
by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira
The recent history of the communist offensive in Brazil mainly comprises three stages. Each stage involves a specific type of agitation, and each one ends in failure.
The first stage was João Goulart’s attempt to implement Fidel Castro-style populism in Brazil. As a backdrop, they tried to incite large-scale worker unrest and stir passions among urban and rural populations. The urban protests, which some media outlets viewed as highly threatening, mainly consisted of a few barracks conspiracies created by a small group, disarmed by brave and responsible Armed Forces members. The “Family with God for Freedom” marches showed where the city’s people stood. Rural unrest was also limited to a small minority. The book Agrarian Reform, a Question of Conscience challenged the legitimacy of the rural unrest and ended Goulart’s land reform ambitions. In a speech days before his fall, he even complained about the indifference of the rural masses toward the socialist and confiscatory plans he intended to use to introduce class struggle into our “hinterland.” So much so that the rural masses showed no signs of wanting to revolt.
The second move aimed to pull the entire youth to the left. As a result, university unrest followed. The threat of imminent danger was once again invoked, and it appeared as if the whole country was on fire. However, clear-headed observers quickly realized that nearly all Brazilians viewed the disturbances negatively, and most students remained unaffected by the demagoguery of a few of their peers. To the relief of Brazilians, the university unrest ended.
Then came the third step, which was to impose communism by force. It began with terrorist unrest that initially caused naive people to believe that terrorists were emerging from the discontented masses as typical representatives of a rebellious mindset. However, Brazilians overwhelmingly condemned terrorist attacks to the point that, as is widely acknowledged, terrorism today is carried out only by a few extremists who have lost hope of winning through persuasion and resort to violence to push their ideas on the country.
Thus, the events confirm what we mentioned at the beginning of this article: three attempts, three upheavals, and three failures.
Given this, a sharp observer cannot help but reflect: Communist parties are undoubtedly led by capable individuals. Why do they keep pushing their ideas despite consistently facing a loud “no” from all of Brazil? Wouldn’t it be smarter for them to retreat into obscurity, quietly reorganize their propaganda efforts, and rebuild their ranks before trying again? Clearly. So, what motivates communists to continue with actions that are beginning to seem unwise? The answer might be found in an impressive August 1 interview with Folha de S. Paulo by Vice Admiral Acyr Dias de Carvalho Rocha, head of the Atlantic Defense Zone Command Center. I will summarize in simple terms what this high-ranking military leader said.
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The Atlantic Ocean played a more crucial role in World War II than many realize. Seventy percent of the ships sunk during that war were lost in that sea.
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Although the northern hemisphere has been the most important Atlantic region for military purposes so far, the rest of the sea is becoming more militarily significant because Arabs or Israelis can easily block the Suez Canal. If such a blockade occurs, Russia’s sea route to Asia will have to go through the South Atlantic.
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Under these conditions, Soviet interest in the waters between our shores and Africa has increased significantly. This may explain the recent increase in Soviet naval ships operating in these waters.
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Just as the Russians sought bases in the Mediterranean to guarantee passage through Suez and mostly secured them in North Africa, it is likely they would want African bases granted by one of the emerging African states on the Atlantic coast to facilitate their passage through the South Atlantic.