Plinio Corręa de Oliveira

 

 

Chapter 2
Refutation of the Erroneous Doctrines

 

 

 

 

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As can be seen, the study of the exact juridical character of the organization founded by Pius XI assumes capital importance. Before treating the matter, it is helpful to list some general principles concerning the fact itself.

Development of Some Notions Given in the Preceding Chapter

As we have said, the word mandatum in Latin has the special meaning of an order or imperative act by a person invested with authority, over his subjects. Thus, this word would be equivalent to the English "commandment" with which we designate the laws of God and of the Church as an expression of the imperative force they exercise over us. It is in this sense that Our Lord imposed a mandate on the Apostles when He ordered them to preach the Gospel to all peoples of the earth. In this sense—the only one accepted in ecclesiastical language regarding the present subject—the procurations that Brazilian civil law calls mandates and that the mandatary may accept or reject are not true mandates.

The authors of works on Catholic Action whose opinions we refute understand that Pius XI imposed a mandate on the laity when he encouraged them to enroll in Catholic Action, which is tantamount to affirming that the fundamental organizations of Catholic Action have a mandate of their own. Regarding other apostolate organizations, since they do not proceed from an initiative of the Church but from a purely individual one; since they did not receive a responsibility with an order to carry it out but have only a permission to act; and, finally, since they consequently do not have the authority of the Church herself to carry out their goals and develop their activities under a mere "laissez-faire," a "laissez-passer," such organizations find themselves in a radically inferior situation, at an entirely different level, separated from Catholic Action by the immense distance that essentially separates the action of subjects from the official action of authority.

Philosophical Inconsistency of the Doctrines Described in the Preceding Chapter

Before going into the analysis of the historical fact and verifying whether Pius XI really granted such a mandate to Catholic Action, let us examine this doctrine itself in order to show its complete lack of foundation.

To avoid being strictly theoretical, let us imagine a concrete case.

Of the Various Kinds of Collaboration

A man owns a field too large to be productive without the help of co-workers. He will be able to remedy this insufficiency by the following means:

1. imposing on some of his sons, by virtue of his paternal authority, the task of cultivating the field;

2. recommending that his sons do so, and approving the work they carry out;

3. not taking any initiative in the matter, but giving his consent to a spontaneous initiative of his sons;

4. giving his approval a posteriori to the fact that his sons, correctly supposing that such was their father's will, prepared for him the pleasant surprise of seeing the work done.

All Have the Same Essence

Note that from the moral and legal point of view, these hypotheses differ from one another only in the greater or lesser intensity of the owner’s act of will. This act of will is equally the source of licitness for each of them. Besides, morality distinguishes, with all propriety, various kinds of voluntary acts. In addition to the voluntary act "in se," which is the act simply and actually voluntary, performed "scienter et volenter," (1) there exist also, among others, the virtual and the interpretative voluntary acts. The virtual voluntary act is that which proceeds from a purposely determined will, not withdrawn in its determination albeit not actually turned toward it, so that such determination is not considered by the subject. In the interpretative voluntary act, there neither is nor was any determination of the will, but given the moral dispositions of the subject, there certainly would have been had he been aware of certain events and factual circumstances.

And Produce Analogous Consequences

All these acts are voluntary, so much so that they can be a cause of merit or demerit, (2) and they bestow the same essential prerogatives on all their agents:

1. The right to carry out an activity in the field to the degree that the task demands it, and by virtue of an expressed or legitimately presumed delegation from the field's owner, either imperatively or simply recommended.

2. From this follows the right, again a consequence of the owner's will, to put an end to any disturbances that third parties may raise against the exercise of this legitimate activity.

Be it for the first or for the second of these effects, we call the reader's attention to a fact of capital importance: Not only the imperative order of the field's owner, but also any form of work performed with his express or simply presumed approval confers or entails these moral and legal consequences.

The first would be in obedience to a "mandate," the others would be collaboration. In any case, however, be it in relation to the owner or in relation to third parties, both mandataries and collaborators would be equally legitimate channels of the owner's will and his legitimate representatives.

Distinction between Mandate and Collaboration

Having reached this far in the exposition, it is fitting to clarify the relationship between the concepts of mandatary and collaborator. As we have seen, there is no mandatary who is not also a collaborator, in the etymological sense of the word, since his function is precisely the execution of the mandator's task with whom and in whose name he works.

Is any collaborator a mandatary?

