Throwing the Pen to the Ground – Folha de S. Paulo, February 4, 1973

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by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

 

For today, I will leave the Cursillos alone. The talent, logic, and verve that shine through in Gustavo Corção’s two recent articles will give them plenty to talk about for quite some time. It will not be easy for Cursillismo to digest two articles like those. I say digest, not respond to. I do not believe the Cursillo movement will refute Corção’s objections, as it did not refute Bishop Mayer’s victorious arguments, my obscure articles, nor the brilliant commentary of Teophilo de Andrade, nor the lucid, perceptive, and cultured study of Salomão Jorge.
But the most difficult thing is precisely this: to digest without refuting. While the Cursillos devote themselves to this (I am referring to the infiltrators and their leaders), let us attend to matters of another order.
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Some facts deserve comment; others do not. Finally, still others are impossible to comment on because they are so rife with contradiction that even the most energetic adjectives in the human vocabulary are insufficient.
Some events in this third category made the international news this week. I record two of them, with the dry language of someone who feels the impotence of any adjectival description.
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Nixon, speaking to his country and the world, asserted that the Paris agreement between the two Vietnams could be considered the beginning of an honorable peace. What is true about this statement?
Let us begin with honor. There is no honor where there is no truth or justice. It was claimed that this agreement was made under the aegis of justice. That claim is not true.
In an agreement that claims there are no winners or losers, justice requires complete equality between the parties. In this particular case, however, the inequality could not be more pronounced.
It is understandable—at least from a certain point of view—to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the people of South Vietnam want the current regime to continue. But then, why not also hold a plebiscite to determine whether the people of North Vietnam want the communist regime to continue?
If the US withdraws its troops from South Vietnam, why doesn’t the other belligerent party do the same? In other words, why don’t the Americans have the right to be in South Vietnam, while it is acceptable for North Vietnamese guerrillas to be concentrated in countless pockets there after the armistice?
No one can speak of honor in an agreement that unabashedly flaunts such disparities (to mention only these two). To claim that this beginning of peace is based on honor is simply untrue.
In fact, this agreement is not even genuine. When it was signed, everyone predicted it would not bring peace but only the American withdrawal. There you have the facts. With hostilities in Vietnam barely subsided (for how long, no one knows), Beijing and Hanoi launched an attack on Cambodia’s anticommunist government, demanding the restoration of Suvana Phuma’s pro-communist government and the withdrawal of American troops.
All those around the world who celebrated this “agreement” with speeches and parties have more than enough evidence to gauge its precariousness. They celebrated with the most contradictory of joys, a beginning of peace with honor, which neither promises true peace nor was made in honor.
For my part, I find the South Vietnamese representative’s attitude infinitely more logical. After signing the agreement under brutal pressure from events, he threw his pen onto the floor.
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This leads to the conclusion that by withdrawing American troops, Nixon left South Vietnam at the mercy of its North Vietnamese and Russian aggressors. I say Russians because not only are Russian weapons and military leadership present there, but also Russian espionage, techniques for undermining the enemy’s resistance, and Russian money, among other things.
However, the reality is even more dire. The Soviets are there, thanks to the gold, wheat, and the political impunity Nixon provides them.
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It is undeniable that, forced by its disorganized agriculture and a harsh winter, Russia had to make spectacularly large wheat purchases from the US. Note that Russia was a major grain exporter during the Tsars’ time.
Everything leads one to suspect that the mysterious payment terms the US accepted for these purchases amount to a most liberal favor that could be conceived only between father and son.
Nixon’s solicitude for Russia was so great that, to supply it fully, the US ended up with a wheat shortage, and Americans had to pay more for bread so that Russians could have plenty on their tables.
At the same time, the flow of American gold into Russia is notable.
According to the January 17 issue of The Review of the News, 26 loans totaling $1.226 billion were extended to socialist countries in the past six months. Russia received $580 million, or 47% of the total.
In reality, these supplies should be treated more as donations than loans. No one knows under what conditions they will be repaid, or even whether they will be repaid in full. However, this is only a first step. The economic catastrophe of the communist regime has created conditions in Russia that, according to the president of the New York Stock Exchange, require the Moscow government to raise $100 billion. And who will give it to them—at least for the most part—if not their Yankee partner?
That being the case, would anything be more just, imperative, indispensable, and irresistible than American pressure on Russia to withdraw from Vietnam, leaving that country’s communists to their own devices?
Nixon did not exert this pressure. American troops retreated before the North Vietnamese army and the Vietcong, which were supported by Russia, which was in turn supported by the US!
In other words, Nixon retreated before an enemy he himself feeds, one that, without him, would sink into chaos and shame.
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There are some in South America who imitate this sad example. The leading Buenos Aires daily, La Nación, reported on January 18 that the presidents of Argentina’s and Chile’s central banks had signed an agreement, marking the most significant operation of its kind ever conducted between the two Latin American nations. The operation involves Argentina granting a $100 million loan to finance Chile’s imports. Chile will pay 5% up front and 95% in ten equal annual installments, with the first installment due 21 months after the loan is granted. The interest rate will be 7% per year.
Dear reader, if someone lent you money on these terms, wouldn’t you accept it? Wouldn’t you consider the one who granted it a benefactor?
Well, Lanusse is such a benefactor to Allende! This is precisely when Argentina, unfortunately, is in a dire financial situation, and it is highly doubtful that communist Chile will be able to repay that huge sum.
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Having laid out all these facts, I am reminded of the friendly and courageous South Vietnamese diplomat. After recording such aberrations, I am strongly tempted to throw my pen to the floor!

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