An impartial assessment of the Brazilian government’s stance on the suspension of sanctions against Cuba leads me to applaud some truly noteworthy aspects of Itamaraty’s actions.
It was notable that Kissinger sent Assistant Secretary H. Schaundeman on a confidential mission to discuss the matter with Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira.
It should also be noted that Brazil’s suggested modification to the proposal by Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica was very favorably received by all parties. This constitutes yet another prestigious milestone for the country.
As everyone knows, Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira proposed that a report be prepared on possible guarantees from Fidel Castro that he would henceforth respect the principle of non-intervention and cease spreading subversion in Latin America, before the embargo against Cuba was lifted.
The omission of this basic precaution in the proposal by Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica was highly surprising. The Brazilian suggestion filled this gap.
And there was another advantage. While this report is being prepared, the suspension of the embargo will be postponed, perhaps marking the first step toward its definitive rejection.
Was this delaying tactic the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s primary goal? I hope so. Countless other Brazilians share that hope. In my view, there are serious doctrinal and practical objections to rapprochement with Cuba.
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I am glad to assume that our Foreign Ministry argued against suspending the embargo on the grounds of non-intervention as part of a simple diplomatic strategy. As negotiations advance, I hope the Foreign Ministry will show that, in unison with all true Brazilians, it is also guided by other principles. Elevating non-intervention to the sole maxim in the Cuban case would amount to utter selfishness, which the Brazilian people, Christian, good, and deeply friendly to their Latin American brothers, would not support. I will try to explain myself in a few words.
I read in the daily press about a prisoner at La Cabaña who was blinded and lost an arm in an explosion upon landing on the island. This unfortunate man refuses to leave prison while even one companion in misfortune remains unreleased. His gesture inspires respect and admiration, revealing a man who thinks not only of himself but also of others.
A very different feeling would be evoked by a policy that, forgetting others—the impoverished, tortured, and martyred Cuban people—thought only of its own interests, however legitimate those interests may be.
Indeed, such staunch nationalist exclusivism would be entirely anachronistic at a time when attention is increasingly focused on humanity’s common good and on human rights—in the secular language of the UN and post-conciliar papal documents.
I cannot believe the Brazilian Foreign Ministry would adopt a stance so at odds with what the Brazilian people think, want, and expect.
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The central point of the issue is that lifting the embargo on Cuba would facilitate the survival of the Marxist regime on the island. This would entail sacrificing the Cuban people in exchange for a little more peace at home.
Would a nation as important as Brazil, with a regime equipped with all the means to repress terrorism and basking in the glory of having effectively exterminated it, need to sacrifice the rights of the Cuban people to prevent that small island from stirring up our vast territory?
Some may object that my argument is futile because the turmoil here did indeed originate in Cuba.
In reality, guilty governments allowed subversion to be introduced among us by Russia, China, and Cuba. But at the cost of enormous sacrifices, it was gradually eliminated after 1964. Ten years later, is it necessary to beg Cuba not to intervene in Brazil and to abandon the Cuban people to their sad fate?
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Another reason to believe that Itamaraty’s judicious and timely initiative is merely a delaying tactic is that it calls for establishing a committee to prepare a report on whether conditions in Cuba guarantee non-intervention.
Well, this is stating the obvious. It is clear that Cuba is under a tyrannical regime that aggressively and completely intrudes on the private lives of its subjects. How can this internally aggressive regime not be viscerally aggressive externally?
With regard to Nazism, it has long been understood that its tyrannical nature necessarily led to imperialist policies. Why would the same logic not apply to Cuba today?
Therefore, our Foreign Ministry’s suggestion went beyond this.
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One might object that Brazil’s doubts about Cuba’s practice of non-intervention are unfounded because international conditions have changed thanks to the “détente” policy, which Nixon placed his trust in, and that Moscow communists, Cuba’s bosses, are no longer imperialists. In my view, and in the view of all Brazilians, Itamaraty’s diplomatic capacity is immeasurably superior to that of the ill-fated Nixon, whose personality did not command authority among us. Today, détente is strongly questioned even in the countries whose governments practiced it most markedly (Germany and the US). In Brazil, only the spectrum of opinion ranging from Catholic leftism to atheist leftism takes it seriously. From Catholic atheism to atheist atheism, I am tempted to say.
Now, this group constitutes a minority, almost confined to certain snobbish salons and sacristies, and eager for demagogic glitter.
Accepting “détente” as an unquestionable backdrop for lifting the embargo on Cuba is, therefore, something our brilliant Foreign Ministry is absolutely right not to accept.
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In closing, I propose to our distinguished and valued foreign minister that the committee formed to investigate Cuba’s intentions request that it hold free elections under the supervision of international observers, including those from Brazil, as the only suitable means. Cuban exiles would be given the right to return and vote, and for fifteen days—which would be sufficient—the opposition in Cuba would be granted the freedom to say whatever it wanted. Once the votes were counted, the authentic will of the Cuban people would prevail. The government that emerged from this process would be able to govern without internal or external aggression and to practice genuine non-intervention.
Will Fidel Castro accept this? If he refuses, will he offer conditions that would make us believe in the sincerity of his non-aggressive stance?
In that case, admitting Cuba to the concert of Latin American nations will grant Russia a seat in the Hemisphere’s assemblies.
For if Fidel Castro has no internal support, he can only survive on external support, and that support can come only from Russia.
Thus, paradoxically, lifting the embargo will give Russia a convenient diplomatic means to intervene in all matters on the continent.
The lifting of the embargo, announced under the banner of non-intervention, would result in systematic, official intervention.
This is what the Brazilian Foreign Ministry must avoid at all costs.
