by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira
In a previous article, I aimed to outline the history of class struggle in France over the past 200 years. I examined the actions of the aristocracy in response to the victorious push of the bourgeoisie, and then the actions of the bourgeoisie in facing the seemingly inevitable rise of the proletariat.
I essentially pointed out that:
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The victory of bourgeois republicanism over monarchical aristocracy was not solely because, as many historians oversimplify, that “new ideas” quickly attracted more supporters while “old ideas” lost theirs. The reality was far more complex. Monarchical aristocracy maintained undeniable political strength and significant chances of victory until 1870, roughly a hundred years following the fall of the Bastille.
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Given this ongoing strength of the monarchic-aristocracy, its major political failures cannot be blamed only on supporters defecting to the opposition but also on the weakness of the remaining loyal supporters when facing the Revolution’s clever tactics.
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This tactic, used in every major republican-bourgeois move, can be called the fear-sympathy stratagem: a) First, it launches a fierce and violent attack against the monarchic-aristocracy. Its supporters resist to some extent, are defeated, and those who survive face all kinds of misfortunes. This plunges them into fear. b) In the second phase, this tactic causes the Revolution to back off somewhat and give the defeated of the day some of what they once had. This act sparks some sympathy for the new order among the “beneficiaries” and prepares them to accept some of the Revolution’s ideas. It stirs in them a desire to maintain the status quo at all costs, so they don’t lose what they’ve recouped. Yesterday’s opponent prefers to “give in some so as not to lose all.” He abandons the vague hope of recovering everything he’s lost to preserve the enjoyment of what little he has regained. He then becomes a half-resigned and half-persuaded situationist. c) Then, another violent revolutionary onslaught strips away the monarchic-aristocrats’ cherished bits. d) Yet, this onslaught is followed by another “setback” in which the Revolution returns to its adversary a few remaining crumbs of the meager pieces it had taken away. e) The fear-sympathy stratagem is once again activated. The monarchist-aristocrat yields again “so as not to lose all” his beloved crumbs. And through a similar process, the crumbs become increasingly microscopic until they disappear.
As a result, bourgeois republicanism’s victory over monarchical aristocracy was mainly due to a clever tactic that weakened the latter’s fighting spirit, resistance, and hope for a complete victory.
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The communists have been subjecting the bourgeoisie to a similar process with even greater success. For many, the reign of the bourgeoisie in France seemed to become definitive starting in 1870. Let’s examine how the fear-sympathy process developed from that point onward.
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FEAR. The terrifying explosion of the Paris Commune in 1870, with its fires, shootings, and Jacobin-style street scenes, gave the bourgeoisie the feeling that the days of Terror could return at any moment. This led to panic, a feeling that lasted throughout the Belle Époque, fueled by widespread unrest led by stern-faced leaders carrying out spectacular anarchist attacks. This situation continued roughly after World War I. During the period known as “entre les deux guerres,” the dramatic rise of communism in Russia, the barely contained communist wave in Hungary, Austria, Germany, and Italy, and the brutal communist persecutions in Mexico and Spain, among others, increased fears. The successes of communism after World War II intensified this panic even more. The threat of nuclear war caused many sectors to fall into panic.
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SYMPATHY. The Revolution’s long string of victories in its antimonarchical-aristocratic and later anti-bourgeois phases encouraged the bourgeoisie, who were much less combative than the nobles, not to fight. Alongside them, orderly, educated, smiling, and polite socialists appeared, promising to help them if they “gave in some so as not to lose all.” Let the bourgeoisie give up part of their bread; the socialists would oppose communism to help them keep the rest.
To gain a crucial ally without whom victory appears impossible, the bourgeoisie is willing to be persuaded and concede with some goodwill—either because its egalitarian upbringing has prepared it for socialism or because it sees socialism as a protector. Once the concession is made, a period of relative peace ensues.
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NEW FEAR. On the far left, radicalism and violence flare up again. The bourgeoisie is once more terrified.
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New sympathy. Socialists once again approach the bourgeoisie, promising to unite against communism if they relinquish their privileges and settle for a few crumbs. The bourgeoisie “gives in some, so as not to lose everything.” New sympathy, new détente, then new tension, and so on.