Reflecting Amid “Suspense” – Folha de S. Paulo, August 28, 1968

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

As I write, the course of the Czechoslovak crisis remains unclear. It seems that the entire nation is mobilizing for a huge resistance movement. This movement is significant, animated by a heroic spirit, and led by still unknown leaders whose superior intelligence must be recognized from the outset.

What will the Soviets do in view of this powerful upheaval? Will they seek to discourage the people through the terror of repression, which, to be effective, would have to have unprecedented ferocity? For the Kremlin, this prospect is fraught with risk:

1) The communist cause would suffer enormous damage, as such repression would force the Communist Parties of almost all countries to choose between breaking with Moscow or losing all popularity.

2) On the diplomatic front, the Soviet Union, with its satellites, would be viewed unfavorably, isolated, and thrown to the wolves, so to speak.

3) All this could stimulate the impulses toward “liberalization” that have been continuously occurring in Russia for some time.

4) Finally, the success of the steamroller approach in Czechoslovakia is uncertain. What will happen to Moscow’s leaders if this small nation becomes to them what Spain was to Napoleon? In that case, could the aggravation of the first three factors I listed lead to the irremediable ruin of the current Soviet despots’ power? Could Washington or Beijing use public opinion’s justified indignation, aggravated by potentially brutal violence, as a psychological basis for armed intervention in the conflict?

If this is the picture seen from Moscow, the prospects seen from Prague are simpler, but equally dramatic:

1. Since the Soviet Union has committed the political error (not to mention the unspeakable moral failing) of invading Czechoslovakia, will it have the finesse to understand the need for a withdrawal, and enough political genius to create circumstances that disguise that humiliating withdrawal?

2. If it is to be feared that it lacks both tact and genius, will the Soviet Union blindly rush to destroy Czechoslovakia?

3. Is it worth it for Czechoslovakia to take the immense risk of resisting the occupier? For those who believe in God and the immortality of the soul, like the Spaniards who fought against Napoleon, the answer can only be in favor of resistance at all costs. I am sure Spain’s attitude would be no different if it were invaded today. I know that the Czechs and Slovaks do not lack courage, a fact that history has made famous. I am not unaware that millions of them are not communists and hold fast to the faith inherited from their forefathers. However, Alexander Dubcek and his aides are communists, as the still unknown leaders of the present Czech resistance likely are. From a communist’s perspective, is it worth exposing to destruction, not a man for whom an individual is nothing, but an entire nation?

Both sides are probably weighing all this. What will be the outcome?

It is too early to say, but recording the political views of both sides can help us better understand our formidable “suspense.”

It will also help us better understand the outcome, which may have already occurred when this article is published.

*   *   *

Since we are currently in “suspense,” let’s take advantage of it to think a little about ourselves. “We” here means Brazil and the entire Free World.

How could public opinion be forced to shift from the optimism of a few days ago to the anguish of the present uncertainty? The answer is very clear. Public opinion had been lulled into believing the myth that the leaders of “de-Stalinized” Russia are peace lovers. The invasion of Czechoslovakia has suddenly proved, with cruel evidence, that they are not. The myth has been shattered.

Another question immediately arises, which is much more challenging to answer: how could world opinion have been led to believe in such an inconsistent myth?

The most immediately visible cause of this deception lies in the thousand small and large maneuvers the Soviet Union put in place to make itself accepted as a peaceful nation and, consequently, to enjoy the benefits of coexistence.

These benefits were immense. We will mention two examples: NATO’s disbanding while the Warsaw Pact remained in force and Lyndon Johnson’s “softening” on Vietnam.

Given these tangible benefits and others, a question of elementary political wisdom naturally arose: Was Soviet pacifism sincere, or was it a ploy to obtain those advantages?

Few asked this very simple question, and those who did received no explicit or consistent answer. Their voices were drowned out in the festive “brouhaha” of universal détente.

What were the causes of this stubbornly blind naivety that penetrated so many people, great and small, educated and ignorant, young and old?

I think it is worth highlighting a single cause, which I believe to be the most dynamic and widespread: fatigue—the terrible fatigue of being logical, serious, coherent, and astute. Since Homer, this fatigue of nations that allow themselves to be overcome by indolence has caused countless tragedies and defeats. It can be said that in many wars or international tensions, the winner was the one who did not allow himself to be penetrated by this fatal softening until the end.

Now, vast sectors of world opinion demonstrated this softening by conclusively interpreting the thousand debatable signs the Soviet Union “manufactured” to make people believe in the sincerity of its allegedly peaceful intentions.

No matter how badly the Soviets are doing, they still have this invaluable card: our weary naivety. And if they play this card in new moves, they will emerge from the Czech impasse with all their prospects for success intact.

Hence, in my view, the key criterion for analyzing Czechoslovakia’s Kremlin occupiers’ next move is to what extent this move would preserve the world’s naive confidence in pacifist communism.