If we take the term mandatum in the strict meaning expounded above, which is the only one admissible in ecclesiastical terminology, the answer is no. But the difference between the various types of collaborators, of which the mandatary is only a species, lies only in that the more categorical the owner's delegation, the more illicit will be any opposition to the will or activity of the delegate. In this matter there is only a simple difference of intensity and nothing else, a difference that does not alter the issue qualitatively.

Let us summarize. Every collaborator or mandatary can be considered a separate member of the principal, or mandator, as an executor of his will. In the various hypotheses we are always in the presence of separate members of the mandator, whose only diversity of conditions in regard to the latter are the various graduations of the will that they obey. But the nature of the moral and legal ties that bind them to the mandator is always the same. Every mandatary is a collaborator. Every collaborator is in some way, a delegate of the mandator in regard to third parties.

Mandate and Delegation

In this regard, it is well to emphasize with even greater clarity the distinction between the mandatum, in the imperative sense of the word, and the mandate in the civil sense of the word, that is, as "power of attorney."

There is power of attorney, or delegation of function, whenever one person makes another responsible for a certain task.

In the terminology of positive civil law, a distinction is made between the mandate of paid services and that of gratuitous collaboration. Nevertheless, in the field of natural law, essentially all collaboration by consent, even though only presumed, is a delegation.

Indeed, collaboration is the insertion of one person's activity into that of someone else. Now, since each person is the owner of his own activity, collaboration is licit only when it is authorized, even if only presumably. In this sense, in regard to third parties, the collaborator is a representative of the will of the person for whom he works. All licit collaboration implies, therefore, a delegation.

Summary of the Notions Given in this Chapter Thus Far

Because of the subject’s extreme complexity, we once again summarize what has been said:

a) Every activity exercised in someone else’s task is collaboration. In this sense, collaborators are those who act by someone’s order, recommendation, or merely through his presumed consent;

b) Since the legal character of these relations is the same in any of the hypotheses, the variants resulting from the latter constitute diverse types within a common species, and the diversities existing among these types do not create essential differences;

c) As authentic collaborators, all can call themselves, in the broadest sense of the word, delegates of the mandator;

d) The various kinds of collaboration consequently imply in the concrete order that, as the mandator's will is the source of the right, any opposition to his collaborator's activity will be more illicit to the degree that the mandator's will is more positive, grave, and energetic.

In view of all this, the conclusion we reach is of a crystalline evidence: a priori, and without delving into the evaluation of the historical fact of the mandate that Pius XI is said to have given Catholic Action, we can affirm that such mandate, of itself, would be radically ineffective to produce a substantial and essential alteration in the very juridical character of the lay apostolate entrusted to Catholic Action.

Mandate and Collaboration in Regard to the Lay Apostolate

Let us apply more concretely the general principles just presented, abandoning the example of the father with a field to be cultivated and directly examining the relationships between the hierarchy and the works of lay apostolate.

The personal and direct efforts of the members of the hierarchy being insufficient for the full realization of the task imposed on them by the Divine Founder, they have recourse to the aid of the laity and, precisely like the field’s owner, they may assume for this purpose one of the following positions:

a) oblige the laity to carry out the apostolate as is said to have happened in the case of Catholic Action;

b) recommend to the laity that they undertake a certain task, as is the case with numerous associations that are approved and vividly encouraged by the hierarchy in their activities;

c) approve initiatives or works that private individuals spontaneously organize and submit to their prior approval;

d) grant a general approval to all merely individual initiatives or work by any of the faithful with the intention of doing apostolate. (3)

The Mandate Is Not Sufficient to Give Catholic Action a Juridical Essence Different from That of Other Lay Organizations

The first case is the only one in which a mandate could be recognized. In the other cases, there would be no mandate. Mandataries or not, all would be true collaborators of the hierarchy and would have in face of it essentially the same juridical status.

The Mandate Is Merely a Way of Granting Powers. It Has Nothing to Do with the Nature and Scope of the Powers Granted

In this regard, we must emphasize that it is erroneous to presume that the mandate—to which they attribute such a marvelous effect (which we have shown it does not have)—derives from the fact that the Holy Father made it obligatory for all the laity to enroll in the ranks of Catholic Action. We shall now show that it is not necessary to admit this obligation of enrollment for all the faithful to sustain that Catholic Action has a mandate.

