WHAT
NEXT?
By
Professor Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira (*)
I have just read a report that a hot fight over a
proposed strike is going on between hardliners and "softliners"
inside the Polish Communist Party. The advocates of the "soft"
position are calling for concessions to the Solidarity union to soften the attitude
of the promoters of the strike. The hardliners maintain that concessions never
soften the attitudes of organizations on the rise like Solidarity and are instead risky shows of weakness.
This disagreement can be considered from a high
theoretical-practical side. It calls to mind principles of the theory of action
that have divided men in the most diverse ideological and political frays, at all
times and in all places.
However, in this concrete case what is in focus is
much less a high and even beautiful strategic problem than a rowdy show, a
sinister knavery.
Indeed, in my reference to men being divided I should
make an exception for those of the communsit-leninist
line, who, since 1917, appear to follow a perfectly studied alternation between
advances and concessions, threats and smiles. Deep down they invariably strive
to strangle their adversary. This is their purpose whether threatening and
advancing or smiling and conceding. They use soft tactics only to boobify their adversaries, deviate them and thus strip them
more quickly and completely of their means of action. For communist-leninists,
every relaxation of tension is really nothing more than a tactical artifice. It
is a way of waging war.
So, I do not believe in the authenticity of the
arguments supposedly raging between hardliners and "softliners"
in the meetings of the leadership of the Polish Communist Party. Both are — by
conviction or out of personal interests — puppets of the Leninist communism
installed in
But what is this show for? — an
innocent person will ask. The answer is simple: Solidarity, the papers say, is also divided into hardliners and softliners. But Solidarity
is not a monolith like the Polish Communist Party. It is composed of different
ideological and political groups, naturally with their own temperamental
positions and tactics. Faced with the option of striking or not, it is natural
and almost inevitable that they disagree with each other. Aversion to communism
is the only thing that unites them.
The communist show is quite useful. In fact, the
Solidarity softliners — at least the majority of them
— really are softliners. As such they have a certain
propensity to believe in the sincerity of their adversaries, except, of course,
the communist hardliners. Everyone behind the Iron Curtain has had horrifying
experience of them, experience that leaves no room for illusions. But they at
least tend to hope for something from the "softliners"
of the Polish Communist Party. For softliners there
is only one step between hope and negotiation. And there is only one more step
from negotiation to agreement. Everything is so easy to arrange when both sides
are soft.
Thus the zephyr of concord between "softliners" and softliners
is beginning to blow over the table of negotiations between the Polish
Communist Party (of which the
What is going to come out of that? The softliners on both sides give the impression that they are
rebelling against their respective hardliners. It is possible that they may
come to sign a softliners' agreement having airs of
victory for peace, and defeat for the hardliners.
But what an illusion! If that is how events go,
something very different will have taken place behind these deceptive appearances.
The "softliners" of the Communist Party are
mere marionettes of their hardline co-religionists.
They will have agreed to make only and exclusively the concessions that the
hardliners of the Communist Party have ordered them to make to the Solidarity softliners.
What concessions? Those that may be necessary to open
a deep cleavage between Solidarity's hardliners and softliners,
in order to have the softliners (always and
everywhere the majority, for the Scriptures say that the number of fools is
infinite) assume the leadership of Solidarity
by unseating the hardliners (always a minority, because it is difficult,
thankless and painful to hold a hard line).
What will the hardliners of the Communist Party have
gained with this Machiavellian ruse? They will have gained the obvious.
Whenever one of two groups in a struggle begins to be led by its hardliners and
the other to be led by its respective softliners, all
the clashes from then on become those of an iron pot against a clay pot!
Let us have the courage to see the whole truth. There
must be a widespread and well-coordinated communist fifth column in Solidarity to help the softliners inside this likeable movement, Communism has
always forcefully repressed all the movements that have tried to organize
against it. But if any of these movements ever appears capable of lasting a
while and becoming dangerous, Communism does not limit itself to fighting it
summarily from the outside. Without giving up strong arm tactics, it also
begins to use cunning. For example, it will try to infiltrate its adversary
with spies or with deviators. While a certain degree of cunning is required of
the spy, much more is required of the deviator. His mission is to infiltrate
the core of the opposing party, sow factors of division, propose wrong maneuvers,
and foment the discouragement arising from reverses. It is to produce defeat.
I tremble for Solidarity
as I think of this. Is it not infiltrated with spies and deviators? What harm
are they doing to it?
Where is all this leading
(*) “Folha de S. Paulo”, 8th
April 1981