by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira
From an anonymous reader:
“Could you please clarify a point about Chile’s situation? Is Allende the main force behind the attack on private property, or is he simply a modern man driven by extremists into a role that conflicts with his true nature? I see signs in his behavior that seem to support both ideas. That’s why I feel confused.
“Let’s look at the facts. In the early days of his government, even his opponents praised Allende as a modern leader. He seemed to be the safeguard against quick and total radicalization. As a result, he gained at least some support from various businessmen, farmers, merchants, and industrialists. They hoped he would judge MIR terrorists fairly and avoid violent reforms.
“This initial image quickly disappeared. He granted amnesty to MIR terrorists, stood passively by while farms were invaded, and promoted illegal and violent land reform.
“Now, Allende seems eager to restore his original image. Although he is speeding up the expropriation of farms larger than 80 hectares, he is also protecting others from illegal occupations and confiscatory reforms. As a result, he is gradually curbing the implementation of the socialists’ and Marxists’ agrarian programs. Meanwhile, he is turning against the Socialist Party’s new secretary-general, Carlos Altamirano, who disagrees with what is or appears to be Allende’s ‘moderation.’
“Please explain to me what specific rivalries and doctrinal clashes are causing so much confusion, and what Allende’s goal is within this chaos.”
* * *
I get the feeling that the writer is a teacher because of the clarity and brevity with which she explains the facts, as well as the accuracy with which she formulates her questions.
That said, I will respond by immediately correcting the assumption that the friendly teacher takes for granted in her question.
Allende and Altamirano are members of the Socialist Party, which is officially Marxist and thus communist.
Therefore, the internal dynamics of Allende and Altamirano’s party should not be judged—like the writer does—by criteria valid for free-market and bourgeois parties, but rather by those appropriate for totalitarian parties. Internally, a democratic party is a small reflection of liberal democracy, and its members act with the flexibility that the regime allows. In contrast, in their internal affairs, totalitarian parties tend to resemble miniature dictatorial states, where decisions are driven much more by the supreme ruler’s choices than by the conflicts of individual opinions or ambitions.
That said, the real question shouldn’t be what role Allende plays, since he’s just a puppet, as communists in the spotlight usually are. What truly matters is whether communism benefits from Allende’s ups and downs, and what that benefit might be. Only by clarifying this can we understand the significance of the Chilean president’s actions.
So, let’s continue with this point.
In politics—whether in Chile, Brazil, or any other country—it is not enough to defeat one’s opponent. Two conditions are essential for a victory to be meaningful: a) that the defeated party be deprived of any chance to respond; b) that the winner not emerge from the struggle so weakened that they lack the means to tackle the many problems inherent in exercising power.
Having risen to the highest office, Allende, the reformist president, must overthrow the rural, industrial, and commercial business communities. Doing so by force might be quick, but it could lead to widespread discontent, unquenchable resentment, and unpredictable, desperate reactions. It would also clearly weaken the government.
So, the correct way to secure a decisive victory over the business community—and also over the majority of Chileans, who are anticommunist—is to get the discontented to accept the reforms with resignation.
How can such resignation occur? A person only resigns themselves to evil when they believe there is no way to avoid it, or when they think the harm caused by accepting it is less than the harm from fighting against it. For example, a homeowner only avoids removing an intruder if they believe they lack the means to do so, or if they fear serious retaliation.
Therefore, it benefits Allende to encourage supporters of private property to feel both powerless to oppose and afraid of worse outcomes if they resist, even if their actions are legal and peaceful.
To accomplish this dual goal, it is necessary, on one hand, to instill great fear in the adversary about what will happen if Allende falls. Altamirano and the MIR serve this purpose. On the other hand, it is vital to gain some sympathy from the adversary by convincing him that everything will not be taken away if he willingly accepts defeat. This is also not difficult. It is achieved through the fifth column embedded within business circles. The hardest and most impossible part is playing the roles of both the bogeyman and the hero at the same time.
The solution is to take turns playing both roles.
Thus, my reader can see how convenient it is for the communists that Allende alternates between being the all-powerful villain, who can destroy everything and everyone with a simple decree, and the hero, who only breaks things in half and fights fiercely against those trying to force him to ruin everything.
If the innocent victim doesn’t understand the game, they’ll end up defending Allende against the “breakers” (Altamirano and the MIR), who are more threatening than he is, and reluctantly surrender half their assets to keep the rest.
Could Allende’s game be any clearer?
* * *
I insist on the two tools needed for Allende to win this game.
First of all, vicious accomplices who seem prepared to overthrow Allende and carry out the most radical reforms all at once. These accomplices are Altamirano and the MIR.
The other tool is the influential “fifth column” within the defeated class, which supports the effort by spreading, from person to person, “confidential” information that depicts Allende as a “good guy” who regrets persecuting businessmen and shows willingness to be lenient in his reforms.
Altamiranos, MIRs, and fifth columns are easy to find, a fact that history has demonstrated throughout the ages.
For example, Napoleon sought to compel opponents of the Revolution to accept the egalitarian state he had created. To do this, he used the Jacobin movement (the terrorists of that time) to play the role of Altamirano. The Corsican maintained strict control over it. If he fell, Jacobinism would rise again. Faced with this frightening possibility, the right accepted the demagogue in uniform. At the same time, his agents whispered in noble salons that Napoleon valued them but demanded sacrifices only to avoid provoking the Jacobins. Thus, the right willingly lost more than half of its “feathers.”
Of course, not everyone was fooled by his trick. Some of those who lost refused to accept the charade.
This yields another valuable advantage of the game: it divides the enemy. “Divide and conquer,” Machiavelli taught. Those who give up tend to survive a bit longer. Isolated and weakened, those who refuse to give in must face a tough and uncertain battle.
This strategy of dividing the opponent to gradually defeat them—similar to the comedy I just described—has a name. The red leader, Matyas Rakosi, perfected it in Hungary. He called it the “salami tactic.” No one eats a whole salami at once; instead, they slice it into pieces. This is how the communists break down and conquer their opponents.
Hungarian communist leader Matyas Rakosi, who coined the term “salami tactics.”