A simple comparison will demonstrate this better than any doctrinal digression. When the State convokes its citizens to a general mobilization, together with the mandatum to join the ranks, it gives them responsibilities characteristic of the State. The same responsibilities may, nevertheless, be granted to volunteers, whose enlistment in the army resulted not from a commanded act but from a free act. The mandatum, as can be seen, is not a necessary element for the granting of an official responsibility.

For this reason the powers of a bishop are just as real when he accepts his office in virtue of an imposition from authority as when the office derives from a simple recommendation, or even when he obtains it after having sought it for himself.

Thus, whether or not one admits the laity's obligation to enroll in Catholic Action, no essential consequence results in regard to the powers it possesses. Even if enrollment is optional, the mandate would fall fully over Catholic Action as a collective organism on which the Holy See imperatively imposed a certain task. All those who enroll in Catholic Action, even if by their own free will, would become participants in its mandate.

In other words, it is not on this point that an essential difference between Catholic Action and other lay organizations can be found.

There Are Other Works Endowed with a Mandate which Have Never Been Attributed a Juridical Essence Different from That of Other Works of Lay Apostolate

Here we can make some interesting considerations. If it is certain that Catholic Action has an obligation to do apostolate, imposed by the Holy Father, it is not certain that other works of lay apostolate preexisting and unrelated to the basic associations of Catholic Action do not have a mandate, that is, an absolute and definite obligation to perform a certain task of apostolate. It is not difficult to find works of lay apostolate established through the initiative of popes or bishops, and at times entrusted by them with most important charges that they could not fail to undertake under penalty of serious disobedience.

Many other works founded by private initiative, with simple ecclesiastical approval, later received orders from the hierarchy to perform certain tasks, tasks that frequently constituted the central and choicest part of more than one program of episcopal government. Never was it claimed, however, that such works, endowed with an evident and unquestionable mandate, placed their lay operators in an essentially different juridical situation.

There is more. After Catholic Action was organized among us, the Plenary Brazilian Council made the foundation of Confraternities of the Most Blessed Sacrament compulsory in all parishes, imperatively charging them with the glorious task, among others, of seeing to the splendor of worship. It is a mandate. Who would dare affirm, however, that this altered the juridical character of these most ancient confraternities? Could there be a more conclusive proof that Catholic Action is not the sole possessor of a mandate and implicitly does not have a juridical nature essentially different from that of other associations?

As president of Catholic Action, the author of this book, although writing to defend Catholic Action against the supreme danger of usurping titles it does not have, could not fail to be extremely grateful for the outstanding prerogatives with which the Holy Church has honored Catholic Action. Thus, it would be absurd for us to purposely disparage or diminish anything that, on the contrary, we are obliged to defend. While denying Catholic Action a juridical nature it does not possess, we cannot fail to emphasize that the rights expressly granted to Catholic Action by the current Charter and Bylaws of Brazilian Catholic Action remain intact throughout our argumentation. These prerogatives, while elevating Catholic Action to the dignity of the highest body of lay apostolate, in no way remove from it the quality of being the hierarchy's subject. While curtailing the excesses of certain circles in Catholic Action, we neither combat nor wage war against it, something that would be on our part not only an indignity, but the most flagrant absurdity. Instead, we render it a service of supreme importance by seeking to prevent it from forsaking its glorious role of servant of the hierarchy and conspicuous sister of all other Catholic organizations to become a devouring cancer and a seed of disorder.

Having mentioned the Bylaws of Brazilian Catholic Action, we may close these considerations with one more reflection they suggest to us.

Once these statutes had been promulgated and the religious associations predating Catholic Action placed in the condition of auxiliary entities, it is admitted as unquestionable that they have the obligation to help the different fundamental sectors of Catholic Action in the measure and ways that their own rules or bylaws permit. Now then, who imposed this obligation of helping in the apostolate? The hierarchy. And what is an obligation imposed by the hierarchy, but a mandate?

Summarizing these considerations, we should conclude that Catholic Action has in fact a mandate imposed by the hierarchy, but that this mandate does not alter its juridical essence, which is identical to that of many other works of lay apostolate, prior to or subsequent to the constitution of the present juridical structure of Catholic Action. Just as no one ever claimed that the aforementioned works had a juridical essence fundamentally different from that of other works of the laity, so also there is no reason to make such a claim on behalf of Catholic Action.

