give his opponent only the minimum amount of freedom needed to prevent a rebellion.
His government is therefore engaged in a lopsided fight with the opposition, as it holds the better cards. Still, even an uneven struggle can bring surprises for the stronger side. Allende might be defeated. In that case— as he has said— all that will be left for him is to “turn off the lights and go home” (cf. O Estado de S. Paulo, November 7, 1971).
Even in this situation, the communist cause has gained significantly from Allende’s presidency. In fact, he is implementing a series of structural reforms that are moving Chile toward a more Marxist direction.
Post-Allende Chile will be much more vulnerable and prepared for a new communist push than pre-Allende Chile.
Whether it remains in power or not, the Marxist government will have provided an invaluable service to the communist cause in Chile with its “revolution in freedom.”
The “revolution in freedom” is therefore a smart strategy. It’s no surprise that Moscow and Beijing now seek to replicate it in free Europe.
In fact, just like in Chile, no Communist Party in Western Europe has ever secured a true electoral majority. For them, the only path to power is through a coalition similar to the Popular Unity that brought Allende into office, consisting of Marxists, socialists, Christian Democrats, and members of the Radical Party.
However, in free Europe, the non-communist left has always been hesitant to form coalitions with communists. Influenced by events in Czechoslovakia and other nations, they fear that once in power, the Communist Party will establish a dictatorship and exclude them from the government.
Under these conditions, either the communist mentors pretend to change their appearance and mindset by adopting a Chilean style and proposing to the left a broad coalition to carry out the “revolution in freedom,” or their progress will remain stagnant.
This tactical contingency explains the communist “new look” launched by Enrico Berlinger with the tacit—but how significant and prestigious—consent of Moscow, Beijing, and all of Western European communists.
* * *
This, which is so clear in the realm of ideological and political speculation, has already been strongly confirmed in reality. Soon after, at an ICP Central Committee meeting, “Comrade” Giorgio Amendola proposed an electoral convergence among what he called the “three great political forces” of Western Europe: communism, socialism, and Christian democracy.
According to Amendola, this convergence aimed to secure victory for the leftist allies or coalition forces in the key elections scheduled for 1973 in Italy, France, West Germany, and the UK. Amendola hopes that, led by the governments formed from these elections, Western Europe will significantly accelerate the creation of the United States of Europe and establish a collective security system to surpass the Iron Curtain. I would add that this would mean expelling the Americans from Europe, ending the Iron Curtain, and unifying the forces of Western and Eastern Europe into a single entity.
In other words, Giorgio Amendola’s goal is for Western Europe to be led by leftists like Allende, politically and militarily united within a bloc where Russia would be the dominant power.
* * *
As we can see, it is definitely worthwhile for communists to adopt the Chilean model in Western Europe.
However, as we have already seen, for this to happen, communism must evolve. Hence, the blandishing neo-communism launched by Enrico Berlinger.
In other words, Amendola’s plan clarifies Berlinger’s proposal. Together, they expose the silent, widespread, and significant collusion across all levels of international communism.
Some readers might argue that none of this is practical. In Chile, the fight against individual initiative and private property is already causing hardship and will eventually lead to Allende’s overthrow. The same will happen in Europe.
The idea that misery always and necessarily causes a government to fall is a disputable claim. If it were always true, then how can we explain that in every country where communism takes hold, hardship appears, but the communist government does not collapse?
In Chile, Allende will only fall if misery reaches its peak before those in power have achieved it. Allende’s strategy is to seize power before poverty becomes intolerable. Once this is accomplished, he will be able to maintain his position by force.
The same principle, with necessary adjustments, applies universally, including to Western Europe.
Berlinger, Amendola, and Co. are striving to achieve this goal.
