When Propaganda Agonizes – Folha de S. Paulo, April 30, 1972

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

As I write this on Friday morning, the Brazilian press reports that Willy Brandt’s government, already severely weakened by the results of the Baden-Württemberg elections, was only saved from being overthrown by the Chamber of Deputies because the opposition fell two votes short of the required total. At the same time, French government officials are trying to digest the frustrating “victory” they achieved in the latest referendum.

Neither Willy Brandt nor Pompidou — the “victors” in both political contests — find the situation encouraging. The former is heading for an even riskier test in his country’s lower house, while the latter must be wondering what stance to take, given that 63.8% of his country’s voters were indifferent or hostile to the grandiose prospects of a United Europe, with Paris as the capital and… himself as the supreme leader.

The French head of state and the West German head of government share not only the frustration of a “victory” that carries all the weight of a defeat; both are also plagued by the same perplexity about the future.

Today, I would like to elaborate on this point in greater detail.

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Let us begin with Willy Brandt. The treaty he signed in Moscow in 1970 does not encompass the entire Ostpolitik program. It is only a first step.

Once ratified by the Bonn Parliament, it would open the way for genuine and ever-wider collaboration between West Germany and the world beyond the Iron Curtain. However, such collaboration would not mark a break with the West. On the contrary, Ostpolitik has the support—more or less explicit, but in any case, warm—of the governments in Washington, Paris, London, and Rome. Bonn-Moscow collaboration would in no way cool West Germany’s ties with these capitals. Thus, Bonn would be the link bringing East and West together in a single bond of peace.

What peace? The peace of the dungeon or the peace that comes from deep understanding, loyal friendship, and frank collaboration among all peoples?

No one can believe in peace with communists based on understanding, friendship, and loyalty. With the United States softening its stance and Europe’s population aging, the Kremlin will never accept any form of peace other than domination over its partners—veiled perhaps in the early years, but brutal thereafter. For communists, the law of force is the only one that counts. Consider the successive threats Moscow recently used to force the Germans to approve the treaty signed by Brandt. Willy Brandt invites his fellow citizens to take the downward path toward the harsh “Soviet peace.” The Moscow Treaty is the gateway to this path. The electorate’s refusal to cross the gateway, as expressed in the latest election, ipso facto means rejecting that path.

Now, a government cannot embark on such paths with support from minorities or infinitesimal majorities. Only robust administrations can take great strides. And great programs can only be carried out by governments with firm political foundations.

In short, Willy Brandt finds the path before him closed.

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Now, let us move on to Pompidou.

The “Europe of Ten,” which he intended to enshrine in a referendum, is nothing more than a collaboration with Brandt’s aims. In fact, Ostpolitik’s ultimate goal is not only to establish good relations between the two Europes but also to form a pan-European entity stretching from the Urals to the Pyrenees or the Portuguese coast. This pan-Europe is the logical outcome of pan-Europeanism, imagined in a climate of reconciliation between the Soviet bloc and the West.

However, the easiest way to form a pan-European alliance is not through endless negotiations between the Kremlin and each Western European country. It is through the construction of a Western European Federation led by utopians friendly to communism and imbued with a socialist spirit. In general, this is the mentality of the main pan-Europeanist leaders in the West. By promoting the consolidation of the ‘Europe of Ten’, Pompidou’s path aligns with Brandt’s.

Feeling the need for strong support for the vicissitudes he would face on his risky path, Pompidou resorted to a referendum.

His concern for the future is evident in the opening words of his consultation with the French people: ‘Do you approve of the new prospects opening up for Europe?’ The response to this consultation amounted to a virtual rejection of these ‘prospects.’ Thus, like Brandt, Pompidou does not know which direction to take.

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I fully understand the perplexity of the two ‘winners.’ It does not stem solely from the fact that their respective electorates did not follow their lead as they had hoped. Behind this problem lies another, more serious one. When the Moscow Treaty was signed, German public opinion was surprisingly apathetic. No boos, no applause, just sleepiness. The government and the powerful ruling party poured out a torrent of arguments, some logical, some psychological, upon this drowsy public, while the opposition leadership showed a disconcerting inertia. However, shortly before the treaties were ratified, popular discontent grew, and the referendum in Baden-Württemberg ended as everyone saw. What was the propaganda worth then?

The same question applies to France. The Pompidou government and the Gaullist party unleashed a torrent of propaganda on the electorate. A hesitant and divided minority offered only a weak reaction. However, we know the outcome of the plebiscite. The vast majority of the people were indifferent to, or even resistant to, the propaganda.

Does this propaganda impotence result from some occasional factor that Brandt and Pompidou can easily eliminate? I don’t think so. This phenomenon is universal. For example, primaries in the United States are showing a decline in prestige among all political leaders. Experts attribute this decline to the vulgarization of politicians, which is often a result of excessive propaganda, particularly on television. It seems that propaganda is self-destructing due to its own excesses.

The perplexity of Brandt and Pompidou, and the twilight of propaganda, are heavenly gifts.

May God increase them by causing the abuse of propaganda to self-destruct, and may Brandt and Pompidou not find ways to lead their countries toward a pan-Europe under the “Pax Sovietica.”