Neither an Authentic Victory Nor a Free Election – Folha de S. Paulo, April 18, 1971

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

As we have seen, the result achieved by the socialist-communist coalition in the Chilean elections was not a true victory for them. The parties supporting Allende only managed to tie under intense and widespread pressure, which is morally comparable to a defeat.

This is essentially what I argued in my latest article. It seems the Chilean government itself acknowledged the futility of claiming victory over such a slim margin. After the overconfidence of the first 48 hours, the government fell silent about its electoral “success.” The news coming out of Chile no longer mentions Allende’s popularity test. This simply amounts to giving up.

One additional piece of information, which I did not mention earlier, helps clarify what frustrates the Marxist government in the election results. The total number of elected “regidores”—that is, city councilors—includes 914 members of opposition parties and 766 members of the governing coalition. This shows that while the government did better in some more populous cities, it performed poorly in rural areas. It is exactly in these rural areas that the government has been “benefiting” from agrarian reform, which is promoted as deeply popular by socialists, Christian Democrats, progressives, and communists.

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That said, one clear fact remains: the government’s vote share increased noticeably from last September’s presidential election to this month’s municipal election, rising from 36.3% to 49.7%.

Let’s face this fact. Where did the difference originate? Obviously, it must have come from the opposition. Let me explain.

The National Party, which is seen as the right wing in the Chilean political scene, ran a weak, discouraged, and ineffective campaign. All signs indicate that many of its voters either stayed home or shifted their support. Some voted for other candidates, perceiving more momentum and better chances of defeating Marxism in the Christian Democrats. Meanwhile, the Radical Party is a harmless anti-Marxist group within the ruling coalition. As a result, although Alessandri, the candidate endorsed by the National Party, received 34.9% of the vote last September, the NP only achieved 18.1% in this month’s elections.

However, the votes for the Christian Democratic Party and the Radical Party do not reflect a corresponding change. The former’s support dropped from 27.8% in September to 26.1% in the most recent elections. Regarding the latter, the data is somewhat more complex but still conclusive. The Radical Party, which received about 13% of the votes in the 1967 and 1969 municipal elections, split into two factions during Allende’s campaign. The faction that kept the name Radical Party now received 8% of the votes, while the other faction, Radical Democracy, which leaned more to the right, got 3.8%. This adds up to 11.8%.

How can this be explained, given that the votes for the National Party should have increased support for the Christian Democrats and Radicals?

On one hand, it is absurd to believe that disgruntled right-wingers voted for Marxism. On the other hand, the increase in abstentions (16.3% in September and 25.5% in April) doesn’t fully account for the drop in right-wing votes. So, where is the answer to this mystery?

Everything suggests that the Marxists gained support from the votes of sympathizers. It turns out that many members of the Christian Democratic Party and the Radical Party are Marxist sympathizers and probably voted with the left. Since they likely also benefited from Alessander’s voters’ support, the shift of voters from their ranks to the left was somewhat balanced out and is hardly noticeable in the numbers.

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Looking at things this way, one might argue that Allende would have lost the municipal elections, and Chile’s situation would be very different today if non-Marxist supporters of Marxism had not given it the victory again.

Let us emphasize again that voters who pride themselves on not being Marxists handed Marxism the victory. Marxists are so weak that they cannot seize power on their own.

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Therefore, non-Marxist supporters of Marxism were mainly responsible for its success in the municipal elections. Looking at their counterparts in other South American countries, “toads,” Christian Democrats, and progressives, it is clear they are gearing up to do the same everywhere.

We can draw an important practical conclusion from this. When confronting the communist threat, simply warning the public about the Communist Party is not enough. It is absolutely necessary, urgent, and crucial to warn the public about movements that, influenced by the most foolish and dangerous illusions, dismiss anticommunism and show sympathy for communism without identifying as communist.

But that is a separate issue. With this article, we conclude our analysis of the Chilean elections. As mentioned, it shows that while the pro-Marxist coalition has received more votes than in the previous election, it relies on votes from non-Marxists. This underscores the illusion of Allende’s “majority” in his country.

This fact has significant and wide-ranging implications.

Since the publication of Marx’s Manifesto in 1848, no communist candidate had ever succeeded in genuine and fair elections. This ongoing electoral failure had two major effects, one within the international Communist Party itself and the other in public opinion overall.

Within the Communist Party, the belief that Marxism could not come to power without violence grew stronger.

The so-called—and much-touted—”victory” of Marxism in two consecutive elections in Chile would serve as an argument for the anti-violence faction. Legal and peaceful processes had brought communism to power at least once in one country. By now, however, Communist Party experts will have analyzed the results and reached the same conclusion as us: both “victories” prove that, given the opportunity to vote in free elections, the majority will stubbornly declare themselves anti-communist. Consequently, the principle remains that, without pressure or the threat of violence, the communists cannot secure the support of an authentic majority of voters.

The other consequence, beyond communism, is clear.

For its supporters and sympathizers, as well as for many naïve people, communism is portrayed as the leading movement fighting for the rights of the “oppressed masses.” According to Rousseau’s democratic theories, the masses are the majority, and majorities hold sovereignty. Therefore, opposing communism means resisting the only legitimate authority—the will of the multitudes—and thus renders all anticommunist movements fundamentally illegitimate.

Although unfounded, that reasoning remains consistent if we assume that Rousseau’s pagan doctrine is true — that the masses can do everything an Eastern despot can, including suppressing all rights guaranteed by God’s Law. However, one of its premises is false. You cannot claim that communism reflects the desires of the masses if its candidates lose elections everywhere. And with that, the structure built by red propaganda collapses.

You can imagine how much discomfort this causes communist propagandists.

Now, with the results of the Chilean elections, they have attempted to rehabilitate communism by making it seem like it won a free election for the first time.

As we aimed to show in a series of articles on this topic, there was no real victory, nor was it a fair election.