Perón with the Hammer and Sickle – Folha de S. Paulo, November 4, 1973
by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira
When the history of this muddy and confusing end of the century is written, the passage of time will reveal a veiled and subtle communist maneuver that—so far as I know—has gone unnoticed by observers of world politics until now.
To understand this maneuver, it is necessary to consider the true purpose of terrorism within the broader framework of communist strategy.
How can the social revolution advance in countries where the Communist Party’s decades-long proselytizing has failed to attract a significant number of followers? In principle, if communist contingents fail to grow, their cause can only win by weakening the obstacles that oppose it. If a certain mass of water cannot overcome a high barrier, the barrier must be lowered to a level below the water’s.
This demolition process for existing structures takes place in several stages.
In the first stage, to weaken their adversary, the communists split into two groups. In the strictly ideological and political sphere, the Communist Party (legal or clandestine) continues its proselytism as best it can. But a faction of communists, dissatisfied with the Party’s slow progress, breaks away and launches a terror campaign. To prevent the public from recognizing the artificial nature of their split, both sides occasionally exchange a barrage of mutual insults.
The process then enters its second phase. While the Communist Party remains in the shadows, a handful of terrorist agitators take center stage in the political arena, committing assaults, confiscations, destruction, kidnappings, torture, and killings.
This unusual and aggressive activity instills panic among the bourgeoisie. It gives the “toads,” the leftist clergy, and Christian Democrats an opportunity to inculcate in the bourgeoisie the supposed need for the famous “basic reforms” as the best means of quelling terrorism. In this way, all blind optimists within the anticommunist majority are gradually led to accept the “give in some not to lose all” formula as the height of wisdom. The stage is set for the demolition of the property-owning class.
The process thus enters its third phase.
In effect, after terrorism has largely exerted its psychological influence on the timid bourgeoisie, a government is brought to power (preferably through elections) that forcibly dismantles the terrorist movement. The entire population lets out a sigh of relief and places unlimited trust in the government, which it sees as the ideal bulwark against communism.
Based on this general trust, the rulers—always wielding the sword against terror—begin to take actions that earn the Communist Party’s categorical, albeit discreet, applause (which, as we have seen, had remained in the shadows). Its members are given back their lost political freedom, and some of its leaders are installed in important administrative or even political positions. From time to time, government statements appear expressing sympathy for this or that aspect of socialism and even communism. Gradually, a flood of laws begins to establish the state’s invasion of the private sector, extinguishing individual property.
Nevertheless, the newspapers continue to trumpet the government’s anti-terrorist action. Property owners, caught between confidence, shock, and a sense of being cornered, give in. The “anticommunist” government will have lowered the barrier to a level the Communist Party can cross.
* * *
I am describing this process, focusing on Argentina, where it has been developing with striking clarity, albeit in a somewhat peculiar chronological order.
The Communist Party had never achieved significant electoral progress there. Then terrorism erupted. Next, Perón enters the scene, playing the role of constable for the terrified conservative classes. As the old caudillo sets about cracking down on terrorist organizations, the right and center applaud emphatically. Meanwhile, however, Perón makes sure to cast sweet glances and say soft words toward the Communist Party. And a flood of statist and confiscatory laws pours over the country. Yet the newspapers continue to hail Perón as the anticommunist leader par excellence.
As an example, I publish here some statements by the old caudillo supporting communism. In the next article, I intend to discuss the confiscatory and dirigiste laws and bills inspired by Peronism.
All of this policy is still “in ovo” in these discreet statements by Perón:
“We [Peronists] are a left-wing movement. But a Justicialist left above all else, not a communist or anarchist left…” “We are revolutionaries because we are pursuing structural reforms that will make Argentines happier…” (La Nación, March 8, 1973).
However, shortly thereafter, when addressing Peronist women, this “non-communist leftist” reveals his true colors. Speaking of Red China, he proclaims:
“There is a clear and striking example: China. It was a country where twelve to fifteen million inhabitants died of hunger every year because food production, given the employment of the inhabitants, was insufficient for everyone. The wise system established in the People’s Republic of China made room for women, and today they produce alongside men. This country, where a large segment of the population used to die of hunger every year, not only satisfied its needs but also achieved development in all areas, and today it can afford to export food” (La Nación, March 28, 1973).
In line with these words, Lopez Rega, Minister of Social Welfare, announced an “exchange of children’s visits” between Argentina and Communist China and praised the “functioning of the children’s gendarmeries in that country, which Argentine children will be able to get to know when they begin their travels” (La Prensa, August 8, 1973). Is there anything more emblematic of police-state totalitarianism than child-gendarmes?
Shortly thereafter, Perón embraced a historical evolutionism with a distinctly Marxist character:
“Man intervenes in [historical] evolution only subsidiarily. Evolution is the work of determinism and, at times, of historical fatalism. … Thus, we were feudal, then liberal-democratic, and today are socialist because the world is undoubtedly moving in that direction, and we do not know what we will be in the universalist stage, which may be closer than we all imagine” (La Nación, September 1, 1973).
In this line of thought, it is clear that the stage after socialism is communism.
Add to all this an inexplicable and even scandalous gesture for a country in the midst of an economic crisis: Argentina has committed to lending Cuba up to a billion dollars, in annual installments of 200 million!
* * *
The Argentine Communist Party knew what to expect from the anti-terrorist Perón. It held a congress at which Leonid Brezhnev was named honorary president. Delegates from Russia’s Supreme Soviet attended. At the end of the congress, the Argentine Communist Party decided to support Perón’s candidacy because “large masses of Peronism are operating a broad shift to the left” and to emphasize the many coincidences between Peronism and communism (La Nación, August 24, 1973).
In a speech, the Secretary of the Communist Party praised the reform laws sent by the Executive Branch to Congress, the restoration of freedom to the Communist Party, the promise to abolish ideological discrimination, and the recognition of the governments of Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, and the German Democratic Republic (La Nación, August 21, 1973).
Delegates of the Russian Communist Party visited Perón and stayed with him for an hour. In turn, Russia declared that it would support the “countries of popular democracy, among which, in its opinion, Argentina would be included” (La Nación, August 29, 1973).
Thus, while Perón demolishes terrorism with a hammer, he reaps the political benefits of support from the Communist Party and Russia with a sickle.