by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira
Chile’s Marxist head of state’s visit to Argentina’s officially anticommunist military leader makes me digress from the topic I was discussing. This visit presents some very interesting points for Brazilian readers, which compels me to express my thoughts about it immediately.
In summary, the meeting between the two presidents in Salta revealed the full extent of what the combination of a communist mentality and a toad mentality can achieve, as well as its potential operational mechanisms. This easily explains the barely concealed satisfaction that the Lanusse-Allende meeting generated among both toadish and communist circles in Brazil. At the same time, what occurred in Salta clearly demonstrates the significant advantage the toads provide to the communist cause. All of this at least helps to open the eyes of many Brazilians to the dangers that the growing influence of the toadish minority could pose to our country.
Before diving into the topic, I want to clarify what I mean by calling Lieutenant General Lanusse a “toad.”
I fully respect him as any head of state. However, the word “toad” is the only term we use to describe a specific type of non-communist bourgeois who is enthusiastic about the “apertura a sinistra” (opening to the left). Therefore, I refer to the distinguished Argentine military man as a “toad” due to the lack of a better term.
That being said, let’s move directly to the facts. I collected them all from the Buenos Aires press, which is naturally much more thorough than ours about the Salta meeting.
* * *
Anyone reviewing the list of issues cited as the reason for the Lanusse-Allende meeting can’t help but be surprised. None seem to require direct negotiations between presidents. They could all easily be handled by foreign ministers or even lower officials.
Paradoxically, the official ceremonies and the publicity surrounding this meeting were extensive, despite its weak content. During Allende’s time in Argentina, many important speeches were exchanged and broadcast throughout the Americas and the world by the entire group of Argentine and Chilean journalists present.
Therefore, it is difficult to shake the feeling that the Salta meeting’s main purpose was not the negotiations but the speeches. Incidentally, the latter are so well-coordinated from president to president that they give a strong impression of being carefully planned. In short, Salta was simply a platform for Mr. Allende and Mr. Lanusse to deliver a new message to their respective peoples and all of South America.
This message’s core is about adopting a new style of relations between communist and non-communist countries, achieved by overcoming the so-called “ideological barriers.” In this regard, both Lanusse and Allende made repeated statements in a grandiose and prophetic tone. And they were absolutely clear.
For example, here is a quote from Lanusse: “The Argentine Republic is willing to guide its foreign relations according to a broad criterion of universality, which does not admit restrictions imposed by ideological prejudices or taboos. In our time, the political philosophies defended by the different countries that make up the international system play a secondary role in the face of the supreme interest of international peace and security” (cf. La Nación, 7/24/1971).
Immediately afterward, Lanusse added a caveat: “This does not mean abandoning the principles that constitute each country’s national identity” (cf. La Nación, 7/24/1971).
As can be seen, this reflects a common toadish stance: in today’s world, doctrinal systems no longer hold significance. The great men of earlier eras prioritized ideas over life; for modern man, life is valued more than ideas.
“It is better for us to die in battle than to see the evils of our nation and the holy places,” exclaimed Judas Maccabeus during the glorious insurrection of his family and followers against the pagans who oppressed the chosen people.[1]
The pursuit of peace is a very high good, but it is not the ultimate good. And if the cost of peace is inaction in the face of the communist threat, it is better to fight.
* * *
Some toad would exclaim, “You’re displaying unilateralism and exaggeration, for international relations have nothing to do with ideology.”
To address this objection, one only needs to consider the ideological advantage that Allende gained from Lanusse’s stance in Salta.
The Argentine head of state took a purely technical stance for his government, leaving a significant ideological gap that was quickly filled by Allende’s highly ideological propaganda. Communists never miss an opportunity.
Thus, Allende did not pass up the chance to promote his pro-Marxist government ideologically. In a speech to Lanusse, he stated: “Through the popular government I preside over, Chile is building a humane and independent economy inspired by socialist ideals. We want to restructure Chilean society in terms of justice and freedom to achieve authentic national development, that is, in the service of the working people” (speech upon receiving the Grand Collar of the Order of the Liberator, Argentina’s highest decoration, conferred on him by Lanusse. (cf. La Nación and La Prensa, 7/24/1971).
Building on a cue given shortly before by Lanusse, he added: “I therefore fully agree with the President: legal equality is not enough to ensure stable and harmonious relations . . . as long as there is de facto inequality and imperialist pressures manifest themselves in the world” (cf. La Nación and La Prensa, 7/24/1971).
Finally, and not without a hint of arrogance toward Brazil and the other South American nations, he boldly outlined a socialist program for all of Iberian-America: “We Chileans want to contribute decisively to projecting Latin America onto the world stage, with its own personality, dignity, and independence, which requires profound transformations in its internal, social, and political structures” (cf. La Nación, 7/24/1971).
Thus, once the “ideological barriers” were barely lifted, what appeared was not peace, nor were money or goods the first things to enter Argentina, but socialist propaganda!
* * *
Consistency would require Lieutenant General Lanusse, a champion of ideological neutrality in international relations, to find a diplomatic way to express his rejection of Marxist Allende’s maneuver.
None of this actually happened. After reminding us that the Argentine regime is not like Chile’s, he affirms the idea of open arms toward its Marxist regime: “For this reason, there is no foreignness between our peoples. Those who share the same past and are willing to cooperate in building a future of greater well-being and development cannot feel like strangers to each other” (cf. La Nación, 7/24/1971).
In short, the ideological barriers that separated Argentina from the Marxist world were indeed torn down, and red propaganda soon followed. It’s only natural. When a toad breaks the cage’s bars, the beast escapes. And then, woe to the toad or to those who believed in it.
* * *
Two final observations. First, regarding the unpopularity of the meeting in Salta. A decisive electoral defeat in Valparaíso had just discredited Allende, and Lanusse was afraid of exposing his politics and his guest to the eyes of the Buenos Aires audience. So, after debating whether to host him in Buenos Aires, Bariloche, or Mendoza, Lanusse ultimately welcomed Allende in Salta. Why avoid the country’s capital if not out of fear of a poor reception?
Regarding Bariloche, it was a different issue. A newspaper reported that the well-known winter sports city was unsafe for Allende… because it was near the Chilean border: “As for San Carlos de Bariloche, another of the places mentioned, it was ruled out due to reports of Chilean guerrillas in the border area, a short distance from the international border with Argentina” (La Prensa, 7/24/1971). As for Mendoza, Allende couldn’t go there either because it was also a border town with many anti-Marxist Chileans. Since it couldn’t be held in Buenos Aires or on the border, the “show” to promote the overthrow of ideologies had to be held in Salta.
As shown, Allende didn’t go to Argentina just to spread propaganda. Uncertain of himself in his discontented and unsettled country, which was recently defeated in an election, he mainly aimed to discourage his domestic opponents who might have been hoping for Argentine support. Lanusse fully helped Allende achieve this goal.
Second observation: The newspapers reported that the Archbishop of Salta, Most Rev. Carlos Mariano Perez, took part in the official events of the visit (cf. La Prensa, 7/24/1971).
How can that be missing during the sad days we’re going through?
[1] 1 Mac 3:59.