Two Elements Related to a Third… – Folha de S. Paulo, July 16, 1972

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

The events unfolding in Argentina compel all South Americans to turn their attention to what is happening in that great and beloved nation.

In fact, through a series of decrees, Alejandro Lanusse has long been dismantling the numerous barriers his predecessors erected to prevent Perón from becoming president. Was there an agreement between the two? The question is valid, given how much Lanusse has done to favor the political resurrection of the old demagogue.

On the left, Alejandro Agustín Lanusse (President of Argentina from March 26, 1971, to May 25, 1973); on the right, Juan Perón (President of Argentina from October 12, 1973, to July 1, 1974).

Salvador Allende (Marxist President of Chile from November 3, 1970, to September 11, 1973)

Three objections can be raised against this hypothesis, which is supported by such an impressive affirmation. However, none of them, when analyzed in depth, is entirely convincing.

True, along with Lanusse’s pro-Peronist measures, he has often rebuked the exile in Madrid, and vice versa. However, a suspicious observer might ask whether this mutual quarreling does not serve as a smokescreen, concealing the two shrewd partners’ connivance from public view.

In Lanusse’s favor, it is worth noting the recent decree freezing the Justicialist Party’s opulent bank funds. This seems to be a fatal blow to Perón’s candidacy, as without money there can be no electoral victory. This is even more true for a demagogue like him. Thus, Lanusse would have irrefutably demonstrated that he does not want Perón to win.

At first glance, the argument seems overwhelming, but strictly speaking, it proves little. Either the government will uphold this decree or it will not. If it does not uphold it, the argument collapses. If it does, and Perón still receives a significant number of votes, the conclusion is that the former dictator—whose mysterious economic resources appear to be endless—had the means to run for office without using Justicialist funds. Thus, Lanusse’s decree will have been as harmless as a sword stroke in water.

What remains as an argument in favor of General Lanusse is the decree requiring all presidential candidates in the upcoming elections to reside in Argentina. At the time of writing, the Brazilian press considers the decree’s enactment likely and notes that it will result in an implicit veto of the caudillo’s candidacy.

By the time this article is published, the decree may already have been issued. If so, will it prove significant? I don’t think so.

Indeed, since General Lanusse has removed all legal obstacles to Perón’s return to his homeland through successive decrees, I cannot see his obstinacy in remaining in Madrid as anything other than a clever propaganda ploy to create “suspense.” The old demagogue can end this “suspense” whenever he sees fit.

Thus, for those who are not satisfied with facile publicity stunts, there is nothing decisive at this point to refute the hypothesis that Lanusse is the principal architect of Perón’s candidacy.

 But to what end, one might ask, if until recently the two were bitter enemies? If Lanusse also wants to run for office, it may help him raise the specter of Perón so he can later benefit from the support of the large anti-Peronist voter majority. Even if Lanusse does not run, there is still an explanation for his pro-Perón actions.

The deplorable policy of “breaking down ideological barriers,” which Lanusse inaugurated to benefit Chile’s communist government, suggests a genuine ideological affinity between the Argentine president and the Justicialist leader. In fact, as we noted in a previous article, the “fall of ideological barriers” only boosted the prestige of the communist Allende and weakened the position of Chilean anticommunists.

Furthermore, in Latin American international politics, the “fall of barriers” weakened the united anti-Castro front. With his usual cunning, the Cuban dictator took advantage of the opportunity presented by the Argentine dictator. He traveled to Santiago and, on the way, visited the presidents of Ecuador and Peru. The latter had just resumed relations with Cuba.

Thus, when analyzed from an ideological point of view, Lanusse does not appear as a communist but as a Communist Party ‘fellow traveler,’ as they say in communist jargon, precisely as Perón.

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Indeed, I believe Perón is a far more enduring “fellow traveler” and friend to Allende and Fidel than Lanusse. This is precisely what qualifies the leftist Lanusse to benefit—if he runs—for the votes of the vast anticommunist electoral majority.

At least to the naked eye, it does not seem easy to prove an affinity among Perón, Fidel, and Allende. Perón was undoubtedly an egalitarian demagogue, but he did not go as far as Allende or Fidel. How, then, can we sustain the claim of a close similarity among them?

Perón himself took on this task in recent statements to the Italian weekly L’Espresso: “I am aware of the situation in Chile and feel I can say that what is happening now with Allende is precisely what happened to me between 1946 and 1955.”

This statement is tantamount to a confession. Perón sees Allende as a political double. He sees his own banner in the banner Allende carries. He sees his own struggle in Allende’s struggle. He sees his own enemies in Allende’s enemies.

In other words, for Perón, Allende is accomplishing in 1972—with the inevitable time lag—a task he, Perón, began in Argentina and would have completed if the conservative people had not obstructed him. The conservative people of his homeland are analogous to Chile’s conservatives now trying to block Allende’s path.

This means that, once elected, old Perón will seek to take Argentina where Allende is taking Chile and where Castro has already taken Cuba.

To conclude, I recall the old principle that two quantities equal to a third are equal to each other. It applies not only to equality but also to affinity. “The friend of my friend is my friend,” as the proverb says.

Perón proclaims himself akin to Allende. Allende is akin to Castro. In turn, Lanusse is akin to Perón…

Where can all this lead?

Let no formalist claim that I am too harsh in my assessments of Lanusse. The free Argentine press, which he scrupulously respects, says far more against him than I do. Incidentally, that respect is a likable trait of the current Argentine President!