Some Faithful Are Also Endowed with Mandates, but That Does Not Change Their Status of Subjects in Holy Mother Church

We will now add an observation. There are people who by virtue of a serious duty of justice or charity have the necessary obligation to perform certain acts of apostolate, this being an imperative of moral character, imposed by God Himself. Such, for example, is the case of parents in regard to their children, employers in regard to their employees, teachers in regard to their students, and so forth. Any member of the faithful, in certain circumstances, has the same grave duty in regard to another as, for example, in the case of someone giving assistance to a dying person. Now, all these obligations constitute true commandments and several organizations were founded to facilitate the performance of these tasks by the mandataries. Such are the associations of Christian parents, Christian teachers, and the like. This notwithstanding, neither these organizations nor mandataries ever found themselves, in regard to the hierarchy, in a situation not essentially identical to that of a layman. And yet, it is a true mandate. In this sense, the opinion of Father Liberatore is significant. In his treatise on Ecclesiastical Public Law, published in 1888, he refers literally to parents and teachers as mandataries of the hierarchy. The juridical nature of Catholic Action is not, therefore, any novelty in Holy Church.

Papal Documents

Furthermore, this is precisely what the Holy Father Pius XI was saying when he insistently identified, on many occasions, the Catholic Action of his time with the uninterrupted lay apostolate that existed in the Church since its earliest days. He referred to the Catholic Action of the Apostolic times by the same name (and using the same capital letters) as the Catholic Action of our times. Let us listen to him addressing the female members of the Italian Catholic Youth Workers, on March 19, 1927:

The first spread of Christianity in Rome itself happened through and because of Catholic Action. Could it have been done otherwise? What would the Twelve have done, lost in the immensity of the world, had they not gathered people about them.…Saint Paul closes his Epistles with a list of names: a few priests, many seculars, some women: “Help those women who have labored with me in the Gospel (Phil. 4:3). It is as if he had said: They belong to Catholic Action. (4)

This excerpt shows us that from the outset of the Church's life the hierarchy began to convoke the faithful, just as Pius XI did, to the work of apostolate. As if to emphasize the complete, and by the way, glorious, identity between the Catholic Action of his day and that of the earliest times, Pius XI writes the words Catholic Action with capital letters in both references; and addressing the bishops and pilgrims of Yugoslavia on May 18, 1929, he adds:

Catholic Action is not a novelty of the present times. The Apostles laid its foundations when, in their pilgrimages to spread the Gospel, they asked help from the laity—men and women, magistrates and soldiers, young, old, and adolescents, who had faithfully kept the word of life announced among them in God's name. (5)

Summonses and Mandates Previous to the Creation of the Present Structure of Catholic Action

As complete as the adaptability of Catholic Action's juridical structure and methods may be regarding the problems of our days, we do not see how, after these documents, it can be sustained that today's Catholic Action has received a mandate that would make it essentially different from the Catholic Action existing in the Church from Apostolic times to this day. Besides, it should be noted that during the twenty centuries of her existence, the Church has uninterruptedly repeated to the faithful this call to the apostolate, sometimes by means of encouragement, at other times by means of summonses; and these convocations, identical in everything to those made by the hierarchy in the first centuries, are likewise identical to those the hierarchy makes today. Indeed, what Church historian would dare affirm that there was a century, a year, a month, or a day on which the Church failed to request and use the laity's cooperation with the hierarchy? Not speaking of the Crusades, a characteristic type of militarized Catholic Action, most solemnly convoked by the Popes; not speaking of knighthood and the Orders of Chivalry, whose monk warriors the Church invested with most ample faculties and apostolic charges; not speaking of the countless faithful who, attracted by the Church to the associations of apostolate she founded, worked together with the hierarchy, let us examine other institutions where our argumentation becomes especially solid.

No one is unaware that there are in the Church several religious orders and congregations that admit only persons who have not received the priestly unction. Among these are, first of all, the feminine religious institutions as well as some masculine congregations such as the Marist Brothers. Secondly, there are the many men religious who are not priests but who are admitted into religious orders of priests as assistants. One could not deny without temerity that, in a general manner, the members of these orders or congregations have a vocation from the Holy Ghost. By affiliating them with their respective institutions, the Church officially charges them with the responsibility to do apostolate; in other words, it reinforces with stronger punishments the obligation that, as faithful, they already had for doing apostolate and makes the performance of certain acts of apostolate obligatory. All of this notwithstanding, there are some who believe that the mysterious and marvelous effect of Catholic Action's mandate places its members far above any religious who do not have Holy Orders. Why? By virtue of which sortilege? If these religious were never considered integral elements of the hierarchy, being mere subjects of the Church, why should it be otherwise when it comes to Catholic Action?

