In Chile, a Tie Under Pressure – Folha de S. Paulo, April 11, 1971

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

During the presidential election in Chile, I wrote an article analyzing the votes received by the Marxist, Christian Democrat, and Nationalist candidates. I showed that Allende’s victory did not mean that most Chileans had chosen a Marxist government. The combined votes of the nationalist and Christian Democrat candidates far surpassed those of the Marxist.

On the 4th of this month, new elections were held in our sister country, this time to select members of the municipal councils. As we know, the election drew worldwide attention. In effect, the Chilean people had the opportunity to express their opinion on the pro-communist policies implemented by Allende during these five months of his government. After the votes were counted, it was found that the ruling coalition received 50.86% of the votes, excluding invalid or blank votes, while the opposition parties received 49.14%. As a result, many commentators concluded that this time, the victory of the ruling coalition led by the Marxists was more meaningful. This is because the total votes for the coalition surpassed that of all its opponents combined.

Naturally, many readers will wonder what I think about this.

I start by noting that the margin by which the governing coalition “won” was 1.68%, including invalid and blank votes. Based on this calculation, the government received 49.73% of the votes, while the opposition garnered 48.05%.

The government was therefore mistaken or misled the public when it announced a majority of just over 50%, conveniently ignoring the invalid or blank votes.

From a strictly legal perspective, a 1.68% difference is enough to declare a victory. In reality, it’s a weak and narrow win. But does it really prove that most Chileans support Allende’s policies? It does not.

Viewing the election as a test, the 1.68% difference is insignificant. Small, occasional factors with no ideological significance could have caused this gap. Therefore, any impartial observer would call it, at most, a tie.

I use “at most” because multiple factors indicate that even the authenticity of this tie is questionable.

1) First of all, we must consider the abstentions. They reached just over 25%. Due to the strict discipline of Marxist parties, abstentions generally occur only in non-communist sectors. Out of every four Chilean voters, one did not vote this time, and this one is not a Marxist. This means that — if he had voted — Marxism would have been substantially defeated.

2) What causes these abstentions? Disinterest? Discouragement? Protest? — Abstentions are often high in Chilean elections. They reflect areas of public opinion that are not politicized and thus not Bolshevized. In any case, assuming disinterest in such areas would be difficult given the importance of these elections to the country and individual lives. Conversely, discouragement and protest are entirely understandable. Therefore, it is important to interpret abstentions as anti-Marxist.

3) I notice some readers pouting at this conclusion. They argue, when reading my words, that abstentions are inherently ambiguous and therefore cannot be reliably counted on either side. I find this claim oversimplified. However, just for the sake of argument, I admit it could be true. If 25% of Chileans held an ambiguous stance toward the electoral test, how can we deny that the outcome of that test was also ambiguous?

4) There is an additional detail. The only non-Marxist party in the ruling coalition, the Radical Party, received 8.18% of the votes. In other words, if it had allied with the other opposition parties, the small pro-Marxist majority would have vanished. Now, I have an election poster from that party. According to this poster, which electoral segment is the Radical Party targeting? The Marxist segment? Not at all. It aims to persuade those dissatisfied with Marxism to work with Allende, arguing that it would be more effective to have some non-Marxists in government to serve as a check, rather than voting for the opposition and ending up with a government entirely composed of Marxists. It is unacceptable that voters drawn to this argument should be counted as supporters of Marxism.

5) Furthermore, any election — such as the one we are discussing — in which there is, on one side, a party or group of parties openly and actively supported by the government, and on the other side, opposition parties, can only be seen as a genuine reflection of the people’s ideological tendencies when the opposition wins. Alternatively, it may be considered valid when the ruling party earns a large majority. The government always holds — especially in such cases — an electoral advantage that attracts many votes, far more than the modest 1.68% lead achieved by the Allende coalition.

6) This, which is true for any election, is especially significant here. Allende, during his five months in office, has repeatedly used violent intimidation against the opposition press. Chile’s leading non-Marxist daily, El Mercurio, is owned by the Edwards family. Allende began by attacking the Edwards Bank, owned by the same family. The stated reason was to investigate alleged currency irregularities. The first step was appointing an intervener to manage the bank. However, shortly afterward, claiming that El Mercurio might be involved in the case, two investigations were launched into the newspaper, leading to considerable defamatory coverage in the leftist press. The investigations found no evidence against El Mercurio. The government then filed criminal complaints against two anti-government radio stations, Radio Minería and Radio Balmaceda.

Radio Minería faced a 24-hour suspension. The case against Radio Balmaceda remains ongoing. Meanwhile, communist deputies visited several independent radio stations, pressuring them to fire their anti-leftist employees, which they did. The Zig Zag publishing house, the largest in Chile, published many magazines and was struck by communists demanding a huge wage increase. Management refused their demands. Allende then appointed a communist intervener who ruled in favor of the workers. As a result, the company faced insolvency, and the government bought it at a low price. This shows how freedom was under Allende’s Chile. Thus, Allende keeps the advertising companies that are still free under a terror regime. For this reason, only government advertising agencies felt completely at ease during the last election. Can this be called a free and fair contest? And if not, how can serious ideological meaning be given to the election results that followed?

7) In fact, this is not the only form of electoral pressure in Chile. During these five months of government, Allende has shown the first signs of police terror in his country. Since the assassination of General Schneider, both the president and his supporters have increased their accusations of real or suspected conspiracies and the related threats. This causes many people to panic at the thought of being falsely accused of crimes with an unpredictable outcome if they speak out loudly and firmly against the government.

8) The business community, whose legitimate influence could have significantly altered the election results, faces yet another form of threat. Commercial and industrial entrepreneurs depend on credit, and in Chile, much of that credit is increasingly controlled by the state. Essentially, the Marxist government has launched a media campaign to intimidate private bank shareholders, threatening them with confiscation. As a result, many shareholders began selling their shares, which the government then purchased. Later, through fiscal pressures and other threats, the government acquired the remaining shares needed to become the majority owner. This process brought eight banks under state control. The sixteen privately held banks remain vulnerable to vague criminal laws, exposing them to fines and sanctions that the state can use to suppress them at any time. In these conditions, a businessman who openly opposes the government during elections risks losing all his credit. The rural business community—still recovering from waves of agrarian confiscation—lives in fear of CORA or the “occupations” carried out by Allende’s supporters. Because of this, even the most prominent anti-Marxist opinion leaders and trade officials are paralyzed. Some have even emigrated, with reports suggesting over 100,000 Chilean refugees in Buenos Aires alone.

9) Regarding the electoral sector of conservative workers, who are sensitive to their bosses’ influence, feel disoriented, and lack their natural leaders, it is clear they have lost much of their initiative and political cohesion. Not to mention the oppression exercised over rural workers “benefited” by agrarian reform, who now depend on government support for everything to farm “their” land. Severe sanctions are imposed on rural districts where government candidates did not receive a significant vote.

Considering all this, accepting such an electoral victory as conclusive is either laughable or tragic. Even more so because, as we mentioned, this slight “victory” is really just a tie.

What does a tie under pressure reveal? Is it equal strength on both sides, or more strength on the side that, even under pressure, controlled the police, the media, credit financing, and government favors?

* * *

I plan to revisit my previous article on individual property later. For now, I need to analyze the significance of the decline in votes for the Radical Party, the Christian Democrats, and the nationalist party. I hope to cover this in my next article.