The Agenda – Folha de S. Paulo, May 21, 1972

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

Such is the intertwining of ideological, political, and economic confrontations in today’s world that, at times, events unfolding outside a country can affect its existence more than other events (albeit important) occurring within it.

Thus, although there have been some events in Brazil lately that strongly invite comment—the expulsion of Fr. Joseph Comblin is one of them—I’ve chosen to analyze, with my readers, international events on which the future of the world, and therefore of our country, depends in the most essential sense.

That is why I am discussing today the talks about to begin in Moscow, where Nixon and Brezhnev may play with the destinies of nations and individuals, including yours and mine. This is in the highest, most intimate, and most minute sense. This can affect everything from our right to believe and profess the true Faith to the quality of the toothpaste or soap we use.

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I begin by expressing my perplexity at the vagueness and fluidity of the official news about the agenda for negotiations. The agenda is the soul of any negotiation. As of early Friday morning, almost no information has been released about it. Why?

I tried to guess what that agenda might be and adopted a simple, reliable method. When two heads of state meet, their primary goal is to resolve issues that affect relations between their countries. Once a list of these issues has been drawn up, the agenda would be complete – at least in large part.

Considering only what we all know, that is, what has been published in the press, here is the list I was able to compile:

1. Limiting nuclear and conventional weapons. With its formidable industrial power, the US can arm itself indefinitely. For this reason, Russia seeks a US commitment not to further arm itself. At the same time, Russia continues to produce more nuclear weapons. Although willing to accept a commitment to halt the arms race, it refuses any oversight. How can Nixon get out of this without angering the Russians and risking a sudden nuclear attack against his country?

2. Russia seeks to establish a pan-European federation stretching from the Urals to Lisbon. The corollary of this federation would be the withdrawal of US troops stationed in Europe. If the US accepts the proposal, the nations of Western Europe would be powerless to contain a massive psycho-ideological and military offensive that the Russian giant might launch. The only guarantee against such a danger would be a Soviet promise not to carry out this offensive. If Nixon accepts this promise as valid, he virtually hands Europe over to Russia. If he rejects it, he risks plunging the world back into the Cold War, a precursor to a hot war. What to do?

III. Russia complains of the gap between its economic conditions and those of the West. It suggests that its resentment toward the West will diminish if it receives substantial Western technical and financial aid, public or private. This would reduce the risk of war. However, if Russia were to grow in prosperity, it could appease internal discontent and better equip itself for war. If Nixon rejects Russian aspirations, he angers the enemy; if he accepts them, he strengthens it. What to do?

1. To further appease its resentment, Russia suggests that Western Europe serve as a consumer market for certain basic products it can supply, such as petroleum gas. If, at Nixon’s suggestion, Western Europe accepts, it will have to break with its current suppliers, thereby disrupting the economies of several friendly and allied nations. If, on the contrary, it rejects the Russian proposal, new international tensions will arise, with the risk of war. In view of this, what will Nixon do?

2. Russia has an unpaid war debt to the US. What will Nixon do? Will he let that money warm the pockets of this aggressive debtor? In this case, will he not be demoralized by collecting debts from allied nations? And if he does not collect them, where will the US economy go? The solution for the US would therefore be to collect these debts from Russia. However, this could enrage the defaulting nation and threaten world peace. How to act?

3. The Russian military presence in the Mediterranean is a threat to all of Western Europe. Russia not only maintains this presence but also continually expands it. Furthermore, it seeks to expel the US Navy from that sea. If it stands its ground, international tensions could worsen significantly, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, could take on tragic proportions. If Nixon gives in, he will have lost Europe, and the US will find itself facing a new Russian threat amid already precarious conditions. That being said, what can be done?

VII. England has withdrawn from the Indian Ocean, leaving a void that Russia is inexorably filling. India is being transformed into a Soviet dominion, and Iran’s oil fields are increasingly within Russia’s grasp. What should Nixon do? Resist, risking war? Or give in, accepting a dramatic loss of ground across those vast, rich, and populous lands?

VIII. In Vietnam, the whole world can see what is happening. One would have to be blind not to realize that Russia wants to take over Indochina at all costs. If Nixon resists, war will break out sooner or later. If he does not resist, he will hand Russia a key position in the world. In that case, Taiwan and South Korea today, and Japan and Australia tomorrow, feeling abandoned by the US, will be dragged into putting left-wing people in government who will pursue a policy of rapprochement with Russia.

If Nixon accepts this, what will the US be reduced to? If he does not, he exposes the US to the risk of war.

1. Russia methodically promotes espionage and subversion worldwide, including in the US itself, through embassies and consulates, communist and para-communist parties, and “useful innocents” of all kinds (disputably innocent but indisputably useful), such as socialists, progressives, protesters, and hippies. Cuba is a Russian claw ready to sink into the living flesh of America. Chile is another claw embedded in South America. Free countries resist this subversive action at great cost. If Nixon asks for the cessation of these activities—which obviously constitute the beginning of a world revolutionary war—he will get nothing, because world revolution is at the heart of the communist movement. If he threatens to use identical methods in Russia, he knows he will not be taken seriously, for his agents will face a relentless police dictatorship. Moreover, Russia could become enraged and unexpectedly unleash a “nuclear deluge” on two or three major American cities. How, then, will Nixon get out of this?

2. It would be impossible not to mention the China-Russia problem. If we take entirely seriously—and I do not—the existence of a genuine split between the two “greats” of communism, will Russia, so willing to embark on a war adventure over other issues, not do so once it realizes that Beijing is really playing Washington’s game? Faced with this, what is left for Nixon to do?

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After reading this agenda, the reader will feel depressed and have a headache. The situation is reminiscent of the fable of the wolf and the lamb. In the present case, however, the stronger nation, which should be the wolf, plays the role of the lamb, while the weaker nation, which should be the lamb, plays the role of the wolf. One could almost say it is the fable of the little wolf and the big lamb.

How can we explain this paradox, which is both incomprehensible and dramatic? Where will it lead us?

Let’s wait and see…