As can be seen, there is no reason to attribute to the convocation made by Pius XI, considered in itself, a scope greater than those made by his predecessors.

Conclusion

It is certain that Pius XI made an especially serious convocation in view of the most pressing risks facing the Church and that he gave to such appeal a most general scope, including all the faithful in it in some way. Nevertheless, as we already said, all the faithful were convoked to the apostolate in other times as well. Pius XI himself says this in the aforementioned allocution to the bishops and faithful of Yugoslavia, when he recalls that in Rome, "Peter and Paul requested this cooperation in their toils from all souls of good will." While the seriousness of the risks was surely never as great as in our days, inasmuch as we were never before threatened with such a profound and general apostasy, it is no less certain that such risks were as imminent in other times as now. Hence, the juridical scope of the appeals made by the popes in those times could not have been smaller than that of nowadays.

Let us cite some papal documents calling the faithful to the apostolate and even ordering them to it:

Pius IX said that "First of all, let them [the faithful] rescue them [the unfaithful] from the darkness of the errors into which they have unhappily fallen and strive to guide them back to Catholic truth." (6)  And the Vatican Council gives this most solemn mandate to all the faithful:

And so in the performance of our supreme pastoral office, we beseech for the love of Jesus Christ and we command, by the authority of him who is also our God and savior, all faithful Christians, especially those in authority or who have the duty of teaching, that they contribute their zeal and labor to the warding off and elimination of these errors from the Church and to the spreading of the light of the pure faith. (7)

To this Leo XIII adds:

Another thing We wish all of you to do, but especially those of you who excel in learning, dignity, and authority, is that in both private and public life, you be solicitous for the good name of religion. Let the cause of the Church be more vigorously prosecuted under your leadership. Let all present and future institutions founded to promote the Catholic cause be willingly aided and increased. (8)

In the encyclical Sapientiae Christianae, of January 10, 1890, the Holy Father adds:

Amid such reckless and widespread folly of opinion, it is, as We have said, the office of the Church to undertake the defense of truth and uproot errors from the mind, and this charge has to be at all times sacredly observed by her, seeing that the honor of God and the salvation of men are confided to her keeping. But, when necessity compels, not those only who are invested with power of rule are bound to safeguard the integrity of faith, but, as St. Thomas maintains: "Each one is under obligation to show forth his faith, either to instruct and encourage others of the faithful, or to repel the attacks of unbelievers." (9)

And in the same encyclical, the Holy Father recalls the above-mentioned text of the Vatican Council to add, "Let each one, therefore, bear in mind that he both can and should, so far as may be, preach the Catholic faith." Further, in the encyclical Testem Benevolentiae Nostrae on Americanism, the Holy Father states that:

The scriptures teach us that it is the duty of all to be solicitous for the salvation of one's neighbor, according to the power and position of each. The faithful do this by religiously discharging the duties of their state of life, by the uprightness of their conduct, by their works of Christian charity and by earnest and continuous prayer to God. (10)

In the encyclical Graves de Communi Re, of January 18, 1901, after recommending a centralized control for the efforts of all Catholics, the Holy Father adds:

In Italy, We desire that this directive force should emanate from the Institute of Catholic Congresses and Reunions so often praised by Us, to which Our predecessor and We Ourselves have committed the charge of controlling the common action of Catholics under the authority and direction of the bishops of the country. So let it be for other nations, in case there be any leading organization of this description to which this matter has been legitimately entrusted. (11)

Finally, in the encyclical Etsi Nos, of February 15, 1882, we find this energetic reflection:

For the Church has not brought forth or educated her sons with this idea, that, when time and necessity compel, she should expect no assistance from them, but rather that they should all prefer the salvation of souls and the well-being of religion to their own ease and their own private interests. (12)

To conclude these considerations, let us employ an analogy. Normally, all citizens have duties toward their country, among which is the duty of defending it if it is attacked. This duty, which precedes the promulgation of any state law, stems from morality. If, however, the state calls its citizens to arms, reminding them of their duty to defend their country, their obligation becomes even more serious. But it cannot be claimed that this call implies a mass promotion to the rank of officer. On the contrary, more than ever, this is the hour for great renunciations and unconditional discipline. On launching a general call, Pius XI made no promotions and promised no rewards. On the contrary, the gravity of the danger he denounced imperatively recommends discipline and renunciation while severely condemning pretenses to command and cravings of disorder.

Notes:

1) “Knowing and willingly.”

2) Cf. Rev. Fr. Victor Cathrein, S.J., Philosophia Moralis, (Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1945) pp. 52-54.

3) In order to avoid any confusion, we want to include in the general order of ideas being expounded here a well-known classification which is, furthermore, one of evident intrinsic worth: official and private apostolate activity. The scope of each of these terms—official and private—is usually seen in an excessive way. The Church is a society endowed with its own government, She acts officially by means of this government, so the personal activities of Her members could not in any way affect the whole collectivity. Herein lies the distinction between "official" and "private" in the Church, as in any other society. It would be patently wrong, however, to presume that private activities have no manner of impact, bearing or effect on society and that they are merely "private" in the fullest sense of the word, proceeding exclusively from the individual who is solely responsible for them. Let us imagine a concrete example. A society founded to initiate and coordinate studies on an unexplored historical problem only manifests itself in an official capacity through its board of directors or trustees. Nevertheless, all the studies carried out by the society's members as a result of the impetus and means provided by the society for the realization of the research and with the intention of attaining the society's goals, are acts that flow from the society and are to be credited to it. The society can sustain, therefore, and it would be right in doing so, that the studies carried out privately by its members within the scope of its purposes, are studies carried out by the society itself.

          The same happens with Holy Church. While having its own authority, the only one that can act in an official manner, it would be wrong to presume that the acts of apostolate recommended or permitted explicitly or tacitly by the Church, or even merely approved "a posteriori" are purely individual acts and that the merit due for them should be credited exclusively to the individual. It was Holy Mother Church that made the individual capable of understanding the supernatural nobility of doing apostolate; it was the Church that provided him the grace without which there is no true desire for apostolate; it was in conformity with the Church's desires that he acted. Moreover, it was in his capacity as a member of the Church that he acted. How can one maintain, then, that the individual action of apostolate we call "private" does not in any way involve Holy Church? This would make it necessary to change the language of all or almost all treatises on Church history that credit her with the merit—and how rightly so!—for all noble deeds the faithful have performed throughout history.

          What are, then, the precise limits of the distinction between official and private apostolate? It remains immense.

          Official apostolate is directed by ecclesiastical authority. It is immediately responsible, therefore, for everything that is done in official tasks. Indeed, ecclesiastical authority has a moral responsibility for everything it ordains. In the works of apostolate that are simply permitted or recommended, whenever the direction of the executive aspects is not carried out by ecclesiastical authority itself, it will receive the merit for everything that is done which is good—this was the only thing it permitted—and the individuals will bear the blame for everything that is done wrong or that is evil—this being contained neither in the intentions nor permission of ecclesiastical authority. The Church, for example, desires and permits that we give good counsel to our neighbor. Whenever we do so, part of the merit for our action belongs to authority. If, however, we do so badly, basing ourselves on doctrines corroded by error, or lacking the necessary charity and prudence, authority has no blame in this, for the blame lies entirely with us.

4)  Pius XI, Address to the Affiliated Workers of the Feminine Youth of Italian Catholic Action, Mar. 19, 1927, in Rev. Fr. Arturo Alonso, O.P., Catholic Action and the Laity, trans. Cornelius J. Crowley (St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1961), pp. 104-105.

5)  Pius XI, Address to the Bishops and Pilgrims of Yugoslavia, May 18, 1929.

6) Pius IX, Encyclical Quanto Conficiamur Moerore, Aug. 10, 1863, no. 9, at www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius09/p9quanto.htm

7) [Trans.: The author refers to the First Vatican Council.] First Vatican Council, Constitution Dei Filius at www.ewtn.com/library/COUNCILS/V1.HTM#1. (Our emphasis.)

8) Leo XIII, Encyclical Quod Multum, Aug. 22, 1886, no. 12, at www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_22081886_quod-multum_en.html

9) Leo XIII, Encyclical Sapientiae Christianae, Jan. 10, 1890, no. 14, at www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_10011890_sapientiae-christianae_en.html

10) Leo XIII, Encyclical Testem Benevolentiae Nostrae, Jan. 22, 1899, at www.papalencyclicals.net/Leo13/l13teste.htm

11) Leo XIII, Encyclical Graves de Communi Re, Jan. 18, 1901, no. 23, at www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_18011901_graves-de-communi-re_en.html

12) Leo XIII, Encyclical Etsi Nos, Feb. 15, 1882, no. 17, at www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15021882_etsi-nos_en